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STEEL

AND MAIN DEPARTMENT
OF STATE SECURITY NKVD

1937-1938

DOCUMENTATION

RUSSIA.

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LUBYANKA

STALIN AND THE MAIN DEPARTMENT
OF STATE SECURITY NKVD

1937-1938

COMPILERS:

V.N. Khaustov, V.P. Naumov, N.S. Plotnikova

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This volume is one of the collections of documents devoted to the role of Vladimir Ulyanov (Lenin) and Joseph Dzhugashvili (Stalin) in the creation of Soviet punitive organs and their use as an instrument of state administration and strengthening the dictatorship.

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INTRODUCTION

The documents in this volume cover the most tragic period of Soviet history - the period of the Great Terror, where the role of I.V. Stalin, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in its organization and conduct.

By this time, that is, by the summer of 1937, an extremely unfavorable international and domestic situation had developed. In the West, German military power was being revived. The first clash with Germany in Spain did not bring success to the Soviet Union, but the front of danger from the West was clearly marked. In the Far East, the Japanese military machine launched a powerful offensive in China. Thus, two fronts of a possible war were clearly taking shape.

The situation inside the country was no easier. Plans for economic development were constantly frustrated. The policy of forced militarization led to tragic consequences. Crop failure in 1936 - to famine. There were many cases of cannibalism. The financial situation of the people was rapidly deteriorating.

The Soviet leadership was feverishly looking for a way out of the dangerous situation, but did not find a reasonable solution. The bet was again placed on violence as a mechanism of state administration. As before, artificial perpetrators of the current situation appeared - spies, saboteurs and other enemies of the people, whose number exceeded one and a half million. Stalin and his entourage diverted the attention of the people from the real culprits of the crisis, that is, from themselves.

Mass repressions unfolded in two directions: this is the so-called "kulak" operation, sanctioned at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, where on July 31, 1937, order No. 00447 of the NKVD of the USSR was approved. the initial figures of Soviet citizens to be arrested were outlined. In fact, it was a secret war of the state, which brought down the entire power of the punitive

apparatus against that part of the population which, for various and always far-fetched reasons, was regarded by the Soviet leadership as "enemies of the people". For twenty years after the October Revolution, "fists", representatives of opposition parties and various groupings in the party, religious activists, former officers of the tsarist and white army, various classes of tsarist Russia were totally persecuted by the state security agencies. It cannot be said that this direction was something new. The new manifested itself in the unprecedented scale of the destruction of its own population. During the second half of 1937, all the forces of the state security organs were sent in accordance with the instructions of the

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lina to "cleanse" the country from "anti-Soviet" elements. The repressions were based on class, social, national, religious and other characteristics.

No less tragic was the second new direction in the conduct of repressions, based on the sign of the nationality of Soviet citizens. Almost all the states bordering the USSR, especially on the western borders, were considered by the Soviet leadership as a hostile capitalist encirclement and potential aggressors who hatched plans for the liquidation of the Soviet state.

From the end of 1937 until the summer of 1938, the policy of the Great Terror was associated with operations against so-called foreign nationalities. The Soviet Poles suffered the most. Entire peoples were relocated from the border areas into the interior of the country.

In just two years—1937 and 1938—more than 1.5 million people were arrested on charges of anti-Soviet activity, of which about 700,000 were shot.

The wave of mass repressions widely embraced not only the leading officials of the Party and Soviet bodies, but also to an incomparably greater extent ordinary citizens who were far from politics and political activity. Mass arrests and executions were carried out in all regions of the country without exception.

These terrible years will forever remain in the historical memory of the peoples of Russia. The thirty-seventh year became a household name in defining open mass terror, state lawlessness and arbitrariness, which fell mainly on workers, peasants and employees.

An atmosphere of fear was created in the country. Millions of people lived in fear for their lives, for the lives and fate of their loved ones. Fear gradually became a habitual state of society.

Fear kept people in uncomplaining obedience, ruled out the possibility of uniting them in groups, opposition authorities, and made it possible to quickly eliminate any manifestations of mass spontaneous discontent.

With the help of unbridled terror, Stalin kept the entire leading elite in the country in a tight leash, rooted out any dissent, put an end to vacillations and doubts in society, in the party, in the ruling circles regarding

the "party line" dictated by Stalin, any action taken by him. It was in 1937-1938 that the formation of the Stalinist system of party and state power, the Stalinist autocracy, was completed.

The plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in February-March 1937 became a turning point in the policy of large-scale expansion of repressions. The book publishes the key documents of this plenum: Stalin's report and the resolution on Yezhov's report "Lessons of sabotage, sabotage and espionage of the Japanese-German Trotsky." Russian agents."

Stalin was the organizer of the mass terror. But Stalin alone could not have carried out such a monstrous action. Stalin's direct accomplices in this matter were members of the Politburo. The leading party group received the support of most of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b). Stalin and the political bureau also received tacit approval of their actions from the majority of the entire party, although a significant part of its membership was repressed during these years. There were no open speeches against Stalin's policy in the second half of the 1930s.

As evidenced by the documents published in the book, Stalin and the political bureau acted as organizers and leaders of the mass repressions of 1937-1938. The Politburo, headed by Stalin, at its meetings considered and approved the operational orders of the NKVD on mass repressions.

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operations, determined the choice of new areas of repression, carried out the adjustment of the activities of the heads of the regional, regional and republican departments of the NKVD. Members of the Politburo personally went to the places to organize repressions and control the activities of local NKVD bodies.

In July 1937, Stalin took the initiative to repress the relatives of nomenklatura workers convicted of anti-Soviet activities. Two weeks after Stalin's letter, the Politburo formalized his proposal by a special decision.

The policy of the Great Terror narrowed somewhat in the autumn of 1938. A number of foreign and domestic political factors led to the weakening of this policy.

Internationally, the isolation of the USSR intensified in the context of the impending war. The division of Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1938 after the Munich agreement became evidence of its approach. England, France and Germany already completely ignored the interests of the USSR. Relations with a number of states worsened, the governments of which protested in connection with the arrests of their citizens. The USSR was abandoned by foreign specialists who were afraid of arrests.

The most important foreign policy departments of the country were beheaded: the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, intelligence, state security agencies and the military department. As a result, the Soviet leadership was not promptly and fully informed about the most important events in world politics. Head of INO GUGB NKVD USSR Z.I. Passov noted that in connection with the recalls and arrests of residents in "the period of preparation and implementation of the seizure of Austria, Czechoslovakia, the foreign department did not have a single agent message from Germany, not a single piece of information."

Mass repeated replacements of leading personnel in all spheres of the country's life created an atmosphere of uncertainty, fear and discontent. Attempts to improve the economic situation in the USSR proved fruitless. The economic difficulties were not only not overcome, but worsened. In addition, the economic apparatus was also beheaded.

To a certain extent, the combination of these factors eventually forced the Soviet leadership, and above all Stalin, to correct its repressive policy, although the repressions themselves continued.

The documents published in this collection are extracted from the archives of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of Russia (CA FSB of Russia). Part of the documents was declassified for this collection.

The collection of documents is compiled in chronological order. It includes documents of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the highest bodies of state power and administration, and judicial institutions. First of all, they contain information about the events with which Stalin was acquainted, took part in their discussion and often gave his opinion. The vast majority of documents reflect the main activities of the organs of the GUGB NKVD of the USSR. According to their type, these are special messages, orders, circulars, directives, cipher telegrams, information reports, protocols of interrogations.

Most of the documents are published for the first time. Documents republished are also necessary for a comprehensive coverage of Stalin's role in the organization and activities of the state security agencies.

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Some documents contain abbreviations that do not affect the overall content and objectivity of the source. Text omitted during publication is marked with a dot. Some appendices to documents are not published when the content of the main document reveals a problem or question. This is stated in the footnotes.

A certain part of the identified documents was not included in the main publication, but was used to the maximum extent in the comments.

Each document has an editorial title. Own titles of documents are enclosed in quotation marks, unlike author's ones.

The texts of documents are printed with the preservation of their stylistic features, but in accordance with the rules of modern spelling. Spelling errors and omissions in the documents have been corrected without reservation.

Saved and reproduced all the resolutions and marks on the documents, except for insignificant office work. Resolutions and remarks

dyatsya after each document.

The collection is provided with a scientific reference apparatus, including an introduction, notes on the text and content of published documents, nominal comments, as well as a name index, which contains a list (in alphabetical order) of the surnames and initials of the persons mentioned in the documents.

The compilers express their gratitude to the staff of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, the Central Archive of the Federal Security Service of Russia for their assistance in preparing the collection.

V.N. Khaustov V.P.
Naumov

No. 1

DRAFT INDICATORY IN THE CASE OF YU.L.
PYATAKOVA, G.Ya. SOKOLNIKOVA,

K.B. RADEK AND OTHERS, SENT TO N.I. Ezhov and A.Ya. VYSHINSKY I.V.
STALIN (1)

January 5, 1937

No. 55107

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

We are sending you the draft indictment in the case of Pyatakov, Sokolnikov, Radek and others.

EZHOV

VYSHINSKY

PROJECT

CLOSING INDICTMENT

in the case: Y. L. PYATAKOVA, K. B. RADEK, G. Y. SOKOLNIKOVA, L. P. SEREBRIAKOVA, N. I. MURALOVA, Y. A. LIVSHITSA, Y. N. DROBNIS, M. BOGUSLAVSKOY S., I. A. Knyazeva, S. A. Rataychaka, B. O. Norkina, A. A. Shestova, M. S. Stroilova, S. B. Chlenova, I. I. Grashe, and G. E. Pushchina and ARNOLD V.V., accused of treason, espionage, sabotage, sabotage and preparation of terrorist acts, i.e. crimes under Art. Art. 58-1-a, 58-8, 58-9, 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

The investigation into the case of the united Trotskyist-Zinoviev terrorist center, the participants of which were convicted by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court on August 19-24, 1936, established that, along with the above-mentioned center, there was a so-called reserve center created in direct line directive L.D. TROTSKY in case the criminal activity of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc is exposed by the organs of the

vet power. Convicted members of the united Trotskyist-Zinovievist center ZINOVIEV, KAMENEV and others testified that the composition of the reserve center included Yu. L. Pyatakov, K. B. RADEK, G. Ya. and SEREBRYAKOV L.P.

The preliminary investigation in the present case established that the so-called reserve center was in fact a parallel Trotskyist center, which was organized and operated on the direct instructions of L.D., who was in exile. TROTSKY.

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The Trotskyite Parallel Center developed its criminal activities most actively after the villainous murder of Sergei Mironovich KIROV and the subsequent destruction of the united Trotskyist-Zynoviev center.

The main task of the parallel center was the violent overthrow of the Soviet government in order to change the existing social and state system in the USSR. L. D. TROTSKY and, on his instructions, the parallel Trotskyist center sought to seize power with the help of foreign states in order to restore capitalist relations in the USSR.

L. TROTSKY outlined these treacherous plans against the Soviet Union in the most complete form in his directive letter to the parallel Trotskyist center, received by the accused RADEK K.B. in the month of December 1935.

Accused RADEK was interrogated on this occasion on December 20-22, 1936.
showed:

"We must understand," wrote TROTSKY, that without a certain equating of the social structure of the USSR with the capitalist powers, the government of the bloc will not be able to stay in power and preserve peace ...

Allowing German and Japanese capital to exploit the USSR will create major capitalist interests on Soviet territory. Those strata in the countryside who have not outlived capitalist psychology and are dissatisfied with the collective farms will be drawn to us. The Germans and Japanese will demand that we clear the air in the countryside, so we will have to make concessions and allow the dissolution of the collective farms or exit from the collective farms.

And further:

"PYATAKOV and I have come to the conclusion that this directive sums up the work of the bloc, puts all the dots over the "i", raising in the most acute form the question that the power of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc can under all circumstances be only the power of the restoration of capitalism" (Volume ... sheet ... cases) *.

In turn, the accused Pyatakov, setting out the contents of his conversation with L. TROTSKY, which took place in the city of Oslo in December 1935, testified that

that L. TROTSKY, demanding the intensification of the sabotage, sabotage and terrorist activities of the Trotskyist organization in the USSR, emphasized that as a result of an agreement with the capitalist states, it was necessary, as he put it, to retreat to capitalism. According to the testimony of the accused PYATAKOV, L. TROTSKY said:

"It means you have to retreat. This must be firmly understood. It is difficult to say now how far to retreat to capitalism, to what extent, it can be specified after coming to power" (Volume ... list ... of the case).

The accused G.Ya. during interrogation on November 30, 1936:

"This program provided for the rejection of the policy of industrialization, collectivization, and as a result of this rejection, the rise in the countryside on the basis of small-scale capitalism, which, in combination with capitalist elements in industry, would develop into capitalist restoration in the USSR.

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... All the members of the center agreed on the recognition that under the present conditions there could be no other program and that it was necessary to put into practice precisely this program of the bloc" (Volume VIII, page 229).

The investigation established that L.D. TROTSKY entered into negotiations with Hitler's deputy for the fascist party* HESS on a joint struggle against the Soviet Union.

As the accused PYATAKOV testified, L. TROTSKY, in a conversation with him in Oslo in December 1935, said that as a result of these negotiations he concluded an agreement with HESS ** on the following terms:

"1) To guarantee a generally favorable attitude towards the German government and the necessary cooperation with it in the most important questions of an international character;

2) Agree to territorial concessions;

3) Allow *** German *** entrepreneurs in the form of concessions or any other forms to operate such enterprises in the USSR that are a necessary economic supplement to the economy of *** Germany *** (it was iron ore, manganese, oil, gold, timber, etc.);

4) To create conditions in the USSR favorable for the activities of German private entrepreneurs.

These foundations of the agreement, as TROTSKY said, were finally

developed and adopted at the meeting between TROTSKY and Hitler's deputy HESS ***. In the same way, said TROTSKY, he has a well-established connection with the ***Japanese government*** (Volume...I...cases).

The nature of this agreement and the extent of the territorial concessions L. TROTSKY reported in his letter to the accused RADEK in December 1935.

In this letter, L. TROTSKY, according to the testimony of the accused K. RADEK, wrote the following:

"Inevitably, we will have to make territorial concessions... We will have to cede Primorye and the Amur Region to Japan, and Ukraine to Germany.

Germany needs raw materials, food and markets. We will have to allow it to participate in the exploitation of ore, manganese, gold, oil, apatite and undertake to supply it with food and fats for a certain period at prices below world prices.

We will have to cede Sakhalin oil to Japan and guarantee her the supply of oil in the event of a war with America. We must also allow it to exploit gold. We will have to agree with Germany's demand not to oppose her in the seizure of the Danubian countries and the Balkans and not to interfere with Japan in the seizure of China ... "(Volume ... list ... of the case).

Without limiting himself to his personal negotiations with representatives of foreign states, L. TROTSKY suggested that the members of the parallel center establish contact with the representatives of ****Germany and Japan**** in the USSR.

According to the testimony of the accused PYATAKOV, L. TROTSKY in his letters to the parallel center demanded that K. RADEK and G. SOKOLNIKOV establish contact with representatives of **** Germany and Japan ****.

On this occasion, during the interrogation on December 4, 1936, the accused RADEK testified:

"... Trotsky's statement about his contact with representatives of the German government was not mere chatter. I could be convinced of this from the conversations that I happened to have at diplomatic receptions in 1934-1935. with *** military attache German general K. ***, naval attache,

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if I am not mistaken, Mr. B., and, finally, with the press officer of the German embassy, Mr. B., a very well-informed representative of Germany.

All three, in a very discreet way, made it clear to me that the German government had contact with TROTSKY.

And further:

"I told K. that to expect concessions from the current government is a matter of

absolutely useless and that the German government can count on concessions from the "real politicians in the USSR," i.e., from the bloc when the latter comes to power" (Volume ... list ... of the case).

The accused SOKOLNIKOV also admitted that, using his official position as Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, he, at the direction of L.D. Trotsky conducted secret negotiations with representatives of Japan.

The accused SOKOLNIKOV testified:

"At the end of one of the official conversations that took place in my office, when Mr. O. and the secretary of the embassy were about to leave, Mr. O. was somewhat delayed.

At this time, both interpreters had already left the office. Taking advantage of this, Mr. O., while I was escorting him to the exit, exchanged a few phrases with me. G. O. said to me: "Do you know that Mr. TROTSKY has made some proposals to my government?" I replied: "Yes, I am aware of this," Mr. O. asked: "How do you regard these proposals?" I replied: "I consider these proposals very serious." Then Mr. O. asked: "Is this just your personal opinion?" I replied: "No, this is also the opinion of my friends" (Volume ... sheet ... cases).

His main hopes for L.D. TROTSKY and his accomplices in the USSR pinned on the defeat of the Soviet Union in the coming war with the imperialist states. In accordance with this, in his negotiations with agents of foreign states, L.D. TROTSKY and the parallel center, through their accused RADEK and SOKOLNIKOV, tried in every possible way to hasten the military attack of these states on the USSR.

This is confirmed by the testimonies of all the defendants in the present case.

Thus, the accused RADEK, during interrogation on December 20-22, 1936, cites the following passage from L.D.'s letter to him. TROTSKY:

"It must be admitted that the question of power will most realistically come before the bloc only as a result of the defeat of the USSR in the war. To this end, the block must prepare smartly.

Since the main condition for the Trotskyists to come to power, if they fail to achieve this through terror, would be the defeat of the USSR, it is necessary, as far as possible, to accelerate the clash between the USSR and *** Germany ***" (Volume ... sheet ... affairs).

L.D. TROTSKY and his accomplices in the USSR considered it necessary to take an active defeatist position during the forthcoming war, helping the foreign invaders in every possible way in their struggle against the USSR.

Thus, for example, the accused Pyatakov, passing on the contents of his conversation with L. TROTSKY to the city. Oslo in December 1935, showed:

"As for the war, L.D. TROTSKY said very clearly. War, from his point of view, is inevitable in the near future. He, TROTSKY, considers it absolutely necessary to take a clear defeatist position in this war. He believes that the coming to power of the bloc, of course, can be accelerated by the military defeat of the USSR" (Volume ... list ... of the case).

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In accordance with this plan of preparation for the defeat of the USSR in order to seize power, traitors to the motherland - L.D. TROTSKY, YU. PYATAKOV, K. RADEK, G. SOKOLNIKOV, Y. LIVSHITS and other enemies of the people accused in the present case launched sabotage, espionage and terrorist activities aimed at undermining the economic and military power of our homeland thus committing a number of grave state crimes.

The investigation established that, on the direct instructions of L. TROTSKY and under the direct supervision of the parallel Trotskyist center, a number of the defendants in the present case - KNYAZEV, RATAICHAK, SHESTOV, STROI LOV, GRASH and PUSHIN were directly connected with agents, *** German and Japanese saboteurs * ** intelligence agencies, systematically engaged in espionage in favor of Germany and Japan and committed a number of wrecking and sabotage acts at enterprises of the socialist industry and railway transport, especially at enterprises of defense importance.

These espionage and sabotage activities were carried out by the above accused in accordance with the agreements that the Trotskyists had with foreign intelligence services on this matter.

So, for example, according to the testimony of the accused RADEK, one of the points of the agreement reached with the representatives of *****Germany***** was the obligation "... during the war of Germany against the USSR to take a defeatist position, to intensify sabotage activities, especially on enterprises of military importance ..., act on the instructions of the *** German General Staff ***, agreed with TROTSKY "(Volume ... I.d.).

Fulfilling its obligations to the representatives of Germany and Japan, the parallel Trotskyist center organized sabotage and sabotage groups at a number of industrial enterprises of the Soviet Union and railway transport, the task of which was to carry out acts of sabotage and sabotage.

The accused PYATAKOV, during interrogation on January 4, 1937, testified:

"I recommended to my people (and I did it myself) not to be scattered in their wrecking work, to concentrate their attention on the main large industrial facilities of defense and all-Union importance. At this point, I acted according to TROTSKY's directive: "deliver sensitive blows in the most sensitive places" (Volume... I.d.).

Following this directive of the accused Yu. PYATAKOV, the groups organized by the parallel center committed a number of acts of sabotage and sabotage at industrial enterprises and railway transport. So, for example, as it was established at the trial on November 19-22, 1936 in the case of the Trotskyist sabotage group at the Kemerovo mine, at the direction of the accused DROBNIS, an explosion was organized at the Tsentralnaya mine, which resulted in the death of 10 and severe injuries of 14 workers (See the materials and court documents attached to the present case)

of the investigation on the Kemerovo trial of November 19-22, 1936).

Three acts of sabotage were organized at the Gorlovsky nitrogen-fertilizer plant under the leadership of the accused RATAICHAK, which resulted in human casualties and caused enormous material damage to the state.

Similar acts of sabotage, on behalf of RATAICZAK, were perpetrated by members of the Trotskyist organization at other chemical

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enterprises of the Union (arson of the Voskresensky chemical plant and the Nevsky plant).

The sabotage nature of these explosions and arsons was established by the acts of a special technical examination and by the own confessions of the accused RATAICZAK, PUSHIN and GRASH (See acts of technical examination, vol. ... I ... d.).

The most active sabotage and sabotage activities in railway transport were carried out by A.Ya. LIVSHITS accused in the present case. and KNYAZEVA I.A.

Thus, the accused KNYAZEVA, on the direct instructions of a parallel Trotskyist center, organized and carried out a number of train wrecks, mostly military trains, which were accompanied by great loss of life. Of these crashes, the most serious are:

a) the collapse of the military. echelon at st. The uproar on October 27, 1935, during which 29 Red Army soldiers were killed and 29 Red Army soldiers were wounded;

b) the crash on the stretch Yakhino-Ust-Katav in December 1935;

c) a crash on the Edinover-Berdyush section in February 1936.

(See acts of technical expertise, volume ... I ... d.).

The accused KNYAZEVA organized the crashes of military trains not only on the instructions of the parallel center and, in particular, the head of sabotage and sabotage work on railway transport LIVSHITS, but also on the direct instructions of the Japanese intelligence agent, Mr. X.

On this occasion, during interrogation on September 14, 1936, the accused KNYAZEVA showed:

"As for espionage work and strikes against the Red Army by wrecking military trains with human casualties, I started this work only after clarifying the attitude of the Trotskyist organization to espionage and sabotage work against the Red Army in favor of Japanese intelligence** *.

The assignment regarding the deployment of sabotage and sabotage work in transport and the organization of train wrecks was completed by me completely, because. in this matter, the task of Japanese intelligence entirely coincided with the task that I received a little earlier from the Trotskyist organization.

(See Knyazev's correspondence with Mr X., vol... I... d...).

Committing acts of sabotage in cooperation with foreign intelligence agents, organizing train wrecks, explosions and arson of mines and industrial enterprises, the defendants in the present case did not disdain the most heinous means of struggle, committing consciously and deliberately such monstrous crimes as poisoning and death workers, seeking to provoke workers' dissatisfaction with the Soviet regime.

So, the accused PYATAKOV during interrogation on December 4, 1936 on this occasion showed:

"We took into account that, if necessary, resorting to acts of sabotage in order to implement sabotage plans would inevitably lead to human casualties. We took this into account and accepted it as inevitable" (Tom ... I ... d.).

The accused DROBNIS testified about this even more cynically:

"It is even better if there are casualties in the mines, since they will undoubtedly anger the workers, and this is what we need" (Tom ... I ... d.).

The fact that these enemies of the people, organizing acts of sabotage, deliberately made numerous human losses, is also evidenced by the following testimony of the accused KNYAZEV dated December 26, 1936:

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"LIVSHITS gave a special order to prepare and carry out a number of acts of sabotage (explosions, crashes or poisonings), which would be accompanied by a large number of human casualties" (Tom ... I ... d.).

Particularly active destructive work in industrial enterprises and railway transport by means of explosions, arson, train wrecks, etc. the Trotskyist center and the sabotage groups led by it in factories and transport were to be deployed during the war, when these monstrous acts of betrayal would deal a particularly sensitive blow to the defense capability of the Soviet Union.

Thus, the accused Pyatakov instructed the accused Norkin to prepare the fire of the Kemerovo chemical plant by the time the war began.

Interrogated about this YuL. Pyatakov showed:

"Yes confirm. I really gave Norkin such a task. This was shortly after my meeting with TROTSKY, in which he posed questions to me about the need to pursue an active defeatist line during the war and the need to carry out acts of sabotage at the beginning of the war at defense enterprises. It was in connection with this that I spoke with Norkin about the need to provide for the possibility of committing such a sabotage act in Kemerovo" (Volume ... I ... d.).

In turn, the accused KNYAZEY, during interrogation on October 14, 1936, testified that, by agreement with the parallel center, he accepted *** from the agent of Japanese intelligence Mr. military warehouses, food points and sanitation points for the troops "(Volume ... I ... d.).

An even more monstrous assignment directed against the Soviet people, the accused KNYAZEY received from the same agent "Japanese intelligence" Mr. X.:

"... *** Japanese *** intelligence especially sharply raised the question of using bacteriological agents at the time of the war in order to infect with acutely infectious bacteria the echelons supplied to the troops, as well as food and sanitation points for troops. I accepted this assignment." (volume ... I d.)

The treacherous connection of the accused KNYAZEY with *** Japanese *** intelligence was established not only by KNYAZEY's personal testimony, but also by his correspondence with Mr. X. and photographs.

The materials of the preliminary investigation and the own confessions of the accused - S.A. RATAICHAKA, I.A. and STROILOV M.S. It has been established that, along with sabotage and sabotage activities, the Trotskyist parallel center attached no less serious importance in the fight against Soviet power to the organization of espionage in favor of foreign intelligence services.

All these defendants, being connected with representatives of *** German and Japanese intelligence ***, systematically supplied them with secret information of the most important national importance.

So, for example, the accused KNYAZEY AND.A. supplied *** Japanese *** intelligence through the above-mentioned agent of this intelligence, Mr. X., with secret information about the technical condition, mobilization readiness of railways in the USSR and military transportation.

The accused RATAICHAK S.A., PUSHIN G.E. and GRASH I.I. admitted that they were connected with *** German intelligence ***, which was given secret materials about the state and operation of our chemical plants.

Interrogated on this occasion, the accused GRACHE testified:

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"The organization, of which I was a member, conducted, on the instructions of *** German *** intelligence, not only sabotage, but also espionage work at chemical industry enterprises" (Tom ... I ... d.).

The accused G.E. PUSHIN, admitting his participation in espionage, testified that he and the accused RATAICHAK S.A. communicated with German intelligence through a fitter from the Linde company LENTZ.

accused PUSHIN G.E. during interrogation on October 26, 1936, he testified:

"The following materials were handed over to LENTZ: 1) data on the production

products at all chemical enterprises of the Union for 1934; 2) the work program of all chemical enterprises of the Union for 1935; 3) a plan for the construction of nitrogen plants, which provided for construction work, ending in 1938.

I personally handed over all these materials to LENTZ at various times in the first half of 1935.

In addition, I know from LENTZ that he received data on production for 1934 and a program of work for 1935 on military chemical plants directly from RATAISCH KA. In addition to all this, LENTZs was systematically supplied by me with information about downtime, accidents, and the state of equipment for nitrogen plants "(Volume ... I ... d.).

Similar espionage work in favor of German intelligence was also carried out by the accused AA Shestov. and STROILOV M.S., exposed in criminal connection with a number of intelligence officers who arrived in the USSR under the guise of foreign specialists, such as, for example, engineer STIKLING, convicted of espionage and sabotage work in the Kemerovo case.

The espionage activities of the Trotskyists in favor of *** German *** intelligence were in some cases covered up by their connection with some *** German *** firms.
mami.

The investigation in the present case established that an agreement was concluded between L. TROTSKY and some *** German *** firms, by virtue of which these firms supported the Trotskyists at the expense of a fund created by capping the prices of goods imported into the USSR from Germany .

On this occasion, the accused Pyatakov testified:

"... SEDOV gave me TROTSKY's instructions that I try to place as many orders as possible with the firms *** Demap and Borzig *** , with representatives of which TROTSKY has contact. "You," added SEDOV, "will have to overpay in prices, but this money will go to our work" (Tom ... I ... d.).

••••• The investigation also established that one of the sources of financing the criminal anti-Soviet activities of the Trotskyists were various kinds of fraudulent operations, the most characteristic of which are the operations carried out by the accused CHLENOV S.B.

As a legal adviser to the Soviet embassy in Paris CHLENOV S.B. created from the funds intended for the payment of fees to lawyers acting in courts on claims arising abroad against the Soviet government, an illegal money fund and for a number of years (1930-1934) transferred from this fund to the disposal of the Trotskyist organization up to half million French francs *****.

In their plans to overthrow the Soviet government and seize power, L. TROTSKY and the parallel center attached paramount importance to terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government, •••••, first of all, against Comrade STALIN***** .

The preliminary investigation in the present case established that the parallel Trotskyist center, on the direct instructions of L.D. TROTSKY, semi-

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chennym PYATAKOV Yu.L. and RADEKOM K.B., organized a number of terrorist groups in Moscow, Leningrad, Kyiv, Rostov, Sochi, Novosibirsk and other cities.

According to the testimony of the accused K. RADEK L.D. TROTSKY demanded:

“... to organize a narrow team of reliable people to carry out terrorist attacks against the leaders of the CPSU (b), primarily against STALIN” (Volume ... I ... d.).

The same instructions L.D. TROTSKY gave the accused PYATAKOV in a conversation with him in 1935.

The accused PYATAKOV testified that:

“... in this conversation, TROTSKY said: “Understand that without a whole series of terrorist acts, which must be carried out as soon as possible, it is impossible to topple the Stalinist government. We must intensify the struggle even more, expand it even more. One must literally stop at nothing to topple STALIN” (Tom ... I ... d.).

So the agent of fascism L.D. TROTSKY instructed the Trotskyist organization, which was preparing a series of terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government.

Organizing the terrorist acts mentioned above, the Trotskyist center tried to use for this purpose the visits of the leaders of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government to the periphery.

For example, during his stay in Siberia in 1934, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, comrade. MOLOTOVA V.M. Trotskyist terrorists, under the leadership of the accused Shestov, attempted to kill Comrade. V.M. MOLOTOV by causing a car accident.

The direct perpetrator of this villainous crime, a member of the Trotskyist terrorist group, the accused ARNOLD testified on this subject during interrogation on September 29, 1936, as follows:

“In September 1934, I don't remember the exact day, Cherepukhin called me to his office and warned me that MOLOTOV was coming to Prokopyevsk. He immediately declared to me that I must sacrifice myself and, at all costs, arrange a catastrophe with my car, which would be handed over to MOLOTOV. I agreed and replied that everything would be done ”(Tom ... I ... d.).

The accused Shestov confirmed this, demonstrating:

“At the direction of MURATOV, in 1934, I actively prepared for a terrorist act against the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR MOLOTOV and the secretary of the West Siberian Regional Committee EIHE” (Volume ... I ... d.).

Such is the vile treacherous anti-Soviet activity of the contemptible fascist hirelings, traitors to the motherland and enemies of the people—the Trotskyites.

Having suffered a final defeat in his long struggle against the party and Soviet power, deprived of any support of the masses due to the complete victory of socialism in the USSR, representing an isolated and politically doomed group of bandits and spies branded with the general contempt of the Soviet people, L.D. TROTSKY and his associates — PYATAKOV, RADEK, SOKOLNIKOV, SEREBRYAKOV, LIVSHITS and the rest of the defendants in the present case committed an unheard-of betrayal of the interests of the working class and *** fascist forces.

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FORMULA OF ACCUSATION

The investigation considers it established:

1) that, at the direction of L.D. TROTSKY in 1933, a parallel center was organized consisting of the accused in the present case - YL PYATAKOV, K.B. RADEK, G.Ya. SOKOLNIKOV. and L.P. SEREBRYAKOV, whose task was to lead the criminal anti-Soviet* activities of an underground Trotskyist organization aimed** at overthrowing the Soviet regime and restoring capitalism in the USSR;

2) that on behalf of the same L.D. TROTSKY, this center, through the accused SOKOLNIKOV and RADEK, entered into relations with representatives of some foreign states in order to organize a joint struggle against the Soviet Union, moreover, the Trotskyist center undertook, in the event of its coming to power, to provide these states with a number of political and economic benefits and territorial concessions;

3) that, at the same time, this center, through its members and other participants in the criminal Trotskyist organization, systematically engaged in espionage in favor of these states, supplying foreign intelligence services with secret information of the most important national importance;

4) that in order to undermine the economic power and defense capability of the USSR, this center organized and committed a number of sabotage and sabotage acts at some enterprises and railway transport, which resulted in human casualties and the destruction of valuable state property;

5) that this center, ***** taking part in organizing the villainous murder of Sergei Mironovich KIROV ***** , was also preparing a number of other terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government, and *** ***In some cases***** attempts were made to carry out these acts;

6) that active participation in the above-mentioned criminal activities of this center, in addition to its leaders - the accused PYATAKOV YU.L., SOKOLNIKOVA G.Ya., RADEK K.B. and SEREBRIAKOVA L.P. received by the accused: YA.A. LIVSHITS, N.I. MURALOV, Y.N. DROBNIS, M.S. A.,

M. S. Stroilov, ***** S. B. *****, I. I. Grache, G. E. Pushin and ARNOLD V.V.

All the defendants fully pleaded guilty to the charges brought against them and are convicted by the documents, material evidence and testimonies of witnesses available in the case.

Based on the foregoing, the following are accused:

1. PYATAKOV Yuri Leonidovich, born in 1890, office worker;
2. SOKOLNIKOV Georgy Yakovlevich, born in 1888, office worker;
3. RADEK Karl Berngardovich, born in 1885, journalist;
4. SEREBRYAKOV Leonid Petrovich, born in 1888, employee, in that, being members of the anti-Soviet underground Trotskyist center, they betrayed their homeland by committing the crimes specified in paragraphs. 1-6 of the accusation formula, i.e. crimes under Art. Art. 58-1-a, 58-8, 58-9, 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.
5. LIVSHITS Yakov Abramovich, born in 1896, office worker;
6. MURALOV Nikolai Ivanovich, born in 1877, office worker;
7. DROBNIS Yakov Naumovich Born in 1891, office worker;
8. BOGUSLAVSKII Mikhail Solomonovich, born in 1886, office worker;
9. KNYAZEV Ivan Aleksandrovich, born in 1893, office worker;

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10. RATAICHAK Stanislav Antonovich, born in 1894, office worker;
11. NORKIN Boris Osipovich, born in 1895, office worker;
12. Alexey Aleksandrovich SHESTOV, born in 1896, office worker;
13. STROILOV Mikhail Stepanovich, born in 1899, office worker;
14. ****CHLENOV Semyon Borisovich, born in 1890, office worker*****;
15. GRAIPE Ivan Iosifovich, born in 1890, office worker;
16. *** PUSHIN Gavriil Efremovich, born in 1896, office worker;
17. ARNOLD Valentin Volfredovich, also known as VASIL'EV Valentin Vasilyevich, born in 1894, employee, in that, being members of the same anti-Soviet underground Trotskyist organization, they betrayed their homeland by committing the crimes specified in paragraphs. 1-6 of the accusation formula, i.e. pre-

steps provided for in Art. Art. 58-1-a, 58-8, 58-9, 58-11 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR.

L. TROTSKY and his son L.L. SEDOV, if they are found on the territory of the USSR, are subject to immediate arrest and trial by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

As a result of the foregoing and in accordance with the decision of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR of July 10, 1934, all the above persons are subject to the court of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR.

The present indictment was drawn up in Mt. Moscow on January 5, 1937.

EZHOV

VYSHINSKY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 269. L. 38-58, 80. Original. Typescript.

The text contains Stalin's handwritten notes:

*
the words "Hitler's deputy for the fascist party" are crossed out, instead
inscribed
"one of the leaders of the German Nazis."

— the word "Hess" is crossed out, instead of it, "mentioned" is entered.

***_yy* underlined in pencil.

****_**** The words "Germany and Japan" have been crossed out, instead of them "these states" have
been entered.

*****_***** the word "Germany" has been crossed out, and "German National Socialist Party" has been written in its
place.

yy*__yyy crossed out.

*
inscribed by hand "spy sabotage treacherous."

**
inscribed by hand "undermining the military power of the USSR, accelerating the military attack on the USSR,
assistance to foreign aggressors in the seizure of territory and the dismemberment of the USSR>. yy*yy_***y
xiaosh "CHLENOV Semyon Borisovich, born in 1890, office worker" are crossed out, "TURK" is written instead.

*** The figure "17" has been corrected to "16".

No. 2

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN WITH
THE APPENDIX OF THE PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION V.N. ASTROVA (2)

January 11, 1937

No. 55228

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending the protocol of interrogation of a member of the anti-Soviet terrorist organization of the right - ASTROVA V.N. dated January 11, 1937.

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Astrov, who had been personally associated with Bukharin since 1923, gave detailed testimony about the practical anti-Soviet activities of the right until recently.

ASTROV showed that:

1. Back in 1929-1930, at the illegal meetings of the rightists, the question of the need to forcibly eliminate the leaders of the Leninist Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was specifically raised. These conferences were attended by BUKHARIN, RYKOV and TOMSKY;

2. At an illegal conference of active participants in the organization of the right, held in Moscow in August 1932, terror was recognized as the main method of combating the leadership of the CPSU (b) and the government. At the same conference, a decision was adopted on a bloc of the Rights with the Trotskyists and the "Leftists";

3. Beginning in 1932, the organization of the rightists, on the orders of the center—BUKHARIN, RYKOV, TOMSKY, UGLANOV, began to create terrorist groups to carry out a terrorist act against comrade. STALIN;

4. In 1932 he—ASTROV—received personally from BUKHARIN a terrorist task;

5. All the active members of the anti-Soviet organization of the Rights named in ASTROV's testimony were arrested.

We are establishing the right-wing employee of the NKVD who was present at the meeting, about whom ASTROV testifies. (SLEPKOV and AREFIEV should know about him.)

People's Commissar of
Internal Affairs of the USSR N. Ezhov

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL

ASTROV Valentin Nikolaevich dated January 11, 1937

ASTROV V.N., born in 1898, born in Penza province., b. member of the CPSU (b) from 1918 to 1933, expelled from the organization as a member of the c.-r. organizations of the right. By the decision of the Special Meeting of the Collegium of the OGPU dated November 16, 1933, he was imprisoned for 3 years. In June 1933 conclusion

replaced by exile to Voronezh for the remainder of the term.

Question: You have submitted a statement of readiness to give frank testimony about the activities of the counter-revolutionary organization of the right. What are you going to show?

Answer: I want to give frank testimony to the investigation. In 1933, I was arrested by the OGPU in Moscow and at that time concealed from the investigation a number of far from minor facts from the illegal activities of the organization of the Rights. Now I intend to tell the whole truth.

Question: What do you mean by these "far from secondary facts"?

Answer: By this I mean, first of all, the terrorist work of the right. *I want to tell you how, over a number of years, starting from the period when the organization of the Rights was just taking shape, how terrorist sentiments were formed in this organization against the leaders of the party and government, sentiments that subsequently resulted in a direct transition to the preparation of terrorist acts. I also want, as far as my memory allows me, to show how the leaders of the organization of the Right, in particular

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Even before the open speeches against the Party, Bukharin was stubbornly preparing for this blow. I want to reveal our tactics in connection with the double-dealing declarations in 1929 about the renunciation of our views, tactics whose essence consisted in a maneuver to regroup our forces in order to continue the struggle against the Party, a struggle that did not stop until recently*.

Question: Let's start in order: first of all, about the emergence of the organization.

Answer: I have already said that the organization of the Rights began to prepare its strike against the Party long before the period of open actions. I will first speak of that group of participants in the organization that was directly grouped around BUKHARIN, to which I myself belonged.

• The Bukharin group, with those of its main cadres, who later in 1928-1936. took an active part in the counter-revolutionary and terrorist organization, headed by the center of the right (BUKHARIN, RYKOV, TOMSKY, UGLANOV), emerged as an illegal factional group within the party in 1923-24, receiving in the period 1925-1927. some notoriety in the party under the name of the "Bukharin school"*.

In 1923-24. BUKHARIN, formally supporting the Central Committee, secretly set about rallying his supporters with the aim of resuming in the future new open attacks on the party line, which he had failed in 1918 and 1921.

Considering one of the reasons for his past defeats in the struggle against Lenin, he (BUKHARIN) lacked permanent and loyal cadres of like-minded people (as BUKHARIN himself told me and A. SLEP-

KOVA during our joint stay with him in Gorki in the spring of 1924), BUKHARIN set it as his goal to educate such cadres from the young people around him. Back in 1919-21. BUKHARIN, while lecturing at the Sverdlovsk University, met the students of this university A. Slepko, D. and Gr. MARETSKY, ROZIT, CRAVAL, and others. BUKHARIN went to their hostel (in the Passion Monastery), talked with them on political and theoretical questions, impressing them with his "scholarship" and exercising an enormous ideological influence on them. A. SLEPKOV and D. MARETSKY have since become the most faithful adherents of BUKHARIN. In conversations with me in 1923-24. (I met him at the end of 1922, having entered the Institute of the Red Professors, where SLEPKOV, MARETSKY and other participants in 1921). SLEPKOV and MARETSKY proved to me that BOGDANOV's "organizational science" stood above the materialist dialectic of Marx-Lenin and that in the doctrine of imperialism BUKHARIN was right against LENIN.

In 1921-1923. BUKHARIN continued to visit his "disciples," coming to their dormitory of the ICP (Ostozhenka, 53), and to talk with them on political and theoretical topics. Here, at Slepko's, at the beginning of 1923, I made the acquaintance of Bukharin. SLEPKOV at that time headed a whole close-knit group among students of the IKP, which included: A. SLEPKOV, D. MARETSKY, D. ROZIT, I. CRAVAL, A. TROITSKY (deceased), I. KAPITONOV, S. RADIN, F. BOGDANOV (deceased), STREMOUKHOV, A. ZAITSEV, and A. GUSEV. A. SLEPKOV introduced me to this group. This group had regular, illegal meetings, at which questions of educational work in the PCI, questions of party life within the PCI, and general political questions were dealt with. During the purge of university party cells, which took place in the ICP in the spring of 1923, a group of "Slepkovites", being soldered by group discipline, previously discussed at their meetings the lists of members of the ICP party cell, outlining candidates for exclusion from

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parties. The group came to the meetings of the cell for the purge of the party in an organized manner, the members of the group came out with demands for the expulsion from the party of persons according to a list previously drawn up by the group and defended each other in the face of the purge commission and at party meetings. The group acted in exactly the same way during the re-elections of the Bureau of the I CP cell in the winter of 1922-23. and in the summer of 1923. At the beginning of 1923, Stan and I joined the group, and soon after him, P. KAREV.

BUKHARIN encouraged the activity of this group, considering this activity as a school for the factional struggle of his future like-minded people*.

In addition to the "Slepkovskaya" group among students of the IKP in 1922-23 tg. there was another organizational group headed by DINGELYPTEDT, ZHAKOV, BELOTSEKOVSKY, GONIKMAN, and others. In the autumn of 1923, this group came out in favor of TROTSKY and led the majority of the ICP cell, while the "Slepkovites" for tactical reasons came out for the Central Committee. Bukharin, through Slepko, proposed to the group, taking advantage of the discussion situation, to establish contacts in the regions of the mountains. Moscow.*

At the end of the discussion in 1923, BUKHARIN, in order to further expand

to expand his influence by recruiting new functional personnel, he undertook to conduct a seminar in the ICP on the "theoretical study of modernity", which, in addition to the "Slepkovites", included the most prepared of the rest of the students of the ICP, including a number of Trotskyists (GOLDENBERG and others). In the course of this seminar, BUKHARIN propagated his anti-Leninist views.

At the beginning of 1924, after the death of LENIN, BUKHARIN, through SLEPKOV, conveyed to a group of "Slepkovites" about his intention to involve them gradually in leading literary and "other party" work with the aim of exerting Bukharin's influence on the party line, * SLEPKOV, KAPITONOV and BUKHARIN took me into our secretariat of the ECCI, where, on the instructions of BUKHARIN, we got acquainted with the secret materials of the Politburo and the ECCI under the pretext of preparing reports for BUKHARIN. SLEPKOV, KRAVAL, me, KAPITONOV BUKHARIN attracted to work in the theoretical and political journal of the Central Committee "Bolshevik", which began to appear. From the spring of 1924, Bukharin systematically began to acquaint us with everything that was happening at the secret meetings of the Central Committee and the Politburo. BUKHARIN repeatedly stressed, in particular told me and SLEP KO VU, that he hoped to educate future "party leaders"* from our midst.

At the same time, BUKHARIN began to intensively disseminate various slanders about STALIN among the members of his group and to prepare the group for the struggle against STALIN.

In the autumn of 1924, BUKHARIN, in the presence of SLEPKOV, told me that it was necessary to "get along" with TROTSKY at all costs in order to subsequently rally with him against the Stalinist leadership and change the Leninist line of the party in his, BUKHARIN's, direction. In November 1924, BUKHARIN, in the editorial office of Pravda, read to me a "memorandum" written by his hand on several quarters of a sheet of paper, in small handwriting. In this "memorandum" BUKHARIN advanced the idea that after the death of LENIN, the organizational principles of building the party should change in the spirit of the "Labor Party" (English workers' party) and freedom of factions and trends within the CPSU (b) should be allowed.

A corpus of factions, groups, and currents is an idea that later remained in the political arsenal of BUKHARIN and us "Bukharinites." In the autumn of 1927, SLEPKOV told me that he and Bukharin, in the editorial office of Pravda, objected to the publication of materials on the connection between the Trotskyists and the White Guards.

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elements (a Wrangel officer), considering the publication of these materials an unacceptable method of combating Trotskyism. This, as well as BUKHARIN's "memorandum" of 1924, was subsequently repeatedly referred to by BUKHARIN and SLEPKOV as proof that we ("the Bukharinites") always had a special line towards Trotskyism, different from the Leninist-Stalinist one. lines towards Trotskyism. In particular, SLEPKOV made such a reference in his speech at the illegal conference of the Bukharinites at the end of August 1932, justifying the need for a right-wing bloc with the Trotskyists. In 1926, after the decision of the Central Committee of the party to expel TROTSKY for

border, BUKHARIN in my apartment, in the presence of SLEPKOV, MARETSKY and PETREIN, told me that he had abstained from voting in the Central Committee on the question of expelling TROTSKY in order to emphasize by this his special attitude towards Trotskyism.

ÿ Back in the autumn of 1924, BUKHARIN and we "Bukharinites" began to oppose STALIN and his assessment of the Social Democracy, rejecting the characterization of the Social Democrats given by STALIN as social fascists*. At the end of 1926, SLEPKOV and I, while in Berlin on the directive of BUKHARIN, became politically close to the leaders of the right-wing German Communist Party, EVERT (BROWN), Ernst MAYER, DEGEL, Hugo EBER LEIN. The German rightists named above then told us, with a request that their statement be passed on to BUKHARIN, that they consider themselves "part of the Bukharin faction in the Comintern."

Finally, at the beginning of 1928, we began to discuss the question of the need to go over to a direct attack against the Central Committee of the Party. SLEPKOV informed me at the same time that a leading "troika" had finally taken shape, consisting of BUKHARIN, RYKOV and TOMSKY, which was directing all the work of the Rights.

Question: How did the leading "troika" formulate the tactical tasks of the Rights in this period?

Answer: *At the end of June 1928, Bukharin, Slepko and I met at a dacha in Zubalov. BUKHARIN informed us that a center consisting of BUKHARIN, RYKOV, TOMSKY had been formed to direct all the activities of the Rights, and that UGLANOV, RYUTIN and from the trade unionists MELNICHANSKIY, YAGLOM and others systematically participate in the illegal meetings of this center. This center not only coordinates the actions and speeches of the troika itself at the Politburo and the Central Committee, but directs the activities of the right-wingers in the Moscow Party organization, trade unions and the Soviet apparatus. The leading group of the Rights in the Moscow party organization consists of UGLANOV, RYUTIN, KOTOV, KULIKOV, UKHANOV. The rightists in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (MELNICHANSKII, YAGLOM, GINZBURG, and others) are united under the leadership of TOMSKY. As for the rightists in the Soviet apparatus (FRUMKIN, A.P. SMIRNOV, and others), they are grouped around RYKOV. The Center decided, in the event that the rightists did not achieve a majority at the forthcoming July (1928) plenum of the Central Committee, to carry out organized open actions against the Central Committee, to overthrow the Stalinist leadership, starting the struggle with the development of a discussion in the Moscow Party organization. Agitation against the line of the party and the recruitment of supporters is being carried out by the right at the moment along all lines of the organization, moreover, the "Uglanites" are conducting it especially strenuously in Moscow, preparing to start speaking at the signal of the center. Our task is to intensify our agitation and recruitment of supporters. At the same time, BUKHARIN did not skimp on the most malicious, slanderous expressions addressed to STALIN, emphasizing that the situation would not change until STALIN was "removed from the Central Committee." In case of victory - reported

The slogan "remove STALIN" already at this stage of the organization's activity was cultivated in every possible way in a number of meetings and conversations: in the fall of 1928, a meeting was held in the apartment of E. MARKUS (Mansion Dead End), in which BUKHARIN, SLEPKOV, MARETSKY, ROZIT, I, SAPOGNIKOV, GURVICH E. AND MARKUS. ROSIT presided. BUKHARIN said that the defeat in the Moscow organization and at the July plenum of the Central Committee (1928) should lead not to weakening, but to intensifying our work in order to prepare new open actions against the Central Committee, since the situation in the country was becoming aggravated. He sharply attacked STALIN, who "is ruining the country and must be removed at all costs." He further said that, by decision of the centre, the Troika would come out at the forthcoming November plenum of the Central Committee with a new attack on the leadership.

At the end of 1928 or at the beginning of 1929 BUKHARIN invited me, SLEPKOV and MARETSKY to his apartment, where a meeting of the center of the Rights was held in BUKHARIN's office, in our presence and with our participation. Following them, TOMSKY, YAGLOM, and RADIN came to Bukharin. RYKOV was late and showed up at the end of the meeting. On the agenda was the question of directing the propaganda work of the right. The speaker, TOMSKY, spoke of the need to recruit new cadres, to develop in them a correct understanding of the line of the Rights, without which we would not be able to create stable organizations capable of leading the masses to fight for our main goal, for the overthrow of the Stalinist leadership. TOMSKY said that we have people, but they do not know how to defend our platform, how to argue with the supporters of the Central Committee, sometimes they do not know the facts that speak for us. We need auxiliary material, theses, in other words, a cheat sheet. He turned to SLEPKOV, MARETSKY and me, as "red professors", with a proposal to write such a cheat sheet, BUKHARIN would edit it, he said, and we would put it into circulation among our people. In the debate, all those present agreed with the speaker's proposal, and the issue was discussed in the practical plane about the content and form of the proposed theses.

To what extent the moods of our people were already "heated" during this period, and where these moods grew, can be seen at least from the following: when, towards the end of the conference described above, MARETSKY pointed out the need for caution in the distribution of materials, otherwise the case could lead to arrests, - TOMSKY threw a remark: "What kind of young people have gone, they are afraid of arrests. In the old days, young people considered it an honor to go to jail for their convictions. MARETSKY replied that he would still prefer to be arrested than to be arrested. Then TOMSKY noticed that in the serious struggle for power that we are waging, arrests are indispensable: "Today they will arrest us, and tomorrow we will arrest them. When we win, we will not stand on ceremony, we will arrest." These words of TOMSKY were accepted by the audience as a matter of course, with which we all were in solidarity.

Before the April plenum of the Central Committee of 1929, a meeting was held in MARETSKY's apartment with the participation of: BUKHARIN, SLEPKOV, MARETSKY, ASTROV, TSETLIN, ROSIT, GOLDENBERG, MARETSKY, GAS PERSKAYA, KUZMIN, KARMALITOV, ZAYTSEV, LEVINA and EIKHEN WALDA.

BUKHARIN reported on the platform that the center was developing for submission to the April (1929) plenum of the Central Committee. This platform contained

himself accusing the party of "military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry." BUKHARIN said that the platform would be submitted to the Central Committee signed by the "troika" and that the center decided, after submission, to illegally duplicate it and distribute it among the members of the party. After discussion of the platform by the meeting participants, it was adopted unanimously. This platform was reproduced and distributed by ROZIT, TSETLIN, KARMALITOV, KUZMIN and I*.

I would now like to cite one fact that testifies to the fact that already at the beginning of 1929, terrorist intentions against the leaders of the party became apparent in the organization of the Rights.

In the spring of 1929 I met SLEPKOV at MARETSKY's apartment on Bryusovsky Lane. From Slepko's words, I realized that he had just had a conversation with BUKHARIN, the content of which, as I understood it, had made a strong impression on him (SLEPKOV). In the words of SLEPKOV, BUKHARIN "ran to him" that morning.

“BUKHARIN suddenly got excited about something to talk about, and in such cases he "can't stand it." To my insistent inquiries about what kind of new idea BUKHARIN had, SLEPKOV replied that BUKHARIN had said to him meaningfully: "It would be good if STALIN suddenly died." I asked what it means "suddenly died", i.e. to kill him? SLEPKOV answered: "Understand as you wish." I noticed that so, for no reason at all, people suddenly do not die. SLEPKOV: "Of course not." I asked: "Maybe Stalin is ill and there is reason to wait for a natural death?" SLEPKOV: "No, it's like it doesn't exist." To my question: "So, why is BUKHARIN suggesting that we engage in terror?" SLEPKOV answered: "He does not put this question directly." He, BUKHARIN, said, supposedly in an abstract way: "It would be good if STALIN suddenly died, then they—BUKHARIN, RYKOV, TOMSKY—would remain the most important figures in the Party and it would be impossible to do without them." I asked SLEPKOV a second time: "Perhaps BUKHARIN wants us to engage in terror, but does not want to say so directly?" To this SLEPKOV replied: "It must be so. This is not the first time he has spoken to me on such topics, but I believe that this is accidental. And today he seemed to have the reins under his tail. It turns out that his thought has recently been working hard in this direction. Well, the teacher gave me a task."***

Question: MARETSKY, in whose apartment this conversation took place between you and SLEPKOV, was present at this?

Answer: No. It happened like this: I met SLEPKOV and MARETSKY in the street. The latter had to go somewhere. Since I needed to talk on the phone, and MARETSKY's apartment was located nearby, Slepko and I went into MARETSKY's apartment. At home, he had only a nanny for his son. This is where my conversation with SLEPKOV, about which I showed above, took place.

Question: MARETSKY was present at this conversation between BUKHARIN and SLEPKOVA?

Answer: Probably yes, because at the moment of my meeting with SLEPKOV and MARETSKY they told me that they had just parted ways with BUKHARIN.

I continue the presentation of my conversation with Slepko. I told SLEP KOV that although it would not be very difficult for any of us to get close to STALIN in order to carry out a terrorist act, this would greatly compromise us. SLEPKOV said: "That's clear." Then I developed SLEPKOV such an idea that if the Socialist-Revolutionaries or other White Guards had killed STALIN, if it would have been possible to organize the murder of STALIN by their hands,

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then that would be the best outcome. SLEPKOV agreed with me. In conclusion, SLEPKOV urged that this conversation be kept in absolute secrecy.

1929 was the turning point in collectivization and the first year of the first five-year plan. The disruption of the five-year plan and the disruption of mass collectivization became at that time the main slogans of our organization, aimed at overthrowing the Stalinist leadership and restoring capitalism in the USSR. The stake on the difficulties of complete collectivization and on the difficulties of fulfilling the five-year plan in industry and agriculture has become our main stake. We lived in hopes of an armed uprising against the Party and the government, led by the kulaks in the countryside, and of bagpipes in the cities, led by our like-minded people. In 1930, a number of "new" tactical guidelines were clearly taking shape in our organization: "the guidelines were for a bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, for sabotage, for defeatism."

In the winter of 1929-30. a number of conferences of the members of our organization were held, at which BUKHARIN attended and spoke. The meeting was attended by: BUKHARIN, A. SLEPKOV, V. SLEPKOV, MARETSKY, KUZMIN, LEVINA, ZAITSEV, RADIN, ALEKSANDROV, KARMALITOV, SAPozhNIKOV, PETROVSKY, TSETLIN, EIKHENWALD, E. MARKUS, G. SHALAKHOVA and I .

The content of Bukharin's speech at the meeting was as follows: he said that the forthcoming spring of 1930, with the third (1928-1929-1930) grain procurement campaign, "would be the most formidable spring for the Stalinist leadership." "Now the peasantry has been forcibly driven into the collective farms. These collective farms are short-lived. But before they disintegrate, the organization of the peasants in the collective farms will turn its edge against the Stalinist leadership and it will become clear that it has taken care to co-organize the force that will ensure its downfall. The matter will begin with the organized refusals of the collective farmers from the delivery of grain. BUKHARIN characterized the methods of grain procurement, just as he did the methods of organizing collective farms, as "continuous violence." From refusing to give up grain, the peasantry, according to BUKHARIN, will inevitably go over to insurrections. * "The village communists—peasants themselves—will take part in these uprisings, and our task is to take advantage of this situation—to lead them along. Our urban workers are connected with the countryside, including many communist workers. Peasant uprisings will inevitably spread to the cities, and our task, by embracing with our organization all members of the Party who sympathize with us, is to ensure our leadership of the uprisings in the cities.

It is important, continued BUKHARIN, that by the time the mass uprisings begin, our like-minded people should remain within the Party and not be expelled from its ranks. themselves right, but at the acute moment of the struggle they will come over to us. Expulsion from the Party would cut off the Rights from these cadres coming towards us. On the other hand, being in the Party makes it easier for us to get information about the situation in the country and access to the leadership of organizations, institutions, and the army. This is precisely the meaning of double-dealing as a tactic adopted by the center of the right in November 1929.

Question: Give specific facts that characterize this transition to double-dealing tactics.

Answer: During the November plenum of the Central Committee (1929), on the day of my arrival in Moscow from Ivanovo, MARETSKY appeared at my apartment, it seems with

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Zaitsev and Aichenwald. MARETSKY told me that a meeting of the center had just taken place, consisting of: RYKOV, BUKHARIN, TOMSKY and UGLANOV, where it was decided at the plenum of the Central Committee "not to accept battle": to admit their mistakes, but to remain with their views, to preserve their organization and continue to work illegally. MARETSKY further told me that such a directive is now being urgently given by the center to all our groups. On behalf of the center, MARETSKY suggested that I immediately return to Ivanovo and submit a "repentant" statement to the regional party committee. He urged me to leave today in order to publish my statement before the "repentance" of the leaders appeared in the press, and thus not be suspected of concerted action in this matter. I did so.

Let me give you one more fact. *SLEPKOV, while in Samara (1929), spoke at the plenum of the regional committee in the spirit of the directives of the right. In the midst of the debate over SLEPKOV's speech, in the interval between two meetings of the regional committee, SLEPKOV was handed a note from BUKHARIN: "Surrender immediately." SLEPKOV immediately carried out this Bukharin directive, arousing bewilderment among the members of the plenum by such a rapid change in his "convictions".

I return to the presentation of BUKHARIN's speech at the January 1930 meeting.

BUKHARIN said that it was impossible to determine how long the period of insurrections might be; it could drag on for a number of years. It is possible that in the course of the struggle for power it will be necessary to enter into temporary blocs with the Socialist-Revolutionaries or the Mensheviks. Dwelling on the major role of STALIN, BUKHARIN said that STALIN, as the main force in this leadership, must be eliminated at all costs.

BUKHARIN further pointed to the impending intervention and said that the USSR, in its present state and under the policies of the Stalinist leadership, would not be able to defeat the imperialists. In the event of intervention, the rightists would have to take advantage of the military situation, preserve their underground organization in order to continue the struggle to overthrow the Stalinist leadership.

The participants in the conference who spoke after BUKHARIN expressed solidarity with him. KUZMIN, in his speech, spoke in favor of the tactics of a "palace coup", with the arrest of STALIN and other members of the Soviet government.
evidence.

Kuzmin's speech ended with his loud statement, made by him in the heat of extraordinary anger: "Give me a revolver, I will shoot Stalin." He was asked not to shout about it, because under the windows they could hear. SLEPKOV, on the other hand, declared that "hatred of Stalin is sacred hatred," but that it should not be expressed so loudly.

A few days later, at MARETSKY's apartment, in the presence of KUZMIN and myself, BUKHARIN told KUZMIN that such, generally speaking, legitimate desires as "I will kill Stalin" cannot be expressed where there are many people present, since the GPU might find out about this.

Somewhat later, in December 1930, in SLEPKOV's apartment, when the talk turned to the active work of a member of the organization AREFIEV, SLEPKOV repeated the words he had said about "sacred hatred" for Stalin, which (hatred) he considers an indispensable criterion for the devotion of our people.

Question: You spoke about the center's intentions to create peripheral branches of the organization. What has been practically done in this direction?

Answer: Work on the creation of local branches, especially from 1928-29, was carried out extremely intensively. I say "especially since 1928-29" because the first significant blow against the right

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and sending us to the periphery. It was stipulated that we should use the expulsion of our cadres from Moscow to strengthen our work in the periphery, but that it should be carried out more secretly. As soon as the members of our organization arrived on the ground, they immediately put together their groups, established contact with the center and began to recruit local people. In 1928-1930, our branches were created and carried out underground work in the following composition:

1. 'Samara* - SLEPKOV, LEVINA, AREFIEV, AREFIEVA, KROTOV, VOROBYEVA, Galina SHALAKHOVA, ZHIROV.

2. 'Saratov* - PETROVSKY, ZAYTSEV, SLEPKOV, SHALAKHOVA, ZAYTSEV, LEVIN, ALEXANDROV, LAPKIN, IVANOV and others.

3. 'Kazan* - you. SLEPKOV (I don't remember the other members of the group).

4. 'Ivanovo* - I (ASTROV), BASHENKOV, BOLSHAKOV, BOGDANOV, ABOLIN.

5. 'Leningrad* - MARETSKY, AIKHENWALD, VI. SLEPKOV, KANIN and etc.

6. 'Novosibirsk* - KUZMIN, YAGLOM.

7. 'Voronezh* - SAPozhnikov.

8. 'Sverdlovsk* - KARMALITOV, ALEXANDROV, NESTEROV, MELNIKOV.

The composition of these groups at different times underwent one or another change, but each of the named persons, moving to another place, continued to keep in touch with the center and carry out counter-revolutionary work until recently.

Question: You say that illegal groups of the Rights carried out counter-revolutionary work in the localities and maintained contact with the centre. What facts can you cite to support this?

Answer: With regard to the illegal work of local branches, I can cite the following facts: in December 1930, SLEPKOV and LEVINA arrived in Moscow from Samara before they were transferred to Saratov. A meeting was held in SLEP KOVA's apartment, at which BUKHARIN, SLEPKOV, TSETLIN, LEVINA, I, and you were present. SLEPKOV, KUZMIN, etc. SLEPKOV spoke on the question of "provincial branches" - as he called them. He summed up the 2-year existence of the Samara branch, which he created in 1923. He said that he included him - SLEPKOV, LEVINA, AREFIEV, AREFIEVA. The group has many sympathizers adjoining it, whose recruitment is active. At one time, the group had behind it the majority of the party cell of the Komvuz, in which SLEPKOV and LEVINA taught. Leaving Samara, SLEPKOV said, he and LEVINA left AREFIEV, recruited by SLEPKOV, as the head of the Samara branch.

To characterize the militant mood of the members of his group, SLEPKOV said that in 1930 a member of his group, KROTOV, tore and trampled on a portrait of STALIN, accompanied by cries of a terrorist nature, for which he was arrested by the GPU. Coming out from under arrest, KROTOV told SLEPKOV that he undertook to inform the GPU about SLEPKOV. After that, each time before KROTOV's meetings with the OPTU staff, SLEPKOV dictated to him the content of information about himself. SLEPKOV cited this as an example of the special devotion of the people he recruited into the Samara group.

Question: You have shown above that the counter-revolutionary group of the Rights in Ivanovo has been formed as part of you, ASTROV, BASHENKOV, BOLYIA

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KOVA, BOGDANOVA, and ABOLIN. What specific counter-revolutionary work did you and your group launch in Ivanovo?

Answer: I will cite some facts: BASHENKOV had great connections among the Ivanovo workers and party members, among whom he conducted recruiting work. Twice BASHENKOV took me to his acquaintances at the apartment, to BOLSHAKOV and to someone else (I don't remember), where counter-revolutionary conversations were going on. Regardless of BASHENKOV, I grouped around me sympathetic right-wing teachers of the Ivanovo Komsomol University and the Polytechnic

godfather (BOGDANOV, ABOLIN). In 1932, already in my absence, these persons created a group of rightists in Ivanovo and were arrested. At meetings of the party organization of the komvu, I repeatedly spoke double-dealingly, and some students (I don't remember their names) sometimes expressed sympathy for me in conversations about the "working through" of me by the party organization. The most active forays on my part were speeches at my purge (early 1930), in defense of the right SLEPKOV, MARETSKY and RYUTIN expelled from the party (at the end of 1930 and beginning of 1931), and in defense of errors in my book "On Austro-Marxism" (end of 1931).

Question: How did you keep in touch with the center during your stay in Ivanovo?

Answer: The conditions of pedagogical work in Ivanovo allowed me to spend half of my time in Moscow, where I kept in touch with the center of the Rights, in particular personally with BUKHARIN, SLEPKOV and others, about which I will speak in detail below.

Question: What other facts can you cite about the counter-revolutionary activities of the Rights in 1930-31?

Answer: There are many. I will reproduce those of them that are well preserved in my memory. I have shown above about the work of our organization along the trade union line. Specifically, about the work of this group and about its connection with the center, I know the following: in the winter of 1930-31, I attended a meeting in Yaglom's apartment. In addition to YAGLOMA, there were GINZBURG and some other of the trade unions, as well as Slepko, Maretsky, Kuzmin and myself. YAGLOM reported on the practical activities of their group, proving that they managed to maintain their positions in the trade unions despite the fact that our supporters were removed from the leading bodies of the trade unions.

I recall my conversation with BUKHARIN in the summer of 1931 or 1932, during which BUKHARIN this time explicitly declared the need to kill STALIN. Developing this idea further, BUKHARIN stressed that in the absence of STALIN no one would be able to rally the party, and this would enable us to seize the leadership in our own hands.

Question: Where did this conversation take place?

Answer: This conversation between BUKHARIN and myself took place in the Zvenigorod area, where we went hunting.

Question: Has the organization taken any practical steps towards realizing its terrorist aims? What exactly were they?

Answer: I will state everything in order. In the spring of 1932, when SLEPKOV left for Saratov and was waiting to be transferred to Rostov, I went to his house. I found AREFIEV, a member of the organization, at Slepko's. In the presence of AREFIEV, SLEPKOV praised him in every possible way to me, characterizing him as the most devoted person, ready for practical actions. *After AREFIEV's departure, SLEPKOV told me that, according to BUKHARIN, he knew that

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the center of the organization decided to recognize terror as a method of struggle, and that AREFIEV is carrying out practical work in this direction. However, SLEPKOV did not let me in on the details of this work. Telling me further about the terrorist plans of the organization, SLEPKOV said that in Leningrad a member of the organization MARETSKY established contact with the terrorist group KAREVA. A few days later, in his apartment, MARETSKY confirmed to me his connection with the Leningrad terrorist group KAREVA*.

Question: What did MARETSKY tell you about the practical activities of the terrorist group KAREVA?

Answer: I did not consider it convenient to ask about the details, and he did not tell me anything about it. In addition, in the same conversation, which was conducted in terms of the prospects for terror, SLEPKOV asked me how the members of the organization associated directly with UGLANOV, i.e. BASHENKOV, CHESNOKOV and MATVEEV. I replied that these guys were quite "strong", that I had talked to them and that I had no doubts about their readiness for active terrorist work.

Question: How did you know the readiness of BASHENKOV, CHESNOKOV and MATVEEV for active terrorist work?

Answer: In 1931 BASHENKOV, CHESNOKOV and MATVEEV visited my house. During the conversation about the situation in the country and the party, they spoke out quite unequivocally as supporters of terrorist methods of struggle against the party leadership.

MATVEEV noted that the main task was to remove STALIN by any means, including terror.

In response to my statement that our people were only talking about this, and that we would not change the situation by talking, MATVEEV informed me that he was not engaged in chatter, but was preparing a group of youth for terror, with whom he personally did not connected.

Question: Of whom did MATVEEV's group personally consist?

Answer: MATVEEV did not give me his last name. Yes, in general then, for reasons of conspiracy, and especially when it was said about terror, it was not customary to expand on details and persons. I now recall that * about AREFIEV, as about a person conducting direct terrorist work, SLEPKOV also told me later, around August 1932 *. Here are the circumstances: in the middle of 1932, after SLEPKOV returned from the rest home, I went to his apartment. The conversation revolved around the forthcoming illegal conference of the right. Enumerating the persons whose participation in the conference is undesirable for conspiratorial reasons, SLEPKOV named AREFIEV "because he conducts direct terrorist work." In this connection, SLEPKOV also named KUZMIN, who had arrived from Novosibirsk, with whom he (SLEPKOV) had been talking a lot these days, who was "capable of the practical implementation of terror."

Question: You testify that in August 1932 you had a conversation with SlepkoV about the impending illegal conference of the Rights. Who came up with the idea of convening the conference?

Answer: I will show this below. Allow me to present a number of facts from the activities of our organization before the conference.

The year 1930 did not justify our hopes. There was no "nationwide" uprising, no intervention. The five-year plans were overfulfilled, and the collective-farm movement was on solid footing.

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In the winter of 1930-31, BUKHARIN spoke at a number of clandestine meetings of our organization. In his speeches, the basic tenets of the tactics of the Right, given by him a year ago and outlined above, remained unchanged. At the dacha in Pokrovsko-Streshnevo in the winter of 1930-31, BUKHARIN also spoke of the conditions in which the underground organization of the Rights was placed. "Now," said BUKHARIN, "for every expression of our views they will be expelled from the Party and arrested, since these views have been declared incompatible with being in the Party." BUKHARIN, however, urged not to lose heart. The work of the organization is incredibly difficult, but not impossible. It is necessary to go deeper underground, to recruit cadres with greater caution, chasing not so much their quantity as their quality. Although 1930 did not justify our hopes, the prospects are not hopeless. STALIN succeeded by means of a "successful maneuver" (as Bukharin called the article "Dizziness from Success") to delay the denouement, but did not resolve the fundamental contradictions. BUKHARIN repeated the insurrectionary orientation he had developed a year ago, confirming that the right-wing tactics in these uprisings would remain the same as they had been outlined a year ago, although the expected "victory" over the Stalinist leadership might be delayed.

At another conference, which took place that same winter in Maretsky's apartment, BUKHARIN spoke of the impracticability of the five-year plan, not only at age 4, but even at age 5, and repeated the previous defeatist attitude. *He stood in solidarity with the wreckers GROMAN, KONDRAT'EV and others in their plans to disrupt the five-year plan. Concerning the international situation, BUKHARIN said that there is more "freedom" in the bourgeois countries than under Stalin's leadership in the USSR. BUKHARIN characterized the trials of the Mensheviks and wreckers as "theatrical productions"*, supposedly necessary for the leadership from domestic political and international considerations. MARETSKY said in his speech that the defendants at these trials were the same Mensheviks, wreckers and interventionists, "like we are Chinese."

At another meeting in the same apartment of MARETSKY, in the same winter of 1930-31, ZETLIN, in the presence of BUKHARIN, said the following about the attitude of the right to Trotskyism: we must admit once and for all, ZETLIN declared, that in internal Party questions we were wrong in 1923-1928 gg., and the Trotskyists are entirely right. They saw before us where the "Stalinist regime" was leading. At this point, TSETLIN was interrupted by KUZMIN, who shouted: "Kill STALIN." SLEPKOV basically agreed with TSETLINNY, but pointed out to him that the line of the right-wing Bukharinists regarding Trotskyism "from the very beginning" was different from the Stalinist line, referring to the 1924 memorandum of BUKHARIN and the conflicts in the editorial board of Pravda with the Central Committee in 1927 year, which I have shown above.

The year 1931, the third decisive year of the First Five-Year Plan, dealt a serious blow to our hopes for an aggravation of "difficulties" and for a mass counter-revolutionary movement in the country. Nor did our hopes for intervention come true. We were faced with a choice: either fully recognize the correctness of the party line and surrender, or continue the struggle in the old positions of the restoration of capitalism in conditions of complete isolation from the masses, passing over to adventurist tactics of struggle without the masses, to individual terror.

The last path, as is known, was chosen at that moment by the Trotskyists.

We have embarked on the same path.

At the meetings of the activists of our organization in November 1931 at my apartment and at the beginning of 1932 at Slepko's apartment, BUKHARIN delivered a series of speeches in which he pointed out the seriousness of the defeats we had suffered,

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on our isolation from the masses as a result of the undeniable successes of the five-year plan and collectivization. BUKHARIN in these speeches attacked STALIN as the main culprit of our defeat. These speeches of his were full of malicious slanderous attacks against the leadership of the party and contained a direct call for the assassination of STALIN.

* In the spring of 1932, SLEPKOV, in his apartment, directly told me about the need to kill STALIN ("either we, or STALIN, one of us will not live") and informed me about the transition of the center of the right to terror tactics *.

At the same time, our previous idea of a bloc with other counter-revolutionary and White Guard organizations was being put into practice. At the beginning of 1932, SLEPKOV at his apartment at a meeting of the organization's activists justified the need to conclude a bloc with the Trotskyists. He said that "the Trotskyists have adopted the economic platform of the Rights, while the Rights have adopted the inner-Party platform of the Trotskyists. Terror tactics unite us. The differences between us and the Trotskyists are insignificant."

Referring to his own and MARETSKY's experience of numerous underground meetings with Trotskyists in Moscow, Samara, Saratov and Leningrad, SLEPKOV argued that the Trotskyists are evolving, approaching us. SLEPKOV informed the meeting that his point of view on the necessity of concluding a bloc with the Trotskyists was agreed with BUKHARIN; with the center of the right and the meeting adopted this point of view. A few days later, in Slepko's apartment, in the presence of MARETSKY, BUKHARIN confirmed the need for such a bloc.

I spoke personally with Bukharin several times about the need for a transition to terror. I remember my conversation in November 1932. The conversation began with the circumstances of Slepko's arrest. I told Bukharin everything I knew. Bukharin remarked that the most dangerous thing for Slepko and our organization was if the GPU succeeded in uncovering our terrorist work. BUKHARIN expressed particular anxiety about the fate of KUZMIN and AREFIEV in connection with the fact that he knew them as the most active supporters of terror.

In a further conversation, I remarked to BUKHARIN that our group had been beheaded by the arrest of Slepko, Maretsky, and Petrovsky, and I expressed misgivings about myself. BUKHARIN replied that, in his opinion, I (ASTROV) had a chance of surviving arrest. He further suggested that I curtail my ties for a while, observe maximum secrecy, and convey the same to the other members of the organization as a directive from the center. In conclusion, BUKHARIN once again stressed that it was extremely important that I remain at large, since I would have to continue the work begun by SLEPKOV in preparing a terrorist act against STALIN. I accepted this as a directive of the center of the organization.

Question: Did BUKHARIN give you more specific instructions about terror at this meeting?

Answer: No, he just said, almost verbatim, the way I reproduced it above.

Question: Where exactly did this meeting of yours with Bukharin take place?

Answer: This meeting of mine with BUKHARIN (in November 1932) took place near Nikitskaya Square. He walked along with the GRASS. Bukharin and I walked along Tverskoy Boulevard, on the right side, heading towards Strastnaya Square. Bukharin apologized to TRAVINA, telling her that we needed to talk in private, and she fell behind us.

*When the anxiety caused by the arrest of SLEPKOV subsided somewhat, we again returned to questions related to the preparation of terror. In the early days of January 1933, AREFIEV came to me in the evening. He

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informed me that the contacts among the Kremlin cadets, with the help of which he intended to penetrate the Kremlin to kill STALIN, were now lost to him. He directly told me that it was necessary to prepare and organize individual terror against STALIN, for this purpose infiltrating any meeting of the central institutions where STALIN would be. AREFIEV asked me if I would personally undertake this act of terrorism*.

Question: Why did AREFIEV turn to you?

Answer: Firstly, because my moods were quite well known to him, and secondly, he let me know that he knew about my conversation with BUKHARIN, during which he told me that I would have to continue terrorist work, interrupted by the arrest of SLEPKOV.

Offering me to take upon myself the commission of a terrorist act, Aref'ev showed that it would be technically easier for me, as a person who was relatively less compromised, technically. I replied that I personally did not consider it expedient for the perpetrator of the terrorist act to be a person known to be close to Bukharin, or in general a rightist, because in this case our best cadres would be physically destroyed. I pointed out to AREFIEV that it would be more profitable to carry out a terrorist attack against STALIN by the hands of the White Guards.

tsev, for example, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, then the right would have remained unsullied, at the same time managing to reap its fruits. As far as I know, some steps were taken towards establishing relations with the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

Question: Which ones exactly?

Answer: I have in mind, in particular, the relationship between BUKHARIN and the Socialist-Revolutionary Semyonov. In the winter of 1932, BUKHARIN, SLEPKOV, and I were heading towards GRAVINA. On the way, BUKHARIN said that, after a considerable break, the Socialist-Revolutionary SEMENOV began to visit him again and that he (BUKHARIN) was having frank political conversations with SEMENOV. As we were walking from TRAVINA'S, SLEPKOV told me that, according to BUKHARIN, there were talks between him and Semyonov about a political bloc. How it ended, I don't know. But this fact, especially in the light of BUKHARIN's own earlier direct statements that "life may prompt us for a temporary bloc with the Socialist-Revolutionaries," seems to me significant.

Regardless of the offer made by AREFIEV to me personally, he informed me that he managed to get in touch with the Trotskyist terrorist group through the right-wing PANOVA, and that among the members of this group AREFIEV saw a man in military uniform, about whom AREFIEV was told that he worked in the organs of the OGPU. In the presence and with the participation of this military man, it was decided to start preparing a terrorist attack against STALIN.

Question: Who is this soldier? What details do you know about him?

Answer: I remember that AREFIEV told me that he had been told that this military man was a leading worker of the GPU of Belarus.

I approved the steps taken by Aref'ev in the sense of establishing contact with the Trotskyist terrorist group and asked him to inform me of the further steps of this group.

Question: Did BUKHARIN know about AREFIEV's connection with the Trotskyist terrorist group?

Answer: Yes, I knew. Bukharin knew about this from EIKHENWALD under the following circumstances. In January 1933, a few days after my above-mentioned meeting with Aref'ev, I called on AIKHENWALD. Knowing that AIKHENWALD continued to meet with BUKHARIN, I told him the content of my conversation about terror with Arefiev, in particular, that the latter had contacted a Trotskyist terrorist group preparing a terrorist act against STALIN. He asked him to pass this on to BUKHARIN.

A few days later I came to AIKHENWALD in the evening, and he informed me that everything I asked, he had told BUKHARIN. You are probably wondering why it was necessary to resort to the mediation of EICHENWALD. I answer: it was stipulated that, for the time being, AREFIEV and I, for secret reasons, should avoid direct contact with BUKHARIN.

The summer and autumn of 1932 were a period of new revival of our hopes for the rise of a mass anti-Soviet movement in the country. New difficulties with grain procurements in the conditions of the collective-farm village are looming on the horizon. At that time there was a lot of talk about the southern regions, especially about the Kuban, about crop failures in the Ukraine, and so on.

We hastened to take advantage of this by intensifying our underground work. Around August 10, 1932, SLEPKOV arrived in Moscow from the south and, meeting me at his apartment, told me that, according to his assessment, the situation of a general economic and political crisis that was in place by the beginning of 1930 was "resurrecting" in the country again. "Everywhere," he said, "you can hear the same conversations as two years ago." Therefore, he, SLEPKOV, thinks that the core of our organization needs to get together and discuss in all its breadth the questions of the platform and tactics of the Rights in connection with the assessment of the international and internal situation of the USSR, in order to prepare the underground organization and the cadres of the Rights to resume the open struggle for the overthrow of Stalinist leadership, possible in the near future. A few days later SLEPKOV came to my apartment and said that at the end of August it was necessary to convene, as he said, a conference to discuss the issues that he had discussed with me at the previous meeting. SLEPKOV said that he had spoken about this with MARETSKY and PETROVSKY, and that they

agree.

SLEPKOV further informed me that he had written off to a number of members of the organization working in the provinces and summoned them to Moscow for August. About 20/VIII-32, a meeting was held at Slepko's apartment with the participation of Slepko, Maretsky, Petrovsky, mine and ZHIROV. The meeting decided to convene a conference in the last days of August.

Question: Was this conference convened on the initiative of SLEPKOV alone?

Answer: No, its convocation was coordinated with TOMSKY, a member of the center of the right. It was like this:

In view of BUKHARIN's absence from Moscow, the conference delegated SLEPKOV and ZHIROV to TOMSKY as the representative of the center for directives on the conduct of the conference and to ascertain the tactical position of the center at the present moment.

Question: When did the conference take place, who participated in it, what questions were discussed and what decisions were made?

Answer: The conference worked in Moscow from August 26 to September 1, 1932. It had 3 sessions: the first two of them were at my apartment (22 Begovaya) and the third at MARETSKY (Bryusovsky per.). The conference was attended by: SLEPKOV (Rostov), MARETSKY (Leningrad), KUZMIN (Novosibirsk), PETROVSKY (Saratov), ALEXANDROV (Sverdlovsk), I (Moscow), ZHIROV (Moscow), LEVIN (Saratov), CHERNUKHIN (Moscow), IDELSON (Moscow), GROLMAN (Moscow), GASPERSKAYA (Moscow).

ASTROVA was also present at the first two meetings, and PETROVSKAYA, at the second. SLEPKOV was unanimously elected chairman of the conference. I must say here that before the start of the first meeting of the conference, when its participants had already gathered in my apartment, SLEPKOV told me

said that KUZMIN and AREFIEV practically developed a plan for the capture of the Kremlin by a company of cadets (AREFIEV had some connections among the cadets guarding the Kremlin), with the arrest of members of the government and the murder of STALIN. At the first meeting of the conference, SLEPKOV and ZHIROV gave information about their visit to TOMSKY, informing the conference participants that TOMSKY agreed with them in assessing the situation in the country. TOMSKY'S point of view, as expounded by SLEPKOV and ZHIROV, is as follows: an economic and political crisis is unfolding in the country, the dissatisfaction of the party and non-party masses with the policy of the party is growing, and a wave of popular uprisings is inevitable. The situation in the very near future will require us to take active action using all means of struggle. According to ZHIROV and SLEPKOV, TOMSKY expounded this point of view to them on behalf of the center of the Rights. On behalf of the center of the right, TOMSKY issued through ZHIROV and SLEPKOV the directive to the conference "to put together cadres with the aim of resuming in the near future the open struggle for the overthrow of the Stalinist leadership." TOMSKY approved our initiative to discuss the platform and tactics of the Rights at the conference.

According to SLEPKOV and ZHIROV, they asked TOMSKY whether there were right-wing disagreements at the center, whether RYKOV and BUKHARIN would support you in the forthcoming open action against the party. TOMSKY assured them categorically that there were no disagreements in the center of the Rights and that there were no grounds for doubting the firmness of the position of RYKOV and BUKHARIN at the moment of the impending struggle. The mood of TOMSKY SLEPKOV and ZHIROV was characterized as "fighting." Zhiron repeated the same information at the second largest meeting of the conference. At the very first meeting of the conference, SLEPKOV informed those present that STEN had come to him the other day and, on behalf of a group of "leftists", suggested that we conclude a bloc with them. SLEPKOV got in touch with him, saying that he would raise this issue for discussion by the organization's activists. This question was discussed at the second meeting of the conference, and it was decided to conclude a bloc with a group of leftists (LOMINADZE, STEN, SHATSKY, and others). At the first meeting of the conference, ALEKSANDROV's report on the economic situation in the country was heard. The speaker talked about the development of a deep economic crisis, accusing the party leadership of undermining the foundations of the national economy in the USSR, and mocked the slogan of fulfilling the five-year plan in 4 years, saying that it was impossible to fulfill even in 5 years.

At the second meeting, AIKHEWALD's report was heard on the general political situation in the country and the tasks of our organization. The report was supplemented by keynote speeches by SLEPKOV. Both EIKHENWALD and SLEPKOV developed and substantiated the basic propositions that were presented by Zhiron and Slepko at the first meeting of the conference on behalf of TOMSKY. Slepko's speech contained a number of malicious slanderous attacks against STALIN and a direct call for his assassination. All the participants of the conference, with the exception of GASPERSKAYA, as well as ASTROVA and PETROVSKAYA, who were present, took the floor in the debate on the report of AIKHENWALD. There were no differences in the main points of view between the speakers. KUZMIN advocated terror tactics and a "palace coup". In view of the unanimity among the members of the conference, the speakers abandoned the final words. For reasons of secrecy, it was decided at the meeting itself not to record the decisions of the conference and it was proposed to formulate them to the chairman of the conference SLEP-

KOVA, which he did at the end of the meeting.

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The solutions basically came down to the following:

1) The Stalinist policy of the party, despite the external successes of industrialization and collectivization, led the country to a deep economic and political crisis. The country is facing a new period of popular uprisings against the Stalinist leadership.

2) Exit for the country is possible only if the program of the right is carried out.

3) The platform of the right, put forward in 1928-29. in the speeches of the leaders and their statements, has justified itself and must be preserved.

4) The task of the rightists at the current moment is to build up cadres and strengthen the illegal organization, to increase the recruitment of new members of the organization, conducting oral propaganda and using all the possibilities of printed propaganda (illegally), combining this with legal opportunities.

5) Orient the organization of the right towards the proximity of open action with the aim of overthrowing the Stalinist leadership. It is possible that for a start we will demand to open discussions in order to transfer it to the masses, and in the meantime prepare for active actions using all means of struggle, up to an uprising, terror and a palace coup.

6) Confirm the correctness of the tactics of bloc with the Trotskyists adopted by the center of the Rights and conclude a bloc with the leftists (LOMINADZE, STEN, SHATSKY).

As you know, some of the conference participants were soon arrested.

Question: Was the well-known Ryutin platform discussed at the conference?

Answer: Ryutin's platform was not discussed at the above meetings of the conference. We discussed it later in a narrower circle.

Question: When and where?

Answer: I will tell everything about it as it was:

The Ryutin platform was essentially a document not of Ryutin, but of the center of the right. This can be seen from the following: around September 10, 1932, a conference was held at SLEPKOV's apartment, in which SLEPKOV, MARETSKY, myself, AIKHENWALD, ZAITSEV, and AREFIEV took part. The subject of discussion was the so-called Ryutin platform. SLEPKOV, having outlined the content of this platform to us, said that in terms of its content, in decisive questions, it is identical to the platform adopted by us at our conference, which I spoke about above. In particular, SLEPKOV said that Ryutin's platform, like our decision, contained the demand for the use of all means, including terror, in the struggle against the leadership of the CPSU(b). *SLEPKOV further reported that the main authors of the Ryutin platform were Ry-

KOV, BUKHARIN, TOMSKY, and UGLANOV, and that in case of failure, this document was conditioned to be portrayed as a document of Ryutin only, so as not to jeopardize the leading elite of the Rights*. Here is the main thing I knew about the underground work of the right before my arrest.

Question: When and for what were you arrested?

Answer: I was arrested on February 18, 1933 in Moscow and on April 23, 1933 I was sentenced by the Collegium of the OPTU to 3 years in a political isolator for participating in a counter-revolutionary organization of the right. On June 16, 1934, I was released early and sent into exile in the mountains. Voronezh, where on February 16, 1936, the reference was replaced by "minus 40".

We used the conditions that were available in the isolation ward to the best of our ability to establish contact with our like-minded people in the wild. Communication with the "will" was carried out through Galina SHALAKHOVA, who lived in Moscow. Information about the state of affairs in the organization SHALAKHOVA reported to SLEPKOV in letters to him, addressed to the Ural prison, using ciphered figures of speech and expressions. For his part, SLEPKOV, in his letters to the SHALAKHOVA, used the same conditional turns of speech,

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He told her about what was happening in the detention center and gave instructions on how to communicate with the leading cadres of the organization who remained in Moscow.

In the Suzdal prison, I and the members of our organization KHAKHAREV, DO MASHIN (DOMASHIN Pansofy at the beginning of 1933, until the moment of his arrest worked in the Sokolnichesky District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Moscow, it seems, as an instructor) and SOMOV established contact and friendship with the Trots who were sitting there – cysts: GAYEVSKY, BOLOTNIKOV and MIKHALEVICH. We all agreed on the basis of the mutual recognition of terror as a method of combating the Party and Soviet power. In such an atmosphere, sitting in prison, we confirmed our terrorist moods and intentions. Thus, SOMOV, in conversations with me in the spring of 1934 in the Suzdal prison, repeatedly declared his readiness to take upon himself the commission of a terrorist act against STALIN. Similar terrorist sentiments were expressed by the Trotskyist SOMER, the right-wing RADIVILIN, and the Trotskyist GAYEVSKY. From the facts deserving attention concerning the activities of the Rights "in the wild", I learned the following from the above-mentioned DOMASHIN: in November-December 1933, DOMASHIN told me that in Moscow he was connected with one of the groups of the organization of the Rights, which had its people on a number of enterprises in Moscow, as well as in the party apparatus and among business executives. Among the members of this group, Domashin named b. director of the aviation plant GORBUNOVA, who died in 1934. From this information of his, I remember that a number of members of the organization managed to get appointments to the posts of heads of political departments of the MTS and state farms. Domashin himself, according to him, was a member of a group located in the Sokolnichesky district and was associated with the central group of this organization. To what time the activity of this organization belongs, who personally was still a part of it, I cannot say. It is possible that DOMASHIN told me about this in somewhat more detail, but I forgot.

Question: Where did you work after your release from the isolation ward?

Answer: As I said, I was exiled to Voronezh. Once in exile in Voronezh, where I stayed from June 1934 to November 1936, I set about resuming organizational ties there. In particular, with NESTEROV and FURNITURE, who were in Voronezh. FURNITURE came to Voronezh in 1936 from Tobolsk, where he was serving a link. There, in Tobolsk, he, according to him, established an org. connection with UGLANOV. FURNITURE told me that Uglanov remains in irreconcilable positions and visits Moscow, where he contacts his like-minded people who continue to work actively in Moscow. MEBEL himself, in conversations with me, expressed extreme bitterness against the leadership of the CPSU (b), especially STALIN, emphasizing that he sees a way out in the murder of STALIN.

Question: Was there any connection between you and the center of the right during your stay in Voronezh?

Answer: Yes, such a connection existed.

Question: How was this connection made?

Answer: I have already shown above that, while living in Voronezh, I established an organizational connection with the right-wing NESTEROV, who was exiled there. Communication with the center in the person of RYKOV was carried out through NESTEROV's wife ARTEMENKO, who regularly came to Voronezh. I remember the arrival of ARTEMENKO from Moscow to Voronezh in August 1934. She stopped at the station. Graftskaya, where NESTEROV and I rented a dacha. Here ARTEMENKO informed us that she continued to keep in touch with RYKOV in Moscow, and that before her departure RYKOV instructed her to hand over to us a directive, the meaning of which boils down (in her presentation) to continue

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reap double-dealing, "not skimping on the praise of the general line of the party and STALIN." ARTEMENKO reported that RYKOV, BUKHARIN and TOMSKY, as she knew from RYKOV's words, did not think of changing their line, continued to represent the center of the Rights, continued to direct the underground work of the Rights. From ARTEMENKO's information, I recall her story that TOMSKY in the OGIZ and RYKOV in the People's Commissariat of Communications are pursuing a sabotage line, sabotaging work, evading the resolution of major issues under the pretext that each of them is surrounded, allegedly by specially party "attached" people to them. So, according to ARTEMENKO, RYKOV explained to her his role in the People's Commissariat of Communications and the role of TOMSKY in the OGIZ.

Of greatest interest, however, is the report made by ARTEMENKO during her visit to Voronezh in December 1934. She made this message to me and NESTEROV in the latter's apartment on the street. Karl Marx. She began from afar: namely, that back when NESTEROV, ARTEMENKO, RADIN, and GOLDMAN were working in RYKOV's secretariat, RADIN once, in the presence of the persons listed

the murder of STALIN and that RYKOV fully agreed with this. NESTEROV remembered this fact of RADIN's statement and confirmed it. In this, as in other conversations, ARTEMENKO showed extreme bitterness against STALIN.

After a short pause, ARTEMENKO told me and NESTEROV that she herself had been monitoring the passage of government vehicles on the streets of Moscow with the aim of assassinating STALIN.

Question: When exactly did she conduct this observation?

Answer: From the facts that I will cite later, it is clear that this refers to 1934-1936. From her further presentation, I remembered the following: government cars driven by STALIN, MOLOTOV and other members of the government, she (ARTEMENKO) can immediately distinguish from all other cars. They move at full speed in several, following one after the other, and that this is done for reasons of precaution. The militiamen, according to ARTEMENKO's observations, recognize the government cars and let them through without any traffic rules. ARTEMENKO further reported that while observing, she found that STALIN and other members of the government often travel along the Arbat, heading to Zubalovo, and the tram has recently been removed from the Arbat with the special purpose of ensuring safety and fast travel when government vehicles pass to the side Zubalovo. According to ARTEMENKO, she specifically observed the activities of the GPU to protect members of the government on the streets of Moscow at the time of transferring the remains of Kirov from the Oktyabrsky railway station to the House of the Union and at the time of their transfer from the House of the Unions to Red Square. According to ARTEMENKO's observations, all the forces of the militia and the GPU, as well as a number of military units, were mobilized that day. In the streets, where members of the government followed the procession, the sidewalks with the public were fenced off with tapestries of the Red Army, and even the windows in many houses overlooking the street were under the supervision of guards.

Question: Did ARTEMENKO tell who personally ordered her to conduct surveillance?

Answer: *I did not speak directly. But since in this information, as in the previous one, she spoke of her organizational connection with RYKOV, from whom she (as I showed) received directives, it was evident from everything that this instruction also came from RYKOV*.

Q: Didn't you ask her directly?

Answer: No, because I did not consider it convenient.

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Question: Did ARTEMENKO name her accomplices in monitoring?

Answer: No, she didn't.

Question: Did she have a weapon, in particular, at the time of observation?

Answer: I don't know if ARTEMENKO had weapons at the time of her observation of government vehicles. But the fact that she had weapons, I know from her own words. In one of the conversations in Moscow, she once told me that, fearing arrest, she, just in case, hid the revolvers she kept, and took them down to someone.

Question: What weapon?

Answer: I don't know. I only remember that it was said "revolvers", i.e. in plural.

Question: Do you know where ARTEMENKO acquired the weapons?

Answer: ARTEMENKO told me that the revolver had been given to her by one of her acquaintances at the OPTU.

Question: What do you know about ARTEMENKO's further terrorist activities?

Answer: At the end of July 1936, while in Moscow, I went to ARTEMENKO (on Nikolskaya). We went back to her earlier reports of surveillance of government vehicles. She told me that during Gorky's funeral she had been shadowing STALIN. She was in the crowd near the entrance to the House of the Unions, where Gorky's body stood. Before her eyes, several cars drove up to the House of the Unions. STALIN stepped out of one of them and entered the House of the Union. ARTEMENKO, with anger and indignation, recounted how those around her shouted "Hurrah" and other words of greeting to STALIN. At the end of the conversation, she declared that she would continue her observation work with the same perseverance and that she did not lose hope for a successful outcome of the "undertakings", as she put it.

Question: Did you meet ARTEMENKO after July 1936?

Answer: Yes. met. Two or three times in September 1936 in Voronezh. Whether she told me anything new during these meetings about the terrorist work she is doing, I cannot say with certainty. In the month of November 1936 I was arrested.

Question: During this period in Moscow, did you keep in touch with BUKHARIN and RYKOV?

Answer: * For reasons of conspiracy, I during this period of direct he did not keep in touch with BUKHARIN. As for RYKOV, until recently, as I showed above, communication with him was carried out through ARTEMENKO*.

Written down from my words correctly, read by me. ASTROV

Interrogated:

Head of the 4th department of the GUGB, Commissar
of State Security, 3rd rank KURSKIY Pom. early 1 sec. 4
departments of the GUGB captain of state
security PULOV Operative officer of the 1st department. 4th
Department of the GUGB Lieutenant of State Security
MATUSOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 269. L. 116-160. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "To the members of the PB. St.". *** underlined in pencil.

*** underlined in pencil in the margin.

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No. 3

M.M.'s NOTE Litvinova I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS IN
CONNECTION WITH THE
PREPARATION OF THE TRIAL ON GERMAN DATA (3)

January 15, 1937

No. 30/I

very secret

I am returning the note, t.t. Yezhov and Vyshinsky and the indictment, on which I have the following remarks:

1. Initially, more than 20 Germans were arrested, of which it is planned to release pending trial and deport all but 8. I would consider it more correct that at least 10 people be involved in the case so that several people could be acquitted in court or deported by a court order. The authority of the court will only benefit if, along with the convicts, there are also acquitted.

2. I don't know when the process will be scheduled. It is possible that due to another process it will be delayed. In the meantime, we have long promised the German ambassador the release of a certain part of the arrested Germans. I would like to offer Comrade. Yezhov, regardless of the approval of the indictment, to immediately release a certain number of Germans.

3. We may be embarrassed by Oberberg's testimony (p. 9) about his alleged receipt of a bomb from a member of a foreign mission. The participation of such a collaborator in the preparation of a terrorist act must result in the most violent protest on our part against this government and at least a demand for the recall of this collaborator. Such actions justify even breaking up a relationship.

One suspicion that the participants in the assassination of Alexander the Serbian were preparing their actions in Hungary almost led to war, and this case was examined at several sessions of the Council of the League of Nations.

Although the government is not named in the indictment, it will be perfectly clear to everyone that we are talking about the German embassy or consulate. I would therefore consider it correct to withdraw this testimony from the published indictment, so that the testimony would be given behind closed doors.

doors.

4. If the Germans are not supposed to be shot, then it would be better not to sentence them to the highest measure in order to pardon them. Some time will pass between the sentence and the pardon. An incredible noise will rise in the German press and the pardon will be interpreted as the result of pressure. It would have been better to immediately sentence him to 10 years' imprisonment. We have always maintained the point of view that foreign citizens, free in relation to us from civic obligations and a sense of duty to their homeland, are less responsible for anti-state actions than Soviet citizens.

LITVINOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 249. L. 158-159. Script. Typescript.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 4

CODE TELEGRAM Y.K. Berzina M.I. TO ROSENBERG ON THE
RETURN TO THE USSR OF EMIGRANTS WHO FIGHTED IN
SPAIN (4)

January 16, 1937

No. 44/sh

Valencia Rosenberg

We inform you that those former Russian White Guards who honestly fought on the side of the Republican troops in Spain and, due to injuries or illness, are now unable to actively participate in the further struggle, are allowed to return to the USSR.

On behalf of the authority of the Owner.

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. P. D. 56. L. 2. Copy. Typescript.

There is a typewritten note in the text: "For. I. Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, K. Voroshilov, Molotov.

No. 5

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN ON THE "POLISH MILITARY ORGANIZATION"

WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOL T.F. DOMBALIA (5)

January 16, 1937

No. 55331

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

At the end of 1936, through intelligence, a connection was established between the former deputy of the Polish Sejm DOMBAL Tomasz Frantsevich and the Pole PUGACHEVSKY S.M., who was in the reserve of the Workers 'and Peasants' Red Army as regiment commander.

Dombal arrived in the USSR in 1923 as an exchange of political prisoners, was transferred to the CPSU (b) with experience since 1920, was the political secretary of the Krestintern, vice-president of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences, a member of the Central Committee of the CP (b) Belarus and the Central Executive Committee of the BSSR until 1935, after that - an academician of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences.

PUGACHEVSKY S.M. was under special surveillance, as he had secret meetings with an employee of the Polish embassy in Moscow, who was an agent of the 2nd department of the Polish main headquarters - Anna Khrzhon Szczewska (now she has left back to Poland).

In December 1936, PUGACHEVSKY was arrested and during the investigation testified that he was engaged in espionage in favor of Poland, being an agent of the 2nd department of the Polish main headquarters, that he was a member of the so-called "Polish military organization" (POV), which was involved by the aforementioned DOMBAL, and on behalf of DOMBAL he was a member of a terrorist group that was preparing an attempt on the life of Comrade STALIN and Comrade VOROSHILOV.

Based on these data, and also bearing in mind the suspicion that DOMBAL belonged to the "Polish military organization", based on the testimony of SKARBEEK and others accused of liquidated Polish organizations in 1934, on December 29, 1936, DOMBAL was arrested.

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As you know, the "Polish military organization" was created by PIL SUDSKII during the years of the imperialist war and was headed by him personally, RYDZ-SMIGLY and SLAVEK.

After the formation of Poland, PILSUDSKY continued to strengthen to fill this organization, filling its main leading positions in the state apparatus and the army with its participants, and concentrated in the hands of this organization all the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the Polish government.

After the May 1926 coup, the "Polish Military Organization" became the ideological and organizational center of Polish fascism, its main leading organization.

This organization is especially active in the creation of reconnaissance, sabotage, terrorist residencies on the territory of the Soviet Union, and for a long time it has been introducing large political agents here, mainly using personnel that it manages to infuse into the Communist Party of Poland.

During the investigation on January 14, 1937, the arrested DOMBAL testified that he was an active participant in the "Polish military organization", that his cooperation and personal connection with Pilsudski began in 1912, that all his activities from that moment in Poland were directed either directly by Piysudski or by his closest assistants, that, on the direct instructions of Piysudski, he entered the Communist Party of Poland and achieved a leading position in it, that, finally, on the initiative of the leaders of the POV, in 1923 DOMBAL was exchanged as a political prisoner and transferred him in the USSR with special intelligence and political assignments.

DOMBAL admitted that since 1934, after the partial failures of the organization in Ukraine and Belarus, he received a directive from the 2nd department of the Polish main headquarters to take over the leadership of the POV on the territory of the USSR.

At the end of 1934, this directive was given to him by the Polish consul in Minsk YANKOVSKY, with whom DOMBAL, working in Minsk as vice president of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences, had been in secret communication since 1932.

At the beginning of 1935, after DOMBAL returned to Moscow, an assistant to the Polish military attache KHARLAND contacted him, confirming the instructions of YANKOVSKY and conveying to DOMBAL the directive of the 2nd department of the Polish main headquarters to start creating sabotage groups and preparing terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b).

In the summer of 1936, DOMBAL sent to Warsaw to communicate with the 2nd department of the Polish main headquarters, a member of the organization, a Polish citizen, SHIM KEVICH, who brought him a directive on the need to speed up the preparation of terrorist acts.

During 1935-1936. DOMBAL created a number of terrorist and sabotage groups in Moscow. In addition, DOMBAL also testified about the leaders and members of the organization in Ukraine and Belarus.

Undoubtedly, DOMBAL is trying to hide a lot from the investigation, mainly trying not to name all the members of the organization in order to keep the cadres of Polish spies, saboteurs and terrorists on our territory.

All members of the organization named by him in the testimony are arrested.

DOCUMENTATION

in the testimony of DOMBAL, we are starting to destroy the largest Polish sabotage-terrorist and espionage station in the Soviet Union*.

Attached are the testimonies of the accused Dombal T.F. dated January 14, 1937 and a certificate of identified members of the organization.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL*

Dombal Tomas Frantsevich

dated January 14, 1937

Born in 1890, a native of Poland, a Pole, was an officer in the Austrian army, arrived in the USSR as an exchange of political prisoners in 1923, a member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1920, an academician of the Belarussian Academy of Sciences, citizen of the USSR.

Question: You came to the USSR directly from a Polish prison. What did the pilsuds have to do with your departure to the USSR?

Answer: At the end of 1922, when the Central African Republic held the post of Minister of Justice, a pilsudchik who worked for the Central African Republic as an investigator contacted me on his behalf in prison, whose name I now do not remember. **On behalf of the CAR, he informed me that an exchange of political prisoners with the Soviet Union was to take place soon, and that the CAR, on behalf of PILSUDSKY, suggested that I agree to the exchange and leave for the USSR to work**. I answered yes. Only six months later it became officially known about the exchange, and in March 1923 I came to the USSR on an exchange.

Question: Who and when first restored contact with you from Poland after your arrival in the USSR?

Answer: **In 1924 I had the first secret meeting with an officer of the 2nd Division, who had arrived from Warsaw, whose name I do not remember**.

Q: How did he find you?

Answer: He contacted me by phone, finding his number in the phone book, saying that an acquaintance who had come from Poland wanted to see me. We agreed to meet him at Filippov's restaurant, where this meeting took place.

Question: How did you get to know each other in the restaurant?

Answer: In a general conversation on the phone, he let me know that he would have a cyclamen flower in his buttonhole.

Question: Why did you find it possible to talk with him on secret topics?

Answer: The captain started the conversation with me by sending greetings from TSAR, and that was more than enough for me.

Question: What instructions did he give you?

Answer: The captain told me that the purpose of this visit is to

new communication with me, obtaining personal information about my situation, as for instructions, they will be passed on to me at the next meeting.

Question: When and under what circumstances did this next meeting take place, and what instructions were given to you?

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Answer: The next meeting I had was with the above-mentioned prominent pilsudchik Georg KUNTSEVICH. I knew him from Poland. He called me on the phone, called himself by his POV pseudonym "Hedgehog". We met with him in the then existing literary cafe on the street. Gorky, located in that house, located opposite the place where the telegraph was later built. ** KUNTSEVICH informed me that SKARBEEK was in charge of all the organizational work of the "POV" in the USSR, and suggested that I establish and continue to maintain contact with SKARBEEK. I was personally instructed by KUNZE-HIV to start work in Moscow to collect important political, economic and military information about the USSR. Soon after the meeting with KUNTSEVICH, SKARBEEK arrived in Moscow. I contacted him and, before his arrest, I handed over to him for further dispatch all the materials I had collected**.

Question: How did you communicate after the arrest of SKARBEEK?

Answer: In connection with the failure of the POV in Ukraine in 1933, the arrest of SKARBEEK, I lost contact with Poland and stopped working.

Question: You are not telling the truth. You have been working against the USSR until very recently, and you will not be able to hide it. How did you communicate with Poland after the arrest of SKARBEEK?

Answer: You are right. I did work, but only reconnaissance, and after the arrest of SKARBEEK. Even during my stay in Minsk, where I went in 1932, even before the arrest of SKARBEEK, I established contact with the Polish consul in Minsk YANKOVSKY. Personally, I had a number of meetings with YANKOVSKY: four meetings within the walls of the Belarusian Academy of Sciences; one predetermined meeting - on the Koydanovsky highway; for the sixth meeting with YANKOVSKY, an official reception was used at the consulate; For one meeting arranged with Yankovsky, he sent his consular officer, whom I met in the area of Leninskaya Street late in the evening. ***During all these meetings, I handed over intelligence materials prepared by me in advance***.

Question: With whom were you connected after your return from Minsk to Moscow?

Answer: Shortly after I moved back to Moscow at the beginning of 1935, I was summoned by phone for a meeting by the assistant of the Polish military attache KHARLAND, whom I personally met back in Minsk at an official reception at the consulate. KHARLAND gave me, as the head of the entire organization, the task of creating a number of terrorist and sabotage groups for the preparation and implementation of terrorist acts.

against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and, first of all, against Stalin and Voro Shilov.

AP RF. F. 3 Op. 58. D. 250. L. 17-20, 43-47. Script. Typescript.

The protocol is published in part.

On the first sheet there are Stalin's handwritten notes: "N8 0 Dombale"; "Read. K. Voroshilov.

— underlined in the margins with a single line.

— underlined in pencil.

*** __ÿ*ÿ underlined in pencil and crossed out in the margin: "From whom D. received these
"materials"?"

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 6

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT N.A. KARTSEVE (6)

January 19, 1937

No. 55370

Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

According to the materials of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, it was established that engineer Nikolai Alexandrovich KARTSEV, who is currently working as the Chief Engineer of Directorate No. 6 of the People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry*, participates in the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist wrecking organization in the chemical industry.

KARTSEV, a former officer in the tsarist army, graduated from the military chemical academy in 1924, was closely associated with Academician IPAT'EV, deprived of Soviet citizenship, for whom he served as adjutant.

In 1924 Kartsev joined the ranks of the CPSU(b), but withdrew from all party work and surrounded himself with a group of former wreckers. He is married to a relative of a major pest, General SINYAVSKY, who was shot in 1931 for sabotage in military chemistry. After graduating from the Military Chemical Academy, in the period 1925-26. Kartsev worked in the mixed Russian-German joint-stock company "Bertoletovaya Salt" and was close to the German group of shareholders.

Arrested in the case of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization, ex. During interrogation on December 1, 1936, the head of Glavkhimprom RATAICHAK testified about the sabotage activities of Kartsev as follows:

"Kartsev supervised all work on sabotage in the design of workshops for poisonous substances. From the words of PYATAKOV, I, RATAICHAK, know that KARTSEV is a hostile person, opposed to the measures of the Soviet government, hindering the development of the chemistry of poisonous substances. It was to him, Kartsev, that Pyatakov, by special order, referred all the questions of poisonous substances.

During the interrogation from 4/XII of this year. RATAJCHAK showed:

"Kartsev, on the instructions of the organization, deliberately delayed the construction of the OV shops in Stalinogorsk and Berezniki, changing the designs of these shops during construction. This was done by him at the mustard gas plant in Berezniki, as well as the reconstruction of the substance-producing workshop No. 6 in Stalinogorsk, in addition, he disrupted the construction of the Perm, Slavyansk and Kemerovo chemical agents workshops.

By order of PYATAKOV, all work, not only on design, but also on consultation, was entrusted to Kartsev. Because of this, the factories did not have the right to change anything in the projects on their own.

At these construction sites, a number of defects in the designs were revealed, but their correction by Kartsev was deliberately delayed.

I remember from conversations with PYATAKOV that the latter spoke of Kartsev as a person hostile to the measures of the Soviet authorities and said that he could be entrusted with whatever he wanted.

Through the fault of Kartsev, the implementation of the resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense No. 85 s / s of September 9, 1933 on providing the Red Army with weapons was disrupted.

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for a year of warfare and capital construction of the NKTP, in terms of the industry of toxic substances.

Kartsev deliberately delayed the implementation of a new task of the Government on the development of defense means (decree of the K.O. dated July 27-35), as a result of which the deadlines for starting the construction and commissioning of a number of basic production of chemical warfare agents and means of chemical protection.

The consequence of KARTSEV's activities is the disruption of the production of the main types of poisonous substances, the needs of the Red Army for which are not met either in quantity or quality: the capacity for the poisonous substance, mustard gas, is negligible compared to any capitalist country, and, moreover, up to The production of non-freezing and viscous mustard has not yet been mastered on a factory scale.

Due to the permanent changes introduced by KARCEV into the design assignments of the newly built and reconstructed plants of poisonous substances Nos. 91, 102, 96 and 97, the capacities provided for by the decree of K.O. from 27/VI-35, according to phosgene, diphosgene, adamsite, calcium hypochloride and ethyl liquid. Kartsev disrupted the implementation of the decision of K.O. dated 27/VI-35 on the creation of capacities for equipping artillery shells and aerobombs with poisonous substances

Being the head of research and experimental work, KARCEV slowed down the production of new types of poisonous substances.

I consider it necessary to arrest Kartsev.

APPENDIX: Statement by TODORSKAYA.*

People's Commissioner of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 272. L. 119-121. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "From comrade Yezhov", "Arch. St.", crossed out: "Arrest Kartsev. St.".

*

The statement is not published (see comment).

No. 7

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOL I.D. TUROKA

January 19, 1937

No. 55372

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending you the protocols of the interrogations of the arrested TUROK I.D. dated January 14 and 16 of this year.

TURK showed that on the railway to them. comrade KAGANOVICH, he (TURK), on the instructions of the Trotskyist organization and Japanese intelligence, conducted active sabotage, wrecking work. The work of the road was largely disorganized, as a result of which there were frequent train wrecks and the transportation of essential goods was disrupted.

A number of crashes were prepared directly by the members of the organization. TUROK gave the following espionage information to Japanese intelligence agents: 1) in September 1934 - about the number of military trains that followed

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dov to the Far East, 2) in 1935 - on the throughput of the Perm road, on military echelons and the technical ability of the armed forces of the road, 3) in the same 1935, statements on the size of the goods movement, projected for the first days of the war and 4) data on the composition of the locomotive fleet of the road.

For his espionage work, the TURK received a monetary reward.

All participants in sabotage and sabotage activities named in the testimony of the TURK were arrested; we establish a Japanese agent named "Georgy Ivanovich".

People's Commissar of
Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

PROTOCOL OF
INTERROGATION OF Turk Iosif Dmitrievich

dated January 14, 1937

TUOK ID, born in 1900, member of the CPSU (b) since January 1918. Prior to his arrest, he served as deputy head of the road named after. L.M. Kaga
newbie.

Question: In the minutes of January 3-1937, you testified that, on instructions from the Trotskyist organization, you carried out wrecking work in transport.

Tell us in detail from whom and what exactly did you receive assignments for subversive wrecking activities?

Answer: I received instructions for subversive destructive activity in transport from MARYASIN.

* In 1934 and at meetings in 1935, MARYASIN gave me instructions on the need to launch extensive subversive work in transport, in particular: to disorganize the work of the road to such an extent as to cause mass train derailments, and disrupt transportation the most important goods of industry*.

In September 1935, I received similar instructions from a member of the organization LIVSHITSA. Having confirmed the instructions of MARYASIN, LIVSHITS instructed me to disrupt the execution of the orders of the People's Commissar of Railways L.M. Kaganovich about the train schedule.

Based on these attitudes, I launched a wide destructive work on the road, which I carried out in the following main areas:

travel disruption,

disruption of the overhaul and medium repair of the track and bringing the track into an emergency condition,

the collapse of the wagon economy of the road,

disruption of uncoupling and uncoupling repairs of cars, decommissioning of the car fleet,

disruption of traffic and organization of mass train wrecks on the road.

Question: What destructive work has been actually done by the members of your organization in the service of the railway?

Answer: We managed to bring the track into an emergency state at a number of important distances of the road and organize a number of serious crashes.

I took into account that the presence of

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a solid and skilled contingent of workers who know the repair and track business, and especially the condition of the track at a distance.

Based on this, I instructed ALEKSIN to deliberately transfer people, starting with repair workers and road foremen, from distance to distance. In carrying out this task, ALEKSIN achieved a weakening of the personnel staff at a number of distances. From the most important distances, people who knew the business of traveling were torn off, instead of them, new ones were hastily recruited - unfamiliar with work. From those distances where new people were sent, cadres were created who did not know the local conditions for maintaining the path.

Along with this, we took advantage of the fact that the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the road were carried out scattered, almost over all distances of the main directions of the road over a long distance.

This led to the fact that a lot of money was spent and not a single distance was brought to a completely accident-free state.

Wrecker work to disrupt the track was carried out deliberately by unsatisfactory maintenance of the track or by direct deliberate damage.

Having spread the paths of our people, members of the organization, at a number of important distances, we had every opportunity to carry out great destructive work in the economy of the track and inflict heavy blows on transport by organizing train derailments and accidents.

Question: Can you name for the investigation specific cases of crashes committed by members of your organization in the track service?

Answer: *In total, over the distances where the members of the organization worked, over the period from 1934 to 1936, there were more than 40 severe derailments and accidents of trains with a large number of broken cars, damage to the track and human casualties. Of these, I remember the following crashes: in July. In 1935, a member of the BONDARENKO organization organized a major wreck of a freight train on the Sarga-Iset stage, on the Sverdlovsk-Goroblagodatskaya section. During this crash, 3 hoppers fell down a slope, several wagons derailed, and train traffic was interrupted for 8 hours*.

Question: Who was the direct organizer of this crash?

Answer: ALEKSIN, and later BONDARENKO himself, told me that this crash was committed by a member of the organization, the foreman of the path PORTNOVIM, on the instructions of BONDARENKO.

Question: How did BONDARENKO and PORTNOV organize this crash?

Answer: ALEKSIN and BONDARENKO told me that the foreman PORTNOV, repairing the track, was correcting shocks, having a task from BONDARENKO to organize the crash. PORTNOV deliberately stretched the scope of work on tamping sleepers over a long distance. PORTNOV did not set any signals about the performance of work over a long distance. When passing trains at the work site, PORTNOV deliberately made a weak darn of the raised ends of the sleepers, which led to the crash.

Question: How did you manage to hide the traces of this crime?

Answer: Traces of the organization's participation in this crash were noticeable in the following way: by agreement with BONDARENKO, ALEKSIN concluded that the crash occurred as a result of a malfunction of the hoppers, which supposedly had gaps between the bearings in excess of the allowable. With regard to the state of the path and the guilt of PORTNOV in this crash, in the act the whole matter was reduced to an oversight shown on the part of PORTNOV,

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and it was immediately concluded that PORTNOV did not deserve to be held accountable.

Question: What destructive work did you carry out in the wagon service of the railway?

Answer: Subversive wrecking activities in the wagon service proceeded along the lines of disrupting the wagon economy of the road and putting the wagon fleet out of action.

This work was carried out by disorganizing the repair of wagons and the collapse of the axle box and lubrication facilities.

Along with this, the members of the organization, acting in the wagon service of the railway, carried out mass train derailments.

Subversive wrecking work in the carriage service of the road was carried out by members of the organization: b. deputy early carriage service by BURLAKOV, personally involved in the organization by me in the middle of 1934, and early. carriage service by INYUTIN, involved in the organization by BURLAKOV.

As a result of the subversive sabotage activities of the members of the organization operating in the wagon service, the wagon economy of the road was brought to a state of collapse. The number of wagon uncouplings due to malfunction in 1935 exceeded 4,000 monthly.

**3a 1935 there were more than 600 crashes and accidents due to the malfunction of cars. Including more than 150 cases due to fracture of axles and bursting of axle necks.

As a result of the deliberate disorganization of the repair of wagons and the obviously poor-quality repair, the railway throughout 1936 systematically received less for loading, on average, up to 300 wagons per day**.

Question: Name specific facts of subversive wrecking work by members of the organization in the wagon service?

Answer: I know that in the carriage section of Yegorshino, a group of members of the organization, acting under the leadership of the beginning. carriage service of the INYUTINA railway, systematically deliberately smashed wagon axles and axle necks with a sledgehammer in order to disable them and roll them under the wagons in an unusable state in order to cause crashes. During February and March 1936, members of the organization in Yegorshino disabled more than 20 wheel sets in this way.

A member of the organization, BURLAKOV, for 8 months in 1936, about 300 sick cars were missed on trains in order to cause wrecks. Including more than 60 cars with cracks in the axles and with unusable draft devices.

Question: Can you name for the investigation specific cases of crashes caused by members of your organization?

Answer: I cannot cite all the cases of crashes committed by members of our organization, because I do not remember. I am well aware of the following crash facts.

In June 1936, a member of the organization, CHERNUSHKIN, wrecked train No. 1025 on the Verkhne-Ivinsk-Rudyanka section. During the crash, 27 wagons were broken, 1 person was killed and 3 people were injured. * Losses from the crash amount to about 200,000 rubles *.

Question: What other wreckage caused by the members of your organization do you know?

Answer: In November 1935, a member of the organization, BURLAKOV, prepared the crash of train No. 701, as a result of which several cars were broken and damaged and 900 meters of track and 900 pieces of sleepers were damaged.

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In September 1936, while in Moscow, I had a meeting with a member of the LIVSHITS organization. I have already testified that at this meeting LIVSHITS gave me detailed instructions on wrecking activities in transport.

Question: What kind of tasks did LIVSHITS give you?

Answer: LIVSHITS gave me the following tasks: disorganization of the work of the railway. The need to disrupt the train schedule LIVSHITS

motivated by the fact that KAGANOVICH puts forward the schedule as an iron law in the work of the road. "That is precisely why," Livshitz said, "we must deal the most decisive blow to the schedule."

Question: What kind of wrecking work and by whom exactly was carried out in the service of the movement?

Answer: Subversive wrecking work in the traffic service was carried out by those involved in the organization: the head of the traffic service, b. head of the Tagil department of operation LAVRENT'EV, head of the Sverdlovsk department of traffic MAKAROV, head of the technical part of the traffic service DYKMAN.

Before LAVRENT'EV and MAKAROV, I set the task of disrupting the train schedule for the Tagil and Sverdlovsk branches. This task was completed by them.

In the Sverdlovsk branch, the percentage of trains running on schedule in the winter months was approximately 37%, and already in May. 1936 17%, in June 20%. According to the Tagil branch, also in May 1936, the percentage of trains running on schedule fell to 28%. At the same time, passenger trains were delayed by 100 train-kilometers along the Tagil branch in January 16 minutes, and already in April 1936 - 37 minutes and in May 32 minutes. In the Sverdlovsk branch in June 1936 - 23 minutes, while in February 1936 only 16 minutes. The turnover of steam locomotives in the Sverdlovsk branch was always very inflated and reached: in July 1936, 22 hours. at a rate of 13 hours (Sverdlovsk-Sortirovochnaya), which, with short shoulders, sharply lowered the earnings of locomotive crews, caused overtime work and sharp dissatisfaction with the locomotive workers. The situation was the same in the Tagil branch ...

** In the 3rd half of 1934, about 2,000 crashes and accidents took place on the road, during which more than 150 steam locomotives were damaged and about 1,500 wagons were broken and damaged. More than 100 people were killed and injured during these crashes. In 1935, up to 3,000 crashes and accidents took place on the road, during which more than 100 steam locomotives and 2,000 wagons were broken and damaged. More than 100 people were killed and wounded in the crashes.

In 1936, for 10 months, about 300 crashes were registered, 10 steam locomotives were damaged, about 1,000 wagons were broken and damaged. More than 50 people were killed and wounded in the crashes. Most of these crashes and accidents were the result of the subversive sabotage activities of our organization**.

Question: What kind of wrecking work and by whom exactly was carried out in the road electrification service?

Answer: In the electrification service, subversive work was carried out by those involved in the organization by me: b. early department of electrification ALBATS and his deputy MEERSON.

On b. On the Perm road, major work was underway to electrify the Sverdlovsk-Goroblagodatskaya section, which, according to government decree, should have been completed by January 1, 1934. MARYASIN told me,

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that he knows that the equipment that is manufactured at domestic factories for this section will be delayed by the supplier factories, and I also need to take action on my part.

Question: In the protocol of 3/1-37, you showed that you did not recruit KNYAZEY into the organization, but established contact with him in 1934, after he revealed to you that he was already a member of the Trotskyist organization, keeps in touch with LIVSHITs and guides K.R. work.

KNYAZEY categorically denies that he was a member of the organization before meeting with you in early 1934. Do you insist on your testimony about KNYAZEY?

Answer: I must say that I gave an inaccurate account of the circumstances of establishing contact with KNYAZEY during interrogation on 3/1-37. I have known KNYAZEY since 1931 through joint work on the b. Kazan railway. In repeated conversations with me, KNYAZEY expressed counter-revolutionary Trotskyist views on the main questions of party policy and showed a sharply hostile attitude towards the leadership of the CPSU(b).

In 1934, when I was involved in the organization by MARYASIN, I recommended KNYAZEY for involvement in the organization as a reliable person hostile to the CPSU (b), and received from MARYASIN the task of drawing KNYAZEY into the organization.

At the beginning of 1934, during meetings with KNYAZEY during his repeated visits to the administration, b. Perm road on the division of roads, I made KNYAZEY a practical proposal to join the organization, to which KNYAZEY, after some hesitation, agreed.

Question: The accused KNYAZEY testifies that when recruiting him into the organization, you reminded him of his negotiations with the Japanese engineer HIROSHIMO on the question of KNYAZEY's work in favor of Japanese intelligence. Do you confirm this.

Answer: Yes, I do.

Question: How did you know that the Japanese engineer HIROSHIMO was negotiating with KNYAZEY about his work in favor of Japanese intelligence?

Answer: HIROSHIMO himself told me about this before leaving the Soviet Union.

Question: In connection with what could HIROSHIMO tell you about his conversation with KNYAZEY?

Answer: He asked to keep in mind KNYAZEY, with whom he had especially good relations.

The protocol was written down from my words correctly and was read by me. TURK

Interrogated:

Pom. early UNKVD of the USSR for the Sverdlovsk region - captain of the vessel, security CHISTOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 273. L. 8-35. Script. Typescript.

* The protocol is published in part.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "T. Kaganovich. Please read. I. Stalin".
underlined in pencil.

** underlined in the margins with two lines.

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No. 8

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT THE LATVIAN "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY" ORGANIZATION

January 21, 1937

No. 55422

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

"The Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD has uncovered and is currently liquidating the Latvian counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization".

** The organization included members of the Latvian Communist Party and political emigrants who arrived illegally in the USSR through the channels of the Comintern and the MOPR.

The organization's counter-revolutionary activities were directed by the Latvian political police in Riga (the Okhrana) through its agents, who were infiltrated by the Okhrana into the organization's headquarters**.

"At the same time, the leaders of the Latvian Trotskyist organization were directly connected with Valentin OLBERG, who was shot in connection with the case of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev center, who led the terrorist activities of the said organization".

"In addition, the organization in its terrorist activities was associated with the head of the Moscow terrorist center SINA NI-SKALOV and Trotsky's emissary terrorist Fritz DAVYD **.

'Individual members of the organization, agents of the Latvian secret police, transferred under the guise of political emigrants to the Soviet Union, were engaged in collecting espionage information on the institutions of the Comintern*.

"The organization arose back in Latvia in 1928-1929 on the basis of a group struggle against the leadership of the Latvian section of the Comintern. At that time, the main goal of the organization was to discredit the leadership of the illegal Communist Party with the subsequent seizure of the central apparatus and its section in Moscow**.

This struggle was used by the Latvian secret police, which began to infiltrate its own people into the Trotskyist organization and actually directed the further activities of the organization. To the leadership of the Trotskyist organization entered:

1. "STRAUTIN (ZITRON)** Albert, former secretary of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party, secretary of the section of the Comintern, former Trotskyist.

2. "JANKUS** Oscar, former member of the worker-peasant faction of the Latvian Seimas, member of the Latvian Communist Party, editor of the party organ in Latvia wii.

3. "BALODIS** Jan, former member of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party, deputy of the Seimas.

*JANKUS, being an agent of the Latvian secret police, on the direct instructions of the latter, joined the Trotskyist organization and became a member of its leadership stva.

The Trotskyist organization also included Okhrana agent ROSENBACH Foitz, a Latvian writer and a member of the Latvian Communist Party.

Some time later, STRAUTIN and BALODIS were recalled by the Comintern to the Soviet Union, where the latter resumed their Trotskyist

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activities, maintaining illegal communication with YANKUS and ROZENBA HOM.

In 1932, the Latvian secret police transferred their agents JANKUS and ROSENBACH to the Soviet Union to infiltrate them into the apparatus of the Comintern for espionage purposes and to intensify the activities of the Latvian Trotskyist organization in the USSR.

At the same time, another Okhrana agent was transferred to the Soviet Union - Emil SUDMALS, a member of the Latvian Communist Party, a former deputy of the Seimas, who also joined the Trotskyist organization*.

The transfer of JANKUS and ROSENBACH was organized by the Okhrana through Berlin, where, upon the appearance of a member of the Trotskyist organization LAITSEN Linard, a Latvian writer, they contacted Valentin OLBERG, from whom they received directive instructions on the work of the Trotskyist organization in the USSR.

With the arrival in the USSR of JANKUS, ROSENBACH and SUDMALS, the Trotskyist organization launched counter-revolutionary activities on a large scale, drew old Trotskyist cadres into the organization and created Trotskyist groups among Latvian political emigrants, students of international

native Lenin school and the Communist University of the National Minorities of the West, in the Latvian educational society "Prometheus" and among Latvian writers.

By this time (April-May 1933), Valentin OLBERG had arrived in Moscow illegally, having attended ROSENBACH, YANKUS, and SUDMALS. OLBERG conveyed Trotsky's directive, which he had received from L. SEDOV, on the need for the Latvian Trotskyist organization to switch to active forms of struggle against the leadership of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government by means of terror.

In September 1935, on his second visit, OLBERG met ROSENBACH at LEIZEN's apartment, to whom he gave instructions on organizing terrorist groups.

****In accordance with this, the leaders of the Trotskyist organization STRAUTIN, YANKUS and BALODIS set about forming terrorist groups from among their Trotskyist cadres**.**

In addition, a member of the Trotskyist organization YANKUS contacted one of the leaders of the terrorist organization in Moscow, an employee of the Comintern, SINANI-SKALOV, whom he informed about the activities of the Latvian Trotskyist organization.

After the arrest of SINANI-SKALOV, YANKUS contacted another leader of the terrorist organization, Fritz DAVYD.

Along with this, YANKUS, as an agent of the Latvian secret police, in the USSR used members of the Trotskyist organization, through whom he received counterintelligence espionage information, namely:

****1) on the most important decisions of the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party;**

2) on the organizational state of the party;

3) about certain individuals who led the work of the Latvian Communist Party in Latvia;

4) on the tactical guidelines of the Comintern and the Profintern;

5) about the students of the Communist University of National Minorities of the West being transferred to Latvia, and other equally important issues.**

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****7 people were arrested in this case**. In total, 33 people are passing through, members of the Trotskyist-terrorist groups of the Latvian organization.**

The protocols of the interrogations of the arrested YANKUS and ROSENBACH are attached.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov AP RF. F.

3. Op. 24. D. 274. L. 14-17. Script. Typescript.

* Published without minutes.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "From comrade Yezhov."

— underlined in the margins with a single line.

— underlined in pencil.

No. 9

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE TRIAL IN THE CASE OF PYATAKOV, RADEK,

SOKOLNIKOV, SEREBRYAKOV AND OTHERS. (7)

January 22, 1937

169 - On the trial in the case of Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov and others.

1) In the press, call the process: "The process of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center."

2) Exclude Stickling and Leonenko from the list of witnesses.

3) Begin the process on January 23, 1937 at 12 noon.

4) Approve the following composition of the court:

Presiding: Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR - comrade. Ulrich;

Members of the court: Deputy Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the ^ÿÿÿ"—"Comrade Matulevich I.O. and a member of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR - comrade. Rychkov N.M.

5) Conduct the process in the October Hall of the House of the Unions.

6) Allow ambassadors of foreign states, or their substitutes, if the latter express a desire to be present at the trial.

7) To admit foreign correspondents of the bourgeois and communist press to the trial.

8) To admit correspondents from the following newspapers to the trial: Pravda, Izvestia, Komsomolskaya Pravda, For Industrialization, Krasnaya Zvezda, Gudok, Krestyanskaya Gazeta, Leningradskaya Pravda, Kommunist, "Dawn of the East", "Ural Worker", "Star", "Soviet Siberia", "Gorky Commune", "Hammer", "Baku Worker", "Deutsche Central Tsai Tung", "Journal de Moscu", Moscow Daily News.

9) Call as witnesses to the trial: Stein, Bukhartsev, Romm, Loginov and Tamm.

10) Call the following experts to the process:

engineer-geologist Lekus in Kuzbass;

chairman of the investigative and expert commission - engineer-technologist Pokrovsky for the Kemerovo chemical plant.

11) Establish the following procedure for interrogating the accused during the trial: Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov, Drobnis, Muralov, Boguslavsky, Norkin, Shestov, Stroilov, Livshits, Knyazev, Turk, Rataychak, Grashe, Pushchin, Arnold.

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12) Accept the offer of comrade. Tal on the procedure for covering the process in the press (see Appendix).

13) Allow representatives of workers, collective farmers and intelligentsia from different regions of the Soviet Union to be present at the trial with special passes.

Determine the personal composition of those present, etc. Andreev and Yezhov.

14) Do not object to the presence at the trial of foreign writers Feuchtwanger and Andersen Nexø.

15) Suggest t.t. Stetsky, Tal and Vyshinsky to publish on behalf of the People's Commissariat of Justice a complete verbatim record of the trial in French, German, English and Spanish.

The publication period is 5 days after the end of the process.

APPLICATION

item 169, etc. PB No. 45 (OP)

ABOUT THE ORDER OF COVERAGE IN PRINT MATERIALS ABOUT THE PROCESS

Establish the following order of coverage of the forthcoming process in the press:

1) Pravda, Izvestia, For Industrialization, Gudok, Rabochaya Moskva print a page and a half every day, and the rest of the newspapers print a page of reports on the process.

The indictment, the prosecutor's speech and the sentence to print half of
ness.

2) Send all material about the process to newspapers through TASS, which has a special apparatus for this.

In addition, publish newspaper articles and responses as the process progresses.

3) All materials going to print must be given with a visa, etc. Stetsky, Tal, Mekhlis, Vyshinsky and Agranov.

4) Oblige the commission to submit a daily report on the trial to the newspaper no later than one o'clock in the morning.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 274. L. 72-74. Script. Typescript.

Protocol number 45.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Yezhov, Vyshinsky, Andreev, Stetsky, Tal - all of them; Mekhlis, Agranov - 12; Krestinsky - 6, 7.

No. 10

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"On the Composition of the Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for Judicial Affairs"

January 23, 1937

177 - On the composition of the Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for Judicial Affairs.

Approve Comrade N.I. Yezhov as a member of the Committee of the PB of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for Judicial Affairs, with the replacement of Comrade Belsky L.N. Yagoda G.G. and Prokofiev G.E.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 57. D. 73. L. 123. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 45.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Kalinin, Yezhov.

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No. I

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT H.G. RAKOVSKY WITH EXTRACTS APPENDIX
FROM THE TESTIMONY IN HIS CASE

January 25, 1937

No. 55464
URGENT

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

According to the available undercover and investigative materials, until * RAKOVSKY H.G. recently he was one of the active participants in the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist-Zinoviev terrorist organization; according to the testimony of PYATAKOV and MILL (Okun), he had an independent line of communication with TROTSKY * (and carried out this connection through ROSMER).

Being in exile in Barnaul until April 1934 and taking sharply hostile positions in relation to the CPSU (b) and its leadership, RAKOVSKY maintained counter-revolutionary organizational relations with active members of the Trotskyist organization Yudkis, Pliso, Kasparova, O. Smirnova and others *RAKOVSKY knew about the existence of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, its composition and terrorist activities of the latter* (From the testimony of GAVEN, TER-VAGANYAN, ESTERMAN).

According to the testimony of KASPAROVA, NIKOLAEV and ESTERMAN, yRAKOVSKY departed from Trotskyism for double-dealing purposes on Trotsky's directive* and remained, as before, in active struggle against the leadership of the CPSU(b).

KASPAROVA testified that "the bloc of Trotskyist and Zinovievist organizations is based on the recognition of terrorist methods of fighting the leadership of the CPSU (b)" - she learned this from RAKOVSKY.

In 1934-35. RAKOVSKY maintained contact with the covert Trotskyist POLYAKOV, who several times transported TROTSKY's bulletins for I.N. SMIRNOV.

In April 1935, RAKOVSKY handed over to one of our agents the Trotskyist platform and two documents illegally published by the Trotskyists in 1928 for safekeeping.

According to intelligence materials available at the GUGB, it can be seen that in May 1935, RAKOVSKY transmitted through KARMANENKO the directive "to survive by the time of international complications that will inevitably occur in the near future"*.

In May of the same 1935, Trotsky's signalman, KLYACHKO, visited RAKOVSKY, who had arrived from abroad with instructions from Trotsky to hand over money for Trotsky's arrested son, Sergei SEDOV.

In August 1935, RAKOVSKY's meetings with a certain DAVIDSON, who came from the USA, and KOTS, who came from London, were recorded.

While in Moscow, RAKOVSKY always maintained close ties with the Trotskyists PREOBRAZHENSKY, SOSNOVSKY, Vinogradskaya, SOSNOVSKY, DANISHEVSKII and CHERNOBORODOV*.

Arrested terrorist NIKOLAEV - ex. employee of the Crossintern and member. The Central Committee of the CP(b)U testified that when meeting with RAKOVSKY in Moscow in

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In 1935, "RAKOVSKY struck him (NIKOLAEV) with his anger" against Comrade STALIN. RAKOVSKY reacted with satisfaction to Nikolaev's report about the meeting with I.N. SMIRNOV and inquired about DROBNIS and RAPHAEL.

"For his part, RAKOVSKY promised all possible support in possible Trotskyist work. He also told me that he was in regular contact with Pyatakov. Through RAKOVSKY, I considered it necessary to verify the data communicated to me by DREITSER on the work of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev center, on its composition, and also on the composition of the Moscow center. RAKOVSKY confirmed all this to me, and also confirmed the composition of the special conspiratorial center" (From the testimony of Nikolaev dated 30.XII.36).

The second meeting between NIKOLAEV and RAKOVSKY took place at the beginning
1936.

"At this meeting, RAKOVSKY already quite definitely and frankly gave me clear directives on the turn of Trotskyist work in a fighting spirit, something like this: "every strike by STALIN against the Trotskyists must be answered with a counterattack" (From the testimony of Nikolaev dated 30/KhP-36) .

PYATAKOV, during an interrogation on December 20, 1936, testified that during his personal meeting with TROTSKY in Oslo in 1935, "TROTSKY indicated to PYATAKOV the need to see RAKOVSKY and give him instructions on more active work. "I," Pyatakov shows, "concluded from this that RAKOVSKY has some sort of line of communication of his own with TROTSKY."*

Accused DROBNIS On January 25 of this year. at the trial he testified that, according to N.I.

"I consider it necessary to arrest RAKOVSKY.

I ask for your approval**.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. Ezhov

APPENDIX: Extracts from the testimony on 6 sheets.

EXTRACT FROM THE PROTOCOL OF THE
INTERROGATION OF KASPAROVA dated 21/IX, 27/X and 5/XI-36

The fact that the block of Trotskyist and Zinoviev organizations is based on the joint recognition of terrorist methods of combating the leadership of the CPSU (b) I learned from H.G. RAKOVSKY.

RAKOVSKY informed me of this by a ciphered letter to Saratov in 1933 shortly before my arrest.

I cannot accurately convey the content of H.G.'s letter. RAKOVSKY, but I remember that in this letter, in very brief terms, Kh.G. RAKOVSKY informed me that the basis of the bloc was the joint terrorist activity of the Trotskyites and Zinovievites against the leadership of the CPSU(b), and, apparently, knowing from I.N. SMIRNOV about my negative attitude towards terrorist methods of struggle, convinced me that this was the only

the path of struggle, that there is no other way to change the leadership of the CPSU (b) and, consequently, to change the regime in the country. The letter ended with an announcement of the composition of the center of the bloc - ZINOVIEV, KAMENEV, SMIRNOV, MRACHKOVSKY.

I know that during the entire period of his stay in exile RAKOVSKY took a sharply hostile position towards the CPSU(b) and its leadership.

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The letters and directives that came from RAKOVSKY in fairly large numbers were notable for their intransigence towards the party line, oriented the Trotskyists towards the rejection of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the USSR, gave a direct directive to the formation of a second party and led, as I showed above, to directives on the transition to terror in the fight against the leadership of the party.

RAKOVSKY was considered by all of us as TROTSKY's "viceroy" in the USSR, and since we knew about the connection between RAKOVSKY and TROTSKY, carried out through I.N. SMIRNOV, then we accepted all the instructions emanating from him as directives from TROTSKY.

RAKOVSKY carried on a very intensive ciphered correspondence with a link and insulators. With the Saratov Trotskyist organization, RAKOVSKY conducted this correspondence mainly through Olga SMIRNOV, the documents were sent to them in book bindings.

I know that all work on the organization of the printing house and the reproduction of Trotskyist documents in the Kursk Trotskyist organization was carried out with the knowledge and sanction of RAKOVSKY. Live communication with the Trotskyists who came to see him in Barnaul was also carried out intensively.

I remember that in 1932 a Trotskyist PLIS came to Saratov illegally and brought us from RAKOVSKY an illegal document called "Dictatorship is an abstraction."

At the end of 1933 YUDKIS traveled to RAKOVSKY from the center of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc.

RAKOVSKY's statement about withdrawal was extremely unexpected for me, his withdrawal is a maneuver.

The departure from Trotskyism was made by RAKOVSKY on the direct directive of TROTSKY. This was reported to me in Alma-Ata by the exiled Trotskyist MAK-NI VELSON.

Right:

Oper, authorized by the 4th department of the GUGB
- ml. Lieutenant of State security Efremov

EXTRACT FROM THE PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION

PYATAKOVA December 19-20, 1936

"We arrived at the airfield near Oslo, from there we drove by car to the summer cottage, where I met TROTSKY in a private apartment. The meeting lasted no more than two hours.

I must add that of the individuals in the course of this conversation, TROTSKY mentioned RADEK, SOKOLNIKOV, RAKOVSKY, and others.

Regarding RAKOVSKY, TROTSKY said that it was absolutely necessary to talk to him and encourage him to work along the lines of the Trotskyite organization. From this I drew the conclusion that RAKOVSKY had his own line of communication with TROTSKY.

After the meeting with TROTSKY, I intended to meet with RAKOVSKY and convey to him TROTSKY's instructions, but this meeting did not take place.

Right:

Oper, authorized by the 4th department of the GUGB
- junior lieutenant of the state. security Efremov

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EXTRACT FROM THE PROTOCOL OF THE
INTERROGATION OF NIKOLAEV, December 30, 1936

"After the return of I.N. SMIRNOV from abroad in 1932, he told me that he had meetings with L. SEDOV there, and gave me a direct directive on the need to restore organizational ties with the former active Trotskyists and turn around activities.

Even then, in 1932, I.N. SMIRNOV received a directive from TROTSKY through SEDOV on the development of terrorist activities against the leaders of the CPSU (b).

Fulfilling this directive, I began to restore my ties with the active Trotskyists RAKOVSKY, DROBNIS, BOGUSLAVSKII and others. Conversations with all these people on political topics convinced me that they were all ready and fully mature in their convictions for an active struggle against parties.

When I asked how to understand the renegade retreat of RAKOVSKY, DRAY ZER informed me "that all this was done with the consent of TROTSKY."

RAKOVSKY withdrew for strategic reasons, remaining in his old positions, and even he, RAKOVSKY, is part of a particularly secret center, naming in its composition, in addition to RAKOVSKY, PYATAKOV, SOKOLNIKOV and K. RACEK, which exists in case the current Trotskyist-Zinoviev center fails block. E. DREITSER suggested that I establish a close organizational relationship with him.

connection.

In response to a question put to me by AKIRTAVOY, how are things in Moscow and with whom I am connected in the Trotskyite leadership, I informed him about the state of affairs in Moscow and that I was in touch with RAKOVSKY.

I told AKIRTAVA that RAKOVSKY was a member of a specially conspiratorial center, which included, in addition to RAKOVSKY, PYATAKOV, K. RADEK and SOKOLNIKOV, as E. DREITSER informed me about this and as RAKOVSKY himself confirmed this to me at one time.

The meeting with RAKOVSKY took place in the summer of 1935 in Moscow after his return from Barnaul near the post office. Having learned about my arrest in 1933, he was interested in the composition of those sitting in the isolation ward, about their moods and about my intentions regarding returning to the party, to which I replied that I no longer intended to return to the party.

I always knew RAKOVSKY as a person hostile to STALIN and the current leadership of the party, but at the last meeting he even struck me with his anger against STALIN, and he especially pressed on the fact that he was overwhelmed in the People's Commissariat of Health, did not give him the opportunity to use call his abilities. In a word, the man almost directly said that he counted on more when he wrote his false declaration about going over to party positions.

Therefore, he met with particular satisfaction my information about the meeting with I.N. SMIRNOV on the transfer, he asked about DROBNISE, whether I have a connection with RAPHAEL.

For his part, RAKOVSKY promised all possible support in possible Trotskyite work. He also told me that he was in regular contact with Pyatakov.

Through RAKOVSKY, I considered it necessary to verify the data communicated to me by DREITZER on the work of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev center, on its

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stave, as well as the composition of the Moscow center. RAKOVSKY confirmed all this to me, and also confirmed the composition of the especially conspiratorial center.

At this meeting, RAKOVSKY already quite definitely and frankly gave me clear directives on the development of Trotskyist work in a fighting spirit, something like this: "Every blow STALIN makes against the Trotskyists must be answered with a counterattack."

RAKOVSKY suggested that I keep in touch with him regularly.

Right:

Oper, authorized by the 4th department of the GUGB
- junior lieutenant of the state. security Efremov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 276. L. 15-23. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Arch. St.".

*—'underlined in pencil.

__ underlined in the margins with two lines.

No. 12

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT AWARDING BIRO B.F. ORDER OF "RED STAR" (8)

January 26, 1937

203 - About awarding Biro B.F. Order of the Red Star.

Approve the following draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR:

For special merits in the fight against counter-revolution, Comrade Biro B.F. Order of the Red Star.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 983. L. 46. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 45.

No. 13

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON ASSIGNMENT TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNION OF THE SSR Ezhov N.I.

TITLES OF THE GENERAL COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE
SAFETY"

January 27, 1937

216-0 assignment to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yezhov N.I. the title of
General Commissioner for State Security. Approve the following draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee of
the USSR:

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decides: Yezhov Nikolai Ivanovich, the title of
General Commissar of the State Security

danger.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 983. L. 50. Original. Typescript.

Protocol N9 45.

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No. 14

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE TRANSFER TO THE RESERVE OF THE GENERAL
COMMISSIONER OF STATE SECURITY G.G. BERRIES"

January 27, 1937

217 - On the transfer to the reserve of the General Commissioner of State Security G.G. Berries.

Approve the following draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR:

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR decides: General Commissar of State Security comrade. Berry Genrikh Grigorievich transferred to the reserve.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 983. L. 50. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 45.

No. 15

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ON THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SR UNDERGROUND

February 1, 1937

No. 55548

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

Recently, in the Sverdlovsk, Voronezh, Kuibyshev, Moscow regions, the West Siberian and Azov-Black Sea regions, as a result of undercover and investigative work, we managed to uncover and begin to liquidate the widely branched Socialist-Revolutionary underground, led by exiled members Central Committee of the Party of the Left and Right Social Revolutionaries.

The investigation established that the members of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party who were in exile: GOTS A.R., TIMOFEEV E.K., GENDELMAN M.Ya., AGAPOV V.V., ARTEMIEV N.I., Podbelsky Yu.N. , N. I. RAKITNIKOV (Right Social Revolutionaries); B. D. Kamkov, M. A. Spiridonova, I. A. Maiorov, M. D. Samokhvalov, and I. K. Kakhovskaya and Izmailovich A.A. (Left Socialist-Revolutionaries) over the past years have been actively working to restore the Socialist-Revolutionary Party in the Soviet Union.

As the arrested members of the Socialist-Revolutionary organization testify, they, on the instructions of the members of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, in 1933-34. began to recreate the Socialist-Revolutionary organization in a number of regions of the Union.

To manage illegal work in the regions, regional

(or regional) bureaus of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, mainly from prominent figures in the past of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party.

Acting on the instructions of members of the Central Committee of the Social Revolutionaries, the regional bureaus launched active work:

- a) recruiting personnel for the purpose of organizing "in the event of external or internal complications";
- b) to organize combat terrorist groups for the preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the government. With a view to the practical implementation of terrorist acts, the Socialist-Revolutionaries were organized

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militant terrorist groups were called in, weapons were purchased, and a series of expropriations were planned to raise money (and weapons);

c) carried out a lot of destructive work in the national economy and collective farms;

d) mainly in the collective farms and among the backward workers who came from the countryside, the Socialist-Revolutionaries carried out extensive propaganda for the need to create peasant unions, a peasant party, which under modern conditions could "defend peasant interests before the proletarian state."

It has been established that in a number of cases the Right and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries blocked themselves in the localities and established contact in practical counter-revolutionary work with Trotskyists, Decists and Rights.

When deploying active counter-revolutionary work, the members of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and regional bureaus focused mainly on those areas of the Soviet Union where in the past there was a strong Socialist-Revolutionary influence (Siberia, Voronezh - mainly Tambov region, Sverdlovsk region and AChK - mainly in peasant areas) .

The following programmatic and tactical guidelines of the Socialist-Revolutionaries deserve attention: "The first point of our program is the gathering of forces. Our central task is to . the revival of our socialist revolutionary peasant party, without which the . start firmly peasantry of great Russia will not find the true path. "We are a peasant party, not a kulak party. And from the point of view of general peasant interests (and these interests are the interests of the whole country), it is necessary to wage a stubborn struggle to bring a living stream into the collective farms, now the dominant form of organizing peasants in the countryside, to free them from the bureaucratic guardianship of the Communists. . Here lies the central task of our Socialist-Revolutionary work.

"We will also strive to create a united front."

"An intellectual dissatisfied with the Bolsheviks, dissatisfied with the collectivization carried out by the communists, a peasant dissatisfied with social

workloads, loan subscriptions, Stakhanovite tricks, leading in the majority to lower wages, the worker—that is what our cadres should consist of. This, of course, is joined by young people who are not completely entangled in the Marxist-Leninist Bolshevik ideology.”

“In solving the problem of gathering Socialist-Revolutionary forces, we must not ignore our foreign supporters. Through business trips abroad of Soviet citizens who sympathize with us, through contact with members of various delegations who are close to us in their social views, through Esperanto, we can expand our cadres, we will be able to find moral and material support in our work.

(From the testimony of PAVLOV F.K.)

At present, the following illegal Socialist-Revolutionary organizations have been uncovered and are in the process of liquidation:

Socialist-Revolutionary organization in the Moscow region

In the Moscow region, a branched counter-revolutionary Socialist-Revolutionary organization that operated in Moscow was liquidated. Tula, Ryazan, Orekhovo-Zuevo and in the districts of the Moscow region, Mytishchi, Tomilinsky, Odoevsky, Kolomensky and Chapaevsky. The management of these organizations was carried out by the so-called Moscow Bureau of the AKP, created in 1933, on the initiative of b. member of the Central Committee of the AKP - RAKITNIKOV. Via RAKIT

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NIKOVA MB AKP has established an organizational relationship with members of the Central Committee of the POR: GOTS - (serving a link in Alma-Ata), GENDELMAN (serving a link in Tobolsk, Omsk region) and with a member of the Central Committee of the PLSR SPIRIDONOVY (serving a link in Ufa).

The investigation in the case of the MB AKP established that in addition to the bloc between the right and the so-called. Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, members of the liquidated organization contacted their counter-revolutionary work with the Mensheviks and Trotskyists. In this direction, the Tula counter-revolutionary organization, acting on the direct instructions of the MB AKP, launched a particularly active activity.

The members of the liquidated organization, on the instructions of the MB AKP, carried out practical work on the preparation of terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government. With a view to the practical implementation of terrorist acts, the MB AKP at one of the illegal meetings in May 1935 made a decision on the need to create a special terrorist organization:

“Putting forward the question of creating a special terrorist organization, ALEKSEEVSKY (member of the IB AKP, arrested) motivated this by the need to maintain the utmost secrecy in the activities of a terrorist organization, the need for a special centralization of its combat

high cadres, and most importantly, ensuring it from all the possibilities of failure.

(From the testimony of a member of the MB AKP - PAVLOV dated 13/1-37)

According to this decision, members of the MB AKP began recruiting into the organization from reactionary-minded youth (mostly children of repressed Socialist-Revolutionaries) and selected from this environment the perpetrators of terrorist acts, obtaining weapons for the same purpose.

According to the directive of the MB AKP, terrorist groups were created in Ryazan (headed by the Socialist-Revolutionary Ostapchenko) and in Tula (led by the Socialist-Revolutionary BESSONOV).

Members of the liquidated counter-revolutionary groups of the Tula organization, working at the ammunition, weapons and Kosogorsk factories in Tula, prepared acts of sabotage at these enterprises, with the intention of carrying them out at the time of the war.

At the same time, according to a special decision of the MB AKP, the participants of the liquidated organization carried out wrecking work in agriculture.

"In the spring of 1935, AUERBACH and GORYANINOV developed a directive on the methods of sabotage in agriculture. That same spring, at Alekseevsky's apartment, this directive was approved by the Moscow bureau of the AKP."

(From the testimony of PAVLOV from 13/1-37)

"In the Leninsky district, a cattle yard was burned, where 70 horses burned down; the same thing was done in January 1936 in the Malinsky district, where 40 horses burned down; in April 1936, a pigsty was burned in the Chapaevsky district. Field work was carried out under the slogan "the worse, the better." AUERBACH said: "It is necessary that the peasants feel on their own blood that they have to fight against the Soviet power."

(From the testimony of GORYANINOV dated 11/1-37)

Socialist-Revolutionary Organization in the West Siberian Territory

The administration for the West Siberian Territory liquidated the illegal s.-r. an organization operating in the city of Novosibirsk and the districts of Ordynsky and Toguchinsky. The leadership of this organization was carried out by the creation in 1934

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Siberian bureau of the AKP on the initiative of the career Siberian Social Revolutionaries OSIPO VAZINOVIN, PETELIN and YEVSTIGNEEV.

The investigation of the case established that the members of the Siberian Bureau launched extensive recruitment work, involving in the activities of the organization the Social Revolutionaries, who were repeatedly repressed by the Soviet authorities for active counter-revolutionary activities.

According to the directives of the Sibburo of the AKP, the participants in the organization practically carried out work to create a militant terrorist organization to carry out central terror, recruiting for this purpose the perpetrators of terrorist attacks from among the counter-revolutionary youth:

"PETELIN I.Kh. told us that Stalin must be eliminated.

Petelin I.Kh. set us the following tasks: 1. To cultivate in ourselves the will, courage and courage in order to be worthy followers of the elderly, honorably fulfill our duty to the people and, if necessary, sacrifice ourselves. Look closely at the surrounding comrades, look for reliable, courageous and courageous and win them over to your side.

(From the testimony of a member of the Novosibirsk Youth Organization

RAUSAEV dated 28/XII-36)

The Siberian Bureau of the AKP also organized counter-revolutionary groups on the territory of the East Siberian Territory and the Omsk Region. For this purpose, he recruited old cadre Socialist-Revolutionaries to work with the Sibburo of the AKP: NEPOKOYEV and PETELIN Mikhail in Irkutsk and SOKOLOV in Omsk.

According to the directive of the Siberian Bureau of the RPS, the members of the organization carried out wrecking work in the system of the Siberian Krai Union and the land authorities.

At the same time, work was carried out through the former Social Revolutionaries to create illegal groups from among the Trans-Baikal Cossacks, in the past participants in counter-revolutionary uprisings in Siberia.

The investigation into the case of the Siberian Bureau of the AKP revealed that the members of the Siberian Bureau established an organizational relationship with the head of the "Orgburo" of the AKP in the Voronezh region, the Socialist-Revolutionary Zhitny, who was arrested in July 1936.

ZhITNY, in turn, had an organizational connection with the former member of the Central Committee of the AKP PODBELSKY, who is currently serving a link in Tashkent. kente.

Socialist-Revolutionary organization in the Voronezh region

In the Voronezh region, a widely branched Socialist-Revolutionary organization was liquidated, which operated in the Tochaevsky, Algasovsky, Sosnovsky and Morshansky districts of the Voronezh region (in the past, the areas of activity of the Antonov gangs). Most of these groups were led by Social Revolutionaries or former commanders of the Antonov gangs. Personnel for the formation of the organization were former members of the rebel groups in the Tambov region.

The leadership of the liquidated organization in the Voronezh region conducted a wide processing of participants in a terrorist spirit to create "militants, perpetrators of terrorist acts:

CHELNOKOV pointed out with great malice that now there was no need to stop before killing communists. CHELNOKOV declared that in the first place it was necessary to kill Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov, who were the main culprits of the misfortunes of the peasantry.

(From the testimony of a member of the organization POPOVA P.M. dated 31.XII.36)

"KORNYUKHIN is a supporter of the fight against the CPSU (b) by methods of terror, and when he spoke about the need to resurrect the old methods of fighting couples

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ties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, then in this sense it was about terror. He directly spoke about this.

Speaking of decisive action, Korniyukhin bluntly stated that terror and the mass peasant movement are the "effective lever" that can and will undoubtedly play a decisive role in the struggle against the Bolsheviks in the near future.

The assassination of Stalin, said Korniyukhin, would cause great confusion in the country.

(From the testimony of a member of the organization GAVRIKOV V.I. from 7.1-37)

To carry out terrorist acts, the members of the organization developed an expropriation plan for the acquisition of weapons and the necessary funds. The liquidated Socialist-Revolutionary groups in the Voronezh region were led by an active Socialist-Revolutionary, BORODIN-KORNYUKHIN, who served a sentence until 1934 for active counter-revolutionary activity. BORODIN-KORNYUKHIN, in turn, acted on the direct instructions of members of the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party SPIRIDONOV, KAMKOV, KAKHOVSKAYA and MAYOROV.

"Declaring to us that the illegal work of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries has been launched in a number of points in the USSR, BORODIN-KORNYUKHIN said that the leadership of this work comes from the members of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionaries Maria SPIRIDONOV, under whose leadership the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries are now fighting against Soviet power .

Of the persons included in the leading center of the organization of the Left Social Revolutionaries, BORODIN-KORNYUKHIN at the same time (in the summer of 1936) named me, in addition to SPIRIDONOV, KAMKOV and KAKHOVSKAYA.

(From the testimony of A.N. Korniyukhin, a member of the organization, dated 27.XI.36)

Socialist-Revolutionary organization in the Sverdlovsk region

In the Sverdlovsk region, the s.-r. an organization operating in the districts of Osinsky, Suksunsky, Kungursky, Okhansky, Bardynsky and in the city of Perm and Irbit.

The leadership of these groups was carried out by the exiled members of the Central Committee of the AKP AGAPOV and ARTEMIEV, who were exiled to the territory of the Sverdlovsk region.

The investigation of the case established that the members of the organization were in contact with their practical counter-revolutionary activities with Trotskyists, anarchists and Tatar nationalists.

The members of the organization carried out significant subversive work aimed at the collapse of the forest trade cooperation, preparing an insurrectionary movement in the Urals, preparing an armed uprising by the time the war of the imperialist states against the USSR began.

During the search, 12 revolvers and six rifles were seized from the members of the organization.

Socialist-Revolutionary organization in the Kuibyshev region

In the Kuibyshev region, a widely ramified Socialist-Revolutionary organization operating in Kuibyshev, Ulyanovsk, Penza and in the districts: Nikolsky, Bishkaysky and Shiryayevsky.

The organization was led by active career SRs, former members of the Volga Region Committee of the AKP, acting on the directive of a member of the AKP Central Committee AGAPOV (serving a link in Kudymkor, Sverdlovsk region) and a member of the Central Committee of the Left SR Party SPIRIDONOV.

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AGAPOV, maintaining an organizational relationship with the Penza S.-r. organization, gave the following guidelines for the work of the Socialist-Revolutionaries: "The Central Committee of the AKP remains in its former positions of the armed struggle against the Bolsheviks.

The program of actions for the near future is as follows:

a) Carry out work to prepare for an armed uprising and, for this purpose, expand the organization by drawing in new members from the peasantry, as well as at the expense of workers and youth.

b) Consider it necessary to indoctrinate individual communists and officers of the army in order to involve them in the active work of the organization.

c) When working in the countryside, one must be especially careful with regard to anti-collective farm agitation, since the overwhelming majority of the peasantry

You have a positive attitude towards collective farms."

On the issue of terror, AGAPOV stated: "As long as Stalin exists, we cannot achieve positive results.

Returning from exile (Ufa) to Penza, the active Right Socialist-Revolutionary STU DENTSOV informed the members of the organization that, while in Ufa, he repeatedly participated in the discussion of questions of practical SR. work with SPIRIDONOV, MAYOROV and KAKHOVSKAYA, and they all take the same positions as the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, and on terror SPIRIDONOV expressed the following point of view: "Terror is expedient even at the present time."

In pursuance of the directive on terror received from members of the Central Committee - AGAPOV and SPIRIDONOV, the head of the Penza S.r. group MOSKVIN gave instructions to the members of the organization on the creation of terrorist

groups. Why did he propose to select suitable and reliable people, tk. "these groups must face the task of carrying out central terror."

Socialist-Revolutionary organization in Kazakhstan

The NKVD Directorate for the Kazakh SSR uncovered an illegal Socialist-Revolutionary organization operating in the city. Alma-Ata, Chikmente, Semipalatinsk and Petropavlovsk, i.e. in the main places of concentration of the active of the Socialist-Revolutionary link.

The main composition of the Socialist-Revolutionary groups are exiled Socialist-Revolutionaries who are serving a link for active counter-revolutionary activities on the territory of the Kazakh SSR.

The activities of these groups are managed by a member of the Central Committee of the AKP GOTSEM, who is exiled in Alma-Ata.

"I am aware of the existence of a conspiratorial Socialist-Revolutionary organization, headed by Abram Rafailovich, a member of the Central Committee of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party GOTS. The GOC himself informed me about this. According to him, the organization of the Social Revolutionaries is actively working in a number of territories and regions.

(From the testimony of a member of the Trotskyist organization

BITSMANA L.G. dated 4.1.37)

On the question of terror, the GOC said that the organization he headed was in the position of individual terror against the leaders of the CP (b) and its Soviet government.

(From the testimony of a member of the Trotskyist organization

BITSMANA dated 5.1.37)

According to the investigation, the GOC maintains organizational links with foreign countries and receives funds for the needs of the organization.

DOCUMENTATION

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Bloc of Socialist-Revolutionaries with the organization of right-wing Trotskyists and Decists

In the course of the investigation into the case of the counter-revolutionary organization of the right, it is established that as early as 1933 the leading center of the organization of the right was discussing the issue of establishing contact with the Socialist-Revolutionaries, in particular the members of the Central Committee - GOTS, TIMOFEEV and SPIRIDONOV. In 1933, BUKHARIN, associated with the active Socialist-Revolutionary SEMENOV (the former head of the fighting Socialist-Revolutionary organization under the AKP in 1917-1919), negotiated with him about involving him in the terrorist activities of an illegal organization of the right. SEMENOV was instructed by Bukharin to prepare and carry out a terrorist act against comrade. Stalin and comrade. Kaga

newbie.

In the case of the illegal counter-revolutionary organization of the Decists in Krasnoyarsk, it turned out that the active Left SR LUZINA established an organizational relationship with a member of the political center of the Decists - DAVYDOV and took an active part in the work of the Decist underground, becoming part of the Krasnoyarsk regional center of the Decist organization. In her testimony, LUZINA stated that in addition to her active Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, members of the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party SAMOKHVALOV (serving exile in Ostyako-Vogulsk, Omsk region) and KAMKOV (serving exile in Arkhangelsk) were connected with the decisst underground.

According to the investigation data on the case of the Trotskyist organization in Kazakhstan, it was found out that the member of the Central Committee of the AKP GOTSEM, who was in exile in Alma-Ata, established an organizational connection with the leaders of the Trotskyist organization in Kazakhstan, KELMANSON and BITSMAN.

Thus, the investigation established that the illegal Socialist-Revolutionary organizations in the Union are led by the Central Committee of the AKP GOTs A.R., Timofeev E.M., GENDELMAN M.Ya., AGAPOV V.V., ARTEMIEV N.I., PODBELSKY Yu. N., RAKITNIKOV N.I. and members of the PC of the Left Social Revolutionaries B. D. Kamkov, M. A. Spiridonova, I. A. Maiorov, M. D. Samokhvalov, and I. K. Kakhovskaya. and Izmailovich A.A.

According to all the liquidated cases listed above, 380 people were arrested as of December 1, 1937. Socialist-Revolutionaries.

In order to completely defeat the SR underground, I consider it necessary to arrest the following members of the Central Committee of the Right SRs:

1. GOTs Abram Rafailovich, born in 1882, is currently serving a link in Alma-Ata, where he works as an economist at Kazgosplan;
2. TIMOFEEV Yevgeny Mikhailovich, born in 1886, is currently serving a link in Tashkent, without specific occupations;
3. GENDELMANA Mikhail Yakovlevich, born in 1881, is currently exiled in Tobolsk (Omsk region), where he works as an economist at Ob-Rybtrest;
4. AGAPOV Vladimir Vladimirovich, born in 1890, currently serving a link in Kulymkar (Sverdlovsk region);
5. Nikolai Ivanovich ARTEMYEV, born in 1888, is currently serving his exile in Irbit (Sverdlovsk Region);
6. PODBELSKY Yury Nikolaevich, born in 1886, is currently serving his exile in Tashkent.

And members of the Central Committee of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party:

7. Boris Davydovich KAMKOV, born in 1885, is currently serving his exile in Arkhangelsk;

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8. SPIRIDONOVY Maria Alexandrovna, born in 1884;

9. Ilya Andreevich MAYOROV, born in 1890;

10. KAKHOVSKY Irina Konstantinovna, born in 1892;

11. IZMAILOVICH Aleksandra Adolfovna, born in 1878, is currently exiled to the mountains. Ufa;

12. SAMOKHVALOV Mikhail Davydovich, born in 1892, is currently serving his exile in Ostyako-Bogul'sk (Omsk Region).

I ask for sanctions.

APPENDICES *: 1. PAVLOV's testimony about the platform.

2. Protocol of the interrogation of PAVLOV dated January 13-37.

3. Record of the interrogation of GORYANINOV dated 11/1-37.

4. Protocol of the interrogation of BESSONOV dated 3/1-37.

5. Record of the interrogation of PETELIN dated 11/XI-36.

6. Protocol of interrogation of OSIPOV-ZANOZIN dated 25-26/XII-36.

7. Minutes of the interrogation of Kornukhin dated 27/XI-36.

8. Protocol of interrogation by Kulyabko-Koretskaya dated January 21-37.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. Ezhov of the Central Administration of the FSB of the Russian Federation. F. 3. Op. 4. D. 1491. L. 329-340. Script. Typescript.

* Published without attachment.

No. 16

CODE TELEGRAM E.G. Evdokimova I.V. STALIN,

L.M. KAGANOVICH, A.A. ANDREEV ABOUT A.S. AMATUNI

February 1, 1937

No. 127/sh From Rostov-on-Don

Moscow, Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, vol. STALIN, KAGANOVICH, ANDREEV

For the second time, I ask for the immediate removal of Amatuni. In addition to the materials of the assets, there are testimonies of Frumkina, Yerofitsky, incriminating Amatuni in participation in the apartment of Livshits, the former head of the road, in discussing the preparation of terrorist acts on the railway against the leadership

supporters of the party and government, as well as Amatuni's connections with the arrested terrorists Kolokolkin and Evstafiev.

Personally, I consider it necessary to raise the question of Amatuni's party membership and his arrest.

His actions are similar.

EVDOKIMOV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 24. Original. Typescript.

There are handwritten marks on the sheet: "Informed to Comrade Stalin. P."; "Which is Amatuni? Where does he work? I. St."

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 17

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOL Z.A. ASHRAFYAN

February 2, 1937

No. 55560

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending you the protocols of interrogations dated January 14 and 15 of this year. one of the leaders of a right-leftist illegal organization in Ukraine, formerly. head Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U Ashrafyan Z.A.

ASHRAFYAN showed that the right-leftist organization in Ukraine had its own cadres in the party apparatus, in the most important sectors of the cultural and theoretical front in the Ukrainian Association of Marxo-Leninist Institutions, the ICP, the Academy of Sciences, the Union of Writers and in the editorial office of the Kommunist newspaper.

The organization maintained contact with the Trotskyist underground in Ukraine through LEIBMAN.

ASHRAFYAN shows about contacting the work with Ukrainian nationalists, about his meetings with KhVYLYA, during which KhVYLYA expounded program settings of the nationalist underground.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. Ezhov

INTERROGATION
PROTOCOL dated January 14, 1937

ASHRAFYAN Zarmair Andreevich, born in 1898, a native of Karaklich (Armenia), ex. member of the CPSU (b) since 1918. Before arrest - head. Propaganda-agitation. Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)U

Question: In the previous protocol of interrogation, you testified that in 1935 the leadership of a counter-revolutionary right-leftist organization in the Ukraine was created. Who was on this guide?

Answer: The leadership of the right-leftist organization in the Ukraine consisted of me, ASHRAFYAN, DZENIS and KROVITSKY, who worked in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U as head of the department of science.

Question: By whom was KROVITSKY brought into the organization?

Answer: KROVITSKY was drawn into the counter-revolutionary organization by VOYTYNSKY.

Question: On the basis of what considerations was KROVITSKY specifically introduced into the leadership of the right-leftist organization?

Answer: KROVITSKY was of great value to the right-left organization in Ukraine, since he was in charge of the department of science. Back in 1935, when the Cultural Department of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U was reorganized and there was talk of new heads of departments of the Central Committee, I and DZENIS were occupied with the question of who would head the department of science of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U.

We were interested in this question because the Ukrainian Association of Marxo-Leninist Institutes, this main base of the right-leftist organization, was to come under the jurisdiction of the department of science. A few days later we learned that KROVITSKY had been nominated for the post of head of the science department. We, i.e. DZENIS and I were satisfied with this candidacy, because we knew from VOYTYNSKY that KROVITSKY was a member of our organization.

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Question: Did you personally contact KROVITSKY organizationally?

Answer: Yes. In 1935, after KROVITSKY was appointed head of the department of science, I established an organizational connection with him.

Question: What issues did you discuss with him?

Answer: Together with him, I resolved questions about retaining the personnel of our organization and about their promotion to the Academy of Sciences, in connection with the liquidation of UAMLIN. Together with KROVITSKY, I nominated the following members of our organization: SARADZHEV for the post of head of the socio-economic department of the Academy of Sciences, VOITINSKYI - director of the historical institute, DZENIS - director of the Institute of Soviet Construction and Law. LEIBMAN, a member of the Trotskyist organization, was nominated by us as director of the Agrarian Institute.

All these proposals, with my and KROVITSKY's support, were later approved by the Central Committee of the CP(b)U.

Since WAMLIN was liquidated in 1935, I, KROVITSKY and DZENIS considered it necessary to transfer the main base of the right-leftist organization to the Academy of Sciences and transfer the main personnel of our organization there.

Question: Tell us about the practical work of the counter-revolutionary right-leftist organization in Ukraine?

Answer: I already testified at previous interrogations that DZENIS and I arrived in Ukraine as members of a right-leftist organization approximately in March-April 1934. At first, we tried to win the confidence of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U to advance to positions of responsibility and then expand the work of the organization. Our active activity began to unfold in the main in the first quarter of 1935.

The work of the right-leftist organization in Ukraine was as follows:

1. — The ideological and indoctrination of a number of people, especially those working on the theoretical front, in the spirit of their struggle against the general line of the party, and then recruiting them into the organization.
2. - Arrangement of proven members of the organization on a number of sectors of the cultural front.
3. - Blocking and supporting the Trotskyist and nationalist cadres fighting against the CPSU (b), helping them in their counter-revolutionary de-activities.

The leadership of the right-leftist organization managed to place cadres in a number of important sectors of the cultural and theoretical front, namely: in UAMLIN, the Institute of Red Professors, the Academy of Sciences, the Writers' Union, the editorial office of the Kommunist newspaper and the party apparatus.

Question: Which of the members of the organization worked in WAMLIN?

Answer: WAMLIN was turned by us into a kind of organizing committee of a right-leftist organization. There, until the middle of 1935, i.e. before the liquidation of UAMLIN, there were the following members of the organization: DZENIS, SARAJEV, VOITINSKY, BEREZIN, SAZONOV, SMOLNY and SHEVKOPLAS.

Question: How were your cadres arranged at the Institute of Red Professors?

Answer: All the members of the organization listed by me above for work in WAMLIN worked in the IKP as teachers and chairmen of departments. We did not dare to create an organization in the YKP among the students, and therefore we recruited almost no one from among the students. The main core of the activity of our organization in the ICP was that teachers and heads of departments - members of the organization had to smuggle in their lectures and seminars Trotskyist and right-leftist smuggling, popularizing

to put it under the guise of "criticism" of the anti-Party theory hostile to Leninism, which they carried out. In addition, we in the ICP have preserved a large fund of Trotskyist, right-leftist and nationalist literature, which was given out to listeners ostensibly for "criticism". This form of "criticism" was a real propaganda of attitudes hostile to Leninism. There were facts when individual listeners of the ICP raised this issue. The teachers in these cases explained that without a detailed explanation of the works of Trotsky, Bukharin and the theoreticians of the Second International, it was impossible to become literate Marxists, but in fact it turned out that we stuffed the students with hostile literature.

Question: Which of the members of the organization worked on the editorial board of Kommunist?"

Answer: In the editorial office of the Kommunist newspaper he worked as a deputy. editor, member of our organization Boris VOLODARSKY, whom I personally recruited in the second half of 1935.

Question: Tell us in detail about the circumstances of your recruitment of Volodarsky?

Answer: I met VOLODARSKII in Ukraine at the beginning of 1935. More than once he turned to me at the Central Committee with a statement that in Kharkov, secretary of one of the District Party Committees BRANDT and secretary of the party organization of the Aviation Institute B. KOTLYA were allegedly "undeservedly" beaten as a Trotskyite. RENCO. He asked me to intervene in this matter and transfer these people to some work in Kyiv. I refused to do this, because I personally did not know these people, and in the press they appeared as Trotskyists.

This appeal to me by VOLODARSKII gave me reason to consider him a person close to us, since I understood that he was defending the Trotskyists. In one of the conversations, in the second half of 1935, after VOLODARSKII began to complain to me that he had received a stern warning from the Central Committee of the CP(b)U for trying to drag the Trotskyists from Kharkov to Kiev, I told him directly that he had to work more cautiously and that there are people who do not act as VOLODARSKY.

VOLODARSKY answered me that he really acted recklessly and became interested in my statement about those people about whom I hinted to him. I switched to open and told VOLODARSKY about the existence of the organization, its platform and leaders. VOLODARSKY, at my suggestion, agreed to join the organization.

Question: Who else, besides VOLODARSKY, was a member of the right-leftist organization from the workers of the editorial board of Kommunist.

Answer: I don't know anyone else.

Question: Which of the members of your organization worked in Party bodies?

Answer: I worked in the party bodies ASHRAFYAN, KROVITSKY and * KARPOV * - head of propaganda, agitation. department of the Kyiv Regional Committee, whom I personally recruited into the organization at the beginning of 1935.

In the middle of 1935 * BLINOV * Peter worked as a responsible instructor of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Ukraine. Before that, when he worked in the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian SSR, I also recruited him into our organization. In addition, our organization included former. Deputy Head of the Department of Leading Party Organs of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U *NAUMOV*.

Question: How do you know about belonging to the NAUMOV organization?

Answer: I first learned that NAUMOV was a member of our organization from VOITINSKY at the end of 1934. Later KROVITSKY also confirmed this. By whom he was recruited into the organization, I do not know.

In addition, from the words of BLINOV in 1935, I became aware that NAUMOV was "one of his own."

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Question: Did you have a personal organizational connection with NAUMOV?

Answer: On November 13, 1936, two days before my arrest, I was in Kharkov at the opening of a school for propagandists of the Central Committee of the CP(b)U. I met there with NAUMOV, to whom I informed about the arrest of DZENIS. NAUMOV was greatly agitated by this circumstance and told me: "I know that you are a member of our organization, now we must be more careful than before, since we can fail." Our conversation was interrupted and we could not continue it.

Question: What do you know about NAUMOV's activities in the right-left organization?

Answer: The practical activities of NAUMOV as a member of the organization are unknown to me. KROVITSKY and VOITINSKY, who were directly connected with him, should know about this.

Question: Which of the members of the organization worked in the Writers' Union?

Answer: The chairman of the Writers' Union of Ukraine was SENCHENKO. He was a member of a nationalist organization and, moreover, was associated with the Trotskyist organization in the person of LEIBMAN and with me in the right-leftist organization.

Question: When did you establish contact with him?

Answer: I established this connection with him as early as 1934, when SENCHENKO worked as secretary of the WAMLIN party committee.

Question: A little higher you showed that the right-leftist organization in the Ukraine formed a bloc with the Trotskyist organization. Tell me, who personally carried out this block?

Answer: This bloc was carried out through a member of the leadership of the right-leftist organization DZENIS, who was associated with LEIBMAN as a member of the Trotskyist organization.

It was written down from my words correctly, I read it, and I sign it.

ASHRAFYAN

Interrogated:

Beginning 5th department of the 4th department of the UTB
NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR senior lieutenant of the state. security BORISOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 278. L. 10-18. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "It is also important. Archive. I. Stalin.

* _ * surnames are circled, in the margins is Stalin's handwritten note: "Who is this?"

No. 18

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN ON THE TROTSKYIST ORGANIZATION IN UKRAINE (9)

February 2, 1937

No. 55563

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending you the protocols of interrogations of E.M. Manyurin-Brovarsky, a member of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization arrested in Ukraine, the former head of the Cult Prom of the Odessa Regional Committee of the CP (b) U. dated January 11 and 14 of this year.

DOCUMENTATION

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MANYURIN-BROVARSKY shows about the wrecking work carried out by the Trotskyists, along with terrorist activities, in the Ukraine in the development of the cotton crop, as well as about the opposition to academician LYSENKO for the vernalization of agricultural crops.

According to GOLUB's participant, MANYURIN-BROVARSKY knows that "the international orientation common with the Ukrainian nationalists" towards Hitler was carried out by the Trotskyists in opposition to the international relations established by the Soviet Union with anti-fascist governments.

Named in the testimony of MANYURIN-BROVARSKY former. I consider it necessary to arrest the second secretary of the Odessa regional committee of the CP(b)U A.G. SOKOLOV, now working in the Kirov region, and GOLUB F.Ya., currently the second secretary of the Odessa regional committee of the CP(b)U.

I ask for your approval.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N.I. Ezhov AP RF. F. 3.
Op. 24. D. 278. L. 47. Original. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "Talk to Malenkov and Andreev (organizational bureau) (how did Sokolov's transfer to Vyatka happen?)".

No. 19

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT THE CONFERENCE OF EMPLOYEES OF THE JAPANESE EMBASSY (10)

February 2, 1937

No. 55565

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

* On January 27, late at night, a special meeting was held at the apartment of the adviser to the Japanese embassy SAKO, at which, in addition to the officials of the embassy, the correspondent MARUYAMA * participated as a speaker. The meeting was convened by the SAKO adviser to hear a report by MARUYAMA, who is the embassy's informant on the course of the trial, regarding the testimony of KNYAZEV and TUROK and to exchange views on the question of the countermeasures of the Japanese embassy.

Ambassador SHIGEMITSU, at a banquet held prior to this meeting at the Savoy restaurant on the occasion of the departure of the fisherman ARIGA, told the latter that the Japanese government would protest the Soviet government even before the verdict was passed on the accused, because otherwise there would be no point in presenting it . If, however, it is not possible to make this protest before the end of the process in connection with the ongoing governmental crisis, then the Japanese government, refusing to protest against the Soviet government, will circulate a memorandum to all the powers, in which a motivated explanation will be given that the testimony of the defendants, in part concerning their communications and negotiations with Japanese officials are false and rigged.

The Ambassador told ARIGA that he personally prefers the second way of responding as more efficient.

At the same banquet, the SIMADA embassy secretary told the embassy legal adviser that the German government had decided not to protest

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in connection with the process, as this may affect the fate of German engineers.

* The Japanese embassy is carefully studying the testimony of LIVSHITS, TUROK and KNYAZEY in order to find contradictions and factual inconsistencies in action.

The MORI correspondent, in a conversation with his secretary, stated that as a result of a thorough study of the above testimony, embassy officials found the following contradictions and factual inconsistencies*:

1) During the interrogation of LIVSHITS at the evening court session of January 26, TUROK, answering the question of the prosecutor, stated that he had received money in the amount of 35,000 rubles from the Japanese in January 1934, and at the session of January 27, the same TURK, during his interrogation, stated, that he received 35,000 rubles in February 1935.

2) "Mr. X.", that is, HIROSHIMA, could not have been in Chelyabinsk in September 1934, which can be documented.

The embassy decided to use these two documents to completely disavow the testimony of the accused about their connection with Japanese intelligence, in particular with "Mr. X."

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov AP RF. F. 3. Op.
24. D. 278. L. 67-68. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "T. Stalin. Yezhov. 2.II-37"; "Ott. Yezhov.

— underlined in pencil.

No. 20

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOL G.A. TATULOVA

February 2, 1937

No. 55567

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending you the protocol of the interrogation of a member of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization arrested by the NKVD AChK, formerly. head Literary Museum in Taganrog TATULOV G.A. dated January 22 of this year.

TATULOV since 1930 had a counter-revolutionary connection with LOMINADZE, CHAPLIN and AGAMALYAN, who at that time worked in the Zakkraykom of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. TATULOV was recruited into the Trotskyist organization by VARDANYAN in February 1936.

TATULOV confirmed the testimony of TER-MINASOV on January 1-2 of this year. (see our communication No. 55259 of 14/1 this year) about the terrorist work of VARDANYAN, GUTMAN and MORISSON, as well as about the treacherous work of the former. early Taganrog City Department of the NKVD BALANYUK.

VARDANYAN instructed TATULOV through D. SIMONYAN, who is connected with the Dashnaks, to ensure the temporary sending of terrorists abroad after they committed a terrorist act in Sochi.

All members of the counter-revolutionary organization named in Tatulov's testimony were arrested.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. Ezhov

DOCUMENTATION _ 75

PROTOCOL OF
INTERROGATION Tatulov Georgy Alexandrovich

January 22, 1937

Tatulov G.A., born in 1902, born in Tbilisi, son of a merchant, ex. member of the CPSU(b) since 1927, expelled in February 1936 for concealing his social origin, Az.-Chern was reinstated. Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and was expelled for the second time in November 1936 as a Trotskyist. Prior to his arrest, he worked as Literary Museum in the mountains. Taganrog.

Question: Why were you expelled from the CPSU(b) in February 1936?

Answer: I was expelled from the party by the Leninsky District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the city. Rostov-on-Don for concealing his social origin from the party (my father was a major merchant), but in the same month he was reinstated in the party by the Azov-Chernomorsky regional committee of the CPSU (b).

Question: What else have you hidden from the Party?

Answer: I didn't hide anything anymore.

Question: Did you tell the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks about your connection with the Trotskyite VARDANYAN?

Answer: No, I didn't report it. At that time I did not know anything reprehensible about VARDANYAN. VARDANYAN himself negotiated my reinstatement in the party with the secretary of the Rostov City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, KOLTILI NYM.

Question: Why did VARDANYAN negotiate the reinstatement of you in the CPSU(b)?

Answer: VARDANYAN knew me well and was sure that although I concealed my origin, I would not deceive the party again.

Question: When did you last meet with VARDANYAN?

Answer: I haven't seen VARDANYAN since 1928.

Question: You contradict yourself. You testified that in 1936 VARDANYAN spoke about your reinstatement in the party with KOLOTILIN, and now you declare that you have not seen him since 1928.

When are you telling the truth?

Answer: I lost sight of the fact that I had 3 more meetings with VARDANYAN in 1935: one in Rostov in the Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and twice went to see him in Taganrog**.

Question: Why did you hide these meetings with VARDANYAN?

Answer: I just forgot about them.

Question: You did not mention these meetings in order to hide from the investigation that you were connected with VARDANYAN as a Trotskyist.

Answer: I have never been a Trotskyist. In 1930, I sympathized with the so-called. leftists, i.e. LOMINADZE group. I did not know that VARDANYAN was a Trotskyist before his arrest**.

Question: Did VARDANYAN know that you shared the counter-revolutionary views of LOMINADZE?

Answer: Yes, I knew. I told VARDANYAN about this in one of my meetings in 1935. At the same time, I informed VARDANYAN that in Tbilisi one of the members of the LOMINADZE group, AGAMALYAN, had been expelled from the party.

Question: In connection with what did you tell VARDANYAN about your connection with the LOMINADZE group and the exclusion of AGAMALYAN from the party?

Answer: I told VARDANYAN about this because I knew that VARDANYAN himself sympathized with LOMINADZE.

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Question: But you said earlier that you didn't know anything reprehensible about VARDANYAN.

Answer: I was insincere in my answers. I only want to state that both I and VARDANYAN did not carry out active counter-revolutionary work.

Question: This is also false. VARDANYAN and you have been exposed as active members of the Trotskyist organization. VARDANYAN himself admitted this. Speak the truth.

**

Answer: Good. I will start with my participation in the LOMINADZE group. Since 1930, I was associated with LOMINADZE, who at that time was working as secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; one of the departments of the regional committee**.

Question: When did you last meet with LOMINADZE?

Answer: In August 1930.

Question: Did you meet other members of the LOMINADZE group after 1930?

Answer: No, I have not.

Question: We will interrogate you on this later.

When were you recruited by VARDANYAN into a Trotskyist organization?

**

Answer: In February 1936, by agreement with VARDANYAN, I moved to work in Taganrog. During one of my visits to VARDANYAN's apartment, the latter started a conversation with me about the situation in the CPSU(b). VARDANYAN very sharply criticized the regime in the party, saying that STALIN squeezed everyone into a fist, that there were only two ways left: either put a bullet in the forehead, like "poor Beso" (LOMINADZE), or remove STALIN **.

VARDANYAN angrily declared: "He will soon wait for this."

VARDANYAN told me that a lot of work was being done against STALIN, "literally everyone united: *Trotskyites, Zinovievites, leftists and rightists* -" the matter is so well organized, "VARDANYAN told me -" that our people are in the Central Committee itself. STALIN does not suspect that he is sitting on a powder keg. You, TATULOV, also need to join our cause."**

I answered VARDANYAN that I was at his disposal.

Question: What kind of "his people" in the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) did VARDANYAN speak about?

Answer: *VARDANYAN spoke about PYATAKOV*, who, according to him, is one of the leaders of the Trotskyist organization.

Question: Who else among the leaders of the Trotskyist organization did VARDANYAN mention to you?

Answer: In addition to PYATAKOV, VARDANYAN named the names of *RADEK and SOKOLNIKOV*.

Question: What else did VARDANYAN tell you about the activities of the Trotskyist organization?

Answer: VARDANYAN told me that back in 1932 the leadership of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev organization decided to carry out a series of terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU(b), primarily against STALIN. As a result, in 1934, Kirov was killed in Leningrad. At the present time, all forces are thrown at the fact that in the shortest possible time to put an end to STALIN. VARDANYAN told me that he personally sent to Sochi one of the members of the Trotskyist organization in Taganrog GUTMAN Abram Markovich*, who there prepared a base for the direct perpetrators of the terrorist act against STALIN. According to VARDANYAN, in 1935, the 2nd member of Trotsky went to GUTMAN in Sochi

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stack organization in Taganrog 'MORRISON' - b. editor of the newspaper Taganrogskaya Pravda.

VARDANYAN told me that MORRISON was especially uncompromisingly disposed towards STALIN. "MORRISON does not want to give up the honor of personally killing STALIN to anyone," VARDANYAN told me.

MORRISON in Sochi contacted GUTMAN and personally reconnoitered the area and methods of protecting members of the government. Upon his return from Sochi, MORRISON told VARDANYAN that it was quite possible to carry out a terrorist act against STALIN in Sochi despite all the security, and proposed a plan to carry out this assassination.

Question: What was the plan of the terrorist act against comrade. STALIN proposed by MORRISON?

Answer: VARDANYAN did not let me in on the details of this plan. He only told me that GUTMANN and MORRISON consider that it is most convenient to carry out a terrorist act against STALIN during his visit to the building of the Matsesta baths. But I repeat that VARDANYAN did not tell me about the details.

Question: What role did VARDANYAN assign to you in preparing the assassination comrade STALIN?

Answer: VARDANYAN told me that after the assassination of STALIN I would have to help the terrorists move to the Transcaucasus, from where, through the *** Dras of the tomato SIMONYAN, connected with the Dashnaks, transfer them temporarily abroad.***

Question: What did Drastomat SIMONYAN have to do with the Dashnaks?

Answer: From the words of VARDANYAN, I know that Drastomat SIMONYAN in 1925-26. was in Paris, where he edited an Armenian newspaper. VARDANYAN said that SIMONYAN, while in Paris, contacted the Dashnaks and kept in touch with them even after returning to the USSR. VARDANYAN simultaneously characterized SIMONYAN as an active militant member of the Trotskyist organization.

Question: Weren't you personally connected with SIMONYAN?

Answer: No, I had no connection with SIMONYAN.

Question: Who else of the members of the Trotskyist organization in Transcaucasia do you know?

Answer: I don't know any other Trotskyists in Transcaucasia.

Question: Which of the members of the Trotskyist organization in Taganrog, besides you, VARDANYAN, MORRISON, GUTMAN, was directly involved in terrorist activities?

Answer: I know only one more person - this is *SHULGOV* - the chairman of the Taganrog City Council. VARDANYAN told me that through SHULGOV, the Trotskyist organization in Taganrog receives significant sums of money for terrorist work.

Question: With which other members of the Trotskyist organization in Taganrog were you connected?

Answer: **In addition to VARDANYAN, I was personally connected with the members of the Trotskyist organization: *TER-MINASOV* Leon Sergeevich - deputy. before, City Council, * ASILOV * Stepan - director of the Theater of Folk Art, * VASILYANSKAYA * Varvara Ustinovna - head. department of culture of the Taganrog City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, * CHISTOVSKAYA Lidia Yakovlevna * - editor of the newspaper Taganrogskaya Pravda.

All these persons, on the instructions of VARDANYAN, carried out active counter-revolutionary work in Taganrog.

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Question: What was it?

Answer: CHISTOVSKAYA and ASILOV, when he worked in the editorial office of the Taganrogsкая Pravda newspaper, shelved the materials coming from the workers' correspondents, who in any way could expose the counter-revolutionary activities of the other members of the Trotskyist organization. They published articles aimed at glossing over the outrages that were being created by VARDANYAN and the rest of the members of the Trotskyist organization in Taganrog.

VARDANYAN developed a whole system of disintegration of the party organization in Taganrog. It consisted in the following: VARDANYAN told me that in addition to TER-MINASOV, ASILOV, CHISTOVSKAYA, VA SILYANSKAYA, he recruited MYLNIKOV, secretary of the Stalinist district committee of the CPSU (b), MIRGORODSKII, assistant to the Trotskyist organization. Secretary of the City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, ZAKAYAN - an employee of the editorial board of Taganrogsкая Pravda, Shcherbakov - Secretary of the Leninsky District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

All of them, on behalf of VARDANYAN, pursued a line of clamping down on self-criticism, ignoring the needs of the workers, going as far as direct mockery of people who tried to seek the truth.

As a result, an abyss formed between the masses of the Party and the Party apparatus. The Communists were left to their own devices, party work was not carried on, a number of members of the CPSU (b) completely decomposed. At the same time, CHISTOVSKAYA, ASILOV, ZAKAYAN wrote in the pages of Taganrogsкая Pravda that everything was going well in the Taganrog Party organization, that successes everywhere extolled VARDANYAN as a "great organizer."

I must add that VARDANYAN generally paid great attention to the capture by the Trotskyists of the party and Soviet apparatus. VARDANYAN proudly told me: "In Taganrog I am a king and a god."* And indeed, VARDANYAN's word was the law in the city committee of the CPSU (b), the prosecutor's office, the city council, and even in the NKVD, where there were also Trotskyists.

Question: Who personally?

Answer: VARDANYAN told me that he was personally recruited into the Trotskyist organization, the head of the Taganrog city center of the NKVD BALANYUK. ***

BALANYUK carried out his counter-revolutionary work in close contact with VARDANYAN. It would be more correct to say that VARDANYAN supervised all the work of the Taganrog city department of the NKVD.

VARDANYAN told me that he gives instructions to BALANYUK, which materials to use, which ones to keep. VARDANYAN, laughing, said:

"Still, Zhenya and I have to arrest some eccentrics for the sake of decency, and whoever is with us will not be lost."

Once VARDANYAN boastfully declared in a conversation that although the director of the Andreevsky factory, KOLESNIKOV, was actively engaged in counter-revolutionary work, nothing had been done and would not be done with him so far.

In general, it must be said that the participants in the Trotskyist organization in Taganrog felt completely safe and VARDANYAN's arrest was literally like a bolt from the blue for us.

Question: You testified that KOLESNIKOV was conducting counter-revolutionary work in Taganrog. What do you know about it?

Answer: VARDANYAN spoke respectfully of KOLESNIKOV, saying that this man was personally connected with PYATAKOV, on whose instructions he was carrying out subversive work at the enterprises of Taganrog.

Question: What exactly?

Answer: VARDANYAN did not tell me the details. He added that Kolesnikova's wife takes an equally active part in the organization -

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PROZOROVSKAYA Galina, who, in turn, has direct connections with the Trotskyists in Moscow. VARDANYAN said that PROZOROVSKAYA organically hated STALIN. According to VARDANYAN, this woman alone is worth several terrorists.

Question: With which of the terrorists was VARDANYAN connected outside of Taganrog?

Answer: I know that VARDANYAN was associated with GOGOBERIDZE - ex. Secretary of the Stalin District Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in Rostov.

From the words of VARDANYAN, I know that GOGOBERIDZE is one of the leaders of the Trotskyist organization in the Azov-Black Sea Territory and is actively involved in the work of terror.

Question: What was the participation of GOGOBERIDZE in terrorist activities?

Answer: I do not know this, since I was not personally associated with GOGOBERIDZE, and VARDANYAN did not tell me the details.

Question: With whom else among the Trotskyists in Rostov, besides GOGOBERIDZE, was VARDANYAN connected?

Answer: VARDANYAN named another of the leaders of the Trotskyist organization KOLOTILIN, Secretary of the Rostov City Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, to me. However, VARDANYAN did not tell me about KOLOTILIN's practical work.

Question: And which of the Trotskyists in Rostov were you personally associated with?

Answer: I personally had no connection with any of the Trotskyists in Rostov.

Written down from my words correctly, I personally read it.

TATTOO LOV

Interrogated:

Deputy early 4 departments of UTB UNKVD
AChK st. lieutenant of states, security GRIGORIEV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 278. L. 69-80. Original Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's resolution: "Talk (shout) with Malenkov and Andreev. (Who replaced those arrested in Taganrog?)".

__ underlined in one line.

»*_«* the paragraph is underlined in the margins.

and 5 zats are underlined in the margins and the sign "xx *" is placed.

No. 21

MESSAGE INO GUGB NKVD USSR I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
CONVERSATION OF THE US ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE WITH THE ENGLISH AMBASSADOR ON THE SETTLEMENT
OF THE WAR IN SPAIN

February 2, 1937

Top secret

The 7th department of the GUGB of the NKVD received by telegraph a brief text of a document emanating from the US State Department.

No. 16

January 11, 1937

In a conversation with US Assistant Secretary of State Moore, the British Ambassador Lindsay said that the Foreign Office considered it necessary to settle the Spanish conflict in one form or another, while it had not yet spread to the rest of Europe. Regular activities

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this failed. After a reliable ascertainment of the intentions of the two fascist governments, Eden came to the conclusion that neither of them intended to bind itself to any obligations. This, apparently, is also true of the USSR. Paris will undoubtedly follow the course of England, and, perhaps, one should count on the fact that she will put pressure on the USSR in order to persuade the latter to make concessions to Germany and Italy and thereby force them to abandon their negative attitude towards international affairs. It will not be easy, but a very difficult situation requires emergency measures. By this *Eden means to inform Moscow that the British government will support Germany and Italy in order to end the war in Spain*. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs believes that even if the USSR does not agree to some reasonable demands, it will take all measures to avoid being involved in the war. Moscow may think highly of its fighters and aircraft, but it knows that a world war could put an end to the existence of the Soviets. It is one thing to outdo all other states with the effectiveness of their aircraft, tanks, machine guns in the Spanish situation, and another thing to fight against the combined attack of German, Japanese and Italian forces. Proceeding from this, *London hopes to persuade the USSR to agree to a compromise proposal for the creation of a liberal-conservative coalition government in Spain. If Moscow refuses, France and England will try to come to terms with Italy and Germany.

The British Cabinet asked that the wisdom of supporting Franco or one of his trusted aides as head of the Spanish government* be weighed. However, two circumstances speak against this: firstly, the Spanish people would prefer death than submission to the tyranny of the fascist regime, and, secondly, the important consideration is that it would be suicidal for England and France to support the formation of another fascist state. under German or Italian sovereignty. In addition to this fact, Italy would have gained practical control over the Mediterranean Sea and the ground would have been prepared for the growth of German colonial power in Africa at the expense of England. Therefore, the only solution to the question would be a compromise with Italy and Germany on the formation of a government that would be as far from communism as it was from fascism.

Eden thinks that Germany and Italy can be convinced by one argument that will be acceptable to both: money and credit. France would be able to come to an understanding with Germany, while London would offer Rome the long-sought credit. It is hoped that Washington will take part in such an agreement. Lindsay recalled that last fall, President Roosevelt proposed something like this. At that time, the situation was too uncertain for specific plans. However, the president said that America, in a moment of stalemate, would weigh its participation accordingly.

Lindsay further stated that during his long diplomatic career he did not remember such a time as the present, so similar to June-July 1914. He also stated that the president would not personally participate in these negotiations and the US government would not be formally represented. It is necessary that Washington, together with the two above-mentioned countries, take part in the provision of such a loan or credit. Commerce Department President Walter Runciman arrives in the US

with a detailed plan. In the opinion of the British Government, this plan, with appropriate support, would resolve the Spanish crisis and avert a worldwide catastrophe.

Moore replied that the State Department would seriously consider London's proposal for a settlement of the Spanish crisis, although he doubted a positive result. Moore does not see how the United States can participate in a loan to Italy or Germany, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Johnson resolution and the act of neutrality just adopted by Congress.

Lindsay noticed that Runciman was also given instructions to settle the debt problem.

Deputy early 7 department of the GUGB NKVD SHPIGEGLLAZ

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 188. L. 99-102. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are notes: "My archive. St." and "T. Stalin. Ya. Airanov. 2.N.-37.

No. 22

MESSAGE INO GUGB NKVD USSR I.V. TO STALIN ON
THE ATTITUDE OF THE EUROPEAN STATES TO THE
WAR IN SPAIN AND THE
POSSIBLE JAPAN-CHINESE CONFLICT

February 4, 1937

Top secret

The 7th department of the NKVD GUGB received the following intelligence message from Washington by telegraph:

At a cabinet meeting on January 21 this year. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Hull-Moore reported that, on the basis of all the data, the preservation of peace in 1937 was almost out of the question. Hitler demanded, with which Mussolini agreed, that Franco's victory be accelerated. The best quality tanks and artillery will be sent with German service personnel. Until the return of the Spanish gold to Spain, Germany and Italy will not agree to any agreement. In this matter, England is on the side of the fascists, while France is against it. Eden told Delbos that France would be forced to do so by the decision of the Neutrality Committee. According to Moore, Eden is increasingly openly siding with Franco.

The secret articles of the Japanese-German treaty are the articles of a real military alliance. Italy, apparently, will join the agreement in the spring, despite the advice of England to refrain from doing so. England will maintain relations with the anti-communist movement - "benevolent neutrality".

According to Moore and Bingham (US Ambassador to England - note of the 7th department), only in the event of an acute situation, England will go to the aid of the fascist states.

Japan will oppose China if the cabinet is replaced by a purely military government, for which the army has a good chance, since the mikado is on the side of Araki.

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Reports from Japan and China speak of a rapprochement between Nanjing and the USSR, but there is no treaty yet. It is possible that Japan will act before the conclusion of such a treaty.

ÿ Roosevelt interrupted Moore with the remark:

"In this case, of course, our duty will certainly be to remain neutral, no matter how great our sympathy for China."

Deputy early 7 department of the GUGB NKVD SHPIGEGLLAZ

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 188. L. 103-104. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are marks: "My arch. St., T. Stalin. Ya. Agranov. 4/11-37 G.".

No. 23

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhov TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE TROTSKYIST ORGANIZATION IN THE CITY OF SHAKHTY

February 5, 1937

No. 55621

Top secret

ÿI am sending you the protocols of interrogations of those arrested in the case of the Trotskyist organization: L.Ya. dated January 28 this year and former deputy chief engineer of the Shakhtanthracite trust V.F. BEITELSPAKHER dated January 20, 1937*.

ÿÿLyubarsky testified that he established contact with the Trotskyist organization in 1935 through Karpov and, on the instructions of KOLOTILIN, led the Trotskyist group in the city of Mines**.

ÿLyubarsky personally prepared a terrorist act against comrade. ORDZHONIKIDZE, and the direct execution of the terrorist act was assigned to a member of the organization, LUPASHKO. Lyubarsky planned to carry out a terrorist act in February 1936 in Moscow. Reception LUPASHKO to comrade. ORDZHONIKIDZE was to be arranged by A.M. - former director of the Shakhtantratsit trust *.

Lyubarsky and SAGOYAN, the former 2nd secretary of the Shakhtinsky city committee of the CPSU (b), during the verification of party documents, took special measures to preserve the Trotskyists in the party, exposed by the primary party organizations (see the attached extracts from the resolution of the Shakhtinsky city Coma of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated 17 and 27/IX -1936)**.

Lyubarsky's testimony established that the Trotskyists carried out subversive work at the Artem and Gukovo 15/16 mines and at power plants*.

We arrest all the members of the organization named in Lyubarsky's testimony.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 279. L. 1-2. Script. Typescript.

Published without minutes.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "Arch. Art.*; "From comrade Yezhov *.
— underlined in pencil.

— The paragraph is crossed out in the margins with a single line.

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No. 24

FROM THE DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ON THE ORDER OF THE DAY AND SPEAKERS AT THE PLENUM OF THE CC AUCP(b)"

February 5, 1937

289 - On the order of the day and speakers at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Approve the final order of the day and speakers at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks:

on the first question - "The Case of Bukharin and Rykov" - the speaker is comrade N. I. Yezhov; on the second question - "Lessons in sabotage, sabotage and espionage by Japanese-German-Trotskyist agents" - speakers: comrade Ordzhonikidze - for the NKTP, comrade Kaganovich L. - for the NKPS, comrade Yezhov - for the NKVD;

on the third question, "On the political education of party cadres and measures to combat Trotskyists and other double-dealers in party organizations," Comrade Stalin was the speaker.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 983. L. 64. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 45.

No. 25

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON STRENGTHENING THE PROTECTION OF ENERGY ENTERPRISES

February 7, 1937

304 - On the protection of power plants (OB dated 03.11.37, pr. No. 65, p. 473gs). Include GRES: Chelyabinsk, Gorky, Krymskaya, Belorusskaya, Bryanskaya, im. Krasin (Baku), the Kuibyshev, Stalingrad, Kazan, Sevastopol hydroelectric power stations named after Krasin and the Krasnaya Zvezda hydroelectric power station are among the enterprises that will be subject to a special regime of protection, access system, hiring and dismissal of labor.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 983. L. 66. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 45.

No. 26

CODE TELEGRAM V.K. BLUKHER ETC. DERIBAS I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
ABSENCE OF THE plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

February 7, 1937

In. N° 158 From Khabarovsk

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

I would very much like to be present at the Plenum of the Central Committee on February 20, but at the same time we understand that we need to deal with the work entrusted to us, so we ask you to allow us not to go to the Plenum.

BLUCHER

DERIBAS

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 25. Original. Typescript.

There is a handwritten note on the sheet: "It is better to stay in Khabarovsk. St.".

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No. 27

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhov TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO

WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION
PROTOCOL B.M. OBERTALLERA

February 1937

No. 55745

Top secret

I am sending you the protocol of interrogation dated January 15 of this year, arrested in Zap. Sib. Territory of a member of the Trotskyist organization OBERTALLER B.M. - former senior inspector of the Sibstroyput trust.

OBERTALLER, a former military worker, testified that N.I. PADARIN*, deputy head of the PUOKR of the Siberian Military District, is an active Zinovievist and at present continues to lead the Trotskyist group in the Siberian Military District, created by the former head of the PUOKR N.N. Kuzmin, who personally kept in touch with Zinoviev.

PADARIN and OBERTALLER during the period of their work in Leningrad were part of the Zinoviev group of workers of the LVO, headed by the former deputy head of the LVO PUOKR AA Gusev *, currently working as chairman of the Moscow Regional Council of OSOVIAKHIM. Gusev in 1931 sent OBERTALLER to Siberia for Trotskyist work.

PADARIN named OBERTALLERA as members of the Trotskyist organization in the SIBVO the chief of the divisional division of the Tomsk division, Kosmin**, and the workers of the military district newspaper PLOSTA** and CHERNOVICH.

Arrests of Gusev A.A. and PADARINA N.I. we are preparing.

We continue the interrogation of OBERTALLER.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

PROTOCOL OF THE
INTERROGATION of the accused Obertaller Boris Mikhailovich
dated January 15, 1937

OBERTALLER B.M., born in 1901, ex. member of the CPSU(b) from 1919 to 1936, expelled on 20/8/36 as an undisarmed double-dealing Trotskyist. B. early departments of the GGU of the Leningrad Military District, b. Commissar of the 31st Infantry Regiment, b. commissar of the 57th Air Squadron, b. pom. early according to watering, parts of the Center, schools of escort troops, b. commissioner and chief political department of the 4th Siberian division of the escort troops. Prior to his arrest, he worked inspector at the beginning builds, installation, trust "Sibstroyput".

Question: You did not testify about all your connections with Trotskyists and Zinovievites, military workers. We require evidence on this matter.

Answer: I showed about all the Trotskyist military workers with whom I was associated in Trotskyist work. I did not show only about the military workers with whom I was not directly connected in Trotskyist work, but I knew that they were Trotskyists and carried out counter-revolutionary work.

Question: Who are these Trotskyist military workers about whom you did not testify in your previous testimony?

Answer: I mean Nikolai Ivanovich PADARIN, Deputy Head of the Political Directorate of the Siberian Military District and Military

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workers, whom I know from the words of PADARIN himself, as connected with him through Trotskyist work.

Question: How long have you known PADARIN?

Answer: I have known PADARIN since the end of 1921 or the beginning of 1922. We met when PADARIN was working in the Leningrad fortified region, and I was in the apparatus of the Leningrad PUOKR.

Question: When and how did you become aware that PADARIN was a Trotskyist?

Answer: Gusev Avenir Asikritovich - b. deputy early Leningrad PUOKR in 1925, before the 14th party congress, among the active and fully tested garrison Zinovievites, Nikolai Ivanovich PADARIN was also named to me - military commissar and commander of the 11th Leningrad Rifle Division. I also knew about his belonging to the Zinoviev opposition from N.I. PADARIN himself.

In 1925, PADARIN was in Moscow at retraining courses for the highest political staff. In the midst of the opposition struggle in Leningrad during the 14th Party Congress, PADARIN appeared in the 31st Infantry Regiment, where I was a commissar, and announced that he had arrived in Leningrad as part of a group of military workers sent by the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and PUR to fight in the garrison against ZINOVIEV-BAKAEV, as well as GUSEV and their activists.

Knowing PADARIN himself as a Zinovievist, I asked him how he got into this group. PADARIN did not answer this question, but said that everything at the congress was not in Zinoviev's favour.

According to PADARIN, Zinoviev is losing his positions, and partly his cadres, that not only in Moscow and Leningrad, but also in all party organizations, a massive ebb from the Zinoviev opposition has begun, that the already shaky ground is beginning to completely disappear from under his feet. We need to rearrange the ranks. The directive of ZINOVIEV-BAKAEV, both for us and GUSEV, is to continue the struggle with those cadres who are already fully involved in the struggle. The rest of the frames must be saved. He, PADARIN, came to Leningrad for this purpose with a group of those who had been sent to fight the opposition.

Question: For what purpose did PADARIN tell you about ZINOVIEV-BAKAEV's directives for the Zinovievites?

Answer: I was known among the Zinovievites in the same way as the Zinovievite, and therefore PADARIN was frank with me. In addition, in the same conversation, PADARIN conveyed to me GUSEV's attitude towards me personally.

Question: What was Gusev's attitude towards you?

Answer: As PADARIN told me, GUSEV suggested that I also reform and conduct formal work against the opposition in order to remain a deeply conspiratorial Zinovievite.

Question: How did you carry out GUSEV's instruction on double-dealing?

Answer: I began to behave as GUSEV pointed out to me, and began to work in the regiment against the opposition, in fact remaining a Zinovievite and trying not to fail. I succeeded.

At the end of 1925 or at the beginning of 1926, new beginnings arrived in the 11th division. political department, a certain ZIMIN and his deputy. — VOYNOROVICH. They fought for the Central Committee of the party - against the opposition.

By that time, I was already quite reoriented. Shortly after their arrival in the division, I was summoned by MUTNYKH - deputy. early PUOKRA, now he seems to be the director of the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow.

Mutnykh said to me: "You will have to go to Cherepovets, because the situation there is bad, and we know you as a good worker." I began to protest and noticed MUTNYKH that I regard my translation as an organizational conclusion

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in regard to me, to which I object, since I had only slight hesitation during the period of the congress. MUTNYKH assured me that there was no question of any organizational conclusions, and in conclusion he left me as the commissar of the regiment.

Question: And what was the behavior of PADARIN himself during the period when the Zinovievites went underground in Leningrad?

Answer: PADARIN formally also fought against the opposition.

However, this struggle was only his cover. As I have already shown, I learned from PADARIN himself about his direct and personal connection with BAKAYEV and GUSEV and about his work on their instructions and under their guidance.

This didn't surprise me. I knew that PADARIN, as one of the old political workers, was always in sight and especially enjoyed confidence and was promoted to great work precisely because he was personally connected with A. A. GUSEV, with whom PADARIN was a personal good friend even in the 56th division, where they worked together. I knew that PADARIN enjoyed special confidence not only in Gusev as a deputy. early PUOKRA, but also BAKAEV as the beginning. PUOKRA, with whom PADARIN also saw at work and often talked. PADARIN, as a boastful person, constantly emphasized his closeness and communication with BAKAYEV and GUSEV in his conversations with workmates.

Question: Are you personally well acquainted with PADARIN?

Answer: I have already shown that PADARIN and I have known each other since the end of 1921 or the beginning of 1922.

After my return to the army from KOMVUZ at the end of 1924, as a military commissar of a separate machine-gun company of the Karelian sector, I was in the police

tic service of the commissar of the 11th division, i.e. PADARINA N.I. My further promotion in the service is connected with PADARIN, who treats me well.

According to the attestation of PADARIN, who also knew about my good acquaintance with GUSEV, I was in the position of a military commissar of a separate company for a short time and at the beginning of 1925 I was transferred to the commissar of the 1st engineer battalion of the 1st rifle corps. In the summer of the same 1925, according to the attestation and good review of me by PADARIN, I was transferred to the post of military commissar of the head 31st Infantry. Uritsky regiment of the 11th Leningrad Rifle Division, i.e. came under the direct personal supervision of the military commissar and the head of this division PADARIN N.I.

From this it is clear that all my subsequent registration as a political worker, and then as a Zinovievite, came directly and directly from PADARIN, who, in turn, was personally directed by BAKAEV and GUSEV.

In the direct subordination of PADARIN and together with him, I worked until PADARIN left for retraining in Moscow in the autumn of 1925.

Question: Did you have a good relationship with PADARIN only on the job, or were you close friends?

Answer: We were close friends.

Question: What did you call each other?

Answer: In front of outsiders, we said to each other "You", but in general we were with him on "you".

Question: Have you been to each other's houses?

Answer: PADARIN never visited me, since I, in general, did not invite anyone to my place. I had to visit PADARINA only once. This was before PADARIN's departure from Leningrad in the autumn of 1925. After the transfer of leadership in the division by PADARIN to his deputy RITMAN,

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also a completely completed Zinovievite, two semi-family banquets were organized: one at the apartment of the instructor of the political department, whose name I do not remember now, and the second - at the apartment of PADARIN. I was also present at these banquets.

It was at the first evening, where almost all the leading political workers of the division were present, I don't remember their names now either, PADARIN especially boasted that he was closely connected with BAKAYEV-GUSEV, that he would work with them a lot more, and that he will always remember all of us - his friends, and will not regret anything for us.

Question: When and under what circumstances did you meet with PADARI-

NIM after his departure for retraining in Moscow?

Answer: Our subsequent meeting was exactly the one I had already shown about when, during the 14th Party Congress, N.I. behavior and thus switched me, for secret purposes, to a formal struggle against the Zinoviev opposition.

Question: When was your next meeting with PADARIN?

Answer: We met PADARIN again already in 1930, at a resort in Kislovodsk.

Question: Give evidence about the nature of your meeting with PADARIN in Kislovodsk?

Answer: In Kislovodsk, PADARIN and I met only once or twice, because when I arrived there, he was already about to leave.

In our conversation, during these meetings with PADARIN, we went over mutual acquaintances and comrades, then I told PADARIN about myself, and he, in turn, briefly and restrainedly shared with me about his then unsatisfied state and great resentment. The fact is that PADARIN, an old political worker, so to speak, a regular military commissar, had one rhombus on his buttonholes and this determined his discontent. PADARIN complained that old workers were no longer valued, recalled with regret the Leningrad period, BAKAEV, GUSEV, and came to the conclusion that this old "good period" itself would not be able to return, and for this it was necessary talk to me about everything in detail.

However, we have not yet been able to meet him in Kislovodsk, since PADARIN unexpectedly left from there.

Question: What conversations about PADARIN did you have with GUSEV?

Answer: I had a conversation about PADARIN with GUSEV in June 1931, when, after being assigned to the Simbirsk escort division, I appeared in Moscow at the PUR to GUSEV for instructions on Trotskyist work. At this meeting, Gusev and I started talking about mutual acquaintances in Leningrad. GUSEV mentioned at the time that PADARIN was serving in Byelorussia, was in close contact with GUSEV, and under his leadership was constantly engaged in active Trotskyist work. Thus, after a long break, I learned about PADARINA and his work.

Question: So, are GUSEV and PADARIN Trotskyites or Zinovievites?

Answer: After the unification of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist opposition bloc was formalized in 1926, we did not draw a sharp line between Trotskyists and Zinovievites. GUSEV instructed me to carry on Trotskyist work in Siberia and to contact BOGUSLAVSKII as the Trotskyist leader in Siberia, it never occurred to me to ask him since when he himself became a Trotskyist. Nor was I surprised when GUSEV mentioned to me the Trotskyist work of PADARIN under his leadership.

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Question: And when and from whom did you become aware of the counter-revolutionary bloc between the Trotskyists and the Zinovievites on a terrorist basis?

Answer: I received this orientation from BOGUSLAVSKII at my second meeting with him in Novosibirsk in 1932.

Then BOGUSLAVSKII informed me that the Trotskyists and Zinovievites had completely united in order to fight against STALIN and the government by means of terror, and that the Trotskyists and Zinovievists were acting as a single organization.

Question: When did you meet PADARIN again?

Answer: I met PADARIN again at the beginning of 1934 in the city of Novosibirsk.

Question: Under what circumstances did you meet PADARIN in Novosibirsk?

Answer: It was in March or April 1934. I came to the head of the PUOKR on some business. They told me that there was no chief, but there was his deputy, who had just arrived, and they gave the name PADARINA.

I immediately went to him.

Question: Give evidence about your conversation with PADARIN at the first meeting in Novosibirsk.

Answer: PADARIN and I met like old acquaintances. In a short conversation, they remembered common Leningrad acquaintances. At the same time, PADARIN told me that GUSEV had not been at PUR for a long time, but he worked at the Moscow OSOAVIAKHIM, and that he, PADARIN, always met with GUSEV when passing through Moscow. At this meeting, neither I nor PADARIN said anything about Trotskyist work.

Question: When did you have a conversation with PADARIN about Trotskyist work?

Answer: PADARIN and I had a conversation about Trotskyist activity on a completely accidental occasion, at our second meeting in Novosibirsk, which took place 10 days after the first, i.e. around April 1934.

Question: On what accidental occasion did you start talking about Trotskyite work with PADARIN, and what was the content of this conversation?

Answer: 5-10 days after my meeting with PADARIN, I talked to the beginning on some business. POKOTILOV's personnel sector At the same time, POKOTILOV asked me why I did not say anywhere that I was a Trotskyist. I declared that I had never been a Trotskyist at all and asked POKOTILOV whether he was joking or asking me seriously. POKOTILOV answered me that he was joking, but immediately noticed that such an idea had arisen in him after one conversation between PADARIN and the PUOKRites.

POKOTILOV said that during one conversation with the PUOKR

For some reason, they were talking about me. PADARIN said that he knew me from Leningrad, and on the question of the struggle against the Trotskyite-Zinovievist opposition he expressed himself so vaguely that it turned out - either I fought against the opposition, or for the opposition. The conversation with POKOTILOV ended in a half-joking manner.

He got me excited.

I immediately went to PADARIN, relayed to him the conversation with POKOTILOV and asked for an explanation. PADARIN replied to me that this was an "obvious provocation", since he really had a conversation about me, but he quite clearly and firmly said that he - PADARIN and I - OBERTAL LER were waging a tough fight against the opposition in Leningrad.

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Since the conversation about Trotskyist-Zinoviev work arose, PADARIN, as if continuing to dispel the doubts that had arisen in me, remembered GUSEV, emphasizing that he, PADARIN, had not broken ties with him all this time and did not think to break, working in Siberia. Immediately he hinted that GUSEV, too, had not broken all this time with the main leaders of the former Leningrad opposition, but PADARIN did not tell me by name.

I, in turn, said that although I had not seen GUSEV for a long time and did not keep in touch, but the advice and instructions received from him in due time - I remember and am guided by them. At the same time, I mentioned that now I am working, so to speak, along a different branch and receiving instructions along a different line, namely, from BOGUSLAVSKII, that the essence of my work remains the same - I am conducting Trotskyist work.

After that, PADARIN remarked to me that what he said about his connection with Gusev - I must understand correctly, i.e. that he too, PADARIN, is carrying on Trotskyite work. According to PADARIN, here in Siberia, despite his relatively recent arrival here, he already knows several people who are Trotskyist, he sounded them out and attracted them to work.

Then PADARIN asked me if I had found the former beginning. PUOKRA KUZMIN Nikolai Nikolaevich. I replied that KUZMIN stayed with me for a very short time, since soon after my arrival he was recalled from the district.

When I asked why he was asking me about this, PADARIN replied that N. N. KUZMIN, as I know, was a Leningrader who was closely connected with ZINOVIEV and the entire elite of the Leningrad opposition, and in Siberia KUZMIN left considerable roots of the Trotskyist organization. He - PADARIN by succession continues to work in the organization, which was led by Kuzmin N.N. PADARIN further mentioned that through KUZMIN he had contacted such a prominent Trotskyist as KOSMIN, commander of the Tomsk division. Then PADARIN named several more names of Trotskyists, with whom he had already contacted here, of which I remember only PLOSTA and CHERNOVICH - both employees of the military district newspaper.

Question: PADARIN did not speak about his connection with BOGUSLAVSKII or MURALOV?

Answer: No. At this meeting, PADARIN did not speak of his leadership in Trotskyist work. Subsequently, we did not have the opportunity to resume the conversation about specific Trotskyist work.

Question: Have you made arrangements with PADARIN about meetings in the future?

Answer: During the same conversation, it was agreed between us that although each was working independently along his own lines, nevertheless, out of old friendship, we would inform each other about our Trotskyist work and its successes.

Question: Did you still meet with PADARIN to talk about Trotskyist work?

Answer: Circumstances developed in such a way that, during my next meetings with PADARIN, I did not have to talk to him about Trotskyist work.

Question: Did you personally know the Trotskyists named by PADARIN - KOSMIN, PLOSTA and CHERNOVICH?

Answer: Yes. Knew all three.

Question: What do you know about their Trotskyist work?

Answer: I know nothing about their Trotskyist work.

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Question: PADARIN, during a conversation with you, was interested with whom you, besides BOGUSLAVSKY, are connected in Trotskyite work, and what kind of work are you doing?

Answer: No, I was not interested. Our conversation lasted only about an hour. Subsequently, we did not manage to talk about Trotskyist work.

Question: Did you tell BOGUSLAVSKII that you had established contact with the Trotskyite PADARIN?

Answer: No, he didn't.

Question: Why didn't you tell BOGUSLAVSKII about your connection with a Trotskyist, an army worker?

Answer: Our conversations with BOGUSLAVSKII never went beyond business conversations. BOGUSLAVSKII gave me guidance on the center's settings, set tasks for me, and I reported to him on the work done.

Question: Did BOGUSLAVSKII give you assignments for Trotskyist work in the army?

Answer: BOGUSLAVSKII did not give me such assignments.

Question: You are vaguely showing. You are an army worker, you had extensive connections with the Trotskyists in the army, and according to your testimony, BOGUSLAVSKII allegedly did not use such opportunities for underground Trotskyist work?

Answer: I show frankly. After all, I am a paramilitary worker, as I served in the escort troops. The escort units were not considered completely military - they were subordinate only to the beginning. PUOKR, made up a separate division, we all lived on wheels, near the houses. Naturally, it was more expedient for the Trotskyist center to use us for connection with the Trotskyist exile, especially since we could give little for work in the garrison, since our contacts with the garrison, military workers were rare, random, due to the fact that we were more on trips.

Question: Continue your testimony about your next meetings with PADARIN.

Answer: I had to meet PADARIN again at the beginning of 1935, when I was dismissed from the army as a former Trotskyist-Zinovievist. It was in connection with my demobilization that I went to PADARIN to ask him to help me stay in the army. After listening to me, PADARIN told me that he would do everything to help me stay in the army, or at least in the reserve of the Red Army. He made the reservation that this task is difficult, since the situation is now extremely difficult for all of us. Immediately he told me that he was going to Moscow - on vacation and there he was using all the possibilities. Since PADARIN was in a hurry, in connection with preparations for his departure, we agreed that I would come to see him off at the station and there we would agree on what we had not yet had time to talk about.

When I arrived at the station, PADARIN soon arrived with his wife, who, when meeting me, called herself DESIRED. When PADARIN and I entered the compartment of the international carriage, I handed PADARIN an envelope with stamps stuck on and my address written on it, and asked that, when PADARIN fulfilled my request, he would immediately write me an answer. PADARIN promised to do everything he could for me and for the cause. Here, DESIGNATE joined the conversation and said that we must assume in advance that nothing will come of it, that we underestimate the severity of the situation, and that PADARIN needs to think about how this might affect the work that he himself is doing. In confirmation of how high vigilance is now in the Party in relation to the Trotskyists, DESIRED has led to

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example your personal question. According to her, she was only a member of the bureau of the factory team in Leningrad, I think at the Elektrosila plant, and took a small part in the opposition, and even then she is afraid that they will now take her into question.

Question: Did you know PADARIN's wife, DESIRED, as a Trotskyist?

Answer: I didn't know WELCOME at all, I saw her for the first time and learned from her own words that she was a member of the Zinoviev opposition in Leningrad.

Question: Continue your testimony about the meeting with PADARIN at the station.

Answer: We didn't talk about anything else. I, despite the objections of the WELCOME, still once again asked PADARIN to help me and hurry up.
drink with the answer - after which we said goodbye.

Question: What help did PADARIN give you to keep you in the army?

Answer: PADARIN never answered me. Obviously he couldn't do anything for me or didn't try to do anything.

Question: When did you meet PADARIN again?

Answer: Having started working on the economic line, I did not look for a meeting with PADARIN, since I could not have a business pretext for visiting him, and I did not want to go on purpose - so as not to bring suspicion on myself and on him.

Already on August 21, 1936, I met for the last time, and then by chance, with PADARIN. It was the morning after I was expelled from the party.

Question: What was the nature of your meeting with PADARIN?

Answer: I must say that at the party meeting, when they asked me who in Novosibirsk could characterize me for my work in Leningrad, I referred to PADARIN. Since I was nevertheless expelled from the party, apparently, PADARIN gave me reviews that did not justify me, saving his Trotskyite work.

On August 21, on the way to the city committee, where I was going with an appeal, I met PADARIN on the street. I asked him reproachfully whether he could not give such a review of me that I would be left in the party, which was in the interests of our common cause. PADARIN replied that, on the contrary, in the interests of the cause, he could not risk himself and his work. Having learned that I was going to the city committee with an appeal, PADARIN advised me to seek, perhaps, a faster examination of the appeal, namely, until August 27-28 - before his departure on a business trip to Omsk. He promised, if he was during my debriefing in Novosibirsk, to come to the bureau of the city committee, and if the situation was suitable for this, i.e. there is no risk of failing his Trotskyist work, then he, PADARIN, will use this opportunity and act in such a way that he will support me and not arouse suspicion about himself. On this we parted ways.

Question: PADARIN spoke in your defense - for keeping you in the Party?

Answer: No, I didn't.

The testimony from my words was recorded correctly and read by me.

OBERTALLER

Interrogated:

Beginning UNKVD under ZSK Art. major of state security MIRONOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 282. L. 15-33. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: Stalin: "Military"; "From comrade Yezhov."

* the surnames are circled and the numbers "1)", "2)*, respectively, are put in the margins. **—** Surnames are circled.

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No. 28

CODE TELEGRAM OF THE CC AUCP(b) TO THE SECRETARIES OF THE TERRITORIAL
COMMISSIONS, OBCOMMS, THE CC OF THE NATIONAL COMPARTIES, THE HEADS OF THE UNKVD (11)

February 13, 1937

No. 185/sh

According to the materials available in the Central Committee, some secretaries of regional committees and regional committees, apparently wanting to get rid of complaints, very willingly give the NKVD bodies consent to the arrest of individual leaders, directors, technical directors, engineers and technicians, designers of industry, transport and other industries. The Central Committee recalls that neither the secretary of the regional committee or the regional committee, nor the secretary of the Central Committee of the National Communist Party, and even more so other Party and Soviet leaders in the field have no right to give consent to such arrests. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks obliges you to be guided by the rule established by the Central Committee long ago, which is obligatory both for parties, o.w.s. organizations on the ground, and for the NKVD, by virtue of which heads, directors, technical directors, engineers, technicians and designers can be arrested only with the consent of the relevant people's commissar, and, in case of disagreement of the parties about the arrest or not arrest of this or that person, the parties may apply to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for the resolution of the issue.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 28. Copy. Typescript.

No. 29

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN ABOUT THE "WARNING" ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE IN THE WEST SIBERIAN REGION

February 15, 1937

No. 55820

Sov. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

Over the past year, the NKVD Directorate for the West Siberian Territory uncovered a number of sabotage espionage and terrorist organizations created by Japanese, German and Polish intelligence services at Kuzbass enterprises, the Tomsk railway and adjacent areas.

Opened cases establish that foreign intelligence agencies, mainly German intelligence, use for espionage and sabotage representatives of German firms and specialists of foreign nationals working at enterprises and institutions of the West Siberian Territory, where foreign nationals settled in the amount of 727 people, from of them: German subjects - 179 people Austrian - 73 - "- Polish - 30 -" - Czechoslovak - 256 - "- and other states - 189 -".

At the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Plant, a sabotage and espionage organization created by a German agent was uncovered and liquidated.

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Kmikh, who worked in the Central Laboratory of the Combine, was a Russian intelligence officer. Before his departure to Germany, Kmikh handed over the leadership of the entire sabotage work of the fascist group organized by him in Stalinsk to the German intelligence agent Berendt, who was officially at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine as a representative of the company

"Schlemann".

Before leaving for Germany, Kmikh gave instructions on sabotage work to disable the Kuznetsk plant at the time of the declaration of war.

The counter-revolutionary organization, on the instructions of Berendt, carried out a number of acts of sabotage at the Kuznetsk metallurgical plant.

German specialists, German subjects Yakimekh and Floren, who worked at the Anzhersky mine, organized a counter-revolutionary fascist espionage and sabotage group, in which foreign specialists were involved - German subjects and Germans - Soviet citizens. Yakimekh and Floren were connected with the German consulate in Novosibirsk.

Working as a mechanic at the construction of a nitrogen plant in the city of Kemerovo, German subjects Frank created a sabotage fascist group, which set itself the task of blowing up the nitrogen plant in Kemerovo at the moment it was put into operation. Frank was closely associated with Groskopf, the former German consul in Novosibirsk, and Kesting, the inspector of the consulate.

The opened sabotage-fascist organization at the Prokopyevsk mine, which consisted of Germans - special settlers, was associated with a German specialist, a German-subscribed Bluger, from whom she received assignments

on the conduct of sabotage and fascist work.

Genko, a German citizen of the USSR, who was arrested in the case of a counter-revolutionary fascist organization in the Kitovsky and Topkinsky districts of the West Siberian Territory, testified that the organization was led by the German consulate in Novosibirsk.

The opened cases also establish that German intelligence uses Trotskyists for espionage and sabotage activities (the case of the counter-revolutionary terrorist and sabotage organization in Kuzbass, headed by the Trotskyist Muralov and engineer Stroilov, a German intelligence agent).

German intelligence agent Weber, an Austrian citizen, a representative of the Siemens-Schuckert company, created a wrecking group at the Prokopyevsk mine. Weber was associated with the German consulate in Novosibirsk and German intelligence agents Baumgartner and Zomerger. Weber carried out wrecking work together with members of the Trotskyite sabotage organization at the Prokopyevsk mine.

The German political emigrant Petter Erwin, who arrived in the USSR on the instructions of the German intelligence agencies, through the Trotskyists, employees of the INO All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions - Klyuchsky and the Central Committee of coal miners - Yel'patevsky, was sent to work in Prokopyevsk, where he contacted the Gestapo residents in Kuzbass - Bifang and Zomerger, and after their departure abroad, he took over the leadership of the fascist sabotage group in Prokopyevsk.

According to Japanese intelligence:

At the Osinovskiy mine of the Kuzbassugol trust, a spy organization created by Japanese intelligence, consisting of 25 people, was liquidated.

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which introduced itself as the "People's Party" and prepared the implementation of acts of sabotage at the time of the outbreak of the war.

One of the leaders of the organization, the former Kolchak officer Grunko, was directly connected with Japanese intelligence, acting on its instructions.

The former white officer Ridzel organized, on the instructions of Japanese intelligence, a sabotage group of 16 people to carry out acts of sabotage on the main highways of the Siberian Railway and Turksib. railroad at the start of hostilities.

In the management of the Tomsk Railway, a spy-sabotage organization was liquidated, which acted on the instructions of the Japanese and Polish intelligence services through agents - Art. Medzykhovskiy track service engineer (Japanese intelligence) and deputy. head of the path service Klochkov (Polish intelligence).

On the line of Polish intelligence:

On the instructions of Eske, the Polish consul in Moscow, a sabotage and espionage group of Polish defectors and anti-Soviet elements was created at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine at the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works by the Polish subjects of Rak.

Medzhevsky, Melnikov and Ivanov, agents of the Vilna Exposition of the 2nd Division of the Polish General Staff, illegally transferred to the USSR, created sabotage and espionage groups, mainly from former Polish legionnaires and Kolchak soldiers at the Barabinsky railway junction and adjacent stations.

Medzhevsky and other members of the residency were preparing an explosion of railway structures at the Barabinsk station, which have a great fear.

tag value.

On the instructions of the Polish embassy in Moscow, Pogansky, a former merchant landowner, a Pole by nationality, created an espionage-rebel organization in Novosibirsk, which was engaged in collecting spy information about the state of railway transport. The members of the counter-revolutionary organization at the beginning of the war were to carry out destructive work in the railway transport.

The above facts indicate that foreign intelligence agencies are actively working on the territory of the ZSK, widely using foreigners for espionage and sabotage activities, who, in addition to subversive work at the enterprises of the West Siberian Territory, also conduct counter-revolutionary fascist propaganda among workers and the surrounding population.

The cadres of foreigners who have settled in the West Siberian Territory are of no practical value to the national economy.

Proceeding from this, I consider it necessary to expel foreign data working in the West Siberian Territory, primarily German subjects, from the USSR, and arrest and prosecute those exposed in espionage and sabotage activities.

I am enclosing a draft resolution.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 98-102. Script. Typescript.

Published without a draft resolution.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 30

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE TRANSFER TO ANOTHER JOB AND TRANSFER
TO THE RESERVE OF THE DEPUTY NKVD COMMANDA G.E. PROKOFIEV

February 20, 1937

18 - 0 transfer to the reserve of the commissar of state security of the 1st rank Prokofiev G.E.

Transfer to the reserve of the GUGB NKVD the commissar of state security of the 1st rank
Comrade Prokofiev G.E., in connection with his transfer to the work of deputy. People's Commissar for
Communications of the USSR.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 984. L. 6. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 45.

No. 31

REPORT I.V. STALIN

AT THE FEBRUARY-MARCH PLENUM OF THE CC AUCP(b)

March 3, 1937

Andreev (chairman). The meeting opens. Comrade Stalin has the floor for the report.

Stalin. Comrades! From the reports and discussions on them heard at the plenum, it is clear that we are
dealing here with the following three main facts.

Firstly, the sabotage and sabotage and espionage work of agents of foreign states, among which the
Trotskyists played a fairly active role, affected to one degree or another all or almost all of our organizations,
both economic and administrative, and party.

Secondly, agents of foreign states, including Trotskyists, infiltrated not only grassroots organizations,
but also certain responsible posts.

Thirdly, some of our leading comrades, both in the center and in the localities, not only failed to see the
real face of these wreckers, saboteurs, spies and murderers, but turned out to be so careless, complacent
and naive that they themselves often helped promotion of agents of foreign states to certain responsible
posts. These are the three indisputable facts that follow naturally from the reports and the debates
on them.

How can we explain that our leading comrades, who have rich experience in fighting all kinds of
anti-Party and anti-Soviet trends, turned out to be so naive and blind in this case that they failed to see
the real face of the enemies of the people, failed to recognize wolves in sheep's clothing, failed to unmask
them? Can it be argued that the sabotage and sabotage and espionage work of agents of foreign states
operating on the territory of the USSR can be something unexpected and unprecedented for us? No, you
can't say that. This is evidenced by wrecking acts in various sectors of the national economy over the
past 10 years, starting from the Shakhty period, recorded in official documents.

Can it be argued that lately we have not had any warning signals and warnings about the wrecking, espionage or terrorist activities of the Trotskyist-Zinov

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evskih agents of fascism? No, you can't say that. There were such signals, and the Bolsheviks have no right to forget about them.

The villainous murder of Comrade Kirov was the first serious warning that the enemies of the people would be double-dealing and, double-dealing, would disguise themselves as a Bolshevik, as a party member in order to ingratiate themselves and open access to our organizations.

The trial of the "Leningrad Center", as well as the trial of "Zinoviev-Kamenev", gave a new substantiation to the lessons arising from the fact of the villainous murder of Comrade Kirov.

The trial of the "Zinoviev-Trotskyite bloc" extended the lessons of the previous trials, showing with their own eyes that the Zinovievists and Trotskyists unite around themselves all the hostile bourgeois elements, that they have turned into espionage and sabotage-terrorist agents of the German police secret police, that double-dealing and disguise are the only means for the Zinovievists and Trotskyists to penetrate our organizations, that vigilance and political perspicacity are the surest means for preventing such penetration, for liquidating the Zinoviev-Trotskyist gang.

The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in its closed letter dated January 18, 1935, regarding the villainous murder of Comrade Kirov, resolutely warned the party organizations against political complacency and philistine rhetoric. The closed letter says: "We must put an end to the opportunistic complacency that comes from the erroneous assumption that as our forces grow, the enemy seems to become more and more tame and harmless. This assumption is fundamentally wrong. It is a belch of the Right deviation, which assures everyone and everything that the enemies of the Butsu are slowly creeping into socialism, that they will eventually become real socialists. It is not the business of the Bolsheviks to rest on their laurels and roam. We do not need complacency, but vigilance, real Bolshevik revolutionary vigilance. It must be remembered that the more hopeless the situation of the enemies, the more readily they will seize on extreme means as the only means of the doomed in their struggle against Soviet power. We must remember this and be vigilant."

In its closed letter dated July 29, 1936, regarding the espionage and terrorist activities of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks again called on the party organizations to be as vigilant as possible, to be able to recognize the enemies of the people, no matter how well they were disguised. The closed letter says: "Now that it has been proven that the Trotskyist-Zinovievist monsters are uniting in the struggle against Soviet power all the most embittered and sworn enemies of the working people of our country - spies, provocateurs, saboteurs, White Guards, kulaks, etc., when

between these elements, on the one hand, and the Trotskyites and Zinovievists, on the other hand, all boundaries have been erased—all our Party organizations, all members of the Party must understand that the vigilance of the Communists is necessary in any sector and in any situation. The inalienable quality of every Bolshevik under present conditions must be the ability to recognize the enemy of the party, no matter how well he is disguised."

So, there were signals and warnings. What did these signals and warnings call for? They called for the liquidation of the weakness of Party organizational work and for the transformation of the Party into an impregnable fortress where not a single double-dealer could penetrate. They called for an end to the underestimation of party political work and for

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a decisive turn towards strengthening such work in every possible way, towards strengthening political vigilance.

And what? The facts showed that the signals and warnings were received by our comrades more than poorly. This is eloquently evidenced by the well-known facts from the field of the campaign for the verification and exchange of party documents. How to explain that these warnings and signals did not have the proper effect? How can we explain that our Party comrades, despite their experience in fighting anti-Soviet elements, despite a whole series of warning signals and warnings, turned out to be politically short-sighted in the face of the sabotage and espionage and sabotage work of the enemies of the people?

Perhaps our party comrades have become worse than they were before, have become less conscious and disciplined? No, of course not! Maybe they are reborn? Again, no! Such an assumption is without any basis. So what's the deal? Whence such rotozeystvo, carelessness, complacency, blindness?

The fact is that our Party comrades, being carried away by economic campaigns and colossal successes on the front of economic construction, have simply forgotten some very important facts, which the Bolsheviks have no right to forget. They forgot about one basic fact about the international position of the USSR and did not notice two very important facts that are directly related to the current wreckers, spies, saboteurs and murderers, hiding behind a party card and disguising themselves as a Bolshevik.

What are these facts that our party comrades have forgotten or simply did not notice?

They forgot that the Soviet power was victorious only in one-sixth of the world, that five-sixths of the world are the possessions of the capitalist states. They forgot that the Soviet Union is in a situation of capitalist encirclement. It is customary for us to talk about capitalist encirclement, but they do not want to think about what kind of thing it is - capitalist encirclement. The capitalist encirclement is not an empty phrase, it is a very real and unpleasant phenomenon. The capitalist encirclement means that there is one country, the Soviet Union, which has established a socialist order in itself, and, in addition, there are many countries, bourgeois countries, which continue to lead a capitalist way of life and which

surround the Soviet Union, waiting for an opportunity to attack it, smash it, or in any case undermine its power and weaken it.

Our comrades forgot about this basic fact. But it is he who determines the basis of the relationship between the capitalist encirclement and the Soviet Union.

Take, for example, the bourgeois states. Naive people may think that there are exceptionally good relations between them as between states of the same type. But only naive people can think like that. In fact, relations between them are more than far from good neighborly relations. It has been proved, as two times two is four, that the bourgeois states send their spies, wreckers, saboteurs, and sometimes murderers to each other behind the lines, give them the task of infiltrating the institutions and enterprises of these states, creating their own network there and "in if necessary, to blow up their rear to weaken them and undermine their power. That is how things stand at the present time. This has been the case in the past as well. Take, for example, the states in Europe during the time of Napoleon I. France was then swarming with spies and saboteurs from la

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heroes of Russians, Germans, Austrians, British. And, conversely, England, the German states, Austria, Russia then had in their rear no less number of spies and saboteurs from the French camp. The agents of England twice made attempts on the life of Napoleon and several times raised the Vendean peasants in France against the government of Napoleon. And what was the Napoleonic government like? A bourgeois government that strangled the French revolution and preserved only those results of the revolution that were beneficial to the big bourgeoisie. Needless to say, the Napoleonic government did not remain indebted to its neighbors and also undertook its own sabotage measures. So it was in the past, 130 years ago. This is how things stand now, 130 years after Napoleon I. Now France and England are swarming with German spies and saboteurs, and, conversely, Anglo-French spies and saboteurs are active in Germany in their turn. America is teeming with Japanese spies and saboteurs, and Japan with American ones. Such is the law of mutual relations between bourgeois states.

The question is, why should the bourgeois states treat the Soviet socialist state in a milder and more good-neighborly manner than they do towards bourgeois states of the same type? Why should they send fewer spies, wreckers, saboteurs and murderers into the rear of the Soviet Union than they send them into the rear of their kindred bourgeois states? Where did you get this from? Wouldn't it be more correct, from the point of view of Marxism, to assume that the bourgeois states should send two and three times more wreckers, spies, saboteurs and murderers into the rear of the Soviet Union than into the rear of any bourgeois state? Is it not clear that as long as the capitalist encirclement exists, there will be wreckers, spies, saboteurs and murderers sent into our rear by agents of foreign states?

Our party comrades forgot about all this, and, having forgotten about it,

were taken by surprise. That is why the espionage and sabotage work of the Trotskyist agents of the Japanese-German police secret police came as a complete surprise to some of our comrades.

Further. While waging a struggle against Trotskyist agents, our party comrades did not notice, they overlooked that present-day Trotskyism is no longer what it was, say, 7-8 years ago, that Trotskyism and the Trotskyists have undergone a serious evolution during this time, which has radically changed the face of Trotskyism that, in view of this, the struggle against Trotskyism, the methods of struggle against it, must be radically changed. Our Party comrades have not noticed that Trotskyism has ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that from the political trend in the working class that it was seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism has turned into a rabid and unprincipled gang of wreckers, saboteurs, spies. → new and murderers acting on instructions from the intelligence agencies of foreign states.

What is a political trend in the working class? A political current in the working class is a group or party that has its own definite political physiognomy, platform, program, which does not and cannot hide its views from the working class, but, on the contrary, propagates its views openly and honestly, on in the eyes of the working class, which is not afraid to show its political face to the working class, is not afraid to demonstrate its real goals and tasks to the working class, but, on the contrary, goes with an open visor to the working class in order to convince it of the correctness of its views . Trotskyism in the past, 7-8 years

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ago, was one of these political currents in the working class, it is true, anti-Leninist and therefore profoundly mistaken, but still a political trend.

Can it be said that today's Trotskyism, Trotskyism, say, 1936, is a political trend in the working class? No, you can't say that. Why? Because contemporary Trotskyists are afraid to show their real face to the working class, they are afraid to reveal to them their real aims and tasks, they diligently hide their political physiognomy from the working class, fearing that if the working class finds out about their real intentions, he will curse them as alien people and drive them away from him. This, in fact, explains why the main method of Trotskyist work is now not the open and honest propaganda of one's views among the working class, but the masking of one's views, the obsequious and sycophantic praise of the views of one's opponents, the hypocritical and false trampling one's own views into the mud.

At the trial of 1936, if you remember, Kamenev and Zinoviev emphatically denied that they had any political platform. They had every opportunity to develop their political platform at the trial. However, they did not do so, saying that they had no political platform. There can be no doubt that both of them lied in denying that they had a platform. Now even the blind see that they had their own political platform. But why did they deny that they had

any political platform? Because they were afraid to reveal their true political face, they were afraid to demonstrate their real platform for the restoration of capitalism in the USSR, fearing that such a platform would arouse disgust in the working class.

At the trial in 1937 Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov took a different path. They did not deny that the Trotskyites and Zinovievites had a political platform. They acknowledged that they had a certain political platform, recognized and deployed it in their testimony. But they launched it not in order to call on the working class, to call on the people to support the Trotskyist platform, but in order to curse and stigmatize it as an anti-people and anti-proletarian platform. Restoration of capitalism, liquidation of collective farms and state farms, restoration of the exploitation system, alliance with the fascist forces of Germany and Japan to bring war with the Soviet Union closer, struggle for war and against the policy of peace, the territorial dismemberment of the Soviet Union with the return of Ukraine to the Germans, and Primorye - to the Japanese, preparing the military defeat of the Soviet Union in the event of an attack by hostile states, and as a means of achieving these tasks - wrecking, sabotage, individual terror against the leaders of the Soviet government, espionage in favor of the Japanese-German fascist forces - such is the one developed by Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov, the political platform of today's Trotskyism.

It is clear that the Trotskyists could not but hide such a platform from the people, from the working class. And they hid it not only from the working class, but also from the Trotskyist masses, and not only from the Trotskyist masses, but even from the leading Trotskyist elite, which consisted of a small handful of people of 30-40 people. When Radek and Pyatakov demanded from Trotsky permission to convene a small conference of Trotskyists of 30-40 people for information about the nature of this platform, Trotsky forbade them to do so, saying that it was inexpedient to speak about the real nature of the platform even to a small handful of Trotskyists, since such an "operation" can cause a split.

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"Politicians" who hide their views, their platform not only from the working class, but also from the Trotskyist masses, and not only from the Trotskyist masses, but also from the leading Trotskyist elite—such is the physiognomy of modern Trotskyism. But it follows from this that modern Trotskyism can no longer be called a political trend in the working class.

Modern Trotskyism is not a political current within the working class, but an unprincipled and unprincipled band of wreckers, saboteurs, spies, spies, murderers, a band of sworn enemies of the working class, acting for hire from the intelligence organs of foreign states. Such is the undeniable result of the evolution of Trotskyism over the past 7-8 years. Such is the difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism in the present.

The mistake of our Party comrades is that they did not notice this profound difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism in the present. They did not notice that the Trotskyists had long ceased to be ideological people, that the Trotskyists had long since turned into brigands from the sick.

on the road, capable of any filth, capable of everything vile, up to espionage and outright betrayal of their homeland, if only to harm the Soviet state and Soviet power. They did not notice this and were therefore unable to reorganize themselves in time in order to wage the struggle against the Trotskyists in a new, more resolute way. That is why the abominations of the Trotskyists in recent years came as a complete surprise to some of our Party comrades.

Further. Finally, our Party comrades have failed to notice that there is a significant difference between the present-day wreckers and saboteurs, among whom the Trotskyist agents of fascism play a rather active role, on the one hand, and the wreckers and saboteurs of the Shakhty period, on the other hand.

Firstly. Shakhtintsy and industrial party members were openly alien people. For the most part, they were former owners of enterprises, former managers under the old owners, former partners in the old joint-stock companies, or simply old bourgeois specialists who were openly hostile to us politically. None of our people doubted the authenticity of the political face of these gentlemen. And the people of Shakhty themselves did not hide their hostile attitude towards the Soviet system. The same cannot be said about the present wreckers and saboteurs, about the Trotskyists. The present-day wreckers and saboteurs, the Trotskyists, are for the most part Party people, with a Party card in their pocket, so they are not formally strangers. If the old wreckers went against our people, the new wreckers, on the contrary, fawn over our people, praise our people, flatter themselves in front of them in order to ingratiate themselves with them. The difference, as you can see, is significant.

Secondly. The strength of the Shakhty and industrial party members consisted in the fact that they possessed, to a greater or lesser extent, the necessary technical knowledge, while our people, who did not have such knowledge, were forced to learn from them. This circumstance gave the pests of the Shakhty period a great advantage, gave them the opportunity to harm freely and without hindrance, gave them the opportunity to deceive our people technically. Not so with the current wreckers, with the Trotskyists. Today's pests have no technical advantage over our people. On the contrary, technically our people are better prepared than the current wreckers, than the Trotskyists. During the time from the Shakhty period to the present day, tens of thousands of real technically savvy Bolshevik cadres have grown up in our country. One could call thousands and ten thousand technically

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risen Bolshevik leaders, in comparison with whom all these Pyatakovs and Livshits, Shestovs and Boguslavskys, Muradovs and Drobnis are empty talkers and preparers from the point of view of technical training.

Wherein, then, lies the strength of the modern wreckers, the Trotskyists? Their strength lies in the party card, in the possession of the party card. Their strength lies in the fact that a party card gives them political credibility and gives them access to all our institutions and organizations. Their advantage

The real problem lies in the fact that, having party cards and pretending to be friends of the Soviet government, they deceived our people politically, abused their trust, did harm on the sly and revealed our state secrets to the enemies of the Soviet Union. "Advantage" - questionable in its political and moral value, but still an "advantage". This "advantage" explains, in fact, the fact that Trotskyist wreckers, like people with a party card, who have access to all places of our institutions and organizations, turned out to be a direct find for the intelligence agencies of foreign states. The mistake of some of our Party comrades is that they did not notice, did not understand all this difference between the old and new wreckers, between the Shakhminists and the Trotskyites, and, failing to notice this, failed to reorganize in time in order to fight the new wreckers. in a new way.

Such are the basic facts of our international and domestic situation, which many of our Party comrades have forgotten or failed to notice. That is why our people have been caught unawares by the events of recent years in terms of sabotage and sabotage. It may be asked: but why did our people not notice all this, why did they forget about all this? Where did all this forgetfulness, blindness, carelessness, complacency come from? Is this not an organic defect in the work of our people? No, this is not an organic defect. This is a temporary phenomenon that can be quickly eliminated with some effort on the part of our people. What is the point then?

The fact is that in recent years our Party comrades have been completely absorbed in economic work, they have been extremely carried away by economic successes and, being carried away by all this business, they have forgotten about everything else, they have abandoned everything else. The fact is that, being carried away by economic successes, they began to see in this matter the beginning and end of everything, and on such matters as the international position of the Soviet Union, the capitalist encirclement, the strengthening of the political work of the party, the fight against sabotage, etc. .p., did not simply pay attention, believing that all these questions are of secondary or even tertiary importance.

Successes and achievements are, of course, a great thing. Our successes in the field of socialist construction are indeed enormous. But success, like everything in the world, has its shadow sides. Among people who are little experienced in politics, great successes and great achievements often give rise to carelessness, complacency, complacency, excessive self-confidence, arrogance, boasting. You cannot deny that in recent times we have seen a lot of braggarts. It is not surprising that in this situation of great and serious successes in the field of socialist construction, moods of bragging are created, moods of ceremonial manifestations of our successes are created, moods of underestimation of the forces of our enemies, moods of overestimation of our own forces are created, and as a result of all this, a political

We know from experience the dangers associated with difficulties. For several years now we have been fighting against such dangers and, I must say, not without success. The dangers associated with difficulties, in unstable people, often give rise to moods of despondency, disbelief in their own strength, moods of pessimism. And, conversely, where it is a matter of overcoming the dangers arising from difficulties, people become tempered in this struggle and come out of the struggle as truly steadfast Bolsheviks. Such is the nature of the dangers associated with difficulties. These are the results of overcoming difficulties.

But there are other kinds of dangers, dangers connected with successes, dangers connected with achievements. Yes, yes, comrades, the dangers associated with successes and achievements. These dangers lie in the fact that among people who have little experience in politics and who have not seen very much, the atmosphere of success - success after success, achievement after achievement, overfulfillment of plans after overfulfillment - gives rise to moods of carelessness and complacency, creates an atmosphere of ceremonial celebrations and mutual greetings, killing sense of proportion and dulling political instinct, demagnetizes people and pushes them to rest on their laurels.

It is not surprising that in this stupefying atmosphere of arrogance and complacency, the atmosphere of ceremonial demonstrations and noisy self-praise, people forget about certain essential facts that are of paramount importance for the fate of our country, people begin to ignore such unpleasant facts as capitalist environment, new forms of sabotage, the dangers associated with our successes, and so on. Capitalist encirclement? Yes, that's bullshit! What significance can any capitalist environment have if we fulfill and exceed our economic plans? New forms of sabotage, the struggle against Trotskyism? All this is nonsense! What significance can all these trifles have when we fulfill and exceed our economic plans? Party charter, election of party organs, accountability of party leaders to the masses of the party? Is there a need for all this? Is it worth bothering with these trifles at all, if our economy is growing, and the material situation of the workers and peasants is improving more and more? All this is rubbish! We are overfulfilling our plans, our party is not bad, the Central Committee of the party is also not bad, what the hell else do we need? Strange people sit there, in Moscow, in the Central Committee of the party: they invent some questions, talk about some kind of sabotage, they themselves do not sleep, they do not let others sleep ...

Here is a vivid example of how easily and "simply" some of our inexperienced comrades become infected with political blindness as a result of their dizzying passion for economic success. Such are the difficulties associated with success, with achievements. These are the reasons why our Party comrades, carried away by economic successes, forgot about the facts of an international and internal character that are of essential importance for the Soviet Union, and did not notice a whole series of dangers surrounding our country. These are the roots of our carelessness, forgetfulness, complacency, political blindness. Such are the roots of the shortcomings in our economic and Party work.

How to eliminate these shortcomings of our work? What needs to be done for this?

It is necessary to carry out the following activities.

- 1) It is necessary, first of all, to turn the attention of our party comrades, who are bogged down in "current questions" along the lines of this or that department, towards major political issues of an international and domestic character.
- 2) It is necessary to raise the political work of our Party to the proper level, placing at the forefront the task of political education, the Bolshevik tempering of Party, Soviet and economic cadres.
- 3) It is necessary to explain to our Party comrades that the economic successes, the significance of which is undoubtedly very great and which we will continue to achieve in the future, day after day, year after year, still do not exhaust the entire work of our socialist construction. To explain that the shadow aspects associated with economic success and expressed in self-satisfaction, carelessness, in the dulling of political intuition, can be eliminated only if economic success is combined with success in party building, in the extensive political work of our party. . Explain that the economic successes themselves, their strength and duration depend wholly and completely on the successes of Party organizational and Party political work, that without this condition economic successes may turn out to be built on sand.
- 4) It must be remembered and never forgotten that the capitalist encirclement is the main factor determining the international position of the Soviet Union. Remember and never forget that as long as there is a capitalist encirclement, there will be wreckers, saboteurs, spies, terrorists sent to the rear of the Soviet Union by intelligence agencies of foreign states, remember this and fight those comrades who underestimate the significance of the fact capitalist encirclement, who underestimate the power and significance of sabotage. To explain to our Party comrades that no economic successes, no matter how great, can annul the fact of capitalist encirclement and the results that flow from this fact. Take the necessary measures to ensure that our comrades, Party and non-Party Bolsheviks, have the opportunity to get acquainted with the goals and tasks, with the practice and technique of sabotage, sabotage and espionage work of foreign intelligence agencies.
- 5) It is necessary to explain to our Party comrades that the Trotskyists, who represent the active elements of the sabotage and espionage work of foreign intelligence agencies, have long ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that they have long ceased to serve any idea compatible with the interests of the working class, that they have become an unprincipled and unprincipled gang of wreckers, saboteurs, spies, assassins, employed by foreign intelligence agencies. Explain that in the struggle against modern Trotskyism what is needed now is not the old methods, not the methods of discussion, but new methods, methods of uprooting and destruction.
- 6) It is necessary to explain to our party comrades the difference between modern wreckers and the wreckers of the Shakhty period, to explain that if the wreckers of the Shakhty period deceived our people on equipment, using their technical backwardness, then modern wreckers, who have a party card, deceive our people on political

confidence in them as members of the party, using the political carelessness of our people.

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It is necessary to supplement the old slogan about mastering technology, which corresponds to the period of Shakhtin's times, with a new slogan about the political education of cadres, about mastering Bolshevism and eliminating our political gullibility, a slogan that fully corresponds to the current period we are going through.

It may be asked: was it not possible ten years ago, in the period of Shakhtin's times, to issue both slogans at once—the first slogan on the mastery of technology, and the second slogan on the political education of cadres? No, it was impossible. This is not how things are done in our Bolshevik Party. At turning points in a revolutionary movement, one fundamental slogan is always put forward as the key slogan, in order to seize hold of it and draw the whole chain through it. Lenin taught us this: find the main link in the chain of our work, grab hold of it and pull it out in order to stretch the whole chain through it and move forward. The history of the revolutionary movement shows that this tactic is the only correct tactic. During the Shakhty period, the weakness of our people consisted in their technical backwardness. Not political, but technical questions were then a weak point for us. As for our political attitudes towards the wreckers of that time, they were quite clear as the attitude of the Bolsheviks towards politically alien people. We liquidated this technical weakness of ours by issuing the slogan of mastering technology and by educating tens and hundreds of thousands of technically savvy Bolshevik cadres in the past period.

It's a different matter now, when we already have technically savvy Bolshevik cadres and when the role of wreckers is played not by openly alien people, who, moreover, have no technical advantages in comparison with our people, but by people who have a party card and enjoy all the rights of members parties. Now the weakness of our people is not technical backwardness, but political carelessness, blind trust in people who accidentally received a party card, the lack of verification of people not by their political declarations, but by the results of their work. Now the key question for us is not the elimination of the technical backwardness of our cadres, for it has already been eliminated in the main, but the elimination of political carelessness and political gullibility towards wreckers who have accidentally obtained a Party ticket.

Such is the fundamental difference between the key issue in the struggle for cadres during the Shakhtin period and the key issue of the present period. That is why we could not and should not have issued both slogans ten years ago—the slogan of mastering technology and the slogan of the political education of cadres. That is why the old slogan about mastering technology must now be supplemented with a new slogan about mastering Bolshevism, about the political education of cadres and the elimination of our political demons.

furnaces.

7) It is necessary to smash and cast aside the rotten theory that everyone

The smoke of our advancement must, as it were, fade more and more in our class struggle, that in proportion to our successes the class enemy becomes more and more tame. This is not only a rotten theory, but also a dangerous theory, for it puts our people to sleep, leads them into a trap, and gives the class enemy the opportunity to recover in order to fight the Soviet Union.

power.

On the contrary, the more we advance, the more successes we have, the more the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes will become embittered, the sooner they will resort to sharper forms of struggle, the more

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they will do harm to the Soviet state, the more they will seize upon the most desperate means of struggle as the last means of the doomed.

It must be borne in mind that the remnants of the defeated classes in the USSR are not alone. They have direct support from our enemies outside the USSR. It would be a mistake to think that the sphere of the class struggle is limited to the USSR. If one end of the class struggle has its effect within the framework of the USSR, then its other end extends into the borders of the bourgeois states surrounding us. The remnants of broken classes cannot be unaware of this. And precisely because they know this, they will continue their desperate attacks. That is what history teaches us. This is what Leninism teaches us. It is necessary to remember all this and be on the alert.

8) It is necessary to smash and cast aside another rotten theory that says that one cannot be a pest who does not always harm and who at least sometimes shows success in his work. This strange theory exposes the naivety of its authors. No pest will do harm all the time if he does not want to be exposed in the shortest possible time. On the contrary, a real saboteur must from time to time show success in his work, for this is the only way for him to survive as a saboteur, ingratiate himself and continue his wrecking work. I think the question is clear and needs no further clarification.

9) It is necessary to smash and cast aside the third rotten theory, which says that the systematic fulfillment of economic plans supposedly nullifies sabotage and the results of sabotage. Such a theory can pursue only one goal: to tickle the departmental vanity of our workers, to calm them down and weaken their struggle against sabotage. What does "systematic fulfillment of our economic plans" mean?

First, it has been proved that all our economic plans are too low, because they do not take into account the enormous reserves and possibilities lurking in the bowels of our national economy.

Secondly, the overall fulfillment of economic plans for people's commissariats as a whole does not yet mean that plans are also being fulfilled in some very important branches. On the contrary, the facts show that a number of people's commissariats, which have fulfilled and even exceeded their annual economic plans, are systematically failing to fulfill their plans in some very important branches of the national economy.

Thirdly, there can be no doubt that if the pests had not been exposed and thrown out, the fulfillment of economic plans would have

the situation would have been much worse, as the short-sighted authors of the theory under consideration should have remembered.

Fourthly, wreckers usually time their main wrecker work not to the period of peacetime, but to the period on the eve of the war or the war itself. Let us suppose that we should begin to lull ourselves with the rotten theory of the "systematic fulfillment of economic plans" and would not touch pests. Do the authors of this rotten theory imagine what colossal harm would be inflicted on our state by wreckers in the event of war if they were allowed to remain in the bowels of our national economy under the shadow of the rotten theory of "systematic fulfillment of economic plans"? Is it not clear that the theory of the "systematic fulfillment of economic plans" is a theory that is advantageous to pests?

10) It is necessary to smash and cast aside the fourth rotten theory, which says that the Stakhanov movement is supposedly the main means of eliminating sabotage. This theory was invented in order to

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under the guise of chatter about the Stakhanovites and the Stakhanovite movement to deflect the blow from the wreckers.

Tov. Molotov in his report demonstrated a number of facts showing how the Trotskyist and non-Trotskyist wreckers in the Kuzbass and Donbass, abusing the confidence of our politically careless comrades, systematically led the Stakhanovites by the nose, put spokes in their wheels, artificially created a number of obstacles to their successful work and finally succeeded in frustrating their work. What can the Stakhanovites alone do if the sabotage of capital construction, say in the Donbass, has led to a gap between preparatory work in coal mining, which is lagging behind the pace, and all other work? Is it not clear that the Stakhanovite movement itself needs real help from our side against any and all machinations of wreckers in order to advance the cause and fulfill its great mission? Is it not clear that the struggle against sabotage, the struggle to eliminate sabotage, the curbing of sabotage is a necessary condition for the Stakhanovist movement to be able to unfold in all its breadth? I think that this question is also clear and needs no further clarification.

11) It is necessary to smash and cast aside the fifth rotten theory, which says that the Trotskyite wreckers supposedly have no more reserves, that they are allegedly gaining their last cadres. This is not true, comrades. Only naive people could come up with such a theory. Trotskyist wreckers have their own reserves. They consist primarily of the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes in the USSR. They consist of a number of groups and organizations outside the USSR that are hostile to the Soviet Union.

Take, for example, the Trotskyist counter-revolutionary Fourth International, which consists of two-thirds of spies and saboteurs. Why is this not a reserve? Is it not clear that this spy international will provide cadres for the espionage and wrecking work of the Trotskyists? Or take, for example, a group of swindler Sheflo in Norway, who sheltered the ober spy Trotsky and helped him to harm the Soviet Union. Why is this group not a reserve? Who can deny that this counter-revolutionary group will continue to provide services to Trotskyist spies and wreckers?

Or take, for example, another group of the same scoundrel as Cheflo, the Souvarine group in France. Why are they not a reserve? Can it be denied that this group of swindlers will also help the Trotskyists in their espionage and wrecking work against the Soviet Union? And all these gentlemen from Germany, all sorts of Ruth Fischers, Maslovs, Urbahns, who sold their souls and bodies to the Nazis—how are they not a reserve for Trotskyist espionage and wrecking work?

Or, for example, the well-known horde of writers from America, headed by the notorious swindler Eastman, all these robbers of the pen, who live by slandering the working class of the USSR—how are they not a reserve for Trotskyism?

No, we must throw away the rotten theory that the Trotskyists are allegedly getting the last shots.

12) Finally, it is necessary to smash and discard one more rotten theory, which says that since we Bolsheviks are many, but there are few wreckers, since we Bolsheviks are supported by tens of millions of people, and only a few Trotskyist wreckers and dozens, then we Bolsheviks could not pay attention to some bunch of wreckers.

This is not true, comrades. This more than strange theory was invented in order to console some of our leading comrades, Provo

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who poured at work due to their inability to deal with sabotage, and lull their vigilance, let them sleep peacefully.

That the Trotskyite wreckers are supported by a few, and the Bolsheviks by tens of millions of people—that is, of course, true. But it does not at all follow from this that wreckers cannot inflict the most serious harm on our cause. In order to mischief and harm, this does not require a large number of people. To build the Dneprostroy, tens of thousands of workers must be set in motion. And to blow it up, this requires, perhaps, several dozen people, no more. To win a battle during a war, this may require several corps of Red Army soldiers. And in order to ruin this gain at the front, all it takes is a few spies somewhere in the headquarters of the army or even in the headquarters of the division, who can steal the operational plan and pass it on to the enemy. It takes thousands of people to build a big railroad bridge. But to blow it up, it only takes a few people. There are dozens and hundreds of such examples.

Therefore, one cannot console oneself with the fact that there are many of us, and few of them, the Trotskyist wreckers. We must ensure that they, the Trotskyist wreckers, are not at all in our ranks.

That is how matters stand with regard to the question of how to eliminate the shortcomings in our work, which are common to all our organizations, both economic and Soviet, and administrative and Party. These are the measures necessary to eliminate these shortcomings.

As regards the special party organizations and shortcomings in their work, the measures to eliminate these shortcomings are discussed in sufficient detail.

in the draft resolution before you. I think, therefore, that there is no need to expand here on this aspect of the matter. I would only like to say a few words on the question of the political training and improvement of our Party cadres.

I think that if we could, if we could, from top to bottom, our Party cadres, train them ideologically and temper them politically in such a way that they could freely orient themselves in the domestic and international situation, if we could make them fully mature Leninists, Marxists capable of solving the problems of leading the country without serious mistakes, then we would solve nine-tenths of all our problems with this.

How is the situation with the leadership of our party? In the composition of our Party, if we have in mind its leading strata, there are about 3,000 to 4,000 top leaders. This, I would say, is the generals of our party. Next come 30,000-40,000 middle managers. This is our party officers. Next come about 100,000-150,000 lower Party commanders. This, so to speak, is our party non-commissioned officer. Raising the ideological level and political tempering of these commanding cadres, pouring into these cadres fresh forces awaiting their advancement, and thus expanding the composition of the leading cadres—this is the task.

What is required for this? First of all, it is necessary to suggest to our party leaders, from secretaries of cells to secretaries of regional and republican party organizations, to select for themselves, during a certain period, two people, two party workers, capable of being their real deputies. They can say: where can they get two deputies for each, we don't have such people, we don't have the appropriate workers. This is not true, comrades. capable people, people

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We have tens of thousands of talented people. You just need to know them and put them forward in time, so that they do not stop in the old place and do not begin to rot. Seek and find.

Further. For party education and retraining of cell secretaries, four-month "Party Courses" must be set up in each regional center. The secretaries of all primary Party organizations (cells) should be sent to these courses, and then, after completing the courses and returning to their posts, their deputies and the most capable members of the primary Party organizations.

Further. For the political retraining of the first secretaries of regional organizations, eight-month "Lenin courses" must be set up in the USSR, say, in the 10 most important centers. The first secretaries of district and district Party organizations should be sent to these courses, and then, after completing the courses and returning to their posts, their deputies and the most capable members of district and district organizations.

Further. For the ideological retraining and political improvement of the secretaries of city organizations, it is necessary to create under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a six-month course on the history and politics of the party. The first or second secretaries of city organizations should be sent to these courses, and then, after passing the courses and returning to their place, the most capable members of city organizations.

Finally, it is necessary to create a six-month "Conference on domestic and international policy" under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. The first secretaries of regional and krai organizations and the central committees of the national communist parties should be sent here. These comrades must provide not one, but several replacements who can replace the leaders of the Central Committee of our Party. This is necessary and must be done.

I'm done, comrades. We have thus outlined the fundamental shortcomings of our work, both those which are common to all our organizations—economic, administrative, party organizations, and those which are peculiar only to specially party organizations, shortcomings used by the enemies of the working class for their own purposes. sabotage and sabotage and espionage and terrorist work. We further outlined the main measures necessary to eliminate these shortcomings and neutralize the sabotage and espionage and terrorist attacks of Trotskyist-fascist agents of foreign intelligence agencies. The question is, can we carry out all these measures, do we have all the necessary opportunities for this?

Of course we can. We can, because we have at our disposal all the means necessary to carry out these measures. What do we lack?

Only one thing is missing: the readiness to liquidate one's own carelessness, one's own complacency, one's own political myopia. This is the snag. But will we really not be able to get rid of this ridiculous and idiotic disease, we who have overthrown capitalism, built or basically socialism and raised the great banner of world communism?

We have no reason to doubt that we will certainly deal with it, if, of course, we want it. Let's get rid of it not simply, but in the Bolshevik way, for real. And when we are done with this idiotic disease, we can say with full confidence that we are not afraid of any

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enemies, neither internal nor external, we are not afraid of their sorties, for we will smash them in the future just as we smash them in the present, as we smashed them in the past. (Applause.)

Andreev. There is a proposal to announce a break for 10 minutes. No objections?

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No. 32

RESOLUTION OF THE plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks ON THE REPORT of comrade Ezhov "LESSONS OF WRECKING, SUBVERSION AND ESPIONAGE OF THE JAPANESE-GERMAN-TROTSKYIST AGENTS" (12)

March 3, 1937

The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks believes that all the facts revealed during the investigation into the cases of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center ÿ (its supporters in the field) show that with the exposure of these worst enemies of the people, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs was late, at least 4 years.

The traitors to the motherland, the Trotskyists and other double-dealers, in alliance with the German and Japanese counterintelligence, managed to launch sabotage, sabotage, espionage and terrorist activities with relative impunity, to inflict damage on the cause of socialist construction in a number of industries and in transport, not only due to the shortcomings of the work of the party and economic organizations, but also due to the weak work of the state security organs of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

Despite the repeated warnings of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks about the restructuring of all KGB work in the direction of a more organized and sharp fight against counter-revolution (instruction of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated May 8, 1933, a closed letter of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the lessons of events, associated with the villainous murder of comrade Kirov and friend.), the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR did not comply with these instructions of the party and government and was unable to expose the anti-Soviet Trotskyist gang in time.

The main shortcomings in the work of the state security agencies, which had a decisive influence on the belated exposure of the Trotskyist anti-Soviet organization, continue to be the following:

a) The People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR did not raise intelligence work to the proper level, which is one of the main levers in the fight against counter-revolution. Agents were recruited by chance and by gravity. As a rule, no attention was paid to the main and decisive areas where the agent network should have been well established. In particular, the agents among the Trotskyists, Zinovievites and the Rights were weak, even in the places where they were most concentrated. There were also no agents in almost any of the foreign anti-Soviet organizations, including the Trotskyists. The leading operatives of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, as a rule, were not personally involved in agents. Meetings with agents and receiving materials from them were carried out by poorly qualified ordinary employees.

As a result of such poor leadership of the agents, many traitors turned out to be among the latter. During the investigation of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center in Moscow alone, 65 agents of traitors were identified who systematically misinformed the state security organs, confused the whole matter, actively contributing to the unpunished activities of the Trotskyists.

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b) The lack of qualified agents and the inept management of the available agents determined the poor organization of the investigative work. The investigation, not having sufficient evidence from the agents, often depended on the criminal and his good will to give exhaustive evidence or not, i.e. the entire investigation was based on the voluntary confession of the accused.

This, to a certain extent, also explains the fact that the arrested Trotskyists managed to hide from the investigation the darkest aspects of their anti-Soviet activities and, most importantly, the people organizationally associated with them.

c) In all its practice, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR pursued an incorrect punitive policy, especially against Trotskyists and other enemies of the Soviet system.

An analysis of the arrests made in 1935-36 shows that the main blow of the state security organs was directed not against organized counter-revolutionary formations, but mainly against individual cases of anti-Soviet agitation, against all kinds of malfeasance, hooliganism, domestic crimes, etc. d. Of the total number of those repressed in 1935-36, about 80% falls on all kinds of petty crimes, which are, in essence, the objects of the work of the police, and not of state security agencies.

d) Even more intolerable is the prison regime established by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the USSR in relation to convicts, the most malicious enemies of Soviet power, Trotskyists, Zinovievists, rightists, socialist-revolutionaries and others.

All these enemies of the people, as a rule, were sent to the so-called political isolators, which were subordinated to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. The political isolators were in especially favorable conditions and looked more like forced rest homes than prisons.

In the political isolators, the convicts had the opportunity to communicate closely with each other, discuss all the political events in the country, develop plans for the anti-Soviet work of their organizations and communicate freely. The detainees were given the right to use literature, paper and stationery in unlimited quantities, receive an unlimited number of letters and telegrams, acquire their own inventory in the cells and receive, along with state food, parcels from the outside in any quantity and assortment.

e) The most serious shortcoming in the work of state security agencies is the practice of selecting, promoting and educating Chekist personnel.

For the most part, the workers of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs are, of course, experienced, selflessly devoted to the cause of our party, qualified Chekists. Despite this, the practice of nominating and appointing people was often guided by non-business motives. In many cases, people were nominated not on the basis of their devotion to the party, their ability and knowledge of the matter, but on the basis of servility and sycophancy.

As a result of this, alien and criminal elements penetrated into separate links of the state security organs. A number of cases were discovered when even spies of foreign intelligence managed to penetrate into the state security organs (Polish spies - Sosnowski, Mazepus,

Polish-German spy Ilinich and friend.). (13).

The same practice of a non-business attitude towards the nomination of people, as well as the lack of political educational work created the conditions under which

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ryh in the leading Chekist work there were direct traitors - trots
cysts.

Some of them systematically informed the members of the Trotskyist organization about the materials available in the NKVD about the anti-Soviet activities of the latter (the head of the Taganrog city department of the NKVD - Bala nyuk, the head of the Novocherkassk city department of the NKVD - Shapovalov, the former head of the SPO of the NKVD of Ukraine - Kozelsky and a friend.).

In addition, it should be noted that party-political educational work was extremely poorly placed among the KGB cadres. People were brought up in one-sided departmental patriotism, out of alignment with the general work of the party. As a result of this, some Chekists broke away from party life and closed themselves in the circle only of their own departmental interests. Such is the case with the general shortcomings in the work of the NKVD of the USSR.

However, the delay in exposing the anti-Soviet activities of the Trotskyist bandits is explained not only by these general shortcomings in the work of the state security organs and the specific criminal activities of certain senior officials of the Cheka and, in particular, the former head of the Secret Political Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR - Molchanov.

This criminal activity was expressed, first of all, in the fact that already in 1932-33 the Secret Political Department had in its hands all the threads in order to fully reveal the monstrous conspiracy of the Trotskyists against the Soviet power. In 1932, the Secret Political Department of the GUGB of the NKVD had sufficient intelligence materials in which there were direct indications of the existence of I.N. the Trotskyist center, about Smirnov's connections with Trotsky and his son Sedov, and about the terrorist intentions of a number of major Trotskyists. From the materials it was clear that the Trotskyist center was establishing organizational ties with groups of Trotskyists in the localities and was carrying out Trotsky's directive on a bloc with the Zinovievists and the Rights.

On the basis of these intelligence materials, at the beginning of 1933, a group of Trotskyists headed by Smirnov was arrested. With such undercover materials at their disposal, the investigation had every opportunity to reveal to the end all organizational ties and all the criminal terrorist activities of the Trotskyites and Zinovievites. Meanwhile, the investigation was carried out so negligently and criminally that the main intelligence materials available in the case were not used. The head of the Trotskyist center I.N. Smirnov was interrogated only on the question of his attitude towards collectivization; the most active member of the Trotskyist center, Safonova, was only asked whether she had read Trotsky's book My Life; Ter-Vaganyan was asked what his disagreements with the party line consisted of; Trotsky's emissary, the terrorist Pereverzev, was not interrogated at all. As a result,

From whom the criminal conduct of the investigation, the accused escaped with a minor punishment and were sent to political isolators and exile, where they were given the widest opportunities to continue their anti-Soviet criminal activities.

Absolutely unprecedented is the case of the secret agent of the UNKVD in the Moscow region, 3-on. Beginning in November 1933, Agent 3-n, in a whole series of his reports, signals the anti-Soviet work launched by the Trotskyists, the presence of a leading Trotskyist center and the participation of Dreitzer, Muradov, Pyatakov, Radek and others in the active work of the center. Agent 3-on's materials openly speak of the terrorist plans of the Trotskyists, indicate the close connection of the Trotskyists with foreign countries and the connection of the imprisoned Trotskyists with the will. According to Agent 3-on

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active Trotskyist terrorists Khrustalev and Zilberman were arrested. However, the former head of the Secret Political Department, Molchanov, turned the investigation in such a way that, as a result, the active Trotskyists Khrustalev and Zilberman were released, and Agent 3-n was convicted on charges of provocation and exiled to 5 years. Meanwhile, in the person of Khrustalev, one of the most ardent enemies of Soviet power, the owner of the safe house of the Moscow Trotskyist terrorist center, from which Comrade Stalin's routes were monitored, was released.

The emissary of Trotsky, the terrorist Olberg V., who was shot in the August trial of 1936, as it turns out, was known to the NKVD as early as 1931. For some time he was monitored, then this case was abandoned and Olberg was given the opportunity to create terrorist groups with impunity for three years, trying to carry out the assassination of the leaders of the party and government.

Along with the signals emanating from the agents, the former head of the Secret Political Department of the GUGB, Molchanov, received a lot of materials from the NKVD workers, who persistently raised the question of the need to take measures against the anti-Soviet terrorist activities of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and rightists. Instead of taking a conscientious and Bolshevik-like attitude towards the reports of some agents and the signals of many operatives of the NKVD, Molchanov suspiciously blindly trusted his double agents, who entangled the apparatus of the Secret Political Department and diverted its employees from the possibility of a timely opening of all vile anti-Soviet Trotskyist work.

Moreover, Molchanov, being personally connected with the Trotskyite Furer, systematically told him about the secret information available in the Secret Political Department about the anti-Soviet activities of the Trotskyists. As is now being established by the investigation, Furer inquired about this from Molchanov, acting on the direct instructions of the head of the entire terrorist organization in transport, Livshits.

These are examples of the criminal activities of some employees of the NKVD, and especially the former head of the Secret Political Department of the GUGB Mol

chanova.

These are the main reasons why the NKVD was unable to expose the monstrous anti-Soviet conspiracy of German-Japanese intelligence agents, the Trotskyists, in a timely manner. Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides:

1. Approve the measures taken by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to defeat the anti-Soviet, sabotage, espionage and terrorist gangs of Trotskyists and other double-dealers.

To oblige the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR to carry out the work of exposing and defeating the Trotskyist and other agents of fascism to the end, in order to suppress the slightest manifestations of their anti-Soviet activity.

2. Approve the measures of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks aimed at improving the organization of work in the bodies of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, and, in particular, measures for the organizational restructuring of the GUGB apparatus and strengthening it with new party cadres.

3. Approve the measures of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks aimed at improving the apparatus of the state security organs by promoting new Bolshevik-proven Chekists to leading positions and removing from the apparatus the decomposed bureaucrats who have lost all Bolshevik sharpness and vigilance in the fight against the class enemy and dishonoring the glorious

the name of the Chekists.

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Approve, in particular, the arrest and trial of one of the main culprits for the shameful failure of the state security organs in the fight against the Zinovievists and Trotskyites, the former head of the Secret Political Department of the GUGB, Molchanov.

4. To continue and complete the reorganization of the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, in particular the apparatus of the GUGB, making it a truly militant body capable of ensuring the tasks entrusted to it by the party and the Soviet government to ensure state security in our country.

5. Taking into account the most important national economic and defense importance of railway transport and the need to protect it from the anti-Soviet destructive activities of the enemies of the Soviet Union, reorganize the 6th department of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD of the USSR (department of transport and communications), allocating railways for maintenance → transport special department.

To entrust this department with the fight against all types of counter-revolution in transport, primarily against the sabotage, sabotage and espionage activities of the enemies of Soviet power.

Release the Transport Department of the GUGB from the functions of protecting public order in railway transport, keeping watch at railway stations, combating the theft of socialist property, hooliganism and children

homelessness.

In order to protect public order and combat criminal crime in railway transport, create a special railway police, which will be subordinated to the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia of the NKVD of the USSR.

Organize the transport department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR on a linear basis, subordinating the road transport departments directly to the Transport Department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR.

Organize within the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR the 11th department for the maintenance of water transport, highways and the system of the People's Commissariat of Communications.

6. To propose to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR to organize, both within the country and abroad, qualified reliable agents, carefully selected and expediently placed in those areas where the activities of the enemies of the Soviet system are most active.

7. The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR to take the strictest measures to ensure that shameful cases are completely eliminated when individual Chekists, due to their talkativeness, themselves were the source of supplying the enemies of the Soviet system with the most secret information.

8. To oblige all regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties to pay more attention to the work of the bodies of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, providing them with every possible assistance in their work, for which:

a) to systematically strengthen the bodies of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs with the best proven cadres of party workers;

b) in every possible way to help the cause of political education and cultivation of the Bolshevik Chekist cadres;

c) not to overburden the organs of state security and the employees of these organs with assignments and assignments that have no direct bearing on the cause of the fight against counter-revolution.

9. To propose to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR, on the basis of this resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, to draw up a letter to all employees of the state security organs of the NKVD of the USSR about the lessons and tasks of the Chekists arising from this resolution.

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The Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks expresses firm confidence that all Chekists will learn the lessons of the mistakes associated with exposing the anti-Soviet Zinoviev and Trotskyist conspiracy, correct these mistakes in the Bolshevik way in the shortest possible time and justify the high title of the advanced armed detachment of the Lenin-Stalin party .

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 30-31. Script. Typescript.

Published: Questions of history. 1995. No. 2. S. 22-26.

No. 33

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT THE TROTSKIST CENTER IN THE WESTERN SIBERIAN REGION

March 11, 1937

No. 56176

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

* In the case of the Siberian anti-Soviet Trotskyist center, the NKVD Directorate in the West Siberian Territory established the existence of a counter-revolutionary organization of anti-Soviet partisans, headed by the partisan command - the Trotskyists SHEVELE VYM-DUBKOV and TRETYAKOV in Western Siberia and the right counter-revolutionary Yakovenko in Krasnoyarsk edge*.

Arrested TABANAKOV A.A. - The former chairman of the Extraordinary Investigation Commission of the Tretyak partisan division testified that *he was involved in the Japanese military organization by Tretyak in 1919*.

According to the testimony of TABANAKOV, TRETYAK was thrown out by the Japanese to Altai in 1919 with special instructions to organize an insurrectionary army, with the task of preventing the British and French from entering Altai and Mongolia and delaying the advance of the Czechs.

During 1919-1920. Tretyak complied with this instruction of the Japanese, hoping after the defeat of the Czechs to form in Oirotia, Khakassia, Tuva and Mongolia an autonomous state under the protectorate of Japan.

In 1920, TRETYAK, through the mediation of TABANAKOV, created his own counterintelligence in the newly organized Soviet apparatus, including the Biysk Uyezd Extraordinary Commission, where they were recruited - the head of the district militia LEKHTOROVICH, the head of agents PETUKHOV and the secret agent Vlasov, who informed Tretyak about the materials and activities of the Extraordinary Commission.

The arrested PETUKHOV confessed to treason and gave detailed testimony about it.

In 1922, on behalf of the Japanese, Tretyak developed a plan to capture Altai, Mongolia, Khakassia and Tuva. Military operations were entrusted to the White Guard Colonel KAIGORODOV, who was in Mongolia and a Japanese agent.

KAIGORODOV raised an uprising, but was crushed by the Red Army.

Following this, over the course of a number of years, Tretyak organized a number of uprisings in Altai and especially intensified its activities during the period of collectivization and during the conflict on the CER.

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In recent years, Tretyak was given orders from the Japanese to prepare subversive groups for operations in the rear of the Red Army in Altai and Mongolia.

TRETYAK's direct connection with the Japanese was also confirmed by ZAKOMALDIN, an arrested Japanese intelligence agent who had previously worked for 5 years as a coachman in the Japanese consulate in Novosibirsk.

ZAKOMALDIN testified that, while working in the Japanese consulate, he carried out direct orders from the Japanese for espionage work.

In 1935, the Japanese gave ZAKOMALDIN 10,000 money to purchase a safe house in Biysk, where ZAKOMALDIN arranged meetings with TRETYAK for the employees of the Japanese consulate, the well-known Japanese intelligence agents KAWAYASHI, SAKAWA, TANAKA and KAYANAGI.

Arrested in the case:

1. **TRETYAK - former commander of the Gorno-Altai partisan division.
2. ZYRYANOV - former chief of staff of this division.
3. VYAZNIKOV - former regiment commander.
4. LYAMIN - former commander of the regiment.
5. TABANAKOV - former chairman of the Extraordinary Commission of Inquiry of the Tretyak Division.
6. PETUKHOV - former head of agents of the Biysk district Cheka.
7. LEHTOROVICH - former head of the Biysk district police.
8. GERASIMOVICH - TRETYAK'S wife.
9. ZAKOMALDIN** - former coachman of the Japanese consulate in Novosibirsk.

As of March 8, the partisans seized and voluntarily handed over the weapons they kept in their possession;

3-line rifles - 199 Shotguns - 70

4-line combat rifles, retired - 531

Revolvers - 444, of which Nagant - 66

Brownings - 66 Smith
& Wessons - 178

Bulldogs - 126 Other
systems - 9

Grenades - 26 _

Total: 1270 military firearms

In addition, 2,300 rounds of ammunition were seized.

The seizure of weapons and the investigation of the case are ongoing.

APPENDIX: Protocols of TABANAKOV, ZAKOMALDIN and PETUKHOV.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 295. L. 167-170. Script. Typescript.

* Published without minutes.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "From comrade Yezhov."
*_*_
underlined in pencil.

_
Each last name has a checkmark next to it.

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No. 34

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT FOREIGNERS LIVING IN THE
WEST SIBERIAN REGION (14)

March 13, 1937

119 - Question of the NKVD.

1. Deny foreigners residing in the West Siberian Territory (when extending a residence permit) the right to further reside in the West Siberian Territory. First of all, to carry out this measure in relation to German, Japanese and Polish subjects.

2. Foreign nationals convicted of espionage and sabotage should be arrested and brought to justice.

3. The issue of residence in Western Siberia of foreign nationals of the Communists and political emigrants who have national passports, to be considered individually for each commission composed of comrade t. Stasova, Agranov and Moskvina (ECCI).

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 98. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 46.

No. 35

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT PRISONS OF THE MAIN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE SECURITY OF THE NKVD OF THE USSR (15)

March 13, 1937

130 - 0 regime and restructuring of the prisons of the NKVD GUGB.

Approve the draft order on the regime and restructuring of the prisons of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD and the regulations on the prisons of the GUGB:

a) for the maintenance of convicts and

b) for the maintenance of persons under investigation.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 984. L. 27. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 46.

No. 36

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. STALIN IN

THE CASE OF THE "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY"

ORGANIZATION IN THE KABARDINO-BALKARIA AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC

March 14, 1937

No. 56202

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The NKVD uncovered and liquidated a counter-revolutionary terrorist nationalist organization operating on the territory of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Republic.

DOCUMENTATION

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The investigation established that the organization arose in 1935 on the basis of the unification of counter-revolutionary formations that arose at different times from bourgeois nationalists, Trotskyists, rightists and White Guards.

The core of the organization included:

Beslaneev Khabala - former manager of the North Caucasian office of the All-Union Association for the supply and marketing of materials for industrial and technical purposes in Nalchik, in 1910 he was the Minister of Internal Affairs of the White Guard government in Chechnya, expelled from the CPSU (b) in 1936 (arrested).

MAKSIDOV Kazigiri - former director of the Kabardino-Balkarian Pedagogical Institute, former mullah, in 1919 was an adjutant of General TLEKHASA, until 1936 a member of the CPSU (b), expelled as a Trotskyist (arrested).

KAKOJEV Akhmetkhan - manager of the regional office of Kozhsindika ta, former prosecutor of Kabardino-Balkaria, expelled from the CPSU (b) in 1936 as a bourgeois nationalist (arrested).

AGZAGOV Lyun - former head of the regional police, formerly a kulak, former white, active, participant in the insurrectionary movement against Soviet power, expelled from the CPSU (b) in 1935 as a bourgeois nationalist (arrested).

KAMENEV Khamshik - member of the CPSU (b), chairman of the Circassian regional executive committee, member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, former worker of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, nationalist. As chairman of the regional executive committee, KAMENEV established close ties with the remnants of the insurgent organization PSYCHO MAKHOV and others, defeated in 1935, and began to conduct active counter-revolutionary work.

Under the leadership of the persons mentioned above, the organization launched extensive wrecking and subversive work in the collective farms and the MTS. As a result of her activities in 1936, the plan for irrigation measures in Malaya Kabarda was frustrated, which led to crop shortages and food difficulties in the collective farms of the villages - Khamidie, Tersky, Urozaino and others.

In a number of districts of Kabardino-Balkaria, the Soviet Party leadership was seized by members of the organization.

In 1935, this organization entered into a bloc with the Trotskyist terrorist organization existing in Nalchik, headed by Jan Sokh, chairman of the Kabardino-Balkarian Union of Soviet Writers, a candidate of the CPSU (b) since 1931 (arrested).

The united organization was preparing to commit terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government.

The investigation established that in 1933 NALOEV was recruited into a Trotskyist organization by a member of the Rostov Trotskyist terrorist center VLADIMIROV, was associated with RADEK, and also knew about the composition of the Rostov Trotskyist center.

NALOEV was privy to the plans of central terror, was given the task of organizing a branch of the center in Nalchik and preparing terrorist acts against members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government during their visits to the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

In addition, the Rostov Trotskyite Terrorist Center carried out special work on the national regions of the North Caucasus Territory.

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For this purpose, through members VLADIMIROV and LIKHNITSKY (both arrested) at the Mountain Research Institute in the mountains. In Rostov, a Trotskyist group was created from mountaineer graduate students.

In order to establish a united front of struggle against Soviet power, the organization established contact with the counter-revolutionary element of the neighboring national regions.

140 members of the organization were identified in the case, of which 51 people were arrested. 26 firearms and 450 rounds of ammunition were confiscated from members of the organization.

I have given instructions to arrest all members of this organization.

I ask for permission to arrest and prosecute in this case the chairman of the Circassian Regional Executive Committee, a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - KAMENEV Khamshik.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 296. L. 1-4. Script. Typescript.

On the first page there are Stalin's resolutions: "I agree[asen]*"; "T. Yezhov has been informed. Poskrebyshev.

#37

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT AN EMPLOYEE OF A JAPANESE COMPANY (16)

March 14, 1937

No. 56215

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The NKVD Directorate for the Far Eastern Territory is investigating the case of an employee of the Vladivostok office of the Japanese transport company Ssen-Gomi, which for a number of years was engaged in espionage and illegal currency transactions in the USSR.

As a result, it was established that the most active illegal work under the guise of transport operations of the Ssen-Gomi office was carried out by the deputy head of this office, spy Takahashi, a Japanese citizen. Expand the investigation in the scope of the full disclosure of the entire criminal de

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The activity of this office is not possible due to the fact that Takahashi is at large and, before each summons for interrogation by the NKVD, receives appropriate instructions at the Japanese consulate in the city of Vladivostok.

On the basis of the same briefing, in order to hide from the investigation the facts of illegal currency transactions, Takahashi specially compiled new cash books for 1936 and presented them to the investigation as exculpatory documents.
cops.

Meanwhile, it has been established for certain that the Sasen-Gomi office is organized on our territory for espionage and illegal currency activities in favor of Japan and, in view of the impunity of Japanese spies among the employees of this company, is developing significant intelligence work.

DOCUMENTATION

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Takahashi is especially dangerous among intelligence officers because of his activities. On January 4, 1937, on the streets of Vladivostok, he was detained at the moment of receiving spy materials from a person he had recruited; during the search, this spy material was found in Takahashi, and he himself was arrested. * However, on January 5, 1937, at the insistence of the NKID, Takahashi was released. In the interests of stopping this big channel for Japanese intelligence activities, covered by the official commercial operations of the firm, I ask you to allow Takahashi to be arrested *.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 103-104. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "Not ascending. St., T. Yezhov has been informed. P.*. underlined in the margins with two lines.

No. 38

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ON PROVIDING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR THE HEAD OF THE
BOLSHEVIK DESIGN PLANT TO REMOVE THE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE "WARNINGS" (17)

March 19, 1937

No. 56312

Top secret

I am sending a note * of N. N. MAGDESIEV, former head of the design bureau of the Bolshevik plant, who was arrested by us. on the elimination of the consequences of sabotage in the artillery systems of the Bolshevik plant.

The note is of a general nature, which MAGDESIEV explains by the absence of the drawings necessary for concretization.

I consider it expedient to send MAGDESIEV to Leningrad, where to provide him with the opportunity in prison conditions, using the necessary drawings and technical assistance, to carry out work to eliminate the consequences of sabotage in the structures of the artillery systems of the Bolshevik plant *.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 343. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "We must ask Belotserkovsky. St. "; "Behind. Molotov"; "From comrade Yezhov."

* Published without note.

*
underlined in pencil.

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No. 39

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhov TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE ARRESTS OF TROTSKYISTS

March 21, 1937

No. 56346

Top secret

I am sending you the protocols of interrogations of those arrested by the NKVD department of the Kalinin region - members of the Trotskyist organization SHOR S.Yu. dated March 3, 1937 and KOPELEVA S.L. dated March 5 and 10, 1937.

KOPELEV and SHOR testified that the Trotskyist organization carried out subversive, wrecking work in the decisive areas of agriculture in the Kalinin region, as well as in the construction of silk, rubber-sole factories and a car building plant.

I consider it necessary to arrest:

1. *Kadaev Vasily Semenovich, Director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute in Torzhok;

2. Alexander Vladimirovich MILOSLAVSKY, agronomist, scientific secretary of the All-Union Research Institute of Flax in Torzhok;

3. Ernest Stepanovich LIVSHITSA, former director of the Kalinin Carriage Building Plant (now Voronezh) *.

I ask for your approval.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov AP RF. F.

3. Op. 24. D. 298. L. 1. Original. Typescript.

* Published without minutes.

There are resolutions on the sheet: "I don't mind. St. "; Yezhov has been informed. P>.

No. 40

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN ABOUT THE ARRESTED "PESTS"

IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY WITH THE
APPENDIX OF THE PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION N.G. KUDRYASHOVA

March 22, 1937

No. 56363

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending you the protocols of interrogations of those arrested by the NKVD department of the Ivanovo region: N. G. Kudryashova, P. A. Sokolov, I. V. Efremov, N. P. Preobrazhensky. dated March 8, 9 and 10 this year

Those arrested were not exhaustively interrogated.

In the coming days, we are sending a group of operatives to Ivanovo to turn the investigation around.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

DOCUMENTATION

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PROTOCOL OF THE
INTERROGATION OF THE Defendant Nikolai Gerasimovich Kudryashov

Kudryashov N.G., born in 1891, b. member of the CPSU (b) since 1917, former. factory director worker F. Zinoviev in Ivanovo, a Trotskyist since 1923, in 1928-1929 he was a member of the Bashenkov group at the Promakademiya im. Stalin in Moscow.

Question: You worked in textiles for a long time. Are you aware of the facts of wrecking activities in the textile industry?

Answer: Yes, they are known. I want to tell the investigation about the largest act of sabotage in the textile industry in the Ivanovo region - the introduction of a functional system of work. The introduction of functionals began with the factory. Lakin of the Sobinsky district, and then from 1931 it was extended to all enterprises of the textile industry. This system led the enterprises of the region to collapse. Thanks to its use, depersonalization took root, the main leading cadres were disqualified, the quality of products decreased, the marriage rate increased, equipment was sought, and wages fell. All this had the consequence of a tremendous growth of discontent among the workers. One can judge what a heavy blow the functionaries of the textile industry dealt because when (already after the abolition of this system) the government, it seems, in 1932 gave the region a large amount of cotton, the industry could not cope with its processing. Thus industry was prepared to frustrate the government's mission. This was facilitated mainly by the lack of a sufficient number of skilled labor, who lost their skills during the period of functional

systems...

I testified earlier about my activities and the activities of the rightist Bashenkov, the Trotskyists A. V. Kornilov, N. P. Preobrazhensky, M. P. Kadykov, and E. I. Lavrentiev, who were directly members of the counter-revolutionary groups. As for the rest of the persons I have listed, I can show the following about them. Dunaev D.I., currently working in Ivanovo office. director at one of the factories, as far as I know, never spoke openly in defense of the Trotskyite platform. However, in the period 1930-1933. in private conversations with me, he repeatedly spoke of the condition of the working class and declared: "Yes, the workers have been firmly clamped down." I remember that in one conversation he expressed regret to Trotsky: "That's the kind of guy they killed." I don't remember anything else about him. N.E. Pirozhkov (I don't know where he works now) came to my apartment in 1933, having arrived from the Promakademiya im. Stalin, where he then studied. In the conversation, one of us raised the question of the position within the Party. He stated that at the present time the old members of the CPSU (b) are being clamped down, there is a clamping in the party and "the dictatorship of the Sta-

lina "...

KUDRYASHOV

Interrogated:

deputy head 4th department of the UNKVD lieutenant of the state. Security MALGIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 298. L. 70-76. Script. Typescript.

* One protocol of N.G. is partially published. Kudryashov.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "N8. Interesting. Art. Easy prom.

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No. 41

SPETSSOOBSHCHBNIB N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT THE TROTSKIST "DIVERSION-TERRORISM"
ORGANIZATION AT THE TORPEDO PLANT (18)

March 25, 1937

No. 56410

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The investigation into the case of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist terrorist and sabotage and sabotage organization liquidated by the NKVD at the torpedo plant No. the terrorist organization carried out a number of sabotage acts to disable the units of the plant and the Feodosiya sighting station. For the war period, the participants of the counter-revolutionary organization planned to carry out acts of sabotage to disable the main equipment, organize a number of explosions in the workshops of the plant and blow up the sighting pavilion of the Feodosiya station.

Directives on the deployment of sabotage activities were received in June 1936 by a member of the counter-revolutionary organization VILENSKY from the former head of the torpedo department of Glavvoenprom, now arrested WOLF L.I.

When transferring this task, WOLF informed VILENSKY that he was an agent of the intelligence department of the Polish General Staff and was acting on his behalf. WOLF gave VILENSKY 5,000 rubles to organize acts of sabotage.

The masters of the 4th workshop of the plant MOROZOV and GOROKHOV and the engineer of the Feodosia sighting station TITOV were recruited as direct perpetrators of acts of sabotage.

Fulfilling the task of WOLF, ABRAMOV proposed to VILENSKY to force the explosion at the Feodosiya station in order to destroy a large number of accumulated ready-made torpedoes by means of an explosion. This act of sabotage was prepared by VILENSKY, but it was not possible to carry it out, since the members of the counter-revolutionary organization, including VILENSKY, were arrested.

The investigation continues.

APPENDIX: protocols of interrogations of VILENSKY and MOROZOV.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 343. L. 13-14. Script. Typescript.

Published without protocol.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 42

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSES OF THE
CRASH OF THE MILITARY TRAIN (19)

March 25, 1937

66-0 train wreck at st. Bugan of the Krasnoyarsk railway e. To investigate the causes of the collapse of a military train at the Bugach station of the Krasnoyarsk railway, send from Moscow to a representative of the Prosecutor's Office and the NKVD.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 985. L. 22. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 47.

No. 43

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. STALIN

ABOUT THE ARREST OF THE PROFESSOR-MONGOLOVERS Ts.Zh. ZHAMSARANO

March 28, 1937

No. 56472

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The NKVD Directorate for the Leningrad Region requested a sanction for the arrest of professor of Mongolian studies ZHAMSARANO Tsyven Zhamsaranovich, who is currently working at the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences in Leningrad, and his closest student, a graduate student of the Academy of Sciences MERGEN Gombozhan, the son of a major Mongolian prince.

ZHAMSARANO has the following materials: living since 1932 in Leningrad, ZHAMSARANO systematically groups

Mongol students, treats them in a Japanophile and anti-Soviet spirit.

According to the materials of the investigation of a group of Buryat-Mongolian students arrested in Leningrad, ZHAMSARANO is exposed as the head of the Buryat-Mongolian counter-revolutionary center that exists in Leningrad, which aims to overthrow Soviet power in Buryat-Mongolia, the elimination of Soviet influence in the Mongolian People's Republic under the Japaneseophile slogan of uniting all Mongolian peoples into one independent state.

ZHAMSARANO conducts recruitment among Mongol students in Leningrad and sends its agents to Buryatia and Mongolia with the tasks of organizing counter-revolutionary insurgent cells among the lama and feudal-kulak elements.

An active assistant in the work carried out by ZHAMSARAN is a post-graduate student of the Academy of Sciences - MERGEN Gombozhan.

The materials of the investigation into the case of the counter-revolutionary insurgent pan-Mongolian center liquidated in Irkutsk confirm the role of

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ZHAMSARANO as the ideologist and direct leader of this organization in Buryat-Mongolia.

I ask you to allow the arrest of citizens of the Mongolian People's Republic prof. ZHAMSARANO and MERGEN Gombozhan.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State. security EZHOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 204. L. 91-92. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "For the arrest. St."

No. 44

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE USE OF CONDEMNED FOR THE PERIOD OF THE WAR

March 29, 1937

BUT - The question of NGOs and the NKVD.

1. All those convicted of counter-revolutionary crimes during the war must be taken out of the Far Eastern Territory.

2. Convicted not for counter-revolutionary crimes may be sued

used in the rear of the army.

3. Those who have served their sentence without loss of rights or have their rights restored are drafted into the army on a general basis in accordance with the law on compulsory military service.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 6. L. 34. Copy. Typescript.

* The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Voroshilov, Yezhov - everything. Akulov, Molotov - p. 3.

Protocol N9 47.

No. 45

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON BERRY"

March 31, 1937

3529 - O Yagoda.

Put the following proposal to the vote of the members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and candidates for membership in the Central Committee:

"In view of the discovered anti-state and criminal crimes of the People's Commissar of Communications, Yagod, committed while he was People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, and also after his transfer to the People's Commissariat for Communications, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union considers it necessary to expel him from the party and the Central Committee and immediately arrest him. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union informs the members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union that in view of the danger of leaving Yagod at liberty even for one day, it was forced to order the immediate arrest of Yagod. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union asks the members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Ukraine to sanction the exclusion of Yagod from the party and the Central Committee and his arrest.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 299. L. 188. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 47.

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 46

DECISION OF THE PLENUM OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ABOUT BERRY"

March 31 - April 1, 1937

1 - Oh Yagoda.

Approve the following proposal of the Politburo of the Central Committee:

April 1, 1937

120 - Issues of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR.

1. Agree with the proposal of the NKVD of the USSR on the measures of punishment for employees of the Kharkov regional apparatus of the NKVD: vol. Govlich M., Kaminsky,

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Shirin and Lissitzky, who took part in the persecution and wrong accusation of Comrade Sukhov.

2. To appoint comrade Ivanov as the first deputy of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, releasing him from the work of the head of the UNKVD of the Donetsk region.

3. To dismiss Comrade Katz Nelson, Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, recalling him to the NKVD of the USSR.

Use Comrade Katsnelson for economic work in the NKVD.

4. To appoint comrade Sokolinsky to the post of head of the UNKVD of the Donetsk region.

5. Approve the order of the NKVD of the USSR on the transfer of comrade Rakhlis from the work of the head of the SPO of the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR and appoint comrade Abugov in his place.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 985. L. 32-33. Script. Typescript.

Protocol number 47.

No. 49

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE REMOVAL OF G.G. BERRIES

April 3, 1937

126 - On the dismissal of the People's Commissar of Communications G.G. Berries.

Approve the following draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR:

In view of the discovered malfeasance of a criminal nature, the People's Commissar for Communications G.G. Yagoda, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR decides:

1) Remove from the post of People's Commissar of Communications G.G. Berry.

2) Transfer the case about G.G. Berry to the investigating authorities.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 985. L. 34. Original. Typescript.

Protocol number 47.

No. 50

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON APPROVAL OF THE REGULATIONS ON A SPECIAL MEETING

April 8, 1937

3 - Regulations on the Special Conference under the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

To amend the decision of the Central Committee of 28.X.34 (pr. No. 16, item 19) to approve the regulation on the Special Conference in the following edition (see appendix).

APPENDIX to
clause 3, pr. PB No. 48

REGULATIONS ON A SPECIAL MEETING UNDER THE
PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIATE FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE USSR (Approved by the
Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on April 8, 1937)

1. Grant the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs the right to deport persons recognized as socially dangerous for a period of up to 5 years under public supervision in the areas, the list of which is established by the NKVD, to exile for a period of up to 5 years

DOCUMENTATION

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under open supervision with a ban on living in the capitals, large cities and industrial centers of the USSR, to imprison in labor camps and in isolation rooms at camps for up to 5 years, and also to deport foreign nationals who are public servants outside the USSR.

but dangerous.

2. Grant the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs the right to imprison persons suspected of espionage, sabotage, sabotage and terrorist activities for a period of 5 to 8 years.

3. For the implementation of the specified in paragraph. 1 and 2 under the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, under his chairmanship, there is a Special Conference in
composition:

- a) Deputy People's Commissars of Internal Affairs;
- b) Commissioner of the NKVD for the RSFSR;
- c) Head of the Main Directorate of the Workers' and Peasants' Militia;
- d) the People's Commissar of the Federal Republic in whose territory the case arose.

4. The Prosecutor of the Union must participate in the meetings of the Special Conference.

for the SSR or his deputy, who, in case of disagreement both with the decision of the Special Conference itself and with the direction of the case for consideration by the Special Conference, has the right to protest to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

In these cases, the decision of the Special Conference is suspended pending a decision on this issue by the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee.

5. The decision of the Special Conference on the exile and imprisonment in a forced labor camp and prison of each individual must be accompanied by an indication of the reason for the application of these measures, the area of exile and the period.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 986. L. 4, 24. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 48.

No. 51

FROM THE LETTER OF MOSHKOVA I.V. TO
STALIN ABOUT THE TROTSKYIST CONSPIRACERS

April 13, 1937

Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

I appeal to you with a request to assist me in bringing the investigation of the vile deed of the Trotskyists to the end.

Since the beginning of 1934, not being a Trotskyist myself, for two years I have been collecting the most detailed material (after trying by all means to gain the trust of the Trotskyists) about the Trotskyist conspiracy.

19.XII. - In 1935, in Moscow, I handed over the following information about the conspiracy to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs: materials about the assassination of leaders (you also), about espionage in the Far East (in the army), about espionage in the People's Commissariat of Defense and in the Baltic Fleet, about a pest about sabotage in the People's Commissariat for Heavy Industry and its system, about the existence of Trotskyist organizations in Moscow, Leningrad, with cells in other cities (also mentioned by me), about the Trotskyists' connections with Germany and Japan and their receipt of funds from there for subversive work, about preparing for a war against the USSR.

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All the materials were completely confirmed, they served as the basis for the Trotskyist trial (I managed to take these materials at the cost of tremendous effort of will, great efforts and constant risk to my own life from the Trotskyist KISELYOVA and the terrorist organizer of the assassination attempt on the leaders Aleksandrov).

How I learned about the conspiracy: for the first time, from the Trotskyite Kiselyova, I accidentally learned about sabotage in Krivoy Rog at the mines of the Ruda trust. Not believing, I decided to check ^ For this purpose, I achieved in the NKTP (I am a specialist in economics

mist) business trips to Krivoy Rog, and there she collected detailed material in support of this. In July 1934, I already gave Comrade T. Lyapidus, an employee of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, detailed information with vivid concrete facts of sabotage: the destruction of mine production, transport equipment and electrical facilities, the closure of mines with powerful ore reserves under the heading "depleted", flooding of mines, artificial reduction the quality of ore with the help of clogging with quartzite (beyond all norms), exploration drilling in empty places in order to hide new ore deposits and irrational spending of money, about the connection of the chief engineer of the trust "Ruda" BENNETT with foreigners within the USSR and in Germany. All this I have established clearly, precisely and definitely.

The material I had handed over was handed over by LAPIDUS without any investigation into the hands of BENNET. This was followed by an attempt (on the part of BENNET) to "liquidate" me, my departure from Krivoy Rog for Moscow prevented me.

In Moscow, I learned from the Trotskyist KISELYOVA about an impending terrorist act against the party leadership of Leningrad, for which I secured a letter from ALEKSANDROV to the Leningrad Trotskyists.

I am going to Leningrad and a few days before the assassination attempt on comrade Kirov I hand over a copy of this letter to the Leningrad branch of the NKVD.

They didn't believe me either or they wanted to hide it, because. no measures were taken, and Comrade Kirov was killed. I lay the blame for the death of KIROV on the Leningrad branch of the NKVD, which I warned of the impending assassination attempt in good time, but did not take measures to save Comrade KIROV. Apparently, there is a connection between the NKVD workers and the Trotskyists.

Killed by the death of Comrade Kirov and the failure of my attempts to save him, I left Leningrad for Moscow.

It would seem that the fight against the Trotskyists and the NKVD alone was beyond my power. But I decided not to retreat, and set myself the goal, by all means, even if it cost me my life, to expose the Trotskyists, because. I had a deep conviction that the facts I cited were not the actions of individuals, but of an entire hostile organization.

Having received from Comrade KISELYOVA the materials of the Kursk Trotskyites, I left for Kursk, without breaking off contact with the terrorist ALEXANDROV, corresponding with KISELYOVA.

In December 1935, I already learned a lot, and most importantly, about the existence of a Trotskyist organization, a widely ramified conspiracy against the USSR, and an impending assassination attempt on the leaders.

At the call of KISELYOVA on 12/17/35, I left for Moscow and on 12/19/35 this year. received from her confirmation of the preparation of an assassination attempt, of belonging to a Trotskyist organization (for several years now, the former People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Comrade Yagoda).

Fearing that Yagoda might "blur over" the case, and "eliminate" me or hide me away for "knowing a lot", I nevertheless immediately, knowing that the attempt on you and Comrade Voroshilov was scheduled that same night, warned NKVD.

My first thought was to warn you of the imminent danger, but I was not allowed to see you, but was sent to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, where I gave the first and basic information about the conspiracy. The active organizers of the detailed investigation of this case were the workers of the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs comrade AGRANOV, Major VOLOVICH and others whom I don't know.

I am writing this letter now in order to put the following questions to you in all frankness:

1. You must be especially careful as The NKVD has not yet arrested the terrorist ALEKSANDROV, a fanatic. ALEKSANDROV is a member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, a mining engineer, but his real name, apparently, is different.
2. The sabotage in Krivoy Rog (despite the specific facts that I reported to the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR) was "hidden" by the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs in Moscow either intentionally or due to inability to disclose the case in detail. They must immediately be forced to take up this matter closely.
3. Espionage was not disclosed in the Baltic Fleet, where (in the event of a war scheduled by the Trotskyists for 37) an uprising was planned on the best ships, where Trotskyist forces were concentrated. The rebellious ships and some of the best ships of the fleet were to be immediately withdrawn to Germany, thus opening up the front for the German attack.
4. Espionage in the army in the Far East by several military engineers (their names are not known to me) has not been disclosed. Materials were transmitted to Japan with the help of Japanese sorties in one place, while in another place where attention was weakening at that time, spy materials were transmitted. It is necessary to bring the matter to an end, but the NKVD stopped the matter.
5. About Yagoda's betrayal. According to Alexandrov (a truthful man), Yagoda is "his own" for the Trotskyists and "works" for their money.

In March 1936, Yagoda received 60,000 rubles from the Trotskyists (through Kiseleva) for concealing the case of a Trotskyist conspiracy. The Trotskyists (arrested) were silent for 6-8 months, did not admit their guilt before the country in the hope that Yagoda would "rescue" them. Yagoda repeatedly received large sums of money from the Trotskyists (I was unable to find out their purpose). In total, at least 250-300 thousand rubles.

According to Kiseleva, the deeds of the Shakhty people, the industrial parties and power plants were also the deeds of the Trotskyists with the "blessing" of Germany, but the NKVD (apparently not without the participation of Yagoda) only "technical executors" were found, and the "ideological inspirers" remained in the shadows. and this made it possible to prepare their forces for a large and widely ramified conspiracy.

Now it is necessary to take measures against Yagoda. The NKVD in Moscow is aware of this (in particular, Comrade Yezhov), but no measures have been taken.

In March 1936, I informed by letter about Yagoda's betrayal of you and Comrade Vyshinsky, but whether the letter reached you, I do not know*.

From 1935 to the present, I have been living in Kursk, where I have also been constantly fighting the Trotskyists.

6. I handed over to the local branch of the NKVD materials about the Kursk link of the Trotskyist organization. I have sent material (to Kursk) about sabotage in the regional memory department, about the terrorist actions of local Trotskyists against party leaders (in Kursk), about sabotage in the Spirit trust, about harm

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telstve, embezzlement and fraud in the Region. ex. communes, households, on the preparation of wrecks on the railway. node, about espionage (shooting plans from military installations of all-Union significance). But the local branch of the NKVD took up these cases reluctantly.

I, in spite of the help I provided, from the Kursk department. I meet the most callous and insulting attitude of the NKVD. For a whole year now, the Trotskyists have been savagely persecuting me and my mother, there have even been attempts to kill me. They don't even let me work, declaring me an unreliable element. The NKVD does not take any measures to protect me, a person who put all his strength, health and life into the fight against the enemies of my homeland.

I am writing to you through a representative of the Central Committee of the party, asking you to investigate all the facts I have reported and bring those responsible to justice.

I have no right to disclose such material, but I am compelled to do so, because any day I may die either from a stomach ulcer or be killed, while the work I have begun will remain unfinished.

It would be best if the Central Committee of the Party could send its representative here to me, because. I need to give details and facts about which I do not consider it possible to write or investigate this material (local) to entrust to a certain person on the spot, while the material related to the organization of the Moscow Trotskyists, to transfer for investigation to the USSR Prosecutor's Office and do it as soon as possible, because it's a serious matter and can't be ignored

gossip.

Moshkov. April 4, 37

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 301. L. 104-110. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "Comrade. Yezhov: It is possible that Moshkova's muddled letter contains some truth. Send a man from the CPC to Moshkova, plus one from the NKVD, and instruct both of them to clear up the matter. It is necessary to find out: who are Kiseleva Aleksandrov, Lyapidus, Bennet, local Trotskyists in Kursk. It would be good to carry out this business without the involvement of Yemets. I. Stalin"; "From Comrade

Moshkova"; "Copy sent to comrade Agranov."

*

There is a handwritten note in the margin: "Letter not received."

No. 52

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT "DIVERSION ORGANIZATIONS" IN THE FAR EAST

April 13, 1937

34 - The case of anti-Soviet sabotage and espionage organizations on the Amur and Far Eastern railways.

Members of anti-Soviet sabotage and espionage organizations on the Amur and Far Eastern railways. bring to trial (with consideration of the case in a closed session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR) and shoot everyone. The execution of the sentence shall be published in the chronicle of the local press.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 117. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol N8 48.

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No. 53

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN ON THE LIQUIDATION OF THE "NATIONALIST" ORGANIZATION

April 19, 1937

No. 56843

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The UNKVD of Tataria liquidated the Trotskyist-nationalist organization, which included former members of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks who held responsible party and Soviet posts. Some of the organization's members are former Socialist-Revolutionaries who later joined the CPSU(b) for counter-revolutionary purposes.

The organization arose in 1925 as a nationalist organization and subsequently linked up with the Trotskyists through TER-VAGANYAN, PREOBRAZHENSKY, SOKOLNIKOV, ELBOVA and others who were in Kazan.

The organization carried out Trotskyist-nationalist and sabotage activities on the ideological front, where the majority of the organization's members worked.

More than 20 people were arrested in the case, including: RAKHMATULLIN, former People's Commissariat of Education of Tatarstan and head of the cultural industry of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; GIMRANOV - former head of the cultural industry of the Tatar Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks; ATNAGULOV, former researcher at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism; KASYMOV - former director of the Pedagogical Institute; ALMUKHA METOV - former head of the Department of Arts of Tatarstan; VIKTAGI ROV - former secretary of the Kazan city committee of the CPSU (b); KOLOSOV - former deputy of the People's Commissariat of Education of Tatarstan, etc.

One of the leaders of the organization is GABIDULLIN Khadzhi Zagidullovich, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1917, previously was the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and currently works in Moscow in the People's Commissariat of Education of the RSFSR as the head of the Directorate of Schools for Adults. The active role of GABI DULLIN Khadzhi Zagidullovich in the organization is confirmed by the testimony of a number of arrested members of the organization (GIMRANOV, RAKHMA TULLIN, SAIFI, SAGADULLIN, and others).

The arrested RAKHMATULLIN shows that in a conversation with GABIDULLIN, the latter told him about his connection with the ideologists of the Tatar-nationalist counter-revolution who were in exile:

"GABIDULLIN asked me to tell ABADULIN that he (GABIDULLIN) has ties with Bari BATTALOVIM (Ankara) and Zeki VALI DOVIM (Constantinople), and also promised to speed up ties with representatives of the Mission-Yush.

(From the testimony of RAKHMATULLIN dated 22-24 / 1-1937).

Member of the organization GIMRANOV Zeki exposes GABIDULLIN as the organizer of terror:

"I once again confirm my testimony that I received the instructions about the transition of the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organizations to terror from GABIDULLIN in 1936. Conversations between me and GABIDULLIN about ter

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Before that, shortly after the murder of KIROV, at the beginning of 1935, there were more. Both I and GABIDULLIN reacted approvingly to the fact of the murder of KIROV.

(From the testimony of GIMRANOV dated January 31, 1937).

RAKHMATULLIN also shows about the terrorist activities of GABIDULLIN.

* In connection with the report of the Tatar Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the Party Committee of the People's Commissariat for Education of the RSFSR, on April 11 of this year, GABIDULLIN was expelled from the party *.

I ask you to authorize the arrest of GABIDULLIN Khadzhi Zagidullovich.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 301. L. 157-159. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are notes: "Arch. St. "; "From comrade Yezhov."
___ underlined in pencil.

No. 54

**SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN ON THE "TERRORIST" GROUP OF SCIENTISTS IN
THE WEST SIBERIAN REGION**

April 19, 1937

No. 56853

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a certificate on the case of a fascist terrorist organization opened and liquidated in the West Siberian Territory, headed by F.V.

I ask you to authorize a secret consideration of the case on the charges of the members of this organization by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR with the application of the law of December 1, 1934.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

in the case of the liquidated fascist-terrorist organization in the West Siberian Territory, which was in an organizational bloc with the Trotsky-Zinoviev terrorist organization, led by Muralov

During the investigation into the case of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev terrorist organization in the West Siberian Territory, a terrorist organization in the amount of 14 people was uncovered and liquidated, headed by F.V. Galakhov, a professor at the Tomsk Industrial Institute.

This organization set itself the task of overthrowing Soviet power and establishing a fascist dictatorship in the USSR. Its main method

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struggle against the CPSU (b) and Soviet power, the organization chose terror against the leadership

the party's leaders.

After the assassination of Comrade The Kirov organization at its meetings decided to form a bloc with the Trotskyists and to contact its terrorist activities with the Trotskyist terrorist organization that existed in the city of Tomsk and was headed by the terrorists Kashkin, Nikolaev and Pyshkin (arrested).

Direct connection with the Trotskyist organization was established by Galakhov through Kashkin in January 1935. At the same time, Galakhov received an order from Kashkin to manufacture explosive projectiles for the terrorist purposes of the Trotskyist organization*.

About the creation of a bloc between the Trotskyist organization and the fascist one and about the order for the manufacture of explosive shells, Kashkin informed the head of the Trotskyist West Siberian Trotskyist center, Muralov, who approved his (Kashkin's) actions.

This organization, which consisted mainly of scientists from the Tomsk State University, an industrial institute, worked on the invention and application of sophisticated methods of terror, in particular, a silent device that could be used to strike at a distance with a projectile like a needle poisoned with curare poison.

In addition, the organization used the chemical laboratory of the industrial institute for the manufacture of explosive projectiles and poisonous substances for terrorist purposes ...

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 301. L. 178-180. Script. Typescript.

* Help is published in part.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "For. I. Stalin. Behind. Kaganovich. Molotov. Voroshilov.

* underlined in pencil

No. 55

M.M.'s NOTE LITVINOVA TO I.V. STALIN ON THE
ARRESTED GERMANS

April 21, 1937

No. 206/L

Secret

To the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks,
comrade. TO STALIN About the arrested Germans

Since we have already decided not to initiate a process and to expel the German citizens involved in the case, I would like to try to get some compensation from the Germans: 1) the release of some Soviet citizens arrested in Germany, and secondly, to use the influence of the German government on General Franko in order to release the interned teams of "Komsomol" and "Smidovich".

I do not think of offering an exchange, because the release of the teams does not depend entirely on Germany, but only to get a promise from the German government against the Germans we are freeing, to seek the release of our teams. I believe that there will be no objections to this.

LITVINOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 133. Original. Typescript.

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No. 56

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A PROPOSAL FOR THE ARREST OF THE WRITER R.M. AZARH

April 25, 1937

No. 56977

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the SSR arrested the wife of the former white officer GUDZ Alexandra Ignatievna, and searched her diaries, which contain a note about the preparation of a terrorist act against comrade. KAGANOVICH.

Interrogated on this circumstance arrested GUDZ A.AND. testified that she was acquainted with the writer AZARH Raisa Moiseevna, who told her that she, AZARH, was reliably aware of the terrorist act being prepared against comrade. KAGANOVICH.

The murder of Comrade KAGANOVICH, according to AZARH, was planned in the house where she lives.

According to GUDZ A.AND. AZARH has been spreading vile slander against members of the Politburo and is engaged in blackmail.

AZARKH Raisa Moiseevna, born in 1897, Red Banner, member of the CPSU(b) since 1918, has ties with the Trotskyists and, through the Party Control Commission, has a party penalty for distorting the history of the CPSU(b) in the Trotskyist spirit.

I consider it necessary to arrest AZARKH R.M.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 302. L. 17. Original. Typescript.

There are handwritten notes on the sheet: "For. Molotov", "St."; "Reported to Comrade Yezhov."

No. 57

NOTE S.P. Uritsky I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
PREPARATION OF ARTICLES ON FOREIGN ESPIONAGE

April 26, 1937

No. 579/s

Secret

Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

On your instructions, a team of employees of the Intelligence Directorate wrote a number of articles describing the organization and some of the methods of work of foreign espionage*.

Seven articles previewed vols. Voroshilov and Yezhov, have already been published in the central press (I represent the newspapers).

•The five articles which I hereby present to you will be published if your consent follows*.

In addition, six more articles on various methods of foreign intelligence work are in preparation.

•According to your personal instructions, on April 25, 1937, together with my employees

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RU is preparing a large article for Pravda - "On the methods of recruitment and involvement in espionage work" *.

I will present this article to you in the coming days.

Head of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army

Commander S. URITSKY

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. II. D. 1594. L. I. Original. Typescript.

— underlined in pencil.

No. 58

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhov TO THE
MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE "TERRORIST" ORGANIZATION

April 27, 1937

No. 56997

Top secret

I am sending the protocols of interrogations of active members of the Trotskyist terrorist organization: SUMKIN, KOPELEV, SHOR and SITNIKOV, whose testimonies established:

1) The presence in the Kalinin region of a military Trotskyist organization of an insurgent-terrorist nature, headed by the former commander of the 48th division division KOVALEV and assistant commander of the 43rd division TOMM.

2) The existence of an underground Trotskyist organization in the V.-Luksky border district, headed by the first secretary of the V.-Luksky district committee, a member of the bureau of the regional committee of the CPSU (b) - YENOV.

A member of the organization TOMM is preparing a terrorist act against comrade. VOROSHILOV during the upcoming maneuvers of 1937.

I consider it necessary to arrest ENOV, TOMMA and KOVALEV, recalling the latter from Spain.

I ask for your approval.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. Ezhov

April 27, 1937

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 302. L. 31. Original. Typescript.

•Published without protocols.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "I vote for the arrest of Enov and Tomm. Discuss about Kovalev. I. Stalin*;

"T. Molotov - for; "From comrade Yezhov", "Comrade Yezhov reported. P.".

No. 59

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOL G.G. BERRIES (20)

April 28, 1937

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending the protocol of interrogation YAGODA G.G. dated April 26 of this year.

This testimony was obtained as a result of lengthy interrogations,

presentation of a whole series of evidence and face-to-face confrontations with other arrests
forged.

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YAGODA to this day does not give detailed testimony about his anti-Soviet and treacherous activities, denies his connection with the Germans and hides a number of participants in the conspiracy. He also denies his participation in the preparation of terrorist acts against members of the government, as shown by all the other participants - PAUKER, VOLOVICH, GAI and others.

It should be noted, however, that at the last interrogations, under the pressure of evidence, YAGODA was nevertheless forced to admit that he was aware of the connection with the Germans and the preparation of terrorist attacks by some participants in the conspiracy.

The interrogation continues.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov PROTOCOL
OF INTERROGATION

Berries of Heinrich Grigorievich from April 26 of this year.

Yagoda's statement: during the long days of interrogation, I tried in vain to hide my criminal, treacherous activities against the Soviet government and the Party. I hoped that my experience in the Cheka would give me the opportunity either to completely hide from the investigation the entire amount of my treacherous work, or, if I failed, to reduce the case to purely criminal and malfeasance. I also hoped that my accomplices, for the same reasons, would not betray themselves, much less me, to the investigation.

But, apparently, all my plans collapsed, and therefore I decided to give up. I will tell everything about myself, about my crimes, no matter how hard it is for me ..

Question: Why is it hard?

Answer: Because for the first time in my life I will have to tell the truth about myself personally.

All my life I went around in a mask, posing as an implacable Bolshevik. *Actually, I have never been a Bolshevik, in his real understanding*. My petty-bourgeois background, my lack of theoretical training—all this, from the very beginning of the organization of Soviet power, created in me disbelief in the final victory of the cause of the Party.

* But I didn't have my own worldview, I didn't have my own program either. Careeristic beginnings predominated in me, and my career had to be built on the basis of the real situation. What was this situation like?

Soviet power existed, strengthened. I ended up in machine b. OPTU, and therefore I had to proceed from these specific facts.

Climbing the hierarchical ladder, in 1926 I reached the deputy chairman of the OGPU. From that moment, my first attempts to play in "big politics" began, my ideas about myself as a person who would be able to influence the policy of the party and modify it.

This was after the death of DZERZHINSKY, during the period of open struggle between the Trotskyites and the Party.

I did not share the views and programs of the Trotskyists, but I nevertheless kept a close eye on the course of the struggle, having determined in advance for myself that "I would join the side that was victorious in this struggle." Hence the special line that I was pursuing at that time in the struggle against Trotskyism.

Question: In what concrete way was this particular line of yours expressed in the struggle against Trotskyism?

Answer: When the repressions against the Trotskyists began, the question of who would win [the Trotskyists or the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks] had not yet been finally resolved. Anyway, that's what I thought. Therefore, I, as deputy chairman of the OGPU,

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in his punitive policy, he proceeded from the fact that he did not embitter the Trotskyists against himself. By sending the Trotskyists into exile, I created conditions for them there under which they could continue their activities there and would not feel condemned.

It goes without saying that when the victory of the Party over the Trotskyists was fully determined, when the Party went after the Central Committee, after STALIN, I also hastened to show myself as an unshakable supporter of the Central Committee, remaining, of course, in my position of disbelief in the victory of the line of the Central Committee, remaining for the Central Committee in its impenetrable mask.

ÿ If the term double-dealer applies to me in any way, then I am an example of it, perhaps even a pioneer of double-dealing *.

Question: Was your line towards the Trotskyists dictated to you by the Trotskyist organization?

Answer: No, in this case I acted independently, on my own initiative. Above, I explained what motives I was guided by.

Matters were different when the Rights entered the arena of struggle against the Party. Here my role was more definite: *I was organizationally connected with the right*.

Question: But the question of your relations with the Trotskyists is still not entirely clear to us. Did you have organizational ties with the Trotskyists?

Answer: At that time it was not. They arose much later, when they entered the bloc with the right.

Question: We will talk about this later. You were going to talk about your connections with the right.

Answer: Yes. I said that I had organizational connections with the rightists. These ties began in my personal relationship with RYKOV, who was then Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.

As deputy chairman of the OGPU, I often met with RYKOV, first at meetings, and then at his home. He treated me well, and this flattered and impressed me.

I also had personal relations with BUKHARIN, TOMSKY and UGLANOV (I was then a member of the MK Bureau, and UGLANOV was the secretary of the MK).

When the Rights were preparing to move against the Party, I had several conversations with RYKOV about this.

Question: Where, when, what kind of conversation?

Answer: It was in 1928, *in RYKOV's office*. As for the nature of this conversation, I remember that it was about some specific differences between RYKOV, BUKHARIN, TOMSKY and the Politburo of the Central Committee on the export of gold and the sale of grain. RYKOV told me that STALIN was pursuing the wrong line not only on these questions. This was the first conversation that was more of a probing and preparing me for more frank conversations.

Soon after that I had another conversation with RYKOV. More direct this time. RYKOV outlined to me the program of the Rights, spoke of their open struggle against the Central Committee, and bluntly asked me who I was with.

Question: What was your answer to RYKOV?

Answer: I told RYKOV the following: "I am with you, I am for you, but due to the fact that I hold the position of Deputy Chairman of the OGPU, I cannot and will not speak openly on your side. Let no one know that I am with you, but I, in every possible way on my part, on the part of the OGPU, will help you in your struggle against the Central Committee.

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Question: *So, in 1928 you joined the rightists and hid it from the party?*

Answer: *Yes*.

Question: In 1928 the right 'openly' opposed the party. Why did you, being a rightist, not speak out openly, but conceal your participation in the organization of the rightists?

Answer: This followed from the whole line of behavior. The matter developed in this way: on the one hand, RYKOV's conversations with me determined my personal sympathies for the program of the Rights. On the other hand, from what RYKOV told me about the Rights, that besides him, BUKHARIN, TOMSKY, UGLANOV, the entire Moscow organization, the Leningrad

organization, trade unions, from all this I got the impression that the right can win in the fight against the Central Committee. And since at that time the question of changing the leadership of the party and the Soviet government, of removing STALIN, was already being raised, it was clear that the rightists were coming to power.

'Precisely because the right was drawn to me as a real force. I told RYKOV that I was with them*.

Question: You did not answer the question, why did you conceal your participation in the organization of the Rights?

Answer: I was deputy chairman of the OGPU. If I openly declared my connections with the right, I would be suspended from work. This I understood. "I thought to myself this way: "What if the rightists don't win. I, keeping in secret my belonging to them, remain in my place. That is why I agreed with RYKOV about my special position among the Rights.

Question: Were you guided by these considerations alone, remaining a conspiratorial Rightist?

Answer: No, not only that. I also had other considerations. It was perfectly clear to me that the attitude of the leaders of the right towards me was determined not by my specific political weight in the party and in the country (I had no such weight at all), but by my position as deputy chairman of the OGPU. If I had been outside the OGPU, not deputy chairman, I would not have been of any interest to the rightists, and my position, in the event of their victory, would have turned out to be insignificant.

But, while remaining deputy chairman of the OGPU, the rightists needed me, I could be useful to them. Rykov also understood this well. Thus, although for different reasons, we both agreed that I did not come out openly with the Rights.

Question: What was your role in the organization of the right? How did your relationship develop with their leaders?

Answer: In 1928-1929. I continued to meet with RYKOV. I supplied him, upon request, with secret OGPU materials on the situation in the countryside. In these materials I singled out in particular the moods of the kulaks (in connection with the emergency measures), passing them off as the general moods of the peasantry as a whole. RYKOV said that they, the Rights, were using these materials as arguments in their struggle against the Central Committee.

In 1928 I was present at a meeting of the Rights in the apartment of TOMSKY. There were leaders of the right, and it seems UGLANOV and KOTOV. There was talk about the wrong policy of the Central Committee. I don't remember exactly what was said.

I also remember a conference at RYKOV's apartment, which was attended, apart from me and RYKOV, by Vasya MIKHAILOV and, it seems, by NESTEROV. I sat with RYKOV on the sofa, and we talked about the disastrous policy of the Central Committee, especially in questions of agriculture. I spoke then RYKO

In 1929, BUKHARIN came to see me at the OGPU and demanded from me materials on the situation in the countryside and on peasant uprisings. I gave him. When I found out that TRILLISSER had also once given some materials to Bukharin, I expressed my negative attitude to this fact to TRILLISSER. In this case, I had to monopolize the supply of right-wing documents, to make them somewhat dependent on me.

Question: And besides participating in the meetings of the leaders of the Rights you mentioned and supplying them with tendentiously selected materials of the OGPU, what exactly did you do to help the Rights? You promised them help from the OGPU apparatus?

Answer: During that period of time in 1928, the middle of 1929, when the Rights were waging an open struggle against the Party, nothing more was required of me.

A different situation arose when it became clear that in the open struggle the Rights were defeated, when the tactics of the Rights took on the character of an illegal struggle against the Party. Here, too, my position had to change.

Firstly, I agreed with RYKOV on a special conspiracy of my own, on the termination of mutual visits and meetings.

Secondly, since it was about the illegal work of the rightists, which naturally led to repressions. My help to the Right could no longer be limited to information.

I was entrusted with the task of protecting the organization from complete failure by the center of the right. In a conversation with RYKOV on this subject, I defined my position as follows: "You act. I won't touch you. But if it breaks through somewhere, if I am forced to resort to repressions, I will try to reduce right-wing cases to local groups, I will not open the organization as a whole, all the more so I will not touch the center of the organization.

Question: When did you have this conversation with RYKOV?

Answer: I don't remember exactly. It seems *at the end of 1929 or at the beginning of 1930*.

Question: You showed that after the transition of the organization of the Rights to illegal methods of struggle against the Party, your role as a member of the organization of the Rights became more active and, as you agreed with RYKOV, it amounted to protecting the organization from failure.

How did you carry out this treacherous line of yours in the OPTU-NKVD?

Answer: It was difficult for me myself to protect the organization of the Rights from failure, in the conditions of their growing activity and transition to an illegal struggle against the Party.

** It was clear to me that if the apparatus of the OGPU, especially in the secret department, did not have its own person, then, contrary to my desire, the organization of the Rights could fail. For this purpose, I was appointed in the fall of 1931 head of the Secret Department MOLCHANOV **.

Question: Why MOLCHANOV in particular?

Answer: For two reasons:

1) I knew about MOLCHANOV, the head of the Ivanovo GPU,

that he is associated with the right, in particular with KOLOTILOV, who was then secretary of the Ivanovo provincial committee of the CPSU(b);

2) MOLCHANOV was personally devoted to me, was in my hands, and I could safely dispose of him.

Question: How did you know that MOLCHANOV was right?

Answer: MOLCHANOV himself told me about this, I don't remember in what year, whether in 1929 or 1930.

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One day he came from Ivanovo, came into my office and told me that there was a group of Rights in Ivanovo headed by KOLOTILOV, that KOLOTILOV was having conversations with him, specific to the Rights, about the incorrectness of the Central Committee line, about the disastrous nature of such a line for the country. MOLCHANOV asked for my advice on what to do.

From the way he expounded KOLOTILOV's right-wing views to me, I felt that he, too, was on the point of view of the Rights, and I asked him directly how he personally regarded the positions of the Rights. MOLCHANOV openly told me that he shared their views.

Question: How can you explain that the head of the Gubernia Department of the GPU was not afraid to present to you, the deputy chairman of the OPTU, his counter-revolutionary right-wing views. Did he know about your belonging to the right?

Answer: In order to make clear the reason for his frankness with me, I must tell about one episode that took place before this conversation with MOLCHANOV.

Approximately in the year 1927, I received materials compromising MOLCHANOV, it was about some of his criminal offenses somewhere in the Caucasus. I called him from Ivanovo, told him about these materials. MOLCHANOV then admitted to himself these sins in the past and, already in the order of confession, he told about one more of his sins - about ascribing to himself a party tenure.

I said that I needed people who were personally devoted to me, that his fate was now in my hands, but if he carried out all my instructions, then I would not give materials about him, and he could continue his work in Ivanovo in the same position.

Question: That is, to put it bluntly, you recruited MOLCHANOV on the compromising materials you had on him, and recruited him for your own criminal, counter-revolutionary purposes?

Answer: Yes, in fact, I recruited him, and at the time of recruitment, I still did not know how exactly he would be used in the future.

Question: How did this recruitment of MOLCHANOV end then?

Answer: He willingly accepted my offer and went back to Ivanovo.

Now you, undoubtedly, understand the reason for MOLCHANOV's frankness and the fact that he was not afraid to tell me about his right-wing views and about his connection with the Ivanovo organization of the right.

Question: What instructions did you give to MOLCHANOV when he informed you of his connection with the Rights?

Answer: At that time I did not tell MOLCHANOV that I myself was right, but suggested that he should support KOLOTILOV's line in everything in Ivanovo.

Question: How, after all, was MOLCHANOV appointed head of the Secret Political Department?

Answer: Allow me a digression.

It is common knowledge that the year 1931 was fraught with the greatest difficulties in the country. It is also well known that in 1931 the activity of all counter-revolutionary elements in the country increased. Against the background of these difficulties, the illegal work of the rightists also intensified. I knew this both from the materials of the OGPU and from personal meetings with the leaders of the right.

In 1931, for the first time, the question arose of a bloc between the rightists, the Trotskyites and the Zinovievists, on the basis of the struggle for the overthrow of Soviet power by methods of terror against the leadership of the party and mass uprisings.

In this regard, I once (it was the summer of 1931) was invited to Bolshevo to the dacha near TOMSKY. There I also found FOMA (A.P. SMIRNOV).

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TOMSKY began his conversation with a general assessment of the situation in the country, that we, the Rights, have no right to remain in the role of mere observers, that the moment demands active action from us.

Naturally, I was interested in the real plans and possibilities of the struggle, and I put the question that way.

FOMA, who was present, told me about the emerging bloc with the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, spoke of the presence of rather widely branched organization groups in a number of cities of the Union, and on the whole described very optimistically the prospects for the struggle against the party.

It must be admitted that these prospects were also drawn to me at that time in the optimistic tones.

Question: Why did you come to TOMSKY? After all, you agreed with RYKOV about your special conspiracy, excluding any meetings with the leaders of the right?

Answer: Two factors played a role here:

First, the difficulties experienced by the country and the possibility, as it seemed to me, in connection with this, of the coming to power of the right. Therefore, I had to show some activity and emphasize my solidarity with them.

Secondly, my position in the OGPU at that time, to some extent, was shaken. This was during the period of work in the OGPU Akulov. I was offended and sought help from the right.

Question: Still, tell me, how did the appointment of MOLCHANOV as head of the SPO happen?

Answer: It was at this conference that TOMSKY raised the question of the need to take measures so as not to fail the work of the Rights, in order to provide them with the OGPU full opportunity to develop their activities on a new, significantly expanded and more active basis.

The question was whether I could do it. I replied that it was difficult for me alone, that it would be best to put my own man in the Secret Department.

And so, either TOMSKY or FOMA said that the head of the Ivanovo Provincial Department of the GPU MOLCHANOV is known to them as a rightist, and it would not hurt to put him in charge of the Secret Department. I accepted this proposal, and MOLCHANOV was appointed head of the SPO of the OGPU.

Question: So, the appointment of MOLCHANOV as head of the Secret Political Department took place by decision of the center of the organization of the Rights?

Answer: Yes, that is exactly what happened.

Technically, this was formalized simply: I summoned MOLCHANOV from Ivanov, informed him that the organization had made a decision to appoint him to Moscow as head of the Secret Department, and warned him that he would be summoned by BULATOV for negotiations on this issue. So that he would give his consent without saying a word about the conversation with me. And at the then practiced meetings of deputy chairmen at MENZHINSKY, I nominated MOLCHANOV for the post of head of the Secret Department. MOLCHANOV's candidacy met with no objections, and he was appointed.

Question: Consequently, MOLCHANOV also knew that he had been appointed head of the SPO of the OGPU by the decision of the center of the Rights?

Answer: Yes, I told him about it. Subsequently, I came to an agreement with MOLCHANOV about the tactics of our work in the OGPU.

Question: About the tactics of betrayal?

Answer: Yes. About tactics that consisted in covering up the counter-revolutionary activities of the rightists, Trotskyists and Zinovievites.

I think that it is not worth listing here all the facts connected with my and MOLCHANOV's traitorous line, they are now known to the entire party, but it is unlikely that you will remember everything.

It is known, of course, that if it were not for our treacherous work in the NKVD, the centers of the Zinovievists, Trotskyists and Rights would have been opened during their inception, in 1931-1932*.

Undercover materials about their counter-revolutionary activities came from all over the Soviet Union in all years.

We attacked these organizations only when further cover-up threatened our own failure. So it was with the Ryutin group, which we were forced to liquidate because the materials ended up in the Central Committee, so it was with the Bukharin "school", the liquidation of which began in Novosibirsk and the case about which we took to Moscow only to be here turn it off, so it was with the Trotskyist group of I.N. SMIRNOV and, in the end, this continued even after the murder of Kirov.

It must be admitted that even in such cases, when we went for the forced liquidation of certain failed groups of organizations, both right-wing, and Trotskyists and Zinovievites, MOLCHANOV and I, on my instructions, took all measures to portray these groups of organizations local, and in particular tried to hide the active centers of organizations.

Question: We will return to the system of your treacherous work and to individual facts of treachery. You acknowledged above that if it were not for your and MOLCHANOV's treacherous role in the OPTU-NKVD system, then the centers of organizations of the Rights, Trotskyists and Zinovievists, or rather the centers of the bloc of these organizations, could have been liquidated in a timely manner.

Answer: Yes, it certainly is.

Question: *Does it mean that the murder of Comrade KIROV could have been prevented?*

Answer: Absolutely*.

Question: *And you didn't?*

Answer: *No*.

Question: So you are an accomplice in this villainous murder?

Answer: No, I cannot admit it.

Question: Did you have any materials about active terrorist centers?

Answer: There were.

Question: Was Kirov killed by them?

Answer: Imi.

Question: Did you cover the activities of these terrorist centers?

Answer: Covered.

Question: How dare you deny your participation in the villainous murder of Comrade KIROV?

Answer: I was not an accomplice in this murder, but, undoubtedly, I must answer for not preventing the murder of KIROV.

Question: Despite the fact that they had every opportunity to prevent this murder?

Answer: Yes.

Question: You are a member of an organization of the Rights, and by the time Comrade KIROV was murdered, you were also a member of a bloc of terrorist organizations. Did you deliberately cover up the preparations for the assassination of Comrade Kirov?

Answer: You must understand that my personal plans, as People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, could not include such disparate acts as the murder of Kirov.

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I understood very well that such acts could lead, if not to complete failure, as a member of the organization of the right, then, in any case, to my responsibility as the People's Commissar in charge of protecting members of the government. Here nothing but a loss could come out for me personally, and just in time for this period my personal plans went quite far and did not quite coincide with the plans of the bloc.

Question: What were your personal plans?

Answer: In 1932, the bloc of Trotskyists and Rights was finally formalized. Together they, in my opinion, represented a rather impressive force. Among the organization of the right, the idea of a palace coup was ripening. I personally was not initiated into these plans by the Rights. And it was clear to me why: since it was about a palace coup, then here they could do without me. The protection of the Kremlin was not in my hands then.

It seemed to me that if they managed to come to power, they could get around me. They always had some distrust of me, and I myself did not particularly trust them.

Along with this, I, the deputy chairman of the OPTU, who had comprehensive information, could see that the balance of forces in the country was not yet such that one could count on the complete success of the conspiracy against the Soviet power in 1932-1933.

But in the future, the aggressiveness of the conspirators grew in direct proportion to the victories of the party. The possibility of their success was not ruled out. And so, in order not to be fooled, I came to the conclusion that it was necessary to insure myself against the success of the conspiracy of the Rights and the Trotskyists and force them to reckon with me as with a real force. And then *I set about organizing a parallel conspiracy against the Soviet government in the apparatus of the OGPU-NKVD*.

Question: Breaking with the right?

Answer: How to say yes and no. Yes, because I hid these plans from the right, no, because I continued to help them.

It was then that the duality of my position manifested itself, which ran like a red thread in all political activity.

Question: What is the duality here. What duality are you talking about? You were an enemy of the Soviet regime, a traitor within the party.

Answer: I am talking about the duality of my own position in the organization of the right. I already said above that I was afraid. That they can, once in power, simply kick me out, and that is why I organized a parallel conspiracy.

Question: You say that you created a conspiracy against Soviet power within the apparatus of the OGPU-NKVD. So you had accomplices among the Chekists?

Answer: Of course he did.

Question: Who?

Answer: I told you about MOLCHANOV, he was recruited by me a long time ago. In addition to him, the participants in the conspiracy organized by me against the Soviet regime were:

- 1) PROKOFIEV - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs;
- 2) PAUKER - head of Operod;
- 3) VOLOVICH - Deputy Head of Operod;
- 4) GUY - head of the Special Department;
- 5) BULANOV - secretary of the NKVD;
- 6) SHANIN - Head of the Transport Department;
- 7) OSTROVSKY - head of the Administrative and Economic Department

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Question: Is that all?

Answer: As direct participants in the conspiracy - everyone. All of them were privy to the plans and aims of the conspiracy and carried out, on my instructions, tasks connected with the preparation of the conspiracy.

Question: Who are these people, name them?

Answer: These include:

- 1) LURIE - head of the Engineering and Construction Department of the NKVD;
- 2) ^IVANOV - assistant secretary of the NKVD *;
- 3) VINETSKY - an employee of Operod;
- 4) *PAKALN* - head of the department of the Administrative and Economic Department of the NKVD;
- 5) *CHERTOK* - assistant to the head of IVF;
- 6) *POGREBINSKY* - head of the UNKVD in the Gorky region.

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— underlined in pencil.

— The paragraph in the margins is crossed out with two lines. 'The protocol of interrogation is published partially.

No. 60

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN WITH
THE APPENDIX OF THE PROTOCOL OF THE INTERROGATION OF A.S. ENUKIDZE

April 28, 1937

No. 57008

Top secret Only in person

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

At the same time, I am sending the first protocol of interrogation to A.S. Yenukidze, April 27, 1937.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General,
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

INTERROGATION
PROTOCOL A.S. Yenukidze dated April 27, 1937

Question: You are accused of being a member of a counter-revolutionary organization and of waging an organized struggle against Soviet power. Do you plead guilty to this?

Answer: Yes, I plead guilty to actually taking part in illegal activities aimed at eliminating the current leadership of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government, aimed ultimately at seizing power of the counter-revolutionary organization of the right and the incoming

with her to the bloc of the Trotskyist-Zinoviev organization.

It would be wrong, however, if I said that I was a member of any of these organizations: I knew that since 1932 there had been a bloc between the underground organization of the Rights and the Trotskyite-Zinoviev organization; knew that a bloc of these organizations was preparing to commit terrorist acts against the leaders of the CPSU(b), I was connected with some leaders of the bloc and was working on preparing an armed

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revolution in the Kremlin, but formally I was neither a member of the center of the bloc, nor a member of these organizations.

For the first time, M. TOMSKY spoke to me about my participation in this illegal work in 1930 on behalf of the center of the Rights, and later on behalf of the bloc.

Question: Why, despite your formal non-participation in the illegal organization of the right, did TOMSKY still negotiate with you about an armed coup in the Kremlin?

Answer: This is explained, first of all, by the official position that I held until 1935. My tenure as secretary of the Central Executive Committee, the concentration in my hands of the leadership of the Kremlin guard *, pushed first the representatives of the center of the organization of the right, and then the bloc of the counter-revolutionary organizations I have listed, to approach me, in order to involve me in their counter-revolutionary activities.

TOMSKY's talks with me were facilitated by the following: while formally not belonging to the Right Opposition within the CPSU(b), I nevertheless, in my views on some essential questions of the policy of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government, in particular, on the issue of taxing the peasantry, about prices for agricultural products, etc. most closely aligned with the right. In addition, being in the party from the first days of its foundation and working all the time among the Bolsheviks, I nevertheless retained many personal, friendly ties with the Mensheviks, and also repeatedly wavered on organizational issues in the RSDLP in the direction of unstable Bolshevism. .

Even before the October Revolution, during the period of acute struggle between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, I often showed Menshevik-liberal, conciliatory and conciliatory moods. These sentiments intensified even more during the period of two or three months of the February Revolution of 1917.

After the October Revolution, in the practice of my work as a secretary - first of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and then of the Central Executive Committee of the Union, these sentiments were reflected in my attitude towards individual representatives of hostile classes and parties and representatives of the previously privileged estates. In many cases, I assisted people from a class-hostile environment in their applications for travel abroad, for granting them various benefits, for release from arrest, and so on. I also financially supported individuals belonging to parties hostile to the VKP(b) and the Soviet government.

This practice sufficiently characterized my behavior as a member of the right

government and as a member of the CPSU(b), it ran counter to the firm class-revolutionary policy of the Bolsheviks in the era of the dictatorship of the proletariat. All this, of course, was known and could not have been unknown to the leaders of the so-called Right Opposition, TOMSKY, RYKOV and BUKHARIN, and it was precisely this that they used to start by talking to me about the fact that they had been undeservedly excluded from participation in the leadership of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government, with criticism of the policies and activities of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the bodies of Soviet power, move on to direct negotiations on the fight against the current leadership of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks

Question: Tell us in detail, when and under what circumstances, which of the rightists had conversations with you in which the policy of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government was criticized and which preceded the negotiations on an organized struggle against the leadership of the CPSU(b)?

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Answer: Conversations in which the policy of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government was criticized, primarily in the field of agriculture, refer to the period 1930-1931. During this period of time I often met with TOMSKY and RYKOV. TOMSKY was my neighbor at home, while with RYKOV, while he was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, I often had to meet on purely business matters in his office. After his removal, I also met with him. During that period I met much less with BUKHARIN, although I also had separate meetings with him, during which he expressed to me his dissatisfaction with the attitude towards him on the part of the leaders of the Communist Party.

It is difficult for me to remember when and under what circumstances this or that conversation took place with RYKOV, TOMSKY, or BUKHARIN.

I remember how RYKOV, after he was removed from the post of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, expressed sharp dissatisfaction with the policy of the Central Committee in resolving issues related to the collectivization of agriculture, believing that it would lead to the decline of agriculture and lead to great complications. At the same time, he characterized the situation in the countryside as follows: we will be left without bread, the peasant is ruined, the cattle are being slaughtered, discontent in the village is growing. This situation is also reflected in the mood in the army.

A.I. RYKOV and his comrades pointed out that if they had not been removed from the leadership and given the opportunity to carry out those measures that they consider correct, such a situation would not have been created in the country.

Mikhail TOMSKY, coming to me, expressed his moods and dissatisfaction in connection with the change in his position in the leading party and trade union bodies, especially sharply. He complained that they did not appreciate him, that they wanted to nullify his entire past, and so on. I became convinced that as the hopes for support from the leaders of the trade union organizations dissipated among TOMSKY, dissatisfaction with the existing leadership of the AUCP(b) grew.

TOMSKY accused the leaders of the CPSU (b) of removing him from the leadership

the country of the most experienced people known to the country, who knew how to defend their views when discussing important issues.

According to TOMSKY, which he expressed not only on his own behalf, but also on behalf of RYKOV and BUKHARIN: "STALIN selected obedient people for himself, as a result of which all the most important questions of politics and economic development are resolved by STALIN alone."

The statements of RYKOV, and even more so of TOMSKY, did not meet with a rebuff on my part. Moreover, when TOMSKY proved to me that both RYKOV and BUKHARIN and he (TOMSKY) should not have been removed from their posts, I told him that both RYKOV and BUKHARIN and he, TOMSKY, were well known for their past throughout the country. and that eventually they will be brought back into leadership.

This attitude of mine towards the leaders of the so-called Right Opposition created, in particular, TOMSKY the impression that I was a supporter of the Rights. Therefore, at the end of 1930, TOMSKY found it possible, in a conversation with me in my apartment in the Kremlin, to declare that there were no hopes of enlisting the rightists in leading work under the conditions of the present leadership of the CPSU(b). He - TOMSKY, RYKOV and BUKHARIN can, in his opinion, count on returning to leading posts only in the event of a change in the current leadership of the CPSU (b).

The conversations I have listed above, as well as a whole series of similar ones, which it is difficult for me to recall now in detail because of the prescription, in fact

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and were the transition to TOMSKY's negotiations with me about my involvement in the struggle against the current leadership of the CPSU (b).

Question: Therefore, was it the first time that TOMSKY made you an offer to take part in an organized struggle against the leadership of the CPSU(b)?

Answer: Yes.

Question: When?

Answer: It was at the end of 1930.

Question: On whose behalf?

Answer: He made this proposal to me on behalf of the center of the organization of the Rights.

Question: Who, according to TOMSKY, was a member of the center of the Rights?

Answer: According to him, the center included: RYKOV, BUKHARIN and him.

Question: What exactly did TOMSKY offer you?

Answer: TOMSKY began the conversation by saying that the return of his TOMSKY, BUKHARIN and RYKOV to leading posts is possible only with a change in the present leadership of the CPSU(b).

I objected to TOMSKY that not only a change of leadership, but also a change

Changing the composition of the governing bodies is possible under present conditions only by force. I told TOMSKY: "STALIN and his closest associates are not the kind of people to make any concessions and compromises, no forces will force them to do this. Consequently, if you want to change the composition or change the leadership, you need to have a huge preponderance of your forces, your apparatus and your influence in the country.

In response, TOMSKY told me that they, i.e. the right take this into account and that work is already being done in this direction.

In this conversation, TOMSKY told me that he, BUKHARIN, RYKOV, and UGLANOV headed an illegal organization that was doing a great deal of organizational work, trying to extend its influence to all the most important regions of the Soviet Union.

TOMSKY said that after all the legal ways of fighting against the existing leadership of the CPSU(b) had been tried and yielded no results, BUKHARIN, RYKOV and TOMSKY came to the conclusion that they should continue to fight openly for their political platform, following the example of It is impossible, as the Trotskyists did in 1927, since this will inevitably lead to mass repressions against the right, to the defeat of the cadres of the right opposition and will not give any chance of victory. Therefore, not only RYKOV, BUKHARIN and TOMSKY themselves declared their departure from right-wing views, but they also gave a directive to this effect to their adherents, which pursued one specific goal: to remain in the ranks of the CPSU (b) and conduct underground organizational work, duplicitously recognizing the right noah policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

Double-dealing, in the opinion of TOMSKY, which he expressed in his own name, and of BUKHARIN and RYKOV, is the only method by which the Rights can develop the work and avoid failure.

In response to my question, how does the organization of the Rights think of the struggle against the leadership of the CPSU(b), TOMSKY, on behalf of his own, BUKHARIN and RYKOV, unfolded for me the following plan of action for the organization of the Rights. He said: "In the conditions of the collectivization currently being carried out, in the conditions when the rural masses are dissatisfied with the policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the peasant question, in the conditions when in a number of regions of the Soviet Union, in connection with the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, there are open protests against the Soviet government, it can be expected that in the near future - this discontent of the rural part of the population will result in mass

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rebel movement. This insurrectionary movement cannot but have its reflection on the Red Army, and on that part of the working class which is connected with the countryside, and on certain sections of the peasant youth. Under the conditions, the combination of the illegal work of the rightists in the country with the development of work to prepare an armed coup in the Kremlin is of exceptionally great importance. This coup in the Kremlin is possible with the appropriate preparation of the Kremlin garrison."

TOMSKY told me that all his previous conversations with me and my attitude towards them as rightists give him reason to believe that I am ENUKIDZE - I will take part in the preparation of the coup and that in this respect I, as a person in whose hands the leadership of the security forces is concentrated, I will be able to benefit in organizing the change of the current leadership of the CPSU (b).

I demanded from TOMSKY an even more detailed explanation of the plan outlined by the right-wing organization for the seizure of power. TOMSKY told me that he could not give me a detailed plan, since they had not yet developed it, but that the general lines along which the activity of the organization of the Rights would go were as follows: the organization of the Rights, through its supporters, should try to lead that insurrectionary movement, which will inevitably unfold throughout the Soviet Union as a result of the collapse of the policy of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in the matter of collectivization. It is precisely at the time of these uprisings that it is necessary to prepare and carry out an armed coup in the Kremlin, arrest the leaders of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Soviet government, and * seize power into their own hands with the help of the guards of the Kremlin and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school *.

TOMSKY repeated to me that my participation in this matter was of great importance, and that he was sure that I would give my consent and do everything in my power to recruit both among the Kremlin guards and at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school the necessary people who were on the most important key areas of the Kremlin garrison and thus ensure its performance.

Having agreed to assist the organization of the right in preparing an armed coup in the Kremlin, I simultaneously drew the attention of TOMSKY that he was too optimistic about the possibility of deploying recruitment work among the Kremlin garrison to fight against the existing leadership of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government. I drew TOMSKY's attention to the fact that the cadets of the Kremlin military school are recruited mainly from workers and workers of the Party and Komsomol youth, that the party stratum in the school never fell below 90%, and that, finally, the cadets of the school change from year to year. in year. As for the permanent composition, firstly, its very small number, and secondly, in its mass, this composition, too, is devoted to the current leadership of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government. In response to this TOMSKY I me

stated that he takes into account all the difficulties that I painted for him, but that, nevertheless, he believes that it is possible to recruit loyal people from the commandant's office of the Kremlin and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school in order to rely on them in organizing a coup in the Kremlin.

Immediately, TOMSKY asked me to think and find people who could gradually act on their part to select people in the Kremlin garrison and identify their moods in order to attract them individually or in groups to carry out the tasks of the organization.

I promised TOMSKY by the next meeting to give my views on the people and on the plan for the deployment of recruitment work.

Question: What have you practically done in the area of selecting people for recruitment?

Answer: As I showed above, the conversation with TOMSKY, during which I undertook to work out a plan for recruitment work, took place at the end of 1930.

After this conversation with TOMSKY I took up a more detailed acquaintance with the command staff of the commandant's office of the Kremlin and the school of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. At the same time, I began to pay more attention to the study of the cadets schools.

In this regard, I had very extensive opportunities, since I received from the OGPU and from the commandant's office of the Kremlin intelligence reports on negative moods among the Kremlin garrison.

The very first results of my acquaintance with the political moods of the Kremlin garrison convinced me that I would be able to develop recruiting work only if I could involve in this work authoritative persons from the command staff of the garrison, who are in daily contact with the average composition of the latter. Otherwise, my position in the Kremlin, the lack of points of contact for systematic communication with this average composition will not give me the opportunity to attract any of them to the organization.

It is quite understandable that I began to look for suitable people among the leadership of the garrison, which was closer to me.

First of all, my attention turned to PETERSON - at that time the commandant of the Kremlin, GORBACHEV - b. the head of the school of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and his deputy Egorov. All these persons, according to their official position, as well as their personal authority among their subordinates, were, of course, suitable for use in recruiting personnel and preparing an armed coup.

At the same time, recruiting any of them to fight against the existing leadership of the CPSU (b) was a big risk.

I knew about PETERSON that he was a former Trotskyist, I knew that * Trotsky personally promoted him to the Kremlin at that time *, I knew that he was at one time an exceptionally devoted person to TROTSKY, but I also knew that after 1923 PETERSON he never spoke openly as a Trotskyist, but in conversations he tried to show that after 1923 he had completely broken with TROTSKY and Trotskyism.

As for GORBACHEV and EGOROV, I was not aware of any past involvement in anti-Party activities.

During my meetings with TOMSKY during 1931, I expressed these views to him and said that, despite PETERSON's great confidence in me and the measures taken to bring GORBACHEV and EGOROV closer to me, I did not have sufficient grounds to put before them questions of struggle leadership of the CPSU(b) from the risk of failure.

TOMSKY, in conversations with me regarding PETERSON, told me; "If you are embarrassed by the fact that PETERSON has departed from Trotskyism, then I can tell you that many Trotskyists who have departed from Trotskyism have again joined the organized struggle, and we, the Rights, are negotiating with the Trotskyists about contact and joint illegal work. In a conversation with PETERSON, you can inform him of this and act more decisively and boldly in the matter of attracting him.

At the end of 1931, during a break in Politburo meetings, TOMSKY, PYATAKOV, and I—ENUKIDZE—met in the corridor of the government building in the Kremlin.

From the bottom floor we went upstairs.

In the course of a conversation between myself, TOMSKY, and PYATAKOV on various topics, TOMSKY told me that he had specially brought me together with PYATAKOV in order to convince me that the Rights were not alone in their struggle against the leadership of the CPSU(b).

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From the whole conversation that took place between us, I understood that TOMSKY wanted to enlist the presence of PYATAKOV in order to secure the promise I had made to him, TOMSKY, to help the organization of the Rights in the development of illegal work in the Kremlin.

Pyatakov asked me what I had done in accordance with my promise to TOMSKY, and how things were in general.

Not wanting to share my work in the Kremlin with anyone but TOMSKY, I deflected Pyatakov's question and did not discuss this subject with him.

I did this on the basis that I did not want PYATAKOV or anyone else from the Trotskyist or right-wing organization to maintain direct contact with me, and thereby put me in danger of failure.

After this conversation with PYATAKOV, in the presence of TOMSKY, I took up more actively the processing of PETERSON, and as a result, at the beginning of 1932, PETERSON was recruited by me and agreed to participate in the preparation of a coup in the Kremlin.

Question: Tell us in detail about the circumstances of your recruitment of PETERSON?

Answer: With PETERSON, as with the commandant of the Kremlin and the closest person on questions of protection and all orders in the Kremlin and, moreover, the person most trusted to me, I met every day.

I have watched him work for many years and have known him to be energetic and very hardworking.

Naturally, under these circumstances, for all the information about the work in the Kremlin and the characteristics of individual employees, I turned first of all to him, PETERSON.

He also informed me about the mood observed among the cadets and command staff of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school, as well as among the employees of the Kremlin Commandant's Office. From this information, it was clear that the mood of a certain part of the cadets of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school was changing in connection with the processes of an economic and political nature taking place in the country.

Although the cadets of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school were recruited mainly from working party members and Komsomol members, among its part connected with the countryside, there were dissatisfaction with the conduct of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (b) in 1930-31. the policy of collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks as a class.

We had to liquidate such dissatisfaction at school quickly by weeding out the dissatisfied and replacing them with more reliable and tested elements. Under such conditions, it is not possible to hope for the deployment at school of any kind of extensive work to organize significant groups against the existing leadership of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government.

was possible.

Despite this, it was necessary to start work on identifying persons who were quite reliable for performing certain tasks related to illegal work in the Kremlin. This I decided to do through PETERSON. It is difficult for me to convey the detailed content of all my conversations with PETERSON during 1931 (when I was working on PETERSON to recruit him into the organization), due to the prescription of time. They met daily both in my office and at my daily exit at 8 o'clock in the morning for work. We spoke on various topics—we touched on all the events in the internal and external life of the USSR.

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I started talking with Peterson, first of all, about those individual discontents that, according to intelligence data, there were among the cadets of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school.

PETERSON and I often talked about inner-party topics, and at the same time we also discussed undercover materials about individual conversations between communists in which the inner-party order was criticized.

Both Peterson and I, in the course of these conversations, often agreed that the discontent recorded in intelligence materials was not unfounded.

After this type of conversation, I informed PETERSON in one of my conversations with him that the former anti-Party currents were again stirring and raising their heads. For example, I told him: "I know that the leaders of the Rights are doing illegal work, double-dealing behind cover within the Party, and are fighting for their return to the leading bodies of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet Union.

government."

In this conversation, I tried not to condemn the rightists and argued that they really should not have been removed from the leadership, that the sharp repulsion of the leaders, both the right opposition and the former Trotskyists and Zinovievites, causes discontent among the members of the CPSU (b) and unnerves the party.

At first, PETERSON treated this kind of talk on my part with some surprise and did not even trust, but later, when we repeatedly returned to the same topic, he got the impression that I, too, was dissatisfied with certain arrangements in the CPSU (B.). I gradually

tamed him to this thought.

Once, in the second half of 1931, I told Peterson that I knew about the illegal activities of the Rights from my conversations with TOMSKY, but then I did not tell him on whose behalf TOMSKY spoke to me. After a while, I explained to him that there was a center of a right-wing organization that was developing underground work throughout the country and also wanted to find people in the Kremlin for such work.

For the time being, for the time being, these conversations of mine with PETERSON were in the nature of informing him of what was being done.

At the end of 1931, I even informed him that I was informed by TOMSKY about the planned contact at the center of the Rights with the Trotskyists and Zinovievites, that they all agreed on the issue of fighting against the leadership of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government and by weakening or overthrowing this leadership intends to seize power into their own hands. After that, at the beginning of 1932, I made an offer to Peterson to take part in the preparation of a coup in the Kremlin. After a long conversation, I managed to secure his consent.

PETERSON also agreed to engage in recruiting work among the workers of the Kremlin garrison, in particular in the commandant's office of the Kremlin, where there are a number of persons who are especially devoted to him.

As for attracting people from the VTsIK school, I told PETERSON that if he is not directly connected with individual cadets and school commanders, then it would be better to probe the ground for this purpose through the head of the school or his pompolit.

Based on my conversations with TOMSKY, I explained to Peterson in detail the purpose of such recruitment of people, and emphasized to him that here, in this work, very great caution is required, in view of the extensive undercover work in the Kremlin. PETERSON took these instructions of mine very seriously and promised, for his part, to get down to work and keep me informed of it.

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Question: It is clear from your testimony that you gave TOMSKY consent to conduct recruiting work as early as the end of 1930, while PETERSON was recruited only at the beginning of 1932. How do you explain this?

Answer: At the end of 1930, I promised TOMSKY to present my views on the recruitment of people in the Kremlin, and also to indicate people through whom it would be possible to conduct recruiting work.

To my question to TOMSKY, in one of the conversations with him, shortly after that, if he could point me to any of the supporters of the right in the Kremlin, on whom I could rely in my work, TOMSKY did not tell me anyone named.

Thus, I had to identify people through whom I could conduct recruiting work. This circumstance explains why

it took me more than a whole year to become more familiar with the mood of the workers, both the school of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Kremlin commandant's office, and, as I have already shown above, it took me a lot of time to talk with Peterson in order to persuade him to take part in preparing a coup.

Question: You showed above that PETERSON was your most trusted person. It is not clear why it took you so long to process it?

Answer: Yes, I confirm that PETERSON was the person most trusted to me, but before 1931 we never had anti-Party conversations with him.

As I have already shown earlier, when I started talking with PETERSON, who was sent to recruit him to fight against the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government, he at first treated my statements with surprise and great distrust.

This explains my caution in its processing and such a long period of this processing.

Question: Why did you tell PETERSON even before he was recruited about the activities of the right-wing organization and your negotiations with TOMSKY?

Answer: This is explained by the following: in the process of conversations with PETERSON, I gradually suggested to him that these conversations were being conducted by me with a definite purpose. Any work on recruiting this or that person is, of course, associated with some risk, but, nevertheless, the recruited person must still be dedicated to the purpose of talking with him. As for PETERSON, I trusted him so much that I could, without fear of failure, inform him of the existence and activities of the organization of the right.

Question: When and under what circumstances did PETERSON give you consent to participate in the preparation of a coup in the Kremlin?

Answer: It was at the beginning of 1932, approximately in the month of March, in my office.

Question: What did PETERSON practically do in fulfillment of your orders?

Answer: In the first months of 1932, PETERSON did not succeed in launching extensive recruitment work. Moreover, his conversations with me gave me the impression that PETERSON, in fact, was not particularly in a hurry to carry out my instructions. I drew PETERSON's attention to this, and in one of the conversations in the summer of 1932, PETERSON told me that in the Kremlin commandant's office he had already identified two or three people who, in his opinion, could be relied upon and whom he intended to attract to illegal activities in order to expand through them a broader recruitment work among the employees of the commandant's office of the Kremlin.

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When I asked who these persons were, PETERSON named SITSELOBOV, who was his collaborator on assignments, DOROSHIN, assistant on duty to the commandant of the Kremlin, and LUKYANOV, commandant of the Grand Kremlin Palace.

After this information from PETERSON, I expressed my opinion to him that these people would indeed be suitable for our task of preparing a coup, and that the final attraction of these people must be accelerated.

Approximately in the same period of time, in conversations with PETERSON, I repeatedly asked him to select the necessary people at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school. PETERSON, in response to this, excused himself by saying that he was much less familiar with the composition of the school of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee than with the composition of the employees of the Kremlin commandant's office. At the same time, he pointed out to me that he was proposing to involve the acting head of the school of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee - EGOROV, who openly spoke in 1923 as a Trotskyist. I reacted positively to Egorov's candidacy, pointing out to Peterson that if Egorov could be attracted, he could be of great use in the further selection of people among the command and cadet staff of the school.

Since my conversations about EGOROV's candidacy took place with PETERSON at the beginning or middle of the summer of 1932, i.e. During the period when the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school was in the camps, naturally, I had to agree with PETERSON that the question of enlisting EGOROV would come to a head only after he returned with the school from the camps.

At the end of 1932, PETERSON, according to him, managed to involve Egorov in our illegal activities, who by that time had been appointed head of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In addition, he had recruited SINELOBOV, DOROSCHIN, LUKYANOV, and POLYAKOV (white) from among the officers of the commandant's office, as he informed me. I don't remember exactly when PETERSON named IMYANINNIKOV, former pompolitist, as a recruit.

Question: What tasks did PETERSON set for the recruits?

Answer: The question of the tasks that should be assigned to each newly recruited person was discussed between me and PETERSON more than once. It must be taken into account that by the time I was talking to him on this subject, TOMSKY had already informed me that an agreement had been reached between the organization of the Rights and the Trotskyist-Zinoviev organization not only on contact, but also on joint work.

In this connection, in a conversation with PETERSON, informing him of this, I told him that when recruiting this or that person to take part in the preparation of a coup in the Kremlin, one should not specifically speak either on behalf of the Trotskyists and Zinovievists, or on behalf of on behalf of the Rights, and what should be said on behalf of people who were in the past in the leadership of the party and government and undeservedly removed from this leadership, i.e. in other words, on behalf of the bloc of Trotskyists-Zinovievites and the Rights.

PETERSON agreed with this.

As for the specific tasks that should have been set for each recruit, in this respect I agreed with PETERSON that Egorov, as head of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school, should be assigned somewhat broader tasks than any recruit from the commandant's office. Both I and PETERSON believed that Egorov would have to independently develop recruiting work at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school, place them at the appropriate key points within the school and direct them directly.

directly, without linking to any of us. Based on the general plan of the coup in the Kremlin, EGOROV had to ensure the timely performance of the entire

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schools of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee in such a way that, due to the presence of their people in the relevant areas, the main cadets of the school would not know for the time being for what purpose it is being used.

As for the recruitment of employees of the Kremlin commandant's office, each of them must be given the task of not only further involving new people in the organization, but, if necessary, in accordance with the general plan of the coup, personal participation in it.

Question: Could you describe in detail the contents of the plan for a coup in the Kremlin?

Answer: As I have already shown above, TOMSKY, back in 1931, in a conversation with me, spoke about the general lines of the plan for preparing a coup in the Kremlin. Discussing the plan for carrying out the coup in the future, we considered the most realistic and feasible arrest of the leaders of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government, either at some narrow meeting in the Kremlin, or at night in their apartments.

In the event that the option of arrest in apartments was accepted, it was decided to arrest the following persons: STALIN, MOLOTOV, KAGANOVICH, VOROSHILOV, ORDZHONIKIDZE.

It goes without saying that the matter would not have been limited to arrest, the fate of those arrested would have been decided depending on the outcome of the coup.

With any of the options I have listed, it was necessary to ensure, on the one hand, the switching off of the telephone connection between the Kremlin and the city and, on the other hand, the opportunity for the organizers of the coup to contact the points they needed by telephone at the right time.

We also talked about this with TOMSKY. The latter proposed the following way out: RYKOV, at that time the People's Commissar of Communications, through his people, organized an accident at the city telephone exchange. This will not arouse the suspicions of the Kremlin and will explain why the telephone connection with the Kremlin has been interrupted.

To this I answered TOMSKY that such an accident did not solve the matter, since in Moscow, in addition to the central manual station, there were several automatic ones.

The only thing that can ensure the capture of telephone communications is: turning off the Kremlin automatic station (turntables), turning off city inputs to some apartments in the Kremlin, control during the coup over the operation of the switchboard, where there are also several city inputs. Or, finally, a break in telephone inputs in certain apartments. All this can be ensured if there are 5-7 members of the organization among the signalers in the Kremlin. As for the telegraph in the Kremlin, it must be taken into our own hands.

TOMSKY agreed with these considerations of mine.

When discussing the first version of the coup plan (arrest during the meeting), we agreed that this plan, on the one hand, has a positive side, since, if successful, it ensures the seizure of power in a very short time. On the other hand, in the case of insufficiently thorough preparation, it inevitably leads to failure. It was clear to us that it was necessary to choose a narrow meeting at which there would be few people present and, at the same time, the above-mentioned leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government would be present. Such meetings often took place in STALIN's office.

The main difficulties that we saw in the implementation of this plan were the following: firstly, meetings usually took place in the daytime, i.e. when there is a big movement in the Kremlin. This meant that if it failed

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quietly arrest all those present at the meeting, then what happened in the Kremlin will immediately become known outside of it. Secondly, we did not rule out that those subject to arrest might have weapons with them, and we understood that these people were not the type to surrender in any situation. This meant that a firefight could begin, which would attract the attention of the outside guards. If it does not consist of recruited people, then it will immediately strive to break inside in order to interfere with our actions.

actions.

When discussing the second option (arrest at night in apartments), we came to the conclusion that it could be more easily implemented, based on the following considerations: access to the apartments of the above-mentioned leaders subject to arrest was relatively free; some of the above persons lived in common residential buildings and at night there were no special guards.

As for STALIN's apartment, it was somewhat more difficult to get into it at night, because night guards walked along the building in the square, but this did not present any particular obstacles.

Question: What was the plan for further actions after the arrest of the leaders of the CPSU(b) and the Soviet government.

Answer: In those years when the bloc was still counting on organizing a coup in the Kremlin, timing it to the moment of mass demonstrations in the country as a result of the collapse of the CPSU(b) policy in the field of collectivization, it was supposed to act as follows: if the arrests of STALIN, MOLOTOV were successfully carried out, KAGANOVICH, VOROSHILOV and ORJONIKIDZE, it was planned to issue a government report on the Soviet Union, in which it would be announced that the old leadership of the party had compromised itself with its incorrect policy and thereby aroused discontent throughout the country, which, in connection with this, it is now removed from the leadership of the country and that the new government will take all measures to improve the situation in the country.

Question: A member of the Politburo was in Leningrad at that time. KIROV, and in Ukraine comrade. KOSIOR. What were your plans for them?

Answer: I do not know the plan for them, since I was interested in work inside the Kremlin. According to TOMSKY, through his people in Ukraine, Leningrad and other places, at the time of the organization of the coup in the Kremlin, measures will be taken against the leaders of the relevant organizations.

Question: You have shown above that such a plan of action was planned for you in the first years of your illegal activities. What years are these?

Answer: As I showed earlier that the plan refers to 1931-1932.

Question: And in subsequent years?

Answer: Starting from the second half of 1932 and thereafter, there were less and less hopes for organizing an armed coup in the Kremlin, combined with mass demonstrations in the country. TOMSKY repeatedly emphasized this in his conversations with me and pointed out that the bloc decided to carry out the main illegal work along the line of terror against the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government, and that inside the Kremlin it was necessary to conduct work in such a way as to have this main task in the center attention. TOMSKY said that among those recruited to take part in the preparation of the coup in the Kremlin, it is necessary to find courageous and determined people who will personally take part in organizing a group terrorist act.

TOMSKY developed the following plan of action: among the recruits inside the Kremlin, a small group of persons is selected, which either at night on

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apartments, or during walks, commits a terrorist act on STALIN, MOLOTOV, VOROSHILOV and ORDZHONIKIDZE.

In the country, as a result of the assassination of the leaders of the CPSU (b) and the Soviet government listed above, confusion begins and people who previously were in this leadership are involved in the leadership.

Question: How many people did you consider necessary to have in order to carry out a coup in the Kremlin?

Answer: 20-25 people.

Question: How many did you have?

Answer: Man 15.

Question: Who personally?

Answer: I know PETERSON, EGOROV, DOROSHIN, LUKYANOV, POLYAKOV and SINELOBOV. In addition, Egorov at the All-Russian Central Executive Committee school had

several people, I don't remember their names, since they were directly connected with Egorov, I didn't personally meet them.

Question: Did you outline the dates for the coup?

Answer: TOMSKY first told me that a coup was planned for the summer of 1933. Due to the fact that we have not yet been able to develop sufficient recruiting work inside the Kremlin and the fact that a number of persons to be eliminated according to the plan were absent from the Kremlin in the summer, the organization of the coup was postponed until the autumn of 1933.

In the autumn of 1933, preparations began for the 17th Party Congress, and therefore the dates were changed. Preparations for the coup were postponed so that the leaders of the bloc could at the 17th Congress double-dealingly declare their devotion to the CPSU(b) and its leadership. *After the 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the coup was planned for the autumn of 1934*.

Question: Why, then, in the autumn of 1934, did they not begin to carry out the coup?

Answer: We agreed with TOMSKY that I would await instructions from him on this matter.

According to TOMSKY, the leadership of the bloc believed that the activities of the members of the organization in the Kremlin should not diverge from the activities of the bloc throughout the Soviet Union. But I did not receive instructions from TOMSKY to start carrying out the coup.

Question: And if you received this instruction, would you start carrying out the coup?

Answer: Yes, I would.

Written from my words correctly.

A. ENUKIDZE

Interrogated:

Pom. early 3rd branch of the 4th department of the GUGB st.
Lieutenant of State Security Altman

Detective officer of the 6th department of the 4th department of the GUGB, lieutenant
of state security - GEYMAN

AP RF. F. 3 Op. 24. D. 302. L. 96-124. Script. Typescript

On the first sheet there is Stalin's resolution: "Send to the rest. (Lacking 23 pages). On a separate sheet there is a handwritten note:
"T. Zina!
(Ordzhonikidze's wife - Comp.) I advise you to get acquainted with Yenukidze's testimony. I. Stalin "(Ibid. L. 95),

__ underlined in pencil.

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No. 61

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN ABOUT B.N. MELNIKOVE (21)

April 28, 1937

No. 57017

Done secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs has materials that give suspicion to the head of the communications service of the ECCI - B.N. MELNIKOV. (aka MULLER) in Trotskyist and espionage activities.

MELNIKOV - born in 1895, citizen of the USSR, native of the city of Seleshchinsk, Transbaikalian region, member of the CPSU (b) since 1916.

Biographical data of MELNIKOV for the period of his stay from 1917 to 1922. in the Far East raise serious doubts.

In 1917, MELNIKOV, after graduating from the Mikhailovsky School in Petrograd, was sent to Irkutsk, where he took part in the October Revolution as a member of the military revolutionary committee, head of the Irkutsk garrison and head of the Red Guard.

At the end of 1918, together with a group of responsible communist workers, MELNIKOV was captured by the Japanese and after 2 months, under suspicious circumstances, according to MELNIKOV's explanation - "being unidentified by the Japanese", was released from prison. Upon his release from prison, MELNIKOV did not contact the party, but went on his own initiative to Shanghai, to his relative L.M. and K".

In China, MELNIKOV was identified in February 1919 as a participant in the uprising in Irkutsk and brought to the investigation by the tsarist consulate in Hankow.

As can be seen from the correspondence extracted from the archives of the consulate in Hankow, MELNIKOV frankly informed the consulate about his leading role in organizing the Bolshevik uprising in Siberia and filed a petition, on the basis of which he was left free.

Consulate documents give grounds to believe that MELNIKOV handed over to the consulate in Hankow the communists known to him from Irkutsk and Troitsko-Savsk who were in China. MELNIKOV is silent about these circumstances in his biography and questionnaires.

In April 1920, during a speech by the Japanese, MELNIKOV, together with a number of members of the military council, again fell into Japanese captivity and again, "without being identified", was released along with ordinary Red Guards.

After the Far East was cleared of Japanese occupation and until 1935, MELNIKOV worked in the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Intelligence Agency for the Far East, repeatedly traveled to Japan and China, carrying out illegal assignments.

When he came to work at the ECCI, MELNIKOV surrounded himself with people from Harbin who were suspicious of espionage (the head of the supply department TARANOV, the secretary of the communications service department YASHCHENKO, the head of the economy of the ACI KALCHUK, the photographers DOBROVOLSKAYA and SMIRNOV, employees on responsible assignments SMIRNOV and BALLOD and the typist BABUROVA and etc.).

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The available materials also expose MELNIKOV as belonging to the Trotskyist opposition in 1924.

It has been established that in 1924, as the Consul General of the USSR in Harbin, MELNIKOV was an active Trotskyist.

At a meeting of communists in the Harbin organization (Minutes No. 1 of January 12-1924), MELNIKOV delivered a sharp Trotskyist speech directed against the Central Committee of the CPSU(b). MELNIKOV accused the Central Committee of carrying out the "Stolypin policy" and expressed distrust of the Central Committee. At the same meeting, MELNIKOV tried to influence the party organization with provocative fabrications about the "unanimous condemnation" of the line of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) by the districts of Moscow.

MELNIKOV hides his involvement in active Trotskyist activities in 1924. The basis for MELNIKOV's involvement in covert counter-revolutionary Trotskyist work in the present is the fact that the apparatus of the communications service, which is headed by MELNIKOV, is clogged with Trotskyists and persons closely associated with Trotskyists, both in the USSR and abroad.

For example:

1. The Trotskyist WALTER, who worked in the foreign apparatus of the communications service, was connected with PYATAKOV, MADIAR, OSINSKAYA, and others, and at the same time obviously suspicious of provocation, MELNIKOV admitted to the apparatus of the communications service in Moscow and entrusted him with the leadership of illegal foreign points. MELNIKOV knew about WALTER's Trotskyist connections. WALTER is arrested.

2. MELNIKOV's confidant on secret questions is Bertha Platen, a foreign national, non-Party, wife of the active Trotskyite Fritz PLATHEN. It has been established that the PLATEN apartment was a meeting place for Trotskyists. PLATEN has been working at the ECCI until recently.

3. GREGOR, brother of the Trotskyist VUJOVICH, kept in touch with VUJOVICH during the latter's time in exile, sending him foreign literature received from MAGYAR. Despite the fact that this is known to MELNIKOV, the latter does not take any measures to remove Gregor from the apparatus

communication service is not accepted.

4. Former Trotskyists, SUVOROV, SEREGIN and BALLOD, MELNIKOV entrusted responsible covert work, and MELNIKOV knows that BALLOD concealed his Trotskyist activities in 1924 when checking party documents. As a result of the admission of politically unreliable people to responsible work in the communications apparatus, a significant part of the secret work ended up in the hands of hostile people.

In addition, there are a number of facts of the moral decay of MELNIKOV for organizing drinking parties with women, and these expensive drinking parties are covered from the funds of the ECCI.

In Leningrad, as an illegal economic representative of MELNIKOV, there is a certain A.Ya.

Shlyapobersky was entrusted with uncontrollably clean ECCI forms, which he uses to obtain gramophone records, etc. items for personal use. He purchases various chemicals, laboratory equipment, etc. without control.

SHLYAPOBERSKY is not a member of the ECCI states.

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As a result of MELNIKOV's management of the communications service, a number of serious failures have recently taken place, on which a special investigation is underway.

I ask for your sanction for the arrest of MELNIKOV B.N.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 302. L. 158-162. Script. Typescript.

* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "T. Yezhov. Melnikov and the "entourage" must be arrested. St. ";
"Comrade Ezhov reported. P.".

No. 62

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V.
STALIN AND V.M. MOLOTOV O B.Ya. MENIS

April 29, 1937

No. 57049

Owls. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks
Comrade. STALIN OF THE PRESIDOVNARKOMA OF THE USSR comrade. MOLOTOV

MENIS Boris Yakovlevich, born in 1904, a native of the mountains. Ananyevsk, from employees, citizen of the USSR, member of the CPSU (b) since 1920. It is currently in the reserve of the Communications Service of the ECCI.

When MENIS was deputy head of the Foreign Workers publishing house, MENIS, during a reception on the Red Square of the Chelyuskinites, gave the Trotskyite EMEL LURIER a book about the Chelyuskin epic in a foreign language, so that EMEL LURIER presented it on Red Square to members of the government. They did not succeed only because by the time MENIS and EMEL arrived at Red Square, the square had already been cordoned off.

According to the testimony of the arrested Trotskyist ROMAN Lion, it is known that MENIS is a hidden Trotskyist. MENIS provided material assistance to his brother ROMAN Joseph (a former Trotskyist), giving them secret literary work and paying them a fee on receipts for fictitious names.

When ROMAN Joseph was expelled from the Party, MENIS continued to maintain close contact with him and promised to assist him in his restoration in the Party through the CCP.

MENIS got the wife of a Trotskyist convicted in the first trial, GERTIK, who turned out to be a member of a counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization, to work in the publishing house of Foreign Workers, and maintained close contact with her until her arrest, providing her support.

There is evidence that gives grounds to suspect MENIS of espionage activities.

MENIS maintained close contact with the now arrested Polish spy-provocateur KITAINOV Ruvyn Kivovich, whom he recommended to the Comintern Communications Department for sending him to work illegally in Shanghai.

MENIS is also in close contact with STRONSKI-ANDREEV, who is scheduled for arrest and is suspected of Polish espionage.

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MENIS supported a group of Chinese in the publishing house of Foreign Workers (LYAU TSAU-KHUDYAKOV, LI-LI-SIANG), known as members of the Trotskyist opposition and suspected of espionage.

MENIS received an order from the Personnel Department of the Comintern to dismiss the Japanese provocateur TEKEUCHI from the publishing house of Foreign Workers. He sabotaged this instruction of the ECCI in every possible way.

I consider it necessary to arrest MENIS.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State. security EZHOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 303. L. 1-2. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a resolution: "For. Molotov"; "Behind. St. "; "Comrade Ezhov reported. Poskrebyshv.

No. 63

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT Sh. Eliava and M. Orakhelashvili

April 29, 1937

92 - Question of the NKVD

On the basis of the materials presented by the NKVD regarding the information connection of Sh. Eliava and M. Orakhelashvili with the Georgian Trotskyists (Mo debadze), the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decides:

Temporarily terminate the admission of t.t. Orakhelashvili and Eliava to the meetings of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and its bodies, as well as the distribution of Central Committee materials to them until the final clarification of the case of the CCP and the NKVD.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 303. L. 3. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "To Yezhov, Poskrebyshv."

No. 64

CODE TELEGRAM L.P. BERIA I.V. STALIN

ABOUT V. CHICHINADZE

April 29, 1937

No. 614/sh From Tbilisi

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

We ask the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to allow the arrest of Chichinadze Vissarion, who is now the head of the Glavhydroproekt of the USSR People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry and is described by the NKVD of Georgia as a German spy and saboteur.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Georgia BERIA

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 31. Original. Typescript.

There are handwritten marks on the sheet: "For the arrest. St. "; "Commun. T. Yezhov. P.".

DOCUMENTATION

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No. 65

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT PRONINA I.S." (23)

May 4, 1937

108 - About Pronin I.S.

Approve the proposal of the Bureau of the Commission of Soviet Control to expel Pronin from the Commission of Soviet Control and from the ranks of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, as an anti-Soviet agent, and transfer the further conduct of the case to the NKVD.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 303. L. 6. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "To Antipov, Yezhov (NKVD), Yakovlev (KPK).

No. 66

NOTE V.P. POTEKINA I.V. STALIN
ABOUT GERMAN SUBJECT W. GEISTTUUSEN

May 5, 1937

No. 1127

The visiting session of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR in the city of Rostov sentenced to death on charges of espionage, sabotage and counter-revolutionary activities the German citizen Wilhelm Wilhelmsovich Geisthuizen, who before his arrest was the deputy head of the section at the Proletarian Dictatorship mine of the Shakhtantratsit trust .

Under the leadership of German intelligence agent Beitelspacher, Geisthuizen committed a series of acts of sabotage, accompanied by human casualties. Geisthuizen pleaded guilty, both at the preliminary and trial, confirming his confession in a petition for pardon.

research institutes

According to the NKID comrade. Ulrich's petition for clemency was rejected and the verdict was approved by higher authorities.

Over the past years, there has not been a case of the application of capital punishment against German citizens. The execution of Geisthuizen may cause

in Germany, a sharp reaction. It is possible that it will entail reprisals against the imprisoned German communists.

Based on this, the NKID believes that, despite the severity of the crime committed by Geisthuizen, it would be advisable for him to replace the capital punishment with imprisonment for 10 years.

V. POTEKIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 144. Original. Typescript.

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No. 67

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO
STALIN ON THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
OF JAPANESE SUBJECTS

May 5, 1937

No. 57125
Owls. secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

A consequence of a number of liquidated during 1933-1936. The NKVD Directorate on Sakhalin of espionage and insurgent organizations established that the foreman of the coal concession on Sakhalin, the Japanese-subscribed KA VASI and the manager of the Alexander office of the same concession, the Japanese-subject BABA-FEDUSUKI, being residents of Japanese intelligence, are actively activities for the preparation of espionage insurgent and sabotage agents. For example, members of the espionage-insurgent organization liquidated in 1934 in the Alexandrovsky district of the Sakhalin region during the investigation testified that all their work on the training of insurgent personnel and espionage was carried out under the leadership of KAVASI. In 1936, an insurgent espionage group was liquidated in the same area, the members of which testified that KAWASI had promised them, in the event of an armed uprising against the Soviet government, to supply them with weapons, which should come from the Japanese coal concession in Douai. The members of the anti-Soviet group personally handed over the collected spy information about military units and industrial enterprises to KAVASI.

Arrested in 1933, Japanese agents FEDOROV E.S. and GOLOVIN I.M. testified that they were recruited by BABA-FEDUSUKI, and GOLOVIN received from the latter the task to go to Izhevsk to organize espionage, sabotage and insurgent cells there.

On the basis of the materials presented above, I consider that an active

intelligence activities on the territory of the USSR of the Japanese subjects of KAWASI and BABA-FEDUSUKI.

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Com. LITVINOV did not give consent to the arrest of these spies and asked that this issue be brought to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

For my part, I consider the arrest of KAWASI and BABA FEDUSUKI as active Japanese residents absolutely necessary.

People's Commissar of Internal USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 141-142. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "For - Molotov", "Sg"; "Comrade Ezhov reported. P."

No. 68

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

About V.A. BALITSKY, etc. DERIBASE

May 8, 1937

144 - 0 head of the UNKVD of the Far Eastern Territory.

1. To strengthen KGB work in the Far East, transfer Comrade Balitsky from the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR to the post of head of the UNKVD of the Far Eastern Territory.

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2. Recall Comrade Deribas at the disposal of the NKVD of the USSR.

The question of Comrade Deribas' further work will be decided upon his arrival in Moscow.

3. To subdue Comrade Balitsky, sent by the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to the Far East, a group of Chekists headed by Comrade Mironov

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 987. L. 34. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

No. 69

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT GERMAN SUBJECT W. GEISTTUYSEN

May 11, 1937

189 - NKID question

In a change to the decision of the Central Committee of 16.GV.37g. replace the German citizen V. Geisthuizen with capital punishment (execution) - 10 years in prison.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 143. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

No. 70

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

About G.G. Yagoda and G. A. Molchanov

May 11, 1937

193 - On the exclusion of Yagoda and Molchanov from the membership of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR and the removal of the name of Yagoda from the Bolshevskaya labor commune and the Tunguska railway. bridge.

Approve the draft resolutions of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on the exclusion from membership of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Yagoda G.G. and Molchanova G.A., as well as the removal of the name of Yagoda G.G. from the Bolshevskaya labor commune of the NKVD and the Tunguska bridge of the Volochevka-Komsomolsk railway.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 987. L. 47. Original. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

No. 71

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) ON ZYKOV MA.

May 14, 1937

231 - 0 Zykove MA

Approve the following decision of the Chelyabinsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks:

Zykov, as an exposed member of the counter-revolutionary organization of the right, to be excluded from the ranks of the party, removed from the work of the authorized KomzagSNK, the case about him to be transferred to the NKVD.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 304. L. 14. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

The text contains a typewritten note about the distribution: "T.t. Zlobin, Yezhov, Yakovlev, Malenkov, Chelyabinsk Regional Committee.

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No. 72

MEMORY V.P. POTECHKINA I.V. TO STALIN ON THE SENTENCE TO
CAPITAL PENALTY OF THE GERMAN UNDER GIVEN

E. RONSTOCK

May 16, 1937

No. 1143

To the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, comrade. STALIN

April 7 this year The Military Tribunal of the Kharkov Military District sentenced to capital punishment - the execution of the German citizen Erich Ronsh current.

Ronstock was accused of collecting espionage information of industrial and military importance, which he systematically sent to Germany through the Embassy and individuals, while fulfilling the tasks of the German political police. To collect espionage information, Ronstock attracted a number of people working at various defense enterprises. In addition to espionage, Ronstock was engaged in incitement to carry out sabotage work at the plant named after. Kirov in the city of B. Tokmak and illegally kept firearms. Ronstock fully pleaded guilty.

According to Comrade. Ulrich's sentence has already been approved by the Commission of the Central Committee.

Quite recently, in a similar case of the German Count Geisthuizen, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs raised the question of replacing execution by 10 years in prison, and a positive decision was made by the court. For the same reasons as in the Geisthuizen case (there has not yet been a single case of execution of German citizens, the execution may cause an undesirable reaction in Germany and worsen the situation of the communists arrested in Germany), the NKID would consider it expedient in this case as well, despite the gravity of the crimes committed by Ronstock, to replace the latter by execution by 10 years in prison.

Deputy People's Commissar V. POTECHKIN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 152-153. Script. Typescript.

No. 73

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON KABAKOV"

May 17, 1937

253 - About Kabakov.

To put to a vote members of the Central Committee of the AUCP(b) and candidates for members of the Central Committee

the following suggestion:

"According to available materials, member of the Central Committee Kabakov is accused of belonging to the counter-revolutionary center of the right.

The Politburo of the Central Committee puts to a vote the members of the Central Committee and candidates for members of the Central Committee on the exclusion of Kabakov from the Central Committee and from the party with the transfer of his case to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 304. L. 63. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

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No. 74

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ORAKHELASHVILI AND ELIAV"

May 17, 1937

254 – About Orakhelashvili and Eliava

Put the following proposal to the vote of the members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and candidates for membership in the Central Committee:

"According to the available materials, a member of the Revision Commission of the CPSU (b) Orakhelashvili, a candidate member of the Central Committee, Eliava, are accused of knowing about the counter-revolutionary work of the Georgian Trotskyist center, but hiding it from the Central Committee.

The Politburo of the Central Committee puts to a vote the members of the Central Committee and candidates for members of the Central Committee on the expulsion of Orakhelashvili from the composition of the Revision Commission and from the party and the expulsion of Eliav from candidates for members of the Central Committee and from the party, with the expulsion of both from Moscow.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 304. L. 65. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

No. 75

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ABOUT GERMAN SUBJECT E. RONSTOCK

May 17, 1937

256 - NKID question

Replace the German citizen E. Ronstock with capital punishment (execution) - 10 years in prison.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 304. L. 14. Copy. Typescript

Protocol No. 49.

No. 76

DECISION OF THE PLENUM OF THE CC AUCP(b) "ON KABAKOV"

May 17-19, 1937, item 2. -

About Kabakov.

Approve the following proposal of the Politburo of the Central Committee:

On the basis of available materials, in which Kabakov, a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, is accused of belonging to the counter-revolutionary center of the right, expel Kabakov from the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and from the party with the transfer of his case to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 304. L. 68. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 10.

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No. 77

RESOLUTION OF THE PLENUM OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT ORAKHELASHVILI AND ELIAV"

May 17-19, 1937

p. 3. - About Orakhelashvili and Eliava

Approve the following proposal of the Politburo of the Central Committee:

On the basis of the available materials in which Orakhelashvili, a member of the Central Revision Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, and a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Eliava, are accused of knowing about the counter-revolutionary work of the Georgian Trotskyist center, but concealed this from the Central Committee, exclude Orakhelashvili from the Central Auditing Commission and from the party and to exclude Eliav from candidates for membership in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and from the party with the expulsion of both from Moscow.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 304. L. 69. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 10.

No. 78

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH A COPY OF THE TELEGRAM

L.G. MIRONOV ON THE SENTENCES IN THE CASE
OF THE TROTSKIST ORGANIZATION IN THE DVK (24)

May 19, 1937

No. 57465

Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of telegram No. 61240 to Comrade Mironov from Khabarovsk.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

In the case of the Trotskyist terrorist-sabotage, espionage-wrecking organization OKDVA, within the next 10 days, I ask permission to hear the case against a group of arrested members of the organization of military builders in the following composition - the first group of persons:

1) KOMENDANTOV Ivan Vasilyevich, former head of the SKO 18th Rifle Corps, military engineer of the 2nd rank. He was exposed by the testimony of SPEKTOR, KAPUSTIN, BORODIN, YEFREMOV, BESSMERTNOV, BOBKOV, EROFEEV and confessed that he was an active member of the Trotskyist organization. He stood close to the leadership of the organization, recruited members of the organization. On a large scale, he conducted sabotage in military construction in parts of the Primorsky Group of Forces OKDVA and the 18th Corps, organized a terrorist group to commit a terrorist act over Gamarnik in 1936.

2) SPEKTR Maks Efimovich, former chief engineer of UVSR 444. He confessed and was exposed by the testimony of KAPUSTIN, KOMENDANTOV, BORODIN that he had been a member of the Trotskyist organization since 1934. He organized and carried out major sabotage in aviation construction in the Khabarovsk and Bochkarevsk aviation brigades. He accepted the task of KOMENDANTOV - to carry out a terrorist act against Gamarnik - he was supposed to personally shoot at him. He handed over spy materials to Kashcheev for their subsequent transfer to Japanese intelligence.

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3) Nikolai Mikhailovich KAPUSTIN, former Chief Engineer of the UVSR 462. Exposed by the testimony of KOMENDANTOV, YEFREMOV and confessed that he was a member of a Trotskyist organization in the OKDVA system.

He carried out wrecking on construction in parts of the 69th division. According to the testimony of the head of the terrorist organization in Leningrad, Leonid Vasilyevich MANILOV, he was exposed and confessed that he was a member of a terrorist organization, and took part in the discussion of the decision of this organization in preparing a terrorist act against Stalin.

4) BOBKOV Konstantin Denisovich, former chief accountant of the North Kazakhstan region in the Primorskaya group, confessed to being a member of the Trotskyist organization in the OKDVA system in 1934. He conducted sabotage work under the leadership of KOMENDANTOV. In practice, sabotage was expressed in the concealment of wrecking acts, for which he compiled fictitious reports, concealed the illegal expenditure of building materials. Together with KOMENDANTOV, he led the construction in the Primorskaya group to a loss of 6.5 million rubles. Convicted by the testimony of the accused KOMENDANTOV.

Second group:

1) Ivan Alexandrovich BORODIN, the former head of the Department of the OKDVA SKO since 1931 was a member of the Japanese spy organization, and from 1933 until the arrests he was a member of the Trotskyist Japanese sabotage and wrecking organization. He was directly connected with representatives of Japanese intelligence GOTO and TAKAHASI, to whom he transmitted information about the state of OKDVA. He recruited members of the organization. Together with the accused Bessmertnov, he worked out a plan for preparing a terrorist attack on Comrade Kaganovich in February 1936 and led a terrorist group that prepared a terrorist attack on Comrade Kaganovich. Gamarnik and Blucher. He personally participated in the preparation of two acts of sabotage: setting fire to a water pumping station in the Lazo garrison and setting fire to the central material warehouse UVSR 408. With his sabotage activities, he disrupted the construction plan for 1936 UVSR 462 and caused OKDVA more than 4 million rubles in loss. He personally confessed to everything, in addition, he is exposed by the testimony of the accused SPEKTOR, KOMENDANTOV, YEFREMOV, BESSMERTNOV, EROFEEV, KARPEL.

2) BESSMERTNOV Alexander Ivanovich, former assistant commander of the 75th construction battalion for the technical unit, head of the construction site of the UVSR 443 SKO OKDVA before his arrest. By the testimony of Kapustin, Borodin, Efremov, Kharchenko and Karpel, he was exposed and confessed that he was a career Trotskyist, and since 1923 an active member of the Trotskyist organization. He personally prepared the perpetrator of the terrorist act against Kaganovich when Kaganovich was at Dalstroy, recruiting KHARCHENKO for this purpose. The latter confessed and confirmed Bessmertnov's testimony. He carried out extensive work in favor of Japanese intelligence, handed over to Kashcheev for Japanese intelligence detailed materials on the 31st Cavalry Division. He personally prepared and carried out a sabotage act - setting fire to the water station of the Lazo garrison. He carried out extensive sabotage in military construction.

3) KHARCHENKO Ivan Ivanovich, former head of the Sibuchary siding of the Far Eastern Railway. He was exposed by the testimony of BESSMERTNOV and confessed that he had been a member of the Trotskyist organization since 1936. In February 1936, on the instructions of the accused Bessmertnov, he prepared a terrorist attack on Kaganovich, by disconnecting the rails to cause the wreck of the train in which Kaganovich was traveling from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok. The crash of Kaganovich's train was prevented by the control train ahead.

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4) EFREMOV Alexander Afanasyevich, former pomnach of the department of the North Kazakhstan Region of the OKDVA. In 1930, he illegally fled from the USSR to Harbin, where he was recruited by Japanese intelligence agencies, worked as an agent for the captain of the Japanese military mission at the Pogranichnaya station - SAKAMA, from which in April 1932 he was transferred to the USSR with sabotage, terrorist and reconnaissance missions. He worked at Daldorstroy, and then at the OKDVA SKO, collected and transmitted to the Japanese intelligence agencies information of a spy nature about the state of strategic border rear armament and the deployment of OKDVA units. In December 1936, he handed over to the Japanese intelligence agencies the complete deployment of OKDVA units. In 1933, he was a member of a counter-revolutionary Trotskyist, Japanese sabotage and terrorist organization and, on the instructions of KASHCHEEV, prepared a terrorist attack on Blucher. He recruited members of the organization. He fully admitted his guilt, espionage activity was documented. Exposed by the testimony of Japanese agents and terrorists: BORODIN, SHIRYANOV, BESSMERTNOV, KOMENDANTOV, BAZILEVICH.

5) Andrey Pavlovich ZYRYANOV, former head of plant No. 11 SKO OKDVA. He was a member of the Trotskyite subversive terrorist organization. He was a member of the terrorist five and was preparing a terrorist attack on Blucher. On the instructions of the organization, he carried out sabotage activities, causing great losses to OKDVA. He fully pleaded guilty. Exposed by the testimonies of the accused BORODIN, NIKOLAEV, EFREMOV, MOTARIN, BESSMERTNOV.

6) BAZILEVICH Vasily Andreevich, a former engineer of the second department of the North Caucasus Department of OKDVA. He confessed that he was a member of the Trotskyist wrecking organization, in which he was recruited by the accused Yefremov in the summer of 1935. He carried out all the installations of the organization for sabotage at the military construction of the OKDVA. Efremov's testimony reveals him as a member of a sabotage group.

7) NIZHANKOVSKY Ivan Nikolaevich, former technician of the second department of the North Caucasus Department of OKDVA. He was exposed by the testimony of the accused Efremov, BAZILEVICH and confessed that since September 1936 he has been a member of the Trotskyist-sabotage organization, in which he was recruited by the accused EROFEEV, carrying out the tasks of the organization, carried out sabotage in the field of financing military units for the current repair of buildings and providing them with building materials.

8) Vasily Nikolaevich NIKOLAEV, the former head of the tractor-ice road at sawmill No. 11 of the SKO OKDVA, was exposed by the testimony of the accused ZYRYANOV and confessed that he was a member of a Trotskyite wrecking organization. Recruited in July 1936 by ZIMIN. On the instructions of the organization, he carried out sabotage, systematically disrupting the logging plan, destroying and ruining the logging economy. The failure to fulfill the plan for logging, already deliberately underestimated by pests from the apparatus of the SKO and ZYRYANOV, led to the disruption of the military construction of the OKDVA.

9) FRAIFELD Lev Yakovlevich, former director of the brick factory SKO OKDVA, according to the testimony of the accused Efremov, Borodin, Spector, he is convicted as a member of the Trotskyist Japanese spy organization

gang, in which he was recruited by BORODIN. On the instructions of the organization, he carried out sabotage at a brick factory, reducing the quantity and quality of output in order to disrupt military construction.

10) TISHCHENKO Grigory Emelyanovich, former head of the stone quarry of the SKO OKDVA at the Korfovskaya station of the Far Eastern Railway

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roads. He is a member of the Trotskyist Japanese sabotage spy organization, of which he confessed and is exposed by the testimony of the accused: YEFREMOV and LAKHNO. He carried out the task of the organization to disrupt the military construction of the OKDVA by systematically failing to fulfill the plan for the procurement of building material.

Third group:

1) SOKOLOV Fedor Vasilyevich, former chief engineer of UVSR 576 SKO OKDVA military engineer of the 2nd rank. He is exposed by the testimony of SPEKTOR, EROFEEV, ANTONOV and confessed to being a member of an illegal Trotskyist organization since 1934. He carried out a lot of sabotage activities both in the work of the SKO apparatus and in construction in the 34th division in Babstovo. He recruited construction foremen for sabotage activities: Ivan Grigoryevich ANTONOV, director of the sawmill UVSR 576, KRYUCHEK Petr Efimovich, director of the brick sawmill and others. ANTONOV and KRYUCHEK were given the task of putting the lumber mill and the brick factory out of action. Involved in the investigation, ANTONOV and KRYUCHEK confessed that they were members of the Trotskyist organization headed by the accused SOKOLOV in the 34th division, and also confessed to wrecking activities. All three - SOKOLOV, ANTONOV, KRYUCHEK - are brought to trial.

Fourth group:

1) MOTARIN Andrey Andreevich, former head of the 9th Department of the North Caucasus Region of the OKDVA, quartermaster of the 2nd rank. He confessed and is exposed by the testimony of KOMENDANTOV, SPEKTOR, BAZILEVICH, NIKOLAEV and EROFEEV that he has been a member of an illegal Trotskyist organization since 1935, was recruited by the Trotskyist GERBEK Georgy Gugovich, with whom he maintained close contact. On a large scale, he carried out sabotage in the field of logging by disorganizing forestry, and disrupted military construction in OKDVA.

2) TANAEV Anton Aleksandrovich, former head of the cost estimate department of the North Kazakhstan Region of the OKDVA. According to the testimony of BAZILEVICH, KREMINSKOY and EROFEEV, he is convicted of being a member of the Trotskyist sabotage organization existing in the OKDVA system, TANAEV confessed to this, stating that he was recruited into the organization by KASHCHEEV in March 1935 and since that time practically carried out all the tasks of Kashcheev on sabotage in order to disrupt the military construction of the army.

3) KREMIN Lev Georgievich, head and chief engineer of UVSR 414 in Birobidzhan. He was exposed by the testimony of SPEKTOR, KOMENDANTOV, BORODIN, YEFREMOV, BESSMERTNOV and confessed that he had been a member of an illegal Trotskyist organization since February 1936. Recruited by KASHCHEEV. On the instructions of the organization and personally, Kashcheev carried out sabotage on the construction of parts of the 20th corps in Birobidzhan. I ask you to telegraph NIKITCHENKO at the field session to hear the case of the listed members of the organization in a special order, but without publishing the verdict in the press.

MIRONOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 305. L. 1-9. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "For Comrade Mironov's proposal. I. Sg."; "IN. Molotov"; "Comrade Ezhov reported. P.".

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No. 79

INTERROGATION PROTOCOL B.M. FELDMAN (25)

May 19, 1937

FELDMAN Boris Mironovich, born in 1890, member of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks since 1919, has a higher military education, commander, former head of the Red Army Command Staff, before his arrest, deputy commander of the Moscow Military District.

Question: You are accused of participating in a Trotskyist military conspiracy. Do you plead guilty to this?

Answer: Yes, I plead guilty to participating in a Trotskyist military conspiracy. I want to inform the investigation that I have not sincerely told about all the vile, treacherous work of me and other participants in the conspiracy. Despite the fact that, when I was arrested on May 15, the very next day I made a statement that I was a member of an anti-Soviet organization, nevertheless, until today, I tried to limit my role and hide the most significant facts related to the conspiracy and people who took part in it.

Question: Tell us in detail by whom, when and under what circumstances you were involved in the military-Trotskyist conspiracy?

Answer: In the beginning of 1932, in Moscow, I was involved in the military-Trotskyist conspiracy by Mikhail Nikolaevich TUKHACHEVSKY. My involvement in this organization was preceded by indoctrination by TUKHACHEVSKY, when I was in Leningrad as chief of staff of the Leningrad Military District, TUKHACHEVSKY repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership of the army, VOROSHILOV, in conversations with me. He expressed a number of points about personal grievances,

about his underestimation as a major military specialist, about the fact that in the past years of the civil war he, as a commander of the fronts, had enormous merits and was highly valued by TROTSKY, and in the present situation he is relegated to the background. These conversations took place in Leningrad and met with due sympathy and approval on my part. Arriving in Moscow at the end of August 1931, about a month later than TUKHACHEVSKY, I was appointed head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army. During meetings and conversations with TUKHACHEVSKY in Moscow, he told me that although he returned back to the leadership of the army, the former attitude of the People's Commissar and the leadership still remained towards him and that he intended, not limited only to conversations, to move on to certain actions. When I asked what these actions were, he told me that he had many supporters in the army, in whom he enjoyed great confidence, and he intended to unite these commanders around him to fight against the army leadership. Naturally, I asked him: on what basis would he be able to unite these commanders, to which TUKHACHEVSKY answered me that among the senior command staff there were many commanders who were former Trotskyites and dissatisfied in general, who could be united to fight against the party and government and called me a number of such commanders from the former troops

cysts.

TUKHACHEVSKY invited me to take part in this struggle.

Question: Did you give TUKHACHEVSKY your consent?

Answer: Yes, having been under his great influence for several years, I agreed to participate in this counter-revolutionary work.

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Question: Continue your testimony.

Answer: A short time after the above conversation and after I agreed to take part in the struggle against the leadership of the party, Tukhachevskii at the beginning of 1932 informed me in his office about the existence of a military counter-revolutionary Trotskyist organization, outlined to me its program and tasks and named a number of participants.

Question: What did TUKHACHEVSKY tell you about practical problems and installations?

Answer: TUKHACHEVSKY told me that the main task is to create a strong organization in the army, which should at the right time serve as an armed force to overthrow the existing government and replace this government with TROTSKY.

He told me that practical work should consist in the selection of reliable commanders, their appropriate placement in the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense and on the periphery, in military districts, which is taken to reduce the rate of deployment of weapons in the army, mainly artillery. According to TUKHACHEVSKY, this is necessary in order to cause a hitch at the front in case of war, which will create favorable

favorable conditions for an armed coup inside the country.

TUKHACHEVSKY also said that a purely conspiratorial connection was being established with representatives of a civilian Trotskyist organization, primarily through the military industry, and that a direct connection was being established with TROTSKY, on whose directives he, TUKHACHEVSKY, would act.

Question: Whom did TUKHACHEVSKY name for you as participants in the military-Trotskyist conspiracy?

Answer: At the beginning of 1932, TUKHACHEVSKY named the participants in the military-Trotskyist conspiracy PUTN, PRIMAKOV, and the head of the Artillery Directorate EFIMOV. Later, at the end of 1932 or the beginning of 1933, TUKHACHEVSKY additionally named GARKAVI, TUROVSKY, ZYUK, SCHMIDT, VASILENKOV, POTAPOV and others, whose names I do not remember now.

Question: What instructions did you personally receive from TUKHACHEVSKY on anti-Soviet practical work, and what did you do?

Answer: TUKHACHEVSKY instructed me personally, when selecting people for command positions, to nominate former Trotskyists and recruit a small but reliable group of people from the employees of the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Defense, indicating that it would be very useful to involve several employees from the Engineering Directorate, Chemical, Moto -Fur. administration and headquarters of the Red Army. I promised to gradually look at certain people, identify and involve them in the organization.

Question: Whom did you personally attract to the organization?

Answer: I recruited into the organization SAVITSKY in 1933, the former assistant to the head of the Engineering Directorate MAKSIMOV in 1933, the head of the 3rd Department of the APOGA in 1934, Olshansky in the same

1934 and head of the SMOLIN Engineering Academy. In addition to the people listed, I recruited into the organization at the end of 1934 the former head of the school of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, EGOROV and KUTYAKOV, about whom TUKHACHEVSKY informed me that he had trained him, and I completed his recruitment at the beginning

1935 In the Moscow military district, I recruited the chief of staff STEPANOV.

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In addition to these people, I had instructions from TUKHACHEVSKY to process and involve in the organization the head of the Chemical Directorate, FISHMAN, and the deputy chief of staff of the Red Army, LEVICHEV.

Question: Did you manage to recruit them?

Answer: I failed to recruit them. I couldn't recruit LEVICHEV

because in 1932 he was seriously ill, then he went to work abroad in Berlin, and upon arrival I did not speak to him.

FISHMAN, as a former member of the Central Committee of the Socialist Revolutionaries, it seemed to me that it would not be difficult to recruit, but, however, after several conversations with him, during which I tried to probe his political mood, I refused this. It is possible that TUKHACHEVSKY recruited him, but I do not know.

Question: You did not name all the members of the organization. I propose to give full and truthful evidence on this matter?

Answer: I am informing the investigation that TUKHACHEVSKY named at different times the following participants in the military conspiracy: the commander of the Kiev military district YAKIR, the former commander of the Moscow military district KORK, the former commander of the Ural military district GAR KAVOGO, the former assistant head of the Combat Training Directorate UGRYUMOV, former deputy head of the Combat Training Directorate TCHAIKOVSKY, head of the Kiev infantry school BELY.

UGRUMOV and TCHAIKOVSKY, at the request of TUKHACHEVSKY, were promoted by me to these positions, and he told me that he relies on them in his anti-Soviet work.

In 1935, TUKHACHEVSKY told me that he had succeeded in recruiting the chairman of the Osoavi Central Council, akhim EIDEMAN, to work in our organization, and that this was a very important area for the development of counterrevolutionary work in the public organizations of Osoaviakhim.

Question: tell the investigation in detail what TUKHACHEVSKY told you about YAKIR and KORKA?

Answer: TUKHACHEVSKY spoke to me about YAKIR more than once as about a person with whom he is closely connected, and pointed out that YAKIR, who is constantly leading a opposition against the Headquarters of the Red Army, could become a member of the organization and his like-minded person. He said that Yakir enjoyed great confidence and authority among the commanding staff, that his participation in the conspiracy was very valuable, and that he, TUKHACHEVSKY, would certainly involve him in the conspiracy.

At the end of 1933 or the beginning of 1934, TUKHACHEVSKY informed me that he had recruited Yakir into the organization, but stressed that I had to be extremely careful with regard to him and not pretend that I knew about his role in the organization. and that YAKIR will carry out relevant work in the Ukrainian military district. At the same time, he suggested that I fully support all the proposals of Yakir regarding the promotion and placement of his candidates, but I helped Yakir to promote his people - former Trotskyists: Butyrsky - first to the post of deputy chief of staff of the UVO, GERMONIUS, DAVOS and some others, whose names I cannot name from memory, but I have always supported YAKIR's proposals and the candidates put forward by him.

I must add that Yakir sought and succeeded in appointing LEVINZON, a former Trotskyite, reserve commander, as head of the Construction and Housing Directorate of the Red Army, who had never worked in any construction organizations before and had no experience in construction. The results of construction under the direction of LEVINSON are such that

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housing construction, especially in connection with the deployment of new units, was brought to such a state that it contributed to the generation of dissatisfaction among the commanding staff and thereby created even more favorable conditions for recruiting new people into the military Trotskyist organization.

As regards the involvement of KORK in a military conspiracy, TUKHACHEVSKY informed me, approximately at the same time as about YAKIR, as a participant in the conspiracy. With regard to KORK, TUKHACHEVSKY said that he was carrying out work in the Moscow Military District and the pace of combat training in the Moscow District was the most backward in comparison with other districts.

gami.

I want to inform the investigation that in one of the conversations with TUKHACHEVSKY I asked him a question - did he have a conversation with UBOREVICH about involving him in the organization. I put this question to TUKHACHEVSKY, knowing, firstly, that he was personally very close to UBOREVICH and, secondly, that UBOREVICH, like Yakir, took the lines of the opposition against the central apparatus, which was especially revealed in 1933, in connection with the huge accident rate in the BVO along the line of aviation, when UBOREVICH, instead of raising the question of the unacceptable behavior of KUSHAKOV (head of the BVO BVO), strongly supported him. TUKHACHEVSKY evaded a direct answer. I must add that KUSHAKOV, according to PRIMAKOV, was a member of a military Trotskyist organization.

Question: Continue your testimony about the participants in the conspiracy known to you?

Answer: According to PRIMAKOV, with whom I have repeatedly talked about the work of the organization, I knew that in Leningrad he managed to involve DRAGILEV, the former head of the air defense of the LVO, into the organization. PRIMAKOV also named me as his people, attracted by him directly: KOSHELEV - former chief of staff of the corps and BAYUSHI. According to SMOLIN recruited by me, they were involved in the organization: the former head of the marine department of the Engineering Academy SELIVANOV and the teacher of the GORODSKAYA.

According to GARKAVOY, during a conversation with him in 1935, I know that the commander of the 65th division GAVRYUSHENKO, the head of the engineering troops VELE ZHEV and someone from the Housing and Construction Department, are participating in the work of the military-Trotskyist organization in the Ural Military District, I don't remember the last name.

GARKAVY told me that he had a group of people that PRIMAKOV handed over to him as a former commander of the 13th Corps.

Question: With which of the members of the organization you named did you have conversations on questions connected with the affairs of the organization?

Answer: Apart from TUKHACHEVSKY, PRIMAKOV and GARKAVI, as well as people directly recruited by me, I had conversations about the affairs of the organization with the following members: in 1935 I had conversations with SCHMIDT in Moscow in my office, where I was interested in

wondered how he was working with people, and he told me that he had a group of people in his brigade recruited by him and working on his instructions. He gave me several names, but since these are commanders of the middle and senior levels, I don't remember their names.

TUROVSKY had a conversation with me in connection with the transfer of the ZYUK to the Kharkov district, that the ZYUK in his division (25th) recruited people, mainly from among the dissatisfied, and his work was moving forward.

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At the beginning of 1936, in connection with Vasilenko's appointment to the Ural District, I cautiously hinted to him about the need to contact GARKA VYM. On the appointment of Vasilenko in the Ural Military District, I warned Garkavy that Vasilenko was going to him as a deputy.

I talked more often with EFIMOV about the affairs of the organization. He informed me about the people he had recruited and who worked on his instructions. Of the people he named, I remember: DROZDOV, head of the department of the AU, and OLSHEVSKY, head of the Base Department.

EFIMOV told me that the issue of ammunition stocks and the development of divisional and corps artillery systems and fire control devices is very acute, that in terms of quantity they do not ensure the deployment of the artillery program properly. This acute situation arose as a result of EFIMOV's wrecking work, which he carried out on the instructions of TUKHACHEVSKY.

Question: What did TUKHACHEVSKY tell you about the state of artillery and engineer armaments in connection with the tasks of organizations?

Answer: TUKHACHEVSKY has repeatedly informed me that the work to disrupt artillery and engineering armaments is proceeding as planned, that is, it is proceeding along the path of quantitative underestimation of industrial orders along the line of disrupting the provision of the army with new models.

In November 1933, he told me that he, TUKHACHEVSKY, had a connection and an agreement with PYATAKOV on the issue of lowering our orders, with the need to delay the production of new artillery systems.

TUKHACHEVSKY said that he was strenuously seeking to push through the idea of a new structure for a rifle division of 7-8 thousand people, that the adoption of such a scheme would lead to a big organizational breakdown in the army for about a year or two, and that this was part of his calculations as the head of the military organization. As regards combat training in the army, TUKHACHEVSKY told me that a lot of fraud was developing, and especially in shooting training, which was led by a member of the organization VASILENKO.

TUKHACHEVSKY repeatedly stressed the need to have his own responsible person at the headquarters, through whom it would be possible to influence organizational work.

Question: What did TUKHACHEVSKY tell you about his connection with PYATAKO?

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Answer: In 1932 or early 1933 TUKHACHEVSKY told me that Pyatakov, with whom he is directly connected, is conducting subversive work in the field of industry, and that this connection is very secret. He immediately pointed out to me that his work in the field of armaments of the Red Army was in contact with the work of Pyatakov in the defense industry.

Question: Did TUKHACHEVSKY tell you about his direct connection with TROTSKY?

Answer: TUKHACHEVSKY told me back in 1932 that he had a connection with TROTSKY, from whom he received directives on work, but at that time he did not tell me the person through whom these directives were sent to him and information from him to TROTSKY. In 1934, in connection with the appointment of PUTNA as a military attaché to London, TUKHACHEVSKY said that he would keep in touch with TROTSKY through the PUGNA. In 1935, on one of PUTNA's visits to Moscow, TUKHACHEVSKY told me that PUTNA had brought a directive from TROTSKY (I can't say in writing or orally, he didn't tell me this) that the military organization should keep its

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connection with the civilian Trotskyist organization, that the military organization must continue to muster forces and deploy people and be ready for action, especially in the event of a war that is approaching.

Question: Tell us about your meetings and direct conversations with PRIMAKOV?

Answer: I must report that TUKHACHEVSKY sought to transfer PRIMAKOV from the North Caucasus Military District to Moscow, considering him an active person and that with his arrival the work would intensify. PRIMAKOV was transferred to Moscow in 1934 and was appointed deputy inspector for higher military educational institutions. Upon PRIMAKOV's arrival, in TUKHACHEVSKY'S office, there was a conversation between TUKHACHEVSKY, PRIMAKOV and myself, where we talked about PRIMAKOV's work, that he should focus on slowing down the pace of combat training at the Academy. Indeed, PRIMAKOV successfully carried out work in this field. There were several similar meetings with TUKHACHEVSKY and PRIMAKOV on organizational matters during 1934. During the meetings, PRIMAKOV informed how his work at the Academy was proceeding, that in connection with the revision of the program and the instructions he gave, there was great dissatisfaction with his work at the Academy. TUKHACHEVSKY informed about the work that is being done to reduce our military orders. I informed about my work in recruiting new people and placing Trotskyist cadres.

Question: Did you have a conversation with TUKHACHEVSKY about organizing a Trotskyist-Zinoviev center in connection with the trial?

Answer: When I learned about the participation of SCHMIDT and KUZMI CHEV in the uncovered organization, I was extremely surprised and excited by this circumstance, since, according to TUKHACHEVSKY, the connection between the military organization and the civilian one was maintained only by him, TUKHACHEVSKY, through PYATAKOV.

At the time I was on vacation. Upon arrival in Moscow, I learned additionally that PRIMAKOV, PUTN and ZYUK had been arrested, and I turned to TUKHACHEVSKY for an explanation of how these military men could be directly connected with a civilian organization, and how it happened. TUKHACHEVSKY answered that he himself was extremely astounded and dejected by this, but that he explained this as follows: that SCHMIDT and KUZMICHEV could be representatives of a civil Trotskyist organization directly involved in Ukraine, and ZYUKA, PRIMAKOV and PUTNA were identified as participants organizations according to the testimony of SCHMIDT and KUZMICHEV. TUKHACHEVSKY said that now, in connection with this, even greater secrecy was needed in order to preserve the existing military organization.

Question: Tell us about your conversation with TUKHACHEVSKY in connection with the trial of the parallel anti-Soviet Trotskyist center?

Answer: Shortly before our arrival, TUKHACHEVSKY told me that he was aware that TUROVSKY and PRIMAKOV were not confessing and that RADEK, as TUKHACHEVSKY put it, was cursing, and therefore we do not have to be especially worried about failure. During the period of the process of the parallel center, between me and TUKHACHEVSKY, in his office there was a conversation about what threatens this process to us and what we should do in the future. TUKHACHEVSKY was very depressed by the failure of PYATAKOV, expressed his fear that PYATAKOV or someone else would give a thread on the military organization, that in connection with this work should be temporarily suspended, waiting for the final clarification of the consequences of the process. TUKHACHEVSKY reassured himself that the question of military organization was not raised at the trial itself, although RADEK mentioned his name, but said nothing about his role.

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TUKHACHEVSKY told me that now is a very dangerous moment, that we must be especially careful and curtail ourselves temporarily.

Telling me about the behavior of those arrested during the investigation, TUKHACHEVSKY said that he was taking steps to alleviate TUROVSKY's situation and was seeking his rehabilitation.

Question: Since you, as head of the Command Directorate of the Red Army, knew about the recent arrests of members of the organization, did you talk to TUKHACHEVSKY about these arrests?

Answer: Yes. When TUKHACHEVSKY returned from vacation in March 1937, he had a conversation with me about Garkavy's arrest. I, in turn, informed him about the arrests of a number of other people. TUKHACHEVSKY told me that these arrests were a signal for our military organization, which the NKVD had begun to destroy, and told me that, since the possibility of arrests of other members of the organization was not ruled out, finding

those living in Moscow, it is necessary to keep the appropriate line during arrests and not to reveal all the cards and all the members of the organization.

The interrogation is interrupted.

The testimony was written down from my words correctly and read by me.

FELDMAN

Interrogated:

Head of the 5th department of the GUGB of the
NKVD of the USSR, Commissar of State Security of the 2nd rank LEPLEVSKY

Assistant to the head of the 5th department of the GUGB
NKVD, captain of state security USHAKOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 304. L. 74-88. Script. Typescript.

No. 80

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT CORRESPONDENT OF "PRAVDA" N.N. MAYORSKOM (26)

May 20, 1937

No. 57406

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

We are sending you the minutes of the interrogation of a member of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist organization, a former correspondent of Pravda in Paris, N.N. dated May 16 of this year.

MAYORSKY, in 1928, while on a scientific trip to Berlin, got in touch with the teacher of the International Lenin School, Trotskyite PAVLOV I. STALIN during the latter's report at the Institute of Red Professors.

MAYORSKY further testified that in 1931, while abroad, he contacted the Trotskyists Romm and Fritz David and received from the latter a visit in the USSR to LURIE Moses. On behalf of LURIER, MAYORSKY monitored the building of the People's Commissariat of Defense with the aim of preparing a terrorist act against comrade. VOROSHILOV.

In 1937 MAYORSKY, while in Paris, met with the French Trotskyite ZELLER, who was personally associated with Trotsky. From ZELLER MAYOR

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In April of this year, the SC received the task of preparing a terrorist act against comrade. STALIN.

MAYORSKY also testified that he was spying for Japan and Germany.

We continue the interrogation of MAYORSKY.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 304. L. 107-108. Script. Typescript.

* Published without protocol.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "Arch. St. "; "From comrade Yezhov."

No. 81

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE INTERROGATION PROTOCOL B.N. MELNIKOVA

May 21, 1937

No. 57432

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending the protocol of the interrogation of BN Melnikov, former head of the department of the Communications Service of the Comintern.

Melnikov has been a member of the CPSU(b) since 1916, in 1924 he was an active Trotskyist, which he hid from the party.

According to Melnikov, he was recruited by the Japanese in 1918 and since 1924 has been active in espionage work in favor of Japanese intelligence.

As a senior official of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Melnikov supplied Japanese intelligence with encrypted telegrams, secret materials on the fishing convention and Japanese concessions.

During his work as deputy head of the Intelligence Department of the Headquarters of the Red Army, Melnikov gave Japanese intelligence agents of the Intelligence Agency for Manchuria, China, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Iran.

During the investigation, it was established that Melnikov was recruited by A.L. Abramov-Mirov in 1933. (assisted by the head of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army) to work in favor of German intelligence.

I have given instructions to arrest Abramov.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR
General Commissar of State Security Ezhov

PROTOCOL OF
INTERROGATION of the arrested Melnikov Boris Nikolaevich

May 16-17, 1937

Born in 1895, a native of the Trans-Baikal region, a member of the CPSU (b) since 1916, from a family of employees, head of the Communications Service of the Comintern.

Question: When and under what circumstances were you first taken prisoner by the Japanese?

Answer: For the first time I was captured by the Japanese in October 1918 in the taiga, about 200 kilometers from the mountains. Zei of the Amur region. We retreated to the taiga after the defeat of the Red units in the Far East in the summer

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1918. At that time, I served as a senior adjutant of the Siberian High Command.

Question: Who was taken prisoner with you?

Answer: VELEZHEV Sergey Grigoryevich, now it seems that he is in Moscow; CLARK Pavel Ivanovich and his son Pavel. Where CLARK Paul (father) I do not know. CLARK Pavel (son) lives in Leningrad; FRID (Clark's son-in-law) died in October 1936 in Spain. MATVEEVA's two brothers, Nikolai and Evgeny, both live in Moscow; ERSHOV (died 1925); three workers, whose names I do not remember now, and my brother Vladimir MELNIKOV, who died in 1919 in a partisan detachment in Primorye.

Question: How long did you stay in captivity?

Answer: Two and a half months - from the end of October 1918 to the beginning of January 1919.

Question: Why were you released so soon?

Answer: After being taken prisoner, we were brought to the city of Zeya, and for some time we were kept at the headquarters of the regiment. Then we were sent to Khabarovsk to the headquarters of the division, where all of us, including me and MELNIKOV, were recruited.

Question: On what basis do you assert that the Japanese recruited all the rest of those taken prisoner with you?

Answer: We all sat together in the same room at the headquarters of the division, which was located in the former cadet corps. In the process of recruiting, we all shared among ourselves and decided, in order to be released from captivity, to agree to cooperate with the Japanese.

Question: Who recruited you?

Answer: I was recruited by the adjutant of the division headquarters YAMAZAKI. He also recruited everyone else.

Question: Did he take away your subscription?

Answer: Yes, I did.

Question: State the exact content of the subscription.

Answer: I don't remember the exact content of the subscription. The subscription was written in Japanese and translated into Russian for me. The meaning of the subscription was that I undertook to work in favor of the Japanese.

Question: With what name did you sign the subscription?

Answer: My real name, under which I was a prisoner of the Japanese. The rest did exactly the same.

Question: What tasks did you receive from YAMAZAKI?

Answer: Yamazaki gave me and my brother Vladimir the task to go to Vladivostok, contact the local illegal party organization and cover it. Yamazaki gave me this task because he knew that I was a communist and promised to establish contact with the Vladivostok party organization.

Question: What instruction did you receive from YAMAZAKI for the task assigned to you?

Answer: YAMAZAKI suggested that I not tell anyone about my stay in Japanese captivity, and after establishing contact with the Vladivostok party organization, go to the Japanese consul in Vladivostok and inform him that I had come from the adjutant of the YAMAZAKI division headquarters to receive instructions.

Question: What documents did YAMAZAKI provide you with?

Answer: I was issued a certificate from the division headquarters, which stated that all my documents were taken away by the division headquarters. In fact, I did not have any documents when I was taken prisoner, and this certificate

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was essentially fictitious. YAMAZAKI didn't give me any money. I had mine that weren't selected.

Question: How long did you arrive in Vladivostok and where did you live?

Answer: I stayed in Vladivostok for 6-10 days and all this time I lived at the station, sometimes in a rooming house.

Question: Have you contacted the party organization in Vladivostok?

Answer: No.

Question: Why?

Answer: I could not establish ties with the party organization and therefore tried to go to China, where I soon left.

Question: How did you go to China?

Answer: I went to China illegally on the steamer "Tver" with the help of sailors. He was in Chifu and Tsingtau, where he stayed for a short time, from where he went to Hankow to his uncle Dmitry Mikhailovich MELNIKOV, the manager

trading house Litvinov and K.

Question: When did you arrive in Hankou?

Answer: In February-March 1919, and when leaving the ship, I was detained by the police and released to the Russian consulate. I am correcting myself - I was not detained when leaving the steamer. Upon arrival in Hankow, I went to my uncle D.M. MELNIKOV.

Question: What did you do in Hankou?

Answer: After my uncle arranged me in a hotel the next day, he came to me and we decided to go with him to the Russian consul, where I had to repent of all my "sins" (meaning my Soviet work) and to On this basis, ask me to leave me in Hankow and not be sent to the territory occupied by the troops of Ataman Semenov. After a preliminary conversation between my uncle and the consul, we went to see him. At that time, I gave detailed testimony to the Consul about my Soviet activities and stated my request to him. A couple of days later I wrote a petition addressed to the consul. In the petition, he briefly indicated that until now I had been a Soviet leader, I was mistaken, that I was a young man, I love my homeland and can be useful to her. The petition ended with a request for me to stay in Hankow.

The uncle to whom I conveyed this petition promised to collect good testimonies from people who could give good testimonies about me, and also write in his own name.

Question: Were there persons in Hankow who knew you and could give positive feedback?

Answer: From the words of my uncle, I knew that there was a NAK VASINYK family in Hankow, which speaks positively of me.

Question: Who is NAKVASIN?

Answer: I studied with NAKVASIN at a real school in Troitsko-Savsk. When I was the chairman of the Trinity-Sava Council, the NAKVA SINYH family (Troitsko-Sava merchants) turned to me through one of their daughters with a request to issue permission to this family to travel to China. Which is what I did.

Question: To whom, besides the NAKVASINYH family, did you give permission to leave for China?

Answer: I gave many permits, including to a non-working element leaving abroad.

Question: You testified that in a petition addressed to the consul you wrote that you love your homeland and can be useful. What services were offered to you?

Answer: None.

Question: Did the consul himself ask you?

Answer: No.

Question: Did you receive a response to your request?

Answer: *Yes, about the 20th of March, my uncle came to my hotel and informed me that the ambassador had refused me and that it had been decided to send me under escort to the Vladivostok prison. The next day a Russian policeman came for me and took me to Shanghai where I was imprisoned. A few days later I was taken from Shanghai to Vladivostok and imprisoned*.

Question: How long did you spend in the Vladivostok prison?

Answer: 10 months - from April 1, 1919 to January 31, 1920.

Question: Were you interrogated?

Answer: No, like other political prisoners, I was not interrogated separately. There was no investigation or trial in my case. I must continue to sit until the "convening" of the constituent assembly.

Question: Why were you released?

Answer: I was released after the overthrow of Kolchak on January 31, 1920.

Question: What did you do after your release?

Answer: *After my release, I was appointed a member of the military council of Primorye and the Far East. In this position, I worked for the first period under the surname BRAGIN. I was a member of the military council until the Japanese action on April 4-5, 1920. At that time, I was among 60 people arrested by the Japanese*.

Question: Give the names of the persons arrested together with you.

Answer: *Of the members of the military council, LAZO and LUTSKII sat with me. We sat under different names. I am under the name of PEREVALOV, LAZO under the name of KOZLENKO, and LUTSKI under the name of LYCHKOV. In addition, the secretary of the regional committee of the party SIBIRTSEV, the commander of the armored car PETROV, the head of military control ANGARSKY, the chairman of the commission of inquiry POKHVALINSKY, ZON, who seems to be in Moscow now, SUCHAK (my personal driver) and others* were sitting.

Question: Were you interrogated?

Answer: No. When we were taken into custody, the Japanese transcribed our surnames and subsequently made daily roll calls. On the morning of April 8, LAZO, SIBIRTSEV, PETROV, and LUTSKII were summoned by their fictitious surnames and sent to no one knows where. As it later became known, they were all executed. All the rest, including myself, were sent to the barracks, where we sat until April 11, 1920, and was released.

Question: How do you explain that the leading officials LAZO, SIBIRTSEV, PETROV and LUTSKII, who were sitting with you, were executed, and you were released.

Answer: These persons, when interrogated by the Japanese, came forward as commanders and were apparently taken to the Japanese headquarters, where they were probably identified and executed. I personally did not come forward with them. He remained in the crowd of fighters and was not identified.

Question: Let's return to this question. Where did you go after your release?

Answer: After my release, I was sent by the Primorye Regional Committee to the Amur, where I was appointed commissar of the headquarters of the Amur Front, after which I was appointed commissar of the 2nd Amur Army and a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front. In February 1922, I was seconded to the Intelligence Department of Siberia, where the chief at that time was ZELZHIEV, who was with me in 1918 as a prisoner of the Japanese.

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Question: How did you get into the Siberian Intelligence Agency?

Answer: *With the arrival of BLYUKHER, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Eastern Front was disbanded, and I was first sent to Chita, from where, at the request of ZELDZHIEV, I was appointed deputy to him. I spent about 2 months at work in the Intelligence Agency in Siberia. After the reorganization of the Intelligence Department, I was sent to Moscow, where I worked as the Head of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army Headquarters. I stayed at this job from June 1922 to May 1923*.

Question: What work have you been doing for Japanese intelligence since your release from the Vladivostok prison?

Answer: Didn't do any work.

Question: This is absolutely incredible. You were recruited by the Japanese in 1918. During this period you worked in the Far East and in Moscow in the army and in the Intelligence Agency. Due to your position, you had information of interest to Japanese intelligence. Why do you deny working for Japanese intelligence during this period?

Answer: Since 1918 I have lost contact with the Japanese, I did not intend to restore it myself. They obviously lost me.

Question: Where did you work after you left the Intelligence Agency?

Answer: I was appointed in June 1923 as a resident of the Intelligence Agency in Harbin, where I was formally the secretary of the Soviet consulate.

Question: Have you established contact with Japanese intelligence?

Answer: Yes.

Question: How did this happen?

Answer: In May 1924, I unexpectedly met on the street in Harbin the former adjutant of the headquarters of the Japanese division YAMAZAKI, who recruited me

in 1918 in Khabarovsk. We got to know each other. YAMAZAKI suggested that I go to a restaurant and there he reminded me of my subscription and offered to work for Japanese intelligence. I agreed. YAMAZAKI was then working as the head of Japanese intelligence in Harbin and served in the Japanese military mission.

Question: YAMAZAKI was interested in your work in the six years since he recruited you in Khabarovsk?

Answer: *Yes, I was interested. YAMAZAKI reproached me for not keeping in touch with Japanese intelligence all this time. He asked where I had been during this time and what I was doing. I told him that I left Vladivostok via Shanghai to Odessa, from where I went to the southern front. After demobilization from the Red Army, I entered the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and from there was sent to Harbin as a consultant secretary. I did not say anything about my work on the line of the YAMAZAKI Intelligence Department*.

Question: What information did YAMAZAKI require from you?

Answer: YAMAZAKI demanded from me information about the personnel of the consulate with the characteristics of employees, in particular, he was interested in who are residents of the GPU and the Intelligence Department; asked to obtain consular codes, encrypted and secret correspondence, information about our policy on the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and lists of people leaving for Soviet Russia.

Question: What information did you give to YAMAZAKI?

Answer: I could not get the ciphers of the consulate, since they were kept by the cryptographer, and I had no access to them. I gave him about twenty ciphered telegrams, mostly of a directive nature. I stole these telegrams from the cryptographer, copied them out, then retyped them on a typewriter and handed them over to YAMAZAKI in this form. *I also transmitted copies of secret correspondence that passed through me as secretary of the consulate. I gave him a list of consular personnel with characteristics, and also

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handed over lists of people leaving for Soviet Russia. I pointed out to him the resident of the GPU ANGARSKY and the representative of the Intelligence Directorate SALSHIN, who was parallel with me. I also told him that the second resident of the Intelligence Agency was ZASLAVSKY, concealing from him that ZASLAVSKY left Harbin a year ago. I gave him information related to the preparation of the Peking Agreement on the CER*.

Question: How did you keep in touch with YAMAZAKI?

Answer: I kept in touch with YAMAZAKI only personally. We met in a separate office in a restaurant on the second line near the diagonal street in Bent's house. Everyone is glad we agreed on the next meeting. There were 7 or 8 meetings in total during this period.

Question: Under what nickname did you work during this period?

Answer: Under the nickname "Alexey".

Question: What remuneration did you receive from YAMAZAKI for the transmitted information?

Answer: I did not receive a reward.

Question: What did you do after your arrival in Moscow?

Answer: Upon my arrival in Moscow in June 1924, I was appointed head of the Far East Department of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. When I took office at the first meeting with the Japanese charge d'affaires SATO, he did not say that he had information about my work for Japanese intelligence and that he asked me to continue this work here in Moscow.

Question: Where did you meet SATO?

Answer: The first time I met SATO was at the Japanese embassy, in front of my official client. This time SATO did not give me specific tasks.

Question: When and what tasks did he give you?

Answer: On the second day after our first meeting, SATO came to me at the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on a return visit. This time he told me that communication with him should be maintained through Maria Mikhailovna YANKOVSKAYA, who was an assistant at the Far East Department of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs for Japan. I agreed with SATO that I would pass all the information through YANKOVSKAYA orally. At this meeting, SATO invited me to give information concerning the issue of concluding a fishing convention, obtaining concessions by the Japanese in the Far East, and on current issues of a diplomatic nature.

Question: How did you contact YANKOVSKAYA?

Answer: Shortly after this meeting with SATO, YANKOVSKAYA came into my office after my confirmation that I had SATO, and said that she would be a link. My further meetings with YANKOVSKAYA also took place in my office.

Question: Did you have any other meetings with SATO?

Answer: Yes, they were. During his stay in Moscow for a year, I met him about 10 times. During these meetings, I informed him on issues of interest and received assignments from him. These meetings took place mainly in my office, and sometimes at the embassy during official visits.

Question: What information did you pass on to SATO?

Answer: *3and all the time I was in contact with SATO, both personally and through YANKOVSKAYA, I transmitted the following information: the limit of concessions by the Soviet side on the fishing convention, the same with regard to the Japanese concession on Sakhalin and the content of a rather large number of encrypted telegrams on issues of the current diplomatic work*.

Question: What other services did you render to the Japanese, besides passing on information?

Answer: On the orders of the SATO, using the fact that I was involved in consultations on the issues of the fishing convention and the Japanese concession, I tried to promote points of view and positions favorable to the Japanese.

Question: What was the SATO information transmission technique?

Answer: During personal meetings I gave him only verbal information. Through YANKOVSKAYA, I transmitted information as follows: I made stocks of materials that were of interest to the Japanese, handed them over to YANKOVSKAYA, and she either informed me verbally from these notes, or gave them to read and returned them to me. In one case, she handed over material written by my hand. On this occasion, I expressed my displeasure to her. From the words of YANKOVSKAYA, I know that she transmitted information not only to SATO, but also to MIAZAKI (Secretary of the Japanese Embassy). YANKOVSKAYA met MIAZAKI in her office and at the Japanese embassy.

Question: During the period from 1924 to 1928, did you keep in touch with Japanese intelligence only through YANKOVSKAYA?

Answer: No. Through Yankovskaya, I kept in touch with Japanese intelligence until about 1926. By this time, the Japanese ambassador TANAKA had arrived in Moscow, who replaced SATO in connection with my connection with Japanese intelligence. At one of my meetings with TANAKA, I informed him that the GPU suspected YANKOVSKAYA of having connections with the Japanese. On this basis, we agreed that YANKOVSKAYA would be replaced. I became aware of the suspicions of the GPU in relation to YANKOVSKAYA from a conversation with TUBALO (head of the department of the KRO OPTU). TUBALO told me that YANKOVSKAYA was suspicious because she received gifts from the secretary of the Japanese embassy, MIAZAKI.

Question: Who replaced **YANKOVSKAYA**?

Answer: After some time, TANAKA told me that communication should be maintained through ASKOV, who was then working as an assistant to the Far East Department for Japan.

Question: How did you establish contact with **ASKOV**?

Answer: A few days later, ASKOV told me that, at TANAKA's suggestion, he would act as a liaison between me and Japanese intelligence.

Question: What information did you pass on to Japanese intelligence through ASKOV and TANAKA personally?

Answer: Through ASKOV I continued to give information on the same issues as through YANKOVSKAYA. In addition, during this period I gave information on China. In particular, I gave information about which of our commanders and under what name worked as advisers in the Chinese army. I gave information about the policy of the Soviet government in China.

Question: When were you appointed Consul General in Harbin?

Answer: In October 1928.

Question: Upon your arrival in Harbin, did you establish contact with Japanese intelligence?

Answer: Yes, upon arrival in Harbin, at the very first meeting with the Harbin (Japanese) consul (I don't remember his last name, but I know for sure that he is now the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo from the Japanese), he told me that he knew about my intelligence work and asks her to continue. At the same time, he offered me Yakovlev, an interpreter from the consulate, as a signalman.

Question: What information did you transmit through YAKOVLEV?

Answer: Through YAKOVLEV, I transmitted the content of most of the main cipher telegrams, both coming from Moscow and sent there. Mean

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A large number of these telegrams dealt with the policy on the Chinese Eastern Railway, and was associated with the growing conflict with the Chinese.

Question: Where were you during the conflict on the CER?

Answer: I was leaving together with the entire staff of the consulate for the USSR. Initially, I stayed for a month and a half in Chita, then went to Moscow and to the south on vacation, after which, after the elimination of the conflict, I left for Harbin.

Question: Have you renewed contact with the Japanese?

Answer: Yes, but the connection was already maintained not through "YAKOVLEV**", but through Vice-Consul Nikolai ORLOV, who was also recommended to me by the Japanese Consul.

Question: Why was YAKOVLEV replaced by ORLOV?

Answer: Because over the past year I have convinced Yakovlev that he is not a reliable person, since he often drank and disappeared from home for several days.

Question: How long did you use the services of ORLOV?

Answer: Until I left Harbin for Tokyo.

Question: In connection with what did you go to Tokyo?

Answer: In June 1931 I went to Tokyo to fill in for Plenipotentiary Troyanovsky, who was going on vacation.

Question: How long did you stay in Tokyo?

Answer: I stayed in Tokyo for six months, and after Troyanovsky's return I left for Moscow.

Question: Did you have contact with Japanese intelligence during this time?

Answer: Yes. Upon arrival in Tokyo, at a meeting with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose name I do not remember now, he told me that he knew about my intelligence work in favor of the Japanese and asked me to continue

live her. As a signalman, he offered me an interpreter of the Embassy ** KLETNOY **. During the period of my stay in Tokyo, I transmitted secret information of a diplomatic nature through KLETNOY.

Question: To whom did KLETNY pass on this information?

Answer: I don't know.

Question: Where did you work after returning to Moscow?

Answer: Upon my arrival in Moscow at the beginning of 1932, I was appointed deputy head of the Intelligence Department of the Red Army Headquarters. Approximately a month or a month and a half after I assumed this position, ASKOV came to me and said that he would be the liaison between me and Japanese intelligence. In addition, he told me that he would conduct independent intelligence work in favor of the Japanese and asked me to arrange a job with the Intelligence Department, in the eastern sector.

Question: Did you arrange it?

Answer: Yes. At my suggestion, he was appointed head of the Eastern Sector of the Intelligence Agency.

Question: Give detailed testimony - what information was transmitted by you and ASKOV during your work in the Intelligence Agency?

Answer: I transmitted the following information through ASKOVA: data on agents in Manchuria, China, Italy, Germany, Czechoslovakia and America. They indicated: nicknames of agents, passwords, time and place of meetings, place of work and characteristics of agents. As agreed with me, ASKOV informed the Japanese intelligence about the resident of the Shanghai Intelligence Agency "Rambek", who was subsequently appointed a resident in Japan. ASKOV promptly informed Japanese intelligence about his move to Japan. Due to the absence of agents in Japan at that time, other information on Japan was not transmitted.

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During the passage of the Chinese units to our territory in 1932, we gave information known to the Intelligence Agency about these units and about the places of their internment. In the autumn of 1932, when I was replacing the head of the Intelligence Agency BERZIN, I handed over to Japanese intelligence a number of projects of the Red Army headquarters on the personnel of the headquarters. I also transmitted information about the personnel of the central apparatus of the Intelligence Agency.

Question: What was the technique of transmitting this information to Japanese intelligence?

Answer: ASKOV maintained direct contact with Japanese intelligence. He made notes of all the information I have listed and reported them orally to the Japanese.

Question: With whom personally from the representatives of Japanese intelligence did

zan ASKOV?

Answer: I don't know.

Question: Did you ask ASKOVA about this?

Answer: No.

Question: Why?

Answer: I was not interested in the question of which of the representatives of Japanese intelligence was personally connected with ASKOV.

Question: Did you ask ASKOV where and how he met with a representative of Japanese intelligence and whether the conspiracy was secured?

Answer: Yes, I was interested. ASKOV assured me that the secrecy was fully ensured, and I could not be worried. Knowing ASKOVA, as an experienced intelligence officer, I believed him in this regard.

Question: With whom else besides you was ASKOV involved in espionage work?

Answer: I know of only two persons: "" DAVYDOV** Vasily Vasilyevich and ** KLIMOV ** Anatoly Yakovlevich.

Question: In connection with what did you become aware of this?

Answer: When at the beginning of 1933 I was informed by ASKOV that Japanese intelligence was demanding information about agents for European residencies, I expressed doubt to him whether the employees of the apparatus would not be suspicious of the fact that I was demanding this information. To this ASKOV replied that he only wanted to agree with me and that he would receive this information from VV DA VYDOV, with whom he was connected in espionage work.

I learned about Klimov from ASKOV under the following circumstances: at the beginning of 1933, ASKOV told me that it was expedient for him to move to the European sector (he was in charge of the Eastern sector). When I asked how, in this case, work would be provided for the Japanese in the eastern sector, ASKOV answered me that Klimov, who was also a Japanese intelligence officer, should be sent to the eastern sector. This permutation was carried out by me.

The answers to the questions put to me are written down from my words correctly and read by me: MELNIKOV.

Interrogated:

pom. early III department of the GUGB of the NKVD of the USSR, major of state security APRESYAN

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 58. D. 250. L. 183-184, 187-203. Script. Typescript.

On the first sheet there are handwritten notes: "Questions to Yezhov. St.", "From comrade Yezhov." underlined in the *—* margins with a single line.

— The surname is circled and there is a mark "YV" in the margin.

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No. 82

SPECIAL MESSAGE N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT TROTSKISTS EXCLUDED FROM THE CPSU(b) AND
THE RIGHTS LIVING IN MOSCOW

May 22, 1937

No. 57354

Top secret Urgent

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

According to our preliminary data, the following people live in Moscow:

More than 4,000 people expelled at various times from the CPSU(b) for participation in Trotskyist-Zinoviev activities or for participation in other anti-Soviet organizations.

2,500 families of persons repressed for active Trotskyist-Zinovievist, terrorist, espionage activities.

Among these contingents there are more than 300 former high-ranking officials of the Soviet Party, economic and trade union apparatus, who, having retained their connections, can inspire the work of anti-Soviet elements against the Party.

In a number of sectors of the national economy, educational and cultural institutions, there is a budding of a significant number of Trotskyists, Zinovievites expelled from the CPSU (b) (military industry - 229, metallurgy - 138, educational and cultural institutions - 408 people, etc.).

In addition, there is a continuous influx from other cities and settling in Moscow of a large number of persons of these categories.

Of the 4,000 Trotskyists and Zinovievites living in Moscow, about 1,150 people do not have a specific occupation. All these personnel, especially in the conditions of Moscow and other capital cities of the Union, undoubtedly, are the base for the work of forces hostile to us.

In this regard, I consider it necessary to carry out special measures in relation to Moscow, Leningrad and Kyiv, which are set out in the attached draft resolution, which I ask you to discuss and adopt.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 305. L. 56-57. Script. Typescript.

The draft resolution is not published.

No. 83

N.I. EZHOV'S SPECIAL COMMUNICATION TO
I.V. STALIN WITH A COPY OF G.A. LUPEKIN AND THE
PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION G.G. KAUFMAN

May 23, 1937

No. 57495

Secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending you a copy of the telegram from the head of the UNKVD for the East Siberian region, LUPEKIN.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

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Secret

Series "K"

TO THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS comrade Yezhov

I am sending you a copy of the testimony of German agent German Germanovich KAUFMAN, a member of the fascist organization arrested by us, dated 9.

V. s.g. The latter claims that the German resident, one of the leaders of the fascist organization ZOOMERFELD, spoke to him about his connection with the Trotskyist organization in Eastern Siberia through LITVIN, a lecturer at the Financial Institute in Irkutsk, and that the latter, according to k.r. activities was associated with the secretary of the regional committee for Eastern Siberia RAZUMOV.

ZOOMERFELD and LITVIN are arrested: the first as a member of a Trotskyist organization, the second as a member of a fascist organization. We are working on both with the necessary care.

Minutes of interrogation of KAUFMAN about his cr. activities and serious work of the fascist organization was sent to you on May 8 of this year. No. 68059.

Head of the UNKVD for VSO.

Senior Major of State Security LUPEKIN

PROTOCOL OF
INTERROGATION * of the accused Kaufman German
Germanovich dated May 9, 1937

Kaufman German Germanovich, born in 1905, native of Kuplongon, German, gr. USSR, the son of the owner of a shoe shop, a mechanical engineer by profession. He was a member of the KKE from 1930 until his arrest, he worked as a mechanical engineer at the plant. Kuibyshev.

Question: At the interrogation on 29 GV. With. You testified that one of the leaders of your fascist organization, an illegal resident of the German intelligence ZOOMERFELD Otto, established contact in the city of Irkutsk with the Trotskyist organization through the teacher of the financial institute LITVIN. Do you confirm the question?

Answer: Yes, I do. One of the leaders of the fascist organization, of which I, KAUFMANN, was a member until the day of my arrest, an illegal resident of the German intelligence ZOOMERFELD Otto in the spring of 1935 informed me that he had established contact with the Trotskyite communist party existing in Eastern Siberia. organization through the teacher of the financial institute of Irkutsk LITVIN

Question: Did ZOOMERFELD name other participants of the c.r. Trotskyist organization besides LITVIN?

Answer: ZOOMERFELD as persons who took part in the work of the Trotskyist K.R. organizations were known: LITVIN's wife, LITVIN's 3 brothers and a number of other persons with whom ZOOMERFELD met at LITVIN's apartment. The names of the persons that ZOOMERFELD called me, I do not remember.

Question: Try to remember.

Answer: I remember that ZOOMERFELD told me that LITVIN was in touch with RAZUMOV, the secretary of the East Siberian Regional Committee of the CPSU(b), and that he was aware of LITVIN's belonging to the Trotskyist organization and his connection with the fascist organization.

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Question: Do you remember well that ZOOMERFELD named RAZUMOV to you as a person connected with LITVIN and aware of the latter's counter-revolutionary activities?

Answer: Yes, I remember well that ZOOMERFELD named RAZUMOV as a person who was aware of belonging to the c.r. Trotskyist organization of LITVIN and his connections with the fascist organization. In addition, ZOOMERFELD said that LITVIN visited RAZUMOV and advised him on various economic issues...

Question: What else do you know about the connections of your fascist organization with the Trotskyists?

Answer: As I have shown before, our fascist organization in Siberia is part of the "National Socialist Party" in the USSR, directed by the German intelligence agencies through the German embassy.

in Moscow. The establishment of a connection between our fascist organization in Eastern Siberia and the Trotskyist organization was no exception, that the same connection of individual groups of our "National Socialist Party" with Trotskyist formations, the use of them by German intelligence, was practiced wherever our fascist organizations and, in turn, the Trotskyist underground existed.

Interrogated:

Beginning UNKVD for
VSO senior major of state security LUPEKIN

Pom. early UNKVD for VSO
State Security Captain YUZHNY

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 305. L. 24-31. Copy. Typescript.

On the first page there is Stalin's handwritten note: "Interesting. About Razumov. 'The protocol of interrogation is published partially.

No. 84

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
ABOUT THE PARTICIPANT OF THE TROTSKIST
ORGANIZATION A.I. BEREZINA

May 23, 1937

No. 57498

Top secret

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending the protocol of interrogation * of the arrested person in the city. Rostov-on-Don, a member of the Trotskyist terrorist organization, former head. ORPO of the Azov-Chernomorsky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks BEREZINA A.I.

BEREZIN testified that he was recruited into the Trotskyist terrorist organization back in Saratov in 1930.

Upon arrival in Rostov, BEREZIN contacted the Trotskyite EROFITSKY, known to him from Saratov, and through him with GOGOBERIDZE.

Particularly noteworthy is the testimony of BEREZIN that after the decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the Azov-Chernomorsky Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks of January 2, 1937, the remaining unexposed members of the organization are the former second secretary of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, now head of the KrayZU MALINOV, former secretary of the North-Don District Committee of the CPSU (b), now head. the agricultural department of the regional committee of the CPSU (b) LUKIN, he, BEREZIN, and others conspired

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continue counter-revolutionary work, deciding to restore the underground Trotskyist organization, and prepare a terrorist act against comrade. STALIN in Sochi in 1937.

Of the members of the Trotskyist organization in the mountains. In Rostov-on-Don, BEREZIN named the deputy head of the regional art department DVO LAYTSKY, the head of the cultural education department of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks GLABATs KHOGO, the former deputy chairman of the regional executive committee of AROTSKER and the head of the Soviet trade department of the regional committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks MURAVKIN.

According to BEREZIN, KOLOTILIN committed suicide at the direct suggestion of a member of the Trotskyist terrorist organization, the former 2nd secretary of the Rostov city committee of the CPSU (b) LIVSHITS, after KOLOTILIN had warned him about his impending arrest.

We are preparing the members of the organization named BEREZIN for arrest.

I consider it necessary to arrest MALINOV and LUKIN.

I ask for your approval.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR N. Ezhov

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 305. L. 32-33. Script. Typescript.

The text contains handwritten notes: "T. Yezhov. It is necessary to arrest all those who have not yet been arrested from among those named in Berezin's testimony. I. St.

•Published without protocol.

No. 85

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"QUESTION OF THE NKVD" (27)

May 23, 1937

306 - Question of the NKVD.

1. All those expelled from the CPSU (b) for belonging to the Trotskyists, Zinovievites, rightists, Shlyapnikovites and other anti-Soviet formations from Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev are administratively evicted to non-industrial areas of the Union and attached to certain points for residence.

2. Apply the same measures to those expelled from the CPSU(b) for anti-Soviet manifestations (dragging hostile views in teaching and in the press).

3. In relation to the old cadre workers, the indigenous inhabitants of Moscow, Leningrad and Kyiv, involved in their time in the Trotskyist-Zinovievist

activities, but who did not actively show themselves - do not apply expulsion, but establish strict supervision over them.

4. All families of Trotskyists, Zinovievites, rightists, detists and members of other anti-Soviet terrorist and espionage organizations who were shot and sentenced to imprisonment for terms of 5 years or more - to be evicted from Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev to non-industrial regions of the Union with attached - Residency to certain places.

5. Oblige local authorities to assist in obtaining work for able-bodied members of the families of deportees and provide the latter housing.

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6. To accept for state support the families of deportees who do not have able-bodied members.

7. In order to prevent the re-entry into Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev of the deportees and their families, as well as to prevent the contingents specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 from settling in these cities - to allow the police in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev to stop the registration of all those subjected to these sanctions for a period exceeding 10 days.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 305. L. 55-55v. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol No. 49.

No. 86

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

Oh Ya.E. RUDZUGAKA AND M.N. TUKHACHEVSKY

May 24, 1937

309 - About Rudzutaki and Tukhachevsky.

Put the following proposal to the vote of the members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and candidates for membership in the Central Committee:

"The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks received information exposing member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Rudza Tak and candidate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Tukhachevsky of participation in the anti-Soviet Trotskyist-right conspiratorial bloc and espionage work against the USSR in favor of Nazi Germany. In this regard, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks puts to the vote of the members and candidates of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks a proposal to expel Rudzutak and Tukhachevsky from the party and transfer their case to the People's Commissar Vnudel.

RGASPI. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 987. L. 79. Original. Typescript.

Published: 3. Arsch GePy anb 01eg V. Liashpov. Te Koad io Teggog. R. 448.

Protocol No. 49.

No. 87

RESOLUTION OF THE PLENUM OF THE CC AUCP(b)

"ABOUT RUDZUTAK AND TUKHACHEVSKY"

May 25-26, 1937

5 - 0 Rudzutake and Tukhachevsky.

On the basis of data exposing a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Rudzutak and a candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Tukhachevsky in participation in the anti-Soviet Trotskyist-right conspiratorial bloc and espionage work against the USSR in favor of Nazi Germany, expel Rudzutak and Tukhachev from the party sky and transfer their cases to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs.

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 304. L. 112. Copy. Typescript.

Protocol number 10.

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No. 88

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE STATEMENT OF A.G. BELOBORODOVA

May 26, 1937

No. 57531

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending a copy of the statement of the arrested Beloborodov A. dated 23.V-37.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR General
Commissar of State Security Ezhov

Owls. secret

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, General
Commissar of State Security Comrade. Ezhov

I am sending you Beloborodov's statement dated May 23 of this year.

Beginning UNKVD for the Azov-Chernomorsky
Territory Commissar of State Security 3rd rank LYUSHKOV

Investigator of the UNKVD of the Azov-Chernomorsky Territory
STATEMENT

I consider it necessary to report two circumstances that were not reflected in my previous testimony.

The FIRST concerns TROTSKY's statements in December 1927 and early January 1928 regarding the formation of future new Trotskyist groupings in the party. When the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc had been defeated by the end of 1927, and its defeat had already become absolutely indisputable by the time of the Fifteenth Party Congress, especially after the congress, TROTSKY began to gradually draw up a forecast about the turn and forms of Trotskyist activity in the more or less near future. This forecast, in general terms, as follows from TROTSKY's conversations with me (and, of course, with other persons around him), is as follows:

social changes in the country will continue, which, of course, will put pressure on the party ranks and thereby create the preconditions for an anti-party struggle and for attracting new supporters to Trotskyism, as well as to other anti-party factions;

the struggle against the party leadership, although it will continue to be waged politically, on the basis of the former main factions (Trotskyists, Zinovievites, etc.), but with enormous changes in form. These changes in form will be brought about by the new phase of the party regime that has begun after the Fifteenth Congress, when a more or less open consolidation of the activities of anti-party groups: speeches, statements, platforms, almost open recruitment of supporters is no longer possible;

changes in the form of activity will affect both the former Trotskyist cadres, and especially the supporters who rejoin him: separate groups of them will be extremely fragmented and will be formed most of all according to "professional" signs (the military are grouped with the military, writers with writers, People's Commissariat of Finance with the People's Commissariat of Finance, etc.) and then

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this folding will go mainly around individuals who are more or less prominent in their role in this or that branch of work or in a given locality.

TROTSKY believed that such fragmentation of groupings and the secrecy necessary under the new conditions would inevitably weaken somewhat Trotskyist activity and would hinder mutual ties between Trotskyists. Proceeding from this, TROTSKY was opposed to the political curtailment of Trotskyism, in order to provide a political "crystallization axis" for orienting the emerging separate groups and in order to maintain the former ones, it was necessary, in his opinion, to preserve Trotskyism as a political trend. At the next wide turn of events, individual groups that have re-emerged during the period of dominance of the above new forms of activity

they would inevitably unite immediately, and this time already openly around the main Trotskyist cadres.

As this forecast was being made, TROTSKY was figuring out around what kind of persons Trotskyist groups would be created from new supporters, i.e. from people who, although they have not yet taken an open part in the struggle against the party leadership on the side of the Trotskyists, are known to TROTSKY from their statements, conversations with them, moods, etc. At the same time, not only those persons who would lead the groupings in the future were named, but also those who would join the groups if there was a suitable "group leader" near them. The following were named as future "group leaders": EIDEMAN (if I am not mistaken, he was then the head or deputy head of the military academy), DYBENKO, YAKIR. In connection with the same question about future new groupings in the military environment, the names were called - KORKA and KUIBYSHEV (military), but I do not presume now to say what role they were assigned in this.

Among the Soviet and party workers there were the names of KERZHENTSEV, SOLOMINA (apparently from the Komsomol), SENTSOVA, KRIVOVA (Central Control Commission) and MIFA (Sinologist, ECCI). The surname of some KVIATKOVSKY was also mentioned, but I do not know to what military or civilian milieu he belongs.

The SECOND relates to a later period, to 1932, and concerns the stakes of the counter-revolutionary bloc on a split in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In my previous testimony, I have already said that in the summer of 1932 in Rostov, shortly after my acquaintance with A. SLEPKOV, who came to Rostov on behalf of the center of the right to strengthen the activities of the right group in the North Caucasus region and to establish contact between the Rights and us Trotskyists, he outlined to me the platform of the counter-revolutionary bloc (Trotskyists, Rights, Zinovievites, "leftists") for the restoration of capitalism in the USSR and the strategic plan for the bloc to seize power. This plan was based on the intensification of the kulak sabotage movement and, in general, the growth of the anti-Soviet movement in the country. In the sequential turn of events, as it was pictured at that time by the authors of this plan, the anti-Soviet movement was supposed to lead to a split in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks.

It was expected that kulak sabotage would develop into more acute forms, mass anti-Soviet demonstrations and armed uprisings, for which the members of the bloc were preparing and trying to provoke their activities. The anti-Soviet movement in the countryside was supposed to spread to industrial centers and the capital, which was also worked on by all the groups mentioned above. This growth of the anti-Soviet movement in the countryside was supposed to

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According to Slepko, lead to a split in the Central Committee, and a split in the Central Committee would greatly facilitate the c.r. bloc seizing power.

The immediate reason for the split was to be a statement addressed to the Plenum of the Central Committee from a group of "leftists" (LOMINADZE, SHATSKIN). "Leftists" will act as skirmishers as the least compromised

lytic flow. The statement of the "leftists" should have contained indications of the supposedly wrong policy of the party leadership, which led to acute discontent in the country. *The declaration was to contain a demand for a transition to a moderate, gradual policy in the field of industrialization and in the reconstruction of agriculture (kolkhozes, sovkhozes). Along with this, the statement was to contain a sharp criticism of the party regime*. A rie of this whole speech should have been directed personally against I.V. Stalin with a proposal to remove him from the leadership of the par-

ti.

This statement would later be joined by members of the Central Committee, members of other counter-revolutionary groups.

The leaders of the counter-revolutionary bloc counted on joining this action against the party leadership by a number of prominent party and Soviet workers. Such affiliation was to be formalized either by direct affiliation to the statement of the "leftists" or by submitting a separate document to the Plenum of the Central Committee. All these statements were supposed to serve as the initial stage of a split, which would then inevitably take on sharper forms. Enumerating those whose joining against the party leadership was counted on by the leaders of the c.-r. Block SLEPKOV gave me the names of the following persons, among whom were members of the Central Committee: *KHATAEVICH, RAZUMOV, EIKHE, LUBIMOV (People's Commissariat for Light Industry), KOLMANOVICH, BRUKHANOV, LOMOV*.

According to SLEPKOV, the calculation for the inclusion of the listed workers was based on their moods of well-known participants in the c.-r. groupings.

I saw a partial confirmation of this in the story of TER-VAGANYAN, who told me during one of my meetings with him in Moscow in the spring of 1932 in some statement or letter of KHATAEVICH addressed to the Central Committee of the party. This statement or letter of KHATAEVICH, which, according to TER-VAGANYAN, was very politically symptomatic for the mood of KHATAEVICH, contained criticism of certain economic measures.

The hopes for joining this action against the party leadership were not limited, as SLEPKOV said, only to hope for the seven people listed above. This was only the first group, after which other party and Soviet workers were expected to perform.

A. BELOBORODOV

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 305. L. 104-111. Copy. Typescript.

* On the first sheet there is a handwritten note: "Ezhov. One might think that for Beloborodov a prison is a tribune for delivering speeches - statements concerning all sorts of persons, but not himself. Isn't it time to press this gentleman and force him to tell about his dirty deeds? Where is he in jail or hotel? I. St.

— Crossed out in the margins with a single line.

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No. 89

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION N.I. Ezhova I.V. TO STALIN
WITH THE APPENDIX OF THE PROTOCOL OF INTERROGATION S.V. Puzitsky

May 29, 1937

No. 57478

Sov. secret Only in
person

Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks Comrade. STALIN

I am sending the first protocol of interrogation of Puzitsky S.V. - the former head of the Dmitrovsky camp of the NKVD on April 29 of this year.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Ezhov

PROTOCOL OF
INTERROGATION Puzitsky S.V. dated April 29 this year

Puzitsky Sergei Vasilievich, born in 1895, a native of Lomza (Poland), son of the director of the 2nd Moscow Gymnasium, Russian, nobleman, graduated from the law faculty of Moscow University, member of the CPSU (b) from 1921. Until the day of his arrest, from 1918 to 1921 investigator of the Tribunal, since 1921 in the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU.

Question: You have filed a statement that you will give truthful testimony to the investigation about your anti-Soviet activities and about your participation in the conspiracy to which Yagoda has involved you.

Tell me, when and under what circumstances were you involved in the conspiracy?

Answer: In the middle of 1935, after leaving the Intelligence Agency, I was summoned by YAGODA to his office. YAGODA immediately attacked me with abuse, pointing out that I was engaged in unrestrained drunkenness, did not work at all and completely decomposed, that he was forced, in the end, to take drastic measures against me, even to the point that he would hand over to the court and will raise the question of my stay in the Party. I began to ask him not to do this, that I was ready to go to any job where he would indicate to me and ready to fulfill any of his instructions. Yagoda then moved on to somewhat different topics, began to tell me that a very difficult situation had arisen in the country, blaming the leadership of the Party and the government for this. Continuing in the same spirit, YAGODA gradually moved to the conclusion that much in the Soviet system would need to be changed, that life would then flow much better, and so on. When I asked him what exactly he meant by the words "need to change", he asked me, in turn, a counter question, whether I would agree to carry out the instructions that he would give me, aimed at changing the existing state of affairs. I immediately and willingly agreed. YAGODA then told me that there was a counter-revolutionary conspiracy directed against the current leadership of the party and the government, that this conspiracy was headed by

It appears to be right that a number of leading party and government officials are taking part in it, and that he himself is an active participant in this conspiracy. The main purpose of this conspiracy, as YAGODA told me, is to change the leadership of the party and the government by any means. To my question, what means are we talking about, YAGODA said that in the case

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necessary, the most extreme means will be used against the leaders, up to the use of terror. Developing this idea, he said that it can be said with certainty that a counter-revolutionary organization, in order to come to power, will have to resort to these extreme means, i.e. to the use of terrorist acts.

Question: What did YAGODA tell you about the participants in the conspiracy?

Answer: YAGODA did not give me names, noting only, as I have already indicated, that the largest and most prominent workers of the Party and government are taking part in it, and that a number of NKVD workers are involved in the conspiracy. Of the NKVD workers involved in the conspiracy, he named PROKOFIEV, BULANOV, VOLOVITCH, GAI and FIRIN.

Question: What tasks were set by Yagoda for you as a participant in the conspiracy?

Answer: YAGODA gave me the task of selecting reliable groups of people with fighting qualities, as he put it, who could carry out any of his tasks during the construction of the canal.

Question: What tasks were discussed?

Answer: In one of the subsequent conversations, Yagoda told me that in order to fulfill the tasks of the organization, i.e. the use of terrorist acts, it is necessary to select groups of terrorist militants who would be unquestioningly loyal to me and who would be ready to commit terrorist acts at any moment.

Question: What did you do in fulfillment of the task you received from YAGODA?

Answer: I became close friends with workers in the 3rd department, KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV, and gradually cultivated them for use in the interests of the conspiracy. I told Yagoda about this during a personal conversation with him in the spring of 1936.

Question: You are showing a lie. Answer directly the question, whom did you involve to carry out the task you received from Yagoda?

Answer: I completed the task only in terms of processing and approaching myself KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV.

Question: The investigation knows that you not only worked on Kshanov

CHA and KOROTKOVA, but directly initiated them into the essence of the conspiracy and together with them created groups of persons in the Dmitrovsky camp to carry out the terrorist tasks of Yagoda. We warn you that some of these persons are known to us and that your further denials will lead nowhere.

Answer: I really tried to soften the testimony in this part. I promise the investigation that I will continue to give only truthful testimony. I actually recruited KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV as members of a counter-revolutionary organization. I did this for the following reasons. YAGODA, when he gave me assignments about recruiting people to recruit into terrorist groups, indicated that I should first of all try to select people who had compromised themselves in some way so that I could keep them in my hands.

I knew about Krzanowicz that he was a morally corrupt person, he had some business when he worked as an assistant. early 00 of the Baltic Fleet, he was offended, he believed that he was bypassed, that he was given a small job, etc. In addition, I had materials that KSHANOVICH, already in the camp, committed a number of crimes, expressed in the fact that he had sexual intercourse with imprisoned women. About this, both me and FIRIN received a number of oral and written statements.

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I kept all these materials with me and used them for the gradual processing of KSHANOVICH and for recruiting him into my group. Once, after one of the next drunkenness, I called him to my place and in a sharp form put before him the question that he had received serious materials about his crimes committed by him in the camp, that I and Yagoda knew about the rape by him female prisoners. I told KSHANOVICH that the issue of him was now extremely acute, that all this could end up in court for him, that if his crimes were taken into account in the 00th Baltic Fleet, he would be tried and shot. At the same time, I told KSHANOVICH that everything depended only on YAGODA, that his whole life was in the hands of YAGODA. KSHANOVICH was terribly frightened and began to beg me to save him from trial. I realized that Krzanowicz was entirely in my hands.

I reported in detail about KSHANOVICH to YAGODA. At my next report, I told him that I had collected a lot of material on KSHANOVITCH and that I considered it possible to work on KSHANOVITCH. IAGODA approved this. Upon my arrival in Dmitrov, I summoned KSHANOVICH to my place and told him that I had been forced to report on compromising material on him to YAGODA and that YAGODA had promised to cover up this case and not accept any reprisals against him. KSHANOVICH was terribly happy about this, he told me that he would follow the BERRY into fire and water, that he would carry out any of my orders.

I recruited KOROTKOV in the same way as I recruited KSHANOVICH. KOROTKOV, KSHANOVITCH's closest friend. He was expelled from the Special Department of the Baltic Fleet as compromised and transferred to work in Dmitlag. He was a morally decomposed type, got drunk in the camp, committed a number of crimes. I had a special conversation with KOROTKOV about his crimes, just as I had with KSHA NOVICH, choosing the appropriate moment for this.

I warned Korotkov that I had at my disposal compromising material on him, that the question was about his arrest and bringing him to trial, that Yagoda knew everything. Korotkov asked me to help him and intercede with Yagoda for him. I promised him this. A few days later I told Korotkov that it was only thanks to YAGODA that I managed to save him, and he owes everything to YAGODA. Thus, Korotkov was completely in my hands.

Approximately in August 1936, after a series of conversations with KSHANO HIV and KOROTKOV, I was finally convinced that they could be directly involved in the conspiracy and used to carry out terrorist tasks. YAGODA first questioned me again in detail about these persons, and agreed to their direct recruitment. A few days later I had a special conversation in my office, first with KSHANOVICH, and then a day or two later with KOROTKOV. In my conversation, both with one and the other, I sharply emphasized that it was only thanks to YAGODA that they were saved and working on the channel, that the attention of YAGODA, rendered to them through me, gives them a guarantee for the future and prospects for a good life. Then I went on to a political conversation with each of them, saying that the situation in the country is now extremely acute, that the leadership of the party and government has gone bankrupt and should be swept away, that a coup is possible in the near future, thanks to which the right will come to power. Seeing that both of them directly and sharply expressed anti-Soviet sentiments, I immediately told them that big people from our KGB environment would take an active part in the upcoming coup and put the question before them: do they also agree to take part in decisive actions when needed.

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Question: What tasks did you set for KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV?

Answer: After I recruited KSHANOVITCH and KOROTKOV, I held a number of additional conversations with him, consolidated them, so to speak, gave them several tasks - to look at and check on individual people in Dmitlag - suitable for us.

Only after I was convinced of my absolute devotion did I tell them that in the near future they would have to be ready to carry out assignments of a terrorist nature.

Question: Thus, you directly put the question before KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV that you are using them as terrorists?

Answer: Yes.

Question: Have you informed KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV who you intend to commit a terrorist act against?

Answer: Yes, I directly pointed out to KSHANOVICH, and then to KOROTKOV, after their consent to carry out any assignment, including a terrorist one, the tasks facing each of them personally. I told them that, on my instructions, they would have to commit a terrorist act against the leaders of the party and government, pointing out that the most likely place for this act to be committed would be the canal. I did not indicate the deadline for the execution of this order to either KSHANOVICH or KOROTKOV, saying that I

they will be given special instructions. Such a statement of the problem was determined by the instructions that I had from Yagoda.

Question: KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV knew each other as members of a terrorist group?

Answer: No, they didn't.

Q: Who else have you recruited?

Answer: I did not recruit anyone else. YAGODA suggested to me that, in addition to KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV, I should appoint a small group of Chekists working on the canal to be used in a terrorist group. YAGODA offered me to pay special attention to the offended, embittered, corrupted, expelled from the party. I identified several such people and had a special conversation about them with Yagoda.

Question: Who are these people?

Answer: 1) Fyodor Alexandrovich SURNAKOV, head of the 3rd department of the Dmitlag.

2) DZINGEL - head of the 3rd department of the Central District.

3) MAKLYARSKY - head of the 3rd department of the Karamyshevsky district.

4) SEMENOV - commandant of the 3rd department of Dmitlag and

5) Krivosheev - detective of the 3rd department of Dmitlag.

I gradually brought all these faces closer to me and processed them. All of them are close friends of KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV, morally corrupted, sycophants with a criminal past, with criminal actions according to Dmitlag: MAKLYARSKY - had in the past been punished for a Trotskyist speech and for this he was sent to work in Dmitlag. Krivosheev - formerly sued, former prisoner. In addition to my personal processing of these persons, I instructed KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV to follow them, cover them through agents, and gradually work them over for use in the conspiracy.

Question: You say that FIRIN was fully aware of your involvement of KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV in a terrorist group. Did FIRIN also know about the other five persons you named?

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Answer: Yes, I knew. When I was appointed head of the 3rd department in Dmitrov, Yagoda specifically warned me that FIRIN was a participant in the conspiracy, a trusted and close person of his — Yagoda, and I needed to rely on him in all work on the conspiracy. YAGODA subsequently instructed me to keep FIRIN informed of the organization of the terrorist group

on the channel.

In July 1935, I was in Yagoda's office together with FIRIN, here YAGODA connected me personally with FIRIN and once again pointed out the need for us, as members of the conspiracy, to work in concert, and for me in the selection of people on the channel for a terrorist group, keep FIRINA informed of everything. Based on these instructions from Yagoda, I reported to FIRIN about the processing and recruitment of KSHANOVICH and KOROTKOV, as well as about the selection of other persons by me. FIRIN warned me that I should only deal with my group, work on them and added that among the "thirty-five" (criminals of Dmitlag) I should not work, there, he - FIRIN will do everything

barks.

Question: What exactly did FIRIN do among Dmitlag's criminals?

Answer: I would like to supplement my testimony with the following.

In Dmitlag there is a huge number of "thirty-five" people, all these are people who have repeatedly sued for criminal and bandit cases and sent to Dmitlag for "reforging". All work on reforging, at the direction of YAGODA, was concentrated in the hands of FIRIN. FIRIN repeatedly told me that in order to fulfill the conspiratorial tasks set by Yagoda, he was doing a lot of work among this element, that he had selected a special group among major criminals, whom FIRIN carefully processed, nominated, brought closer to himself, surrounded with great attention, created for them special conditions and privileges on the channel, especially cultivated among them the indisputable authority of Yagoda. FIRIN inspired them that fate is wholly and completely connected with the name of Yagoda, that outside of Yagoda they have no life, no future. The former high-profile criminals LAZAREV on the Volga, Mishkin and KOVALEV in the Central District, and a number of other persons nominated by him for administrative positions, were very closely connected with Firin. FIRIN told me that all these people are entirely in his hands, that he can do whatever he wants with them - in the broadest sense of the word, having his people in Dmitlag at the head and as part of the construction teams, he can use them as combat terror groups. FIRIN told me directly that, on Yagoda's instructions, if necessary, at the time of the coup, he would send at least 35,000 criminals from the canal to Moscow, blindly following him.

Question: Who else do you know of the persons recruited by FIRIN?

Answer: The commander of the Dmitrovsky detachment, KRAVTSOV, is very closely connected with FIRIN. FIRIN pinned great hopes on him for the conspiracy, as on the person leading the armed detachment. The second person is the head of the Volzhsky district, BYKHOVSKY. FIRIN spoke to me about him as about a person sent to him personally by BERRY, reliable, infinitely devoted to BERRY. I also know that FIRIN and YAGODA covered up a number of BYKHOVSKY's crimes on the channel. BYKHOVSKY is a personal friend of the now arrested Trotskyist, former director of Plant No. 22, MARGOLIN.

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Question: What tasks did YAGODA give you after he left the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs?

Answer: After Yagoda left the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, during my last conversation with Yagoda, and also with Firin, I sensed the possibility of the conspiracy failing and some demoralization of the conspirators.

On October 10, 1936, when Yagoda went on vacation, I also went on vacation to Kislovodsk. In Kislovodsk, I did not find BERRIES. He seems to have been in Sochi at that time. Some time later, YAGODA arrived in Kislovodsk and stopped at the Kabot dacha. As soon as Yagoda arrived in Kislovodsk, I immediately went to him. At the dacha were "Dr. and Korotkov), YAGODA replied that the group must be preserved at all costs, we must preserve our strength in Dmitlag, and offered to keep in touch with him regularly. measures were taken to ensure his return to the NKVD. To my question, what measures and how realistic they are, he replied that they are quite real and that Ezhov will not be in the NKVD, no matter what the cost, that the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs will be he is YAGODA." At the same time, he emphasized that my group could play a particularly important role in this matter and its role should be preserved in every possible way.

Question: How did Yagoda propose to return to the NKVD?

Answer: In a conversation at the dacha in Kabot, Yagoda evaded a direct answer to my question about how realistic the plan for his return to the NKVD was. Thus, I do not know the details of his plan.

Question: How were you supposed to keep in touch with Yagoda in Moscow?

Answer: We agreed that I would visit him at Narkomsvyaz.

Question: Which of the participants in the conspiracy do you still know, besides the ones you have already named PROKOFIEV, BULANOV, VOLOVICH, GAY and FIRIN?

Answer: I don't know the other participants in the conspiracy directly. But I know people who are especially close to Yagoda, his like-minded people who have been closely associated with him for many years. According to my personal observations, according to my repeated conversations with Firin, I am firmly convinced that they are related to the conspiracy.

Question: Who are these people?

Answer: * PILLYAR, HORB and MIRONOV *.

Question: Why are you convinced of this?

Answer: With regard to PILLAR, with whom I have been associated for many years by personal friendship and joint work, I know that he is a very close person of Yagoda and a personal friend. PILYAR is exceptionally friendly with the AVERBAKH family, especially with Leonid and Leopold.

I also know the following circumstance: in November 1936, in the reception room of the People's Commissar, I met Ignatius Sosnovskii. My first question to him was about PILYAR. SOSNOVSKY told me that PILLAR was in Saratov, he felt very bad, he was panicking that PILLAR was now

a very sharp and painful reaction to the departure of Yagoda and the arrival of Ezhov in the NKVD, that PILLAR shows unhealthy decadent moods and even intensely reads and works through Polish chauvinist literature.

With regard to HORPLE, I know that this person was very close to Yagoda, carried out his special assignments in the INO and abroad. Yagoda outwardly treated Gorbu rather coldly, but in essence he did everything to consolidate

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hump near him. I know a case when, at the end of 1932, at the time of Slutsky's arrival from Berlin, a major waste of foreign currency was discovered in the INO's money management: Yagoda was reported on unreported foreign currency expenditures, the purchase of various kinds of things, etc., with the main role in this GORB was playing, VOLOVITCH, LOEV, SAMSONOV and BOGUSLAVSKII helped him. The amount of embezzlement was then called about 40,000 dollars. When all this embezzlement was discovered, Yagoda entrusted BULANOV with the investigation. I know for sure that YAGODA ordered the case to be stopped, and HORB was appointed assistant. early OO to GAYU. After the appointment of gorba to the Special Department, I know, according to SAMSONOV, that gorba called YAGODA and told him that he was transferring him to the Special Department, and in relation to the case of embezzlement of currency - Yagoda allegedly told him - "Do you really think that I will not protect you."

With regard to MIRONOV, I know that he is one of Yagoda's close people, the relationship between them was the closest. Mironov was essentially an adviser to Yagoda in all his affairs, strongly influenced him, was one of the most influential people in the NKVD under Yagoda.

The interrogation is interrupted.

The protocol was written down from my words correctly and read by me -

PUZITSKY

Interrogated:

Beginning 2nd Division of the GUGB
of the NKVD, Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank NIKOLAEV

Beginning 3rd Division 2nd Department of the GUGB
NKVD Captain of State Security Yamnitsky

AP RF. F. 3. Op. 24. D. 305. L. 8-23 Original. Typescript.

On the first sheet there is a handwritten note by Stalin: "It is important. Kanner, Markaryan, Samsonov, Loev, Dr. Mariupolsky, Bykhovsky ("friend of Margolin")."

— Surnames are circled in pencil.

No. 90

CODE TELEGRAM A.A. Andreeva I.V. TO STALIN ON THE
ARRESTS OF PARTY WORKERS

May 31, 1937

No. 913/sh From Sverdlovsk

Moscow. Central Committee of the CPSU (b) comrade. STALIN

The Sverdlovsk city party conference has ended. The carpenter was well received, unanimously elected. The mood in the organization is good, the Central Committee is thanked. It can be seen that everything was crushed and terrorized by the Kabanov gang, expelled from the party and the Trotskyists. For two years, the regional committee accumulated 900 unexamined appeals of those expelled from the party for various reasons. All this will now be considered.

It is necessary to arrest 7 secretaries of district committees, head. agricultural department of the regional committee of Borovsky and the Soviet trade department of Kozubovsky. All of them have serious testimonies and all their behavior suggests that they are active right-wing saboteurs.

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Please agree, we will find a replacement on the spot.

The arrested former secretary Kuznetsov testified about the active participation in the organization of the right of the former secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee of the Komsomol Kovalev, now secretary of the Azov-Chernomorsky regional committee of the Komsomol. He must be arrested in order to investigate the work of the right in the Urals among the youth.

ANDREEV

RGASPI. F. 558. Op. 11. D. 65. L. 33. Original. Typescript.

There are handwritten notes on the sheet: "I agree to both points. St. "; "Report. Comrade Frinovsky on June 1, 1937, P.

— the numbers "1)", "2)" are put in the margins, respectively.

No. 91

DECISION OF THE POLITBURO OF THE CC AUCP(b)

ON THE DEVOTION OF FORMER LEADING EMPLOYEES OF THE PEOPLE'S
COMMITTEE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE ORDERS OF THE USSR

June 1, 1937

406 - On the deprivation of the orders of the USSR Molchanov G.A., Volovich Z.I. etc. Approve the following draft resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR:

For betrayal and counter-revolutionary activity to deprive the orders of the USSR:

1. Molchanova G.A. —

Order of the Red Banner

2. Volovich Z.I. —

- " - A red star

3. Loganovsky M.A. —

- "- Red Banner

4. Margolina S.L. —

- "- Red Banner, Lenin

and Red Star

5. Ukhanova K.V. —

- "- Lenina

6. Yagoda G.G. —

- "- Lenin, 2 Orders of the Red

Banner

7. Pivovarova I.N. —

- "- Lenina

8. Kabakova I.D. —

- "- Lenina

9. Gvakharia G.V. —

- "- Lenina

10. Prokofieva G.E. —

- "- Red Banner

11. Paukera K.V. —

- "- 2 Orders of the Red Banner

and ord. Red Star

12. Eukidze A.S. —

- "- Lenina

13. Gorbacheva B.S. —

- "- 3 Orders of the Red Banner

14. Peterson R.A. —

- "- Order of the Red Banner

and Lenin

15. Garkavy I.N. —

- "- Red Banner

16. Korka A. I. —

- "- 2 Orders of the Red Banner,

Honorary Revolutionary Weapon

17. Eideman R.P. —

- "- 2 Orders of the Red Banner

and the Order of the Red Star

18. Pogrebinsky M.S. —

ÿ - "- ord. Red Banner

and ord. Red Star

19. Guy M.I. -

- "- Red Banner

20. Bokia G.I. —

- "- Red Banner

21. Bulanova P.P. —

- "- Lenina